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STV News
3 days ago
- Entertainment
- STV News
Scots students reconstruct John Logie Baird's original television
A team of students have reconstructed a working version of famed Scots inventor John Logie Baird's original mechanical television. Born in Argyll in 1888, Baird gained worldwide fame as the first person to televise moving pictures in 1926. The centenary of his invention will be marked on October 2, when Baird first transmitted an image in his laboratory. The first public demonstration happened in 1926 when images of Stooky Bill, the head of a ventriloquist's dummy created by the inventor, were the first successfully transmitted by television. STV News Baird, born in Argyll in 1888, gained worldwide fame as the first person to televise moving pictures in 1926. Baird was a student of Strathclyde's predecessor institution, the Glasgow and West of Scotland Technical College, and now, 100 years later, Strathclyde students have reconstructed his groundbreaking invention. Molly Barry, Guy Horne, Angus Milligan, Lewis Gibney, and Jade Graham, from the Electronic and Electrical Engineering, Electrical and Mechanical Engineering, and Computer and Electronic Systems programmes at the University, created the replica project. Speaking on the project, Ms Graham said: 'It was important to me that the project has a use after our assignment and it's nice that it will be used for outreach work.' Guy Horn added: 'It was a great project to do, especially with the 100th anniversary coming up, and it was one we were able to be very hands on with.' The team of final-year students recreated the televisor system over nine months using the same principles underpinning the historic invention, but with a digital twist. STV News The team of final-year students recreated the televisor system with a digital twist. In addition to reconstructing the TV, the team produced an interactive demonstration that allowed users to send images from their mobile phones, which were then converted and displayed on the television. One of the engineers explained to STV News how they managed to bring the invention back to life. The mechanical television recreation was designed to follow key characteristics of Baird's prototypes, including the utilisation of spinning nipkow disks for image encoding and decoding. It was found that many historic components, like fluorescent bulbs, used by Baird, weren't available, and modern counterparts, like LEDs, were instead used. Molly Barry explained that the device comprises a recorder and a television or display that synchronises a signal sent from the recorder to the display. 'It's centred around a disk with a spiral pattern, which, when a light shines through and rotates very quickly, can reform and recreate an image in real time,' she said. 'We also added a digital aspect to allow a user to send an image directly from a phone or any other device to be displayed on the TV.' Molly Barry said: 'The further into the work we got, the more we noticed the plaques and posters on John Logie Baird across the campus and the sense of the history of it sank in.' Professor Graeme West, from the department of Electronic and Electrical Engineering who oversees the Mechanical Engineering group projects, said: 'It is fantastic to see how John Logie Baird's original innovation is being brought to the new generation of engineers and scientists through this interactive recreation of the mechanical televisor. 'Outreach demonstrators such as this are a great way of explaining the fundamental principles that underpin the technology we use on a daily basis, inspiring school pupils to take up careers in STEM-related fields.' Get all the latest news from around the country Follow STV News Scan the QR code on your mobile device for all the latest news from around the country
Yahoo
10-04-2025
- Business
- Yahoo
China's new underwater tool cuts deeps, exposing vulnerability of vital network of subsea cables
Chinese researchers have unveiled a new deep-sea tool capable of cutting through the world's most secure subsea cables − and it has many in the West feeling a little jittery. The development, first revealed in February 2025 in the Chinese-language journal Mechanical Engineering, was touted as a tool for civilian salvage and seabed mining. But the ability to sever communications lines 13,000 feet (4,000 meters) below the sea's surface − far beyond the operational range of most existing infrastructure − means that the tool can be used for other purposes with far-reaching implications for global communications and security. That is because undersea cables sustain the world's international internet traffic, financial transactions and diplomatic exchanges. Recent incidents of cable damage near Taiwan and in northern Europe have already raised concerns of these systems' vulnerabilities − and suspicions about the role of state-linked actors. The growing sophistication and openness of underwater technology evidenced by the latest news from China suggest that undersea infrastructure may play a larger role in future strategic competition. Indeed, this development adds a new layer to the broader challenge of securing critical infrastructure amid expanding technological reach and the rise of so called 'gray zone' tactics – antagonisms that take place between direct war and peace. Despite their unassuming appearance, undersea cables form the backbone of modern communication systems. Stretching around 870,000 miles (over 1.4 million kilometers) across every ocean, these cables transmit almost 100% of global internet communication. These information superhighways are a major engine for the modern economy and are indispensable for things such as almost instantaneous financial transactions and real-time diplomatic and military communications. If all these cables were suddenly severed, only a sliver of U.S. communication traffic could be restored using every satellite in orbit. The entire system is built, owned, operated and maintained by the private sector. Indeed, approximately 98% of these cables are installed by a handful of firms. As of 2021, the U.S. company SubCom, French firm Alcatel Submarine Networks and Japanese firm Nippon Electric Company collectively held an 87% market share. China's HMN Tech holds another 11%. Tech giants including Amazon, Google, Meta and Microsoft now own or lease roughly half of the undersea bandwidth worldwide, according to analysis by the U.S.