04-05-2025
General's Jottings: Key to crafting a strategy in response to Pahalgam horror
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Just when it appeared that the trajectory of Kashmir's economy had gathered traction with more tourists coming in, Baisaran Valley in
Pahalgham
was jolted by the April 22 terrorist attack. The attack, though denied by Pakistan, has unmistakable links to deep state across the border.
Consequently, the whole nation is angry and making demands for revenge. PM Narendra Modi has assured of stringent action against the perpetrators and securing justice for victims. Both sides have initiated a slew of politico-diplomatic measures. This build-up of war hysteria building is now having a cascading effect on the Indian public.
Pakistan Army is scrambling to take up positions and people across are nervous. The obvious questions are: when and how much of kinetics is likely?
Unfortunately, ill-informed TV experts have sensed a TRP opportunity and converted it into a somewhat comical sideshow.
Missed Warnings
Lots has been written about the build-up to the attack and possible motivations of its initiators. It will be appropriate to accept that there has been failure on part of intelligence agencies, despite clearly articulated intransigence by Pakistan, coupled with gaps in our inter-agency coordination.
However, post-mortem and correctives can be done discreetly and shared at an appropriate time, if we ensure that accountability is non-negotiable. The first signal of the attack was generated by Pakistan's Lt Gen Ahmed Sharif Choudhary, DG (inter-services public relations) in the aftermath of the hijacking of the Pakistani train Jaffer Express in March.
He vowed 'badla' (revenge) and blamed elements from India for the hijacking. His calls for revenge were accentuated by a highly provocative statement on the two-nation theory by Pakistan Army chief Gen Asim Munir.
It may be appropriate to recount that diabolic drift in Pakistan Army was initiated by Gen Zia-ul-Haq.
He gave theological twist to its motto with 'Jihad-fi-Sabilillah' and added the defence of ideological frontiers in its role. This was sustained by the likes of Gen Pervez Musharraf.
Gen Munir is sort of an outlier and dark horse, a rare OTS product, with an ordinary track record.
After 2.5 years at the helm, there is no point in getting surprised at his orientation.
Born to an imam, he had madrasa education that was supplemented with Hafiz (formal theological course) in Saudi Arabia, when he was on military diplomatic assignment. He went to the extent of calling Kashmir Pakistan's jugular.
In the long list of Pakistan Army chiefs, somewhat moderate ones were Generals Jehangir Karamat and Qamar Javed Bajwa. The timing of Munir's uncalled for diatribe was triggered by his yearning for extension.
He is unsettled by growing dissent in junior ranks, coupled with a recent statement by Gen Karamat and other senior veterans, calling for review of ongoing mismanaged operations, in KPK and Baluchistan.
Attack: Objectives and challenges
In brief, the Pahalgam attack was designed to derail tourism, economy and the process of normalisation in Kashmir. The targeting is also to exploit festering fault lines in our society.
Most regrettably, irresponsible politicians are only adding fuel to fire. It will be appropriate if we don't fall prey to this diabolic plot.
The angst in Kashmiri 'awaam' (populace) is unprecedented. Notwithstanding it being driven by loss of livelihood, the angst is credible, and has a possibility of strategic pay-offs. The bigger challenge now is to revive tourism with assured security and incentives.
Govt has initiated first tranche of measures in politico-diplomatic domain. However, people are demanding actions more lethal than surgical raids and Balakot strike, along with verifiable evidence.
Due to various factors, earlier measures resulted in sort of temporary stalemate, with limited deterrence value, which seems to have eroded. Unfortunately, expectations have gotten hyped-up due to masochist declarations. It will be appropriate to recall that hysteria, whipped up after Kandahar hijack, forced the govt to release terrorists like Masood Azhar.
The seminal wisdom is that govts and armed forces don't act in anger and haste.
Retribution, unlike revenge, will have to be timed and calibrated to retain control on the escalation matrix. The other pivot of matrix is not only nuclear nation but, interestingly, with self-proclaimed and cultivated irrationality in dealing with us.
Suspension of Indus Water Treaty
The most significant non-kinetic measure is holding IWT in abeyance. The notice on review was given in Jan 2023 and reiterated in Oct 2024. Holding a treaty in abeyance is a well thought-out escalation. After commissioning of Shahpur Kandi project (with balancing reservoir) and repairs of Hussainiwala barrage, we have established effective control on waters of the eastern rivers — Ravi, Beas and Satluj.
Even for western rivers, stopping of sharing of hydrological data itself would accentuate psychological fear and uncertainty amongst Punjabi 'waderas' (large landholders), who are an extension of military establishment.
Run-of-the-river projects like Kishanganga (on Jhelum), and Salal and Baglihar (on Chenab) have limited storage that can be leveraged to upset crop-cycles in Pak Punjab. When Baglihar was filled in 2011, there was huge outcry in Pakistan, with reports of 30%-40% drop in crop output.
We have an urgent need to flush and desilt Kishenganga and Salal reservoirs, this is an appropriate time to do it. We should expedite on-going projects on the Chenab and Wullar-Barrage on the Jhelum. More importantly, Kashmir's water flowing across is diverted through link canals to Punjab. It is time Kashmiris take ownership and draw benefits.
Way Ahead
There are many more possibilities in the cyber, maritime and aerospace domains, besides conventional air-land options. Every action is likely to invite seemingly equal and immediate
response
by Pakistan. Their sequencing and de-risking will have to be considered in detail to ensure that it doesn't derail our journey to Viksit Bharat. In the long term, we need to establish effective punitive deterrence.
(Author is former GOC-in-C of the Western Command, Indian Army)
