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The Hill
06-05-2025
- Health
- The Hill
There is no better alternative to the World Health Organization
When President Trump issued an executive order withdrawing from the World Health Organization on his first day in office, he pledged to 'identify credible and transparent United States and international partners to assume necessary activities previously undertaken by the WHO.' Since that time, the president's supporters have doubled down on the idea that we can find an alternative to the WHO via many outlets, including this opinion page. But the truth is, we can't and we won't. The only thing that will happen as the U.S. pulls out of the WHO, stops all funding and instructs the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention not to even communicate with the agency is that we will become weaker and more isolated. In fact, as if to spite the president, the world just got on without the U.S. and is about to adopt an unprecedented pandemic treaty without us. When we joined WHO in 1948, Congress was virtually giddy, asking the organization to 'initiate studies looking toward the strengthening of research and related programs against [heart disease, cancer] and other diseases common to mankind.' In the nearly eight decades since, the organization has overseen the eradication of smallpox and is on the verge of eradicating polio. It has generated vast data troves on diagnosing, treating and preventing chronic and infectious disease and led the world through eight global health emergencies, including HIV, SARS, Ebola, Marburg, mPox and COVID-19. It has done all of this on a shoestring budget — its approved biennial $6.83 billion budget for 2024-2025 is roughly the same as the Food and Drug Administration's for a single year. This makes WHO one of the most efficient uses of international financial support available. This translates to the cost of running a single large U.S. university hospital. From the minuscule sums the U.S. gives to the WHO, we couldn't get a better investment. The president's beef with WHO has little reality behind it. He claims we pay way more than our fair share of the organization's budget. But our 'assessed' mandatory dues are a little more than China's. U.S. contributions are capped at 22 percent. China's will reach about 20 percent for 2025-27, extremely close to ours. Most of the funding disparity comes from voluntary U.S. contributions. But these are purely discretionary and help pay for what matters to us — health emergency response, polio eradication, HIV and tuberculosis. China, on the other hand, has contributed very little to the WHO on top of its fees. Under the sensational heading: ' Lab Leak: The True Origins of COVID-19,' the White House recently simply asserted what most scientists dispute. Yes, it is possible SARS-CoV-2 came from the Wuhan Institute of Virology, and China certainly should have allowed WHO teams to independently investigate, which it didn't. But it is still more likely that COVID was a naturally occurring ' spillover ' from wild animals to humans at the Huanan Seafood Wholesale Market in Wuhan. China also was not a good actor. It failed to alert the world to a mysterious SARS-like virus circulating in December 2019. When China finally confirmed the outbreak, it falsely claimed there was no efficient human-to-human transmission. WHO Director-General Tedros Adhanom Ghebreyesus was relentless in pushing China to report more transparently and to permit independent scientists to investigate. And he has no power to force China, or any other country, including the U.S., to follow the binding requirements in the International Health Regulations. Led by the Biden administration, the WHO adopted stricter amendments to the International Health Regulations in June 2024, but Trump also said those amendments would have no binding effect on the U.S. And then there are the widely amplified claims that WHO has, or will be given, sweeping new powers under the International Health Regulations and Pandemic Treaty, including the authority to order 'lockdowns' or mandatory vaccinations. Those claims are simply false. WHO has no such powers and won't be given them. The U.S. and all countries have unfettered power to determine their own national health policies — sovereignty that both the International Health Regulations and Pandemic Treaty empathically recognize. There is no bogeyman here. But even more importantly than all of this is the fact that no alternative organization, public or private, has the constitutional authority, legitimacy, infrastructure and trust of governments worldwide to share information, collaborate with partners to save vulnerable populations, and pool resources during times of threat. Ghebreyesus is one of the most recognizable and trusted public figures in the world. During COVID-19, WHO, under his leadership, organized and led with other public and private sector partners the Access to COVID-19 Tools Accelerator to facilitate the development and distribution of diagnostics, therapeutics and vaccines and to simultaneously strengthen health systems. Millions were saved. The U.S. will now