-based telecommunications research group TeleGeography. The very characteristics that make undersea cables effective also render them highly vulnerable. Built to be lightweight and efficient, they are exposed to a variety of natural hazards, including underwater volcanic eruptions, typhoons and floods. But human activity is still the primary cause of cable damage, whether it's from accidental anchor drags or inadvertent entanglement with trawler nets. Now, security experts are increasingly concerned that future human disruptions might be intentional, with nations launching coordinated attacks on undersea cables as part of a hybrid war strategy. Such assaults could disrupt not only civilian communications but also critical military networks. An adversary, for example, could cut off a nation's command structures from intelligence feeds, sensor data and communication with deployed forces. The ramifications extend even to nuclear deterrence: Without reliable communication, a nuclear-armed state might lose the ability to control or monitor its strategic weapons. The loss of communications, even for a few minutes, could be catastrophic. It could mean the difference between a successful defense and a crippling first strike. In recent years, Western policymakers have become particularly concerned about the capabilities of Russia and China to exploit the vulnerabilities of undersea cables. One particularly illustrative incident occurred in 2023 when Taiwanese authorities accused two Chinese vessels of cutting the only two subsea cables supplying internet to Taiwan's Matsu Islands. The resulting digital isolation of 14,000 residents for six weeks was not an one-off episode. Taiwan's ruling Democratic Progressive Party has pointed to a pattern, noting that Chinese vessels have disrupted cable operations on 27 occasions since 2018. In January 2025, Taiwan's coast guard blamed a Cameroon- and Tanzania-flagged vessel crewed by seven Chinese nationals and operated by a Hong Kong-based company when an undersea cable was severed off the island's northeastern coast. Such incidents, often described as gray-zone aggression, are designed to wear down an adversary's resilience and test the limits of response. China's recent push to enhance its cable-cutting capabilities coincides with a surge in its military drills around Taiwan, including a number of recent exercises. Similar cable disruptions have occurred in the Baltic Sea. In October 2023, a telecom cable connecting Sweden and Estonia was damaged along with a gas pipeline. In January 2025, a cable linking Latvia and Sweden was breached, triggering NATO patrols and a Swedish seizure of a vessel suspected of sabotage tied to Russian activities. Dmitry Medvedev, deputy chairman of Russia's Security Council, even hinted at the possibility of targeting undersea communication cables as retaliation for actions such as the Nord Stream pipeline explosions in 2023. The involvement of state-linked vessels in incidents operating under flags of convenience − that is, registered to another country − further complicates efforts to attribute and deter such attacks. It isn't just security and defense at risk. The modern financial system is predicated on the assumption of continuous, high-speed connectivity; any interruption, however brief, could disrupt markets, halt trading and lead to significant monetary losses. Given the strategic importance of undersea cables and the multifaceted risks they face, Western governments intent on preventing further conflict would be wise to find a comprehensive and internationally coordinated way to secure the infrastructure against threats. One clear option would be to bolster repair and maintenance capacities. Currently, a significant vulnerability stems from the overreliance on Chinese repair ships. China's robust maritime industry and state-supported investments in global telecommunications has contributed to the Asian nation taking a prominent position when it comes to cable repair ships. The protection of undersea cables should not, I believe, be viewed as the responsibility of any single nation but as a collective priority for all nations reliant on this infrastructure. As such, international frameworks and agreements could facilitate information sharing, standardize security protocols and establish rapid response mechanisms in the event of a cable breach. But such international efforts would be fighting against the tide. The incidents in Taiwan, the Baltic Sea and elsewhere come as great power competition intensifies between the U.S. and China. China, in developing deep-water cable-cutting technology, may be sending a message of intent. Meanwhile, the Trump administration's 'America First' approach signals a shift that could complicate efforts to foster partnerships for the general global good. The defense of undersea cables reflects the challenges of our hyperconnected world, requiring a balance of innovation, strategy and cooperation. But as nations including China and Russia seemingly test and probe this vital global infrastructure, it appears the systems underpinning the West's prosperity and security could become one of its greatest vulnerabilities. This article is republished from The Conversation, a nonprofit, independent news organization bringing you facts and trustworthy analysis to help you make sense of our complex world. It was written by: John Calabrese, American University Read more: Undersea cables are the unseen backbone of the global internet Treating Nord Stream blasts as a whodunit misses the point – and plays into Russia's plan to distract and divide This chart explains why Trump backflipped on tariffs. The economic damage would have been huge John Calabrese does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.
