Latest news with #NouriAl-Maliki
Shafaq News
29-04-2025
- Politics
- Shafaq News
Shadow ballot: Iraq's November geopolitical chess game
Shafaq News/ The upcoming Iraqi parliamentary elections, slated for November 11, 2025, are shaping up to be more than a domestic political contest. In the background looms the persistent shadow of a high-stakes geopolitical tug-of-war between the United States and Iran. Both powers—deeply entrenched in Iraq's political and security matrix—see the vote as a critical inflection point to either reinforce or recalibrate their influence over Baghdad's direction. With a fragile security environment, a fatigued electorate, and a fragmented political elite, the elections risk becoming a flashpoint for renewed contestation rather than a path toward institutional stability. The future of Iraq's sovereignty, the fate of armed non-state actors, and the viability of democratic governance are all on the ballot—albeit indirectly. Iraq: Proxy Chessboard Since 2003 Since the 2003 US invasion, Iraq has served as a theater for external influence, with Tehran and Washington emerging as primary patrons to rival factions. While American policymakers still view Iraq through the prism of counterterrorism and regional balance, Iran sees its western neighbor as a strategic buffer zone—a vital node in the "Axis of Resistance" stretching from Tehran to Beirut. The upcoming elections offer a moment of recalibration. For the US, it's an opportunity to empower centrist, nationalist forces and reduce the footprint of Iran-aligned armed factions. For Iran, the priority lies in preserving influence through political alliances, faction integration, and economic entrenchment. Both strategies are playing out simultaneously, often through competing electoral alliances, legal maneuvers, and behind-the-scenes diplomacy. Tehran's Quiet Manoeuvring Iran enters these elections with its traditional toolbox: a network of Shiite parties, the Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF), and quiet diplomacy through its consulate system and Quds Force operatives. Tehran's influence is most deeply embedded within the Shiite Coordination Framework—a bloc characterized by its opposition to the Patriotic Shiite Movement led by Muqtada al-Sadr. The CF functions as a significant political entity, involves negotiating collectively with the Iraqi government on diverse issues and wielding influence as a potential "blocking third" in parliament, capable of obstructing government formation if its interests are disregarded. The main CF parties are the State of Law, led by Nouri Al-Maliki; Fatah Alliance, led by Hadi al-Ameri; Asaib Ahl al-haq led by Qais Al-Khazali, and Al-Hikma Movement, led by Ammar Al-Hakim. Despite growing public fatigue with armed actors, these parties remain electorally viable due to well-established patronage networks and control over local security dynamics in southern and central Iraq. However, Tehran has adopted a more measured tone in recent months, reportedly encouraging its allies to scale back anti-American rhetoric and emphasize state-building and economic recovery in campaign messaging. "Iran is playing a longer game," said a senior Western diplomat based in Baghdad. "They know that raw militancy is no longer sellable to the Iraqi public, especially post-October 2019 protests. Their bet is on institutionalizing influence, not flaunting it." Iranian officials have also engaged in shuttle diplomacy, discreetly meeting with Kurdish and Sunni leaders to ensure post-election alliances do not marginalize Tehran's axis. US Strategy: Minimalist but Targeted The Trump administration's Iraq policy has largely revolved around containment—of Iranian influence, of renewed ISIS activity, and of political instability. Unlike earlier eras of direct state-building, today's US approach is minimalist but strategic. It supports Iraq's Independent High Electoral Commission (IHEC) and engages in quiet support for security sector reform. American diplomats have also been actively encouraging Shiite cleric Muqtada al-Sadr and Prime Minister Mohammed Shia al-Sudani to maintain a neutral stance on regional conflicts, particularly regarding the Gaza war and Iranian-Israeli tensions. US officials see these elections as a chance to empower