be on the outside looking in as the world continues to exchange scientific information to stem diseases and innovate for vaccines and treatments. The U.S. is the epicenter of an avian influenza outbreak in dairy cattle, and yet we won't have unimpeded access to circulating influenza viruses from WHO's Global Influenza Surveillance and Response System, a collaboration of some 130 countries. Nor will we have full access to WHO's Global Measles and Rubella Laboratory Network despite a major measles epidemic currently centered in Texas. How does that advance American national interests? To be sure, there is room for improvement, as there is for all large, complex international organizations. WHO could operate with more transparency and could be more welcoming to civil society. It could raise assessed dues or charge higher fees for projects it undertakes for its partners. All this would help the agency move away from a budget model that relies too heavily on voluntary contributions, especially from a single large donor like the U.S. The sustainable financing initiative is already moving the WHO toward less dependence on earmarked/voluntary funds. U.S. withdrawal from the WHO is a grievous mistake that will jeopardize the lives and livelihoods of Americans and everyone else. But even for those that support the withdrawal, they should not think that there is any real alternative to the WHO. Frankly speaking, we cannot imagine a world without the World Health Organization. Sam Halabi is the director of the Center for Transformational Health Law at Georgetown University's O'Neill Institute for National and Global Health Law and a professor at Georgetown's School of Health. He is also an affiliate researcher at the school's Center for Global Health Science and Security. Lawrence O. Gostin is a Distinguished University Professor, the co-faculty director of the O'Neill Institute and the founding O'Neill Chair in Global Health Law. He is director of the WHO Collaborating Center on Global Health Law.
Forbes
04-05-2025
- Health
- Forbes
NIH Lab Studying Deadly Pathogens Goes Offline Over Safety Issues. Is The Public At Risk?
On April 29, 2025, the National Institute of Allergy and Infectious Diseases within the NIH put the brakes on research at its high containment lab (known as the Integrated Research Facility) at Fort Detrick, Maryland for a safety stand-down. The lab studies high consequence pathogens, such as Ebola virus and SARS-CoV-2. In a report from WIRED magazine, Bradley Moss, communication director for NIH's office of research services noted 'This decision follows identification and documentation of personnel issues involving contract staff that compromised the facility's safety culture, prompting this research pause.' The IRF's director, Dr. Connie Schmaljohn, an experienced scientist and expert on hantaviruses, was also placed on administrative leave. No further information on the cause of the safety stand-down has been reported by the NIH; however, Fox News subsequently cited an anonymous source, who stated the cause was a 'lover's spat' between facility researchers, where one individual poked holes in another's protective equipment. 'That individual has since been fired, the official indicated.' The NIH public affairs office did not respond to a query for more information. High consequence pathogens are 'serious and deadly agents that pose a substantial threat to domestic and global security.' Many are difficult to treat and frequently do not have a preventive vaccine. Consequently, they require specialized containment facilities to study them safely, because they are known to infect laboratorians. Some additional examples include Marburg and Lassa viruses and anthrax bacteria. These are some of the deadliest infectious pathogens on the planet, with death rates that can range from approximately 25 to 90%. Laboratories that work with human or animal samples are categorized at different 'biosafety levels,' from BSL-1 to BSL-4, with each increase in level corresponding to increasingly dangerous pathogens and concomitant increases in required safety measures. Most hospital microbiology labs work at the BSL-2 level, where deadly organisms can be worked on, such as staphylococcus, streptococcus, or even HIV, but those disease can be handled safely by working under a microbiology safety cabinet (or 'hood') with HEPA filtration, wearing gloves and a lab coat and washing your hands when you leave the lab. The biggest risk to the laboratorians would be through a splash or penetration of the skin with a sharp instrument or needle. At the BSL-3 level, we cross into a level where 'containment' measures are needed to protect the laboratorians. Pathogens at this level are known to infect through the air and therefore require specialized air handling and personal protective equipment, such as a respirator and gowns as well as decontamination measures upon exiting the lab. Organisms worked on at the BSL-3 level, although potentially deadly, such as plague or tularemia, usually have a specific vaccine or treatment. When we move into BSL-4, we are at maximum containment. At BSL-4, we separate the person from the pathogen by either a fully encapsulated 'space' suit or by working with the organism inside a glove box. Pathogens at this level are usually highly deadly and generally have limited or no vaccines or treatments. Viruses like Ebola, Lassa and Marburg are handled under BSL-4 precautions. There are many reasons to study these pathogens. Some are considered possible biological weapons threats. Others cause disease in endemic regions around the world, particularly in less-developed regions, such as Africa and South America. These pathogens are deadly and can cause outbreaks, so there has been a concerted effort in the military, at the NIH and academic institutions to 1) understand the ecology of where they exist in nature, 2) determine how they spread and cause disease and 3) develop countermeasures, including ways to diagnose, treat and prevent them. Whether the public is at risk largely depends on what the problem is. I've written previously that there are four basic ways a pathogen can 'escape' a lab: through the air, human exposure, hitching a ride on an animal or inanimate object and through deliberate release. The most likely is through human exposure from a lab accident, where a laboratorian becomes infected in the lab with something contagious and once they become ill, they can spread it to others. In this situation, the idea that a laboratorian would intentionally compromise a colleague's protective suit, thus putting them at potential risk of infection with a deadly agent is unconscionable and incredibly serious. Having said that, unless the individual whose protective suit was breached became infected, there is no risk to the public from a pathogen. In my own personal experience working in a containment laboratory and managing laboratory safety stand-downs, these can be mandated after a specific safety breach has been identified, a general attitude or 'culture' of the institution has been lax regarding safety procedures or even in response to a specific political issue or new safety mandate. Usually, the first thing that happens is an assessment of what the problem is and if anyone is at risk. If there are specific issues identified, either with safety protocols or how the workers are following them, then re-training of the individuals or the entire institute is undertaken. If there are mechanical problems with the facility, such as with the air handling systems, decontamination machinery, such as autoclaves or other methods to decontaminate instruments or other equipment, then those need to be fixed. Once any urgent issues are handled, it is in the best interest of the institute to provide more information on what led to the stand-down. Absent that, it is difficult to make a true assessment of public risk and also to reduce speculation as to the actual cause. A stand-down can cause significant disruption to ongoing experiments, especially if they include work with animals that have received a vaccine or that have been infected with a specific pathogen. The longer a stand-down lasts, the more damaging the disruption can be. Therefore, the key is to get to the root of the problem, fix it, restore the public trust and resume the important work as soon as feasible.
Yahoo
01-05-2025
- Health
- Yahoo
Top secret US research lab studying SARS-CoV-2 shut amid safety concerns
A top-secret US research facility that studies Sars-CoV-2, Ebola and other deadly pathogens has been shut down by the Trump administration amid safety concerns. The Integrated Research Facility (IRL) – which is located at a US Army base in Fort Detrick, Maryland – was told by email to stop all experimental work by 5pm on April 29 and its director was placed on administrative leave. The high security facility, which was once the centre of the US biological weapons program, is believed by many in China to have sparked the Covid-19 pandemic. Until Tuesday, when its doors were locked, the lab conducted research for the prevention and treatment of 'high consequence' diseases including Ebola, Sars-Cov-2 Lassa fever, Marburg and Eastern equine encephalitis. Bradley Moss, the communications director for the US National institutes for Health (NIH), told WIRED magazine that the lab had been closed amid safety concerns. 'NIH has implemented a research pause – referred to as a safety stand-down – at the Integrated Research Facility at Fort Detrick. This decision follows identification and documentation of personnel issues involving contract staff that compromised the facility's safety culture, prompting this research pause,' he said. 'During the stand-down, no research will be conducted, and access will be limited to essential personnel only, to safeguard the facility and its resources.' An email seen by WIRED, further revealed that the facility's director had been placed on administrative leave, while the freezers in the facility's biosafety-level-4 (BSL4) labs padlocked shut. There are only around a dozen BSL4 labs in North America studying the world's most dangerous diseases, but the IRF facility is also one of just a handful globally that is able to perform medical imaging on animals infected with high consequence diseases. It has 168 employees and is part of the National Institute of Allergy and Infectious Diseases – which Dr Anthony Fauci led for 38 years. In August 2019, its germ research operations were temporarily shut down following serious safety violations – an unfortunate fact that has enabled the Chinese authorities to magnify un-evidenced conspiracy theories about the lab's role in the Covid-19 pandemic. While the consensus among scientists globally is that Covid-19 most probably had natural origins, a leak from a high security lab remains a possibility. The National Institute of Allergy and Infectious Diseases and its labs have been under scrutiny since Robert F Kennedy, President Donald Trump's controversial pick to lead the Department of Health and Human Services, assumed office. The department has since announced that 10,000 people would lose their jobs – including those at the NIH, the Food and Drug Administration, and the Centres for Disease Control and Prevention – as Mr Trump and Elon Musk's attempt to reduce government spending. But there are concerns that overnight funding cuts could be a major setback for research. 'The sustained attacks on collaborative US biomedical science and public health are already destroying disease surveillance systems and game-changing clinical trials that will result in avoidable deaths and morbidities for years to come in some of the poorest countries,' said Prof Stuart Neil, head of the department of infectious diseases at King's College London. 'These aren't on-off switches that you restore with a flick of a finger if someone on high changes their minds. This is wilful vandalism of research and treatment programmes that have taken years to establish – things that you could legitimately say made America great,' he told the Telegraph. This week, Nature also reported that an upcoming NIH policy will at least temporarily stop funding to laboratories and hospitals outside the US. While the final text has not yet been agreed, it could have major ramifications on international partnerships. In 2023, about 15 per cent of NIH grants had at least one 'foreign component' – mostly in the UK, Canada, Germany and Australia – on projects ranging from cancer to Aids, Ebola to child health. 'These decisions will have tragic consequences,' Prof Francis Collins, who led the NIH for 12 years, told Nature. He added that when combined with the dismantling of USAID – which also funded research into diseases including malaria and tuberculosis – it means 'more children and adults in low-income countries will now lose their lives because of research that didn't get done'. The Telegraph has contacted Mr Holbrook and the NIH press office. Protect yourself and your family by learning more about Global Health Security Broaden your horizons with award-winning British journalism. Try The Telegraph free for 1 month with unlimited access to our award-winning website, exclusive app, money-saving offers and more.
Telegraph
01-05-2025
- Health
- Telegraph
Top secret US research lab studying SARS-CoV-2 shut amid safety concerns
A top-secret US research facility that studies Sars-CoV-2, Ebola and other deadly pathogens has been shut down by the Trump administration amid safety concerns. The Integrated Research Facility (IRL) – which is located at a US Army base in Fort Detrick, Maryland – was told by email to stop all experimental work by 5pm on April 29 and its director was placed on administrative leave. The high security facility, which was once the centre of the US biological weapons program, is believed by many in China to have sparked the Covid-19 pandemic. Until Tuesday, when its doors were locked, the lab conducted research for the prevention and treatment of 'high consequence' diseases including Ebola, Sars-Cov-2 Lassa fever, Marburg and Eastern equine encephalitis. Bradley Moss, the communications director for the US National institutes for Health (NIH), told WIRED magazine that the lab had been closed amid safety concerns. 'NIH has implemented a research pause – referred to as a safety stand-down – at the Integrated Research Facility at Fort Detrick. This decision follows identification and documentation of personnel issues involving contract staff that compromised the facility's safety culture, prompting this research pause,' he said. 'During the stand-down, no research will be conducted, and access will be limited to essential personnel only, to safeguard the facility and its resources.' An email seen by WIRED, further revealed that the facility's director had been placed on administrative leave, while the freezers in the facility's biosafety-level-4 (BSL4) labs padlocked shut. There are only around a dozen BSL4 labs in North America studying the world's most dangerous diseases, but the IRF facility is also one of just a handful globally that is able to perform medical imaging on animals infected with high consequence diseases. It has 168 employees and is part of the National Institute of Allergy and Infectious Diseases – which Dr Anthony Fauci led for 38 years. In August 2019, its germ research operations were temporarily shut down following serious safety violations – an unfortunate fact that has enabled the Chinese authorities to magnify un-evidenced conspiracy theories about the lab's role in the Covid-19 pandemic. While the consensus among scientists globally is that Covid-19 most probably had natural origins, a leak from a high security lab remains a possibility. The National Institute of Allergy and Infectious Diseases and its labs have been under scrutiny since Robert F Kennedy, President Donald Trump's controversial pick to lead the Department of Health and Human Services, assumed office. The department has since announced that 10,000 people would lose their jobs – including those at the NIH, the Food and Drug Administration, and the Centres for Disease Control and Prevention – as Mr Trump and Elon Musk's attempt to reduce government spending. But there are concerns that overnight funding cuts could be a major setback for research. 'Wilful vandalism' of research programmes 'The sustained attacks on collaborative US biomedical science and public health are already destroying disease surveillance systems and game-changing clinical trials that will result in avoidable deaths and morbidities for years to come in some of the poorest countries,' said Prof Stuart Neil, head of the department of infectious diseases at King's College London. 'These aren't on-off switches that you restore with a flick of a finger if someone on high changes their minds. This is wilful vandalism of research and treatment programmes that have taken years to establish – things that you could legitimately say made America great,' he told the Telegraph. This week, Nature also reported that an upcoming NIH policy will at least temporarily stop funding to laboratories and hospitals outside the US. While the final text has not yet been agreed, it could have major ramifications on international partnerships. In 2023, about 15 per cent of NIH grants had at least one 'foreign component' – mostly in the UK, Canada, Germany and Australia – on projects ranging from cancer to Aids, Ebola to child health. 'These decisions will have tragic consequences,' Prof Francis Collins, who led the NIH for 12 years, told Nature. He added that when combined with the dismantling of USAID – which also funded research into diseases including malaria and tuberculosis – it means 'more children and adults in low-income countries will now lose their lives because of research that didn't get done'. The Telegraph has contacted Mr Holbrook and the NIH press office.
Zawya
27-04-2025
- Health
- Zawya
The end of Ebola outbreak in Uganda demonstrates World Health Organization (WHO)'s value in controlling and stopping diseases
Uganda has officially declared the end of the Ebola disease outbreak, which was confirmed on 30 January 2025 by Uganda's Ministry of Health. The outbreak infected 14 people, two of whom were probable (not confirmed by laboratory tests) and caused four deaths (including two probable). Disease outbreaks, such as Ebola, Marburg, and yellow fever, are not new in Uganda. The country has faced multiple outbreaks and, in doing so, has built a resilient health system capable of detecting and containing outbreaks rapidly. With active support from the World Health Organization (WHO) and other partners, this outbreak again demonstrated Uganda's capacity to deal with such challenges. The latest Ebola disease outbreak occurred in the bustling, highly mobile city of Kampala. In many places, such an announcement could have triggered widespread panic. But, within 72 hours of confirmation, the Ministry of Health, actively supported by the WHO and health partners, activated its response mechanisms. Rapid response teams were deployed on the ground, identifying contacts to the confirmed patient, collecting samples for testing, setting up treatment units, and educating the community about Ebola prevention. Similarly, within 24 hours of notification, the WHO Deputy Director General and Executive Director for Emergencies, Dr Mike Ryan, was in Uganda to guide WHO's strategic and operational support to the response. 'The outbreak occurring in an urban setting is of significant concern to us, given past experiences. In this outbreak, every minute is of the essence, and we must set up rapidly to avert a potential disaster,' said Dr Mike Ryan upon arrival in the country. WHO mobilized 129 national and international staff to support the response. They brought a wealth of technical expertise, ensuring that WHO's input was present at every critical stage. The impact of these efforts was quickly evident. On 14 March 2025, the last confirmed patient was discharged, and 534 contacts had been successfully identified and followed up daily. This is no mean achievement given the area in which the outbreak occurred. It is a testament to Uganda's strengthened capacity to detect and respond to disease outbreaks in line with the International Health Regulations (2005) (IHR), for which WHO is the principal custodian. Uganda has now completed the 42-day mandatory countdown without a confirmed Ebola case. During this critical period, WHO worked closely with the Ministry of Health to conduct active case search and mortality surveillance to ensure that no potential chains of transmission went undetected. It's important to acknowledge the groundwork that made this rapid response possible. WHO's presence on the ground through its regional hubs and prior technical leadership in helping Uganda develop a multisectoral preparedness and response plan were pivotal. These provided clear direction for all responding actors, enabling effective coordination, optimizing resource allocation, and preventing duplication. Another key enabler was the swift deployment by WHO of 165 multidisciplinary Rapid Response Team members (RRTs) to hotspot districts. These members strengthened local capacity for alert management, case investigation, and contact tracing, even in remote areas. Backed by WHO's technical training and tools, the RRTs worked hand in hand with district teams to ensure that no case went undetected. This strong collaboration helped halt the further spread of the disease. Special attention was also given to border health. With the international imperative to prevent cross-border transmission, health workers were rapidly reoriented, thermal scanners were deployed, and screening protocols were enforced at 13 key entry points, especially at Entebbe International Airport. The laboratory response was equally robust. Over 1500 samples were collected, transported, and tested, with national labs rising to the challenge. Thanks to WHO's prior technical support, Uganda had the capacity to manage samples under strict biosafety and quality standards. Laboratory teams at the Uganda Virus Research Institute and Central Public Health Laboratories handled the workload professionally and efficiently, earning praise for their quick turnaround. At the heart of the response was a courageous and well-prepared case management team. Equipped with WHO Ebola supplies designed to protect health workers and support clinical care, they treated patients with professionalism and care. Of the 12 confirmed cases, two patients succumbed, while the rest were successfully treated and reintegrated into their communities. Two probable cases were identified after their death, therefore not managed in the treatment center. WHO-supported 78 Emergency Medical Teams (EMTs) further reinforced case management efforts. These highly trained and well-equipped teams ensured the safe transportation and treatment of patients across affected regions, delivering high-quality care at every step. For the second time in an Ebola outbreak caused by the Sudan virus in Uganda, WHO deployed anthropologists, risk communication experts, and community engagement teams. These specialists worked directly with communities to address stigma, mistrust, and misinformation, while providing real-time public health information. Their efforts were instrumental in gaining trust and reinforcing safety practices. Despite the absence of a licensed vaccine against the Sudan virus, candidate vaccines are in various phases of clinical trials, recommended by the independent WHO candidate vaccine prioritisation working group. Within four days of the government's declaration of the outbreak, a randomized clinical trial for vaccine safety and efficacy using the ring vaccination approach was launched. In addition, the administration of Remdesivir treatment under the Monitored Emergency Use of Unregistered and Experimental Interventions (MEURI) protocol was initiated. Ecological studies aimed at identifying the source of infection were initiated and are continuing. These are important because they help to anticipate risks of outbreaks as well as ensure health systems are well prepared and ready to detect outbreaks early and respond effectively. Behind the scenes, coordination and partner engagement played crucial roles. WHO was responsible for aligning resources, reducing duplication, and maximizing impact. Through its coordination role, WHO mapped out key stakeholders and facilitated effective resource use at all levels of the response. No successful outbreak response is complete without adequate financial backing. So far, WHO has mobilized and utilized US $6.2 million for this response. This support, along with in-kind contributions of essential medicines, supplies, and equipment, has been vital in maintaining the momentum of operations. WHO acknowledges and deeply appreciates all partners who contributed through the WHO Contingency Fund for Emergencies (CFE), including: Germany, Norway, Ireland, Canada, France, New Zealand, Kuwait, Portugal, Philippines, Republic of Korea, Switzerland, Estonia, and the WHO Foundation. Thanks to the United Kingdom, the Republic of Ireland, the Netherlands, the European Commission - Health Emergency Preparedness and Response (HERA), International Development Research Centre (IDRC), European Commission - European Civil Protection and Humanitarian Aid Operations (DG ECHO) and the African Public Health Emergency Fund (APHEF) for supporting WHO's interventions. As the situation in Uganda stabilizes, this outbreak highlights three clear lessons: early preparedness saves lives, rapid response is critical, and WHO's support remains vital, not only for Uganda, but for global health security. Distributed by APO Group on behalf of WHO Regional Office for Africa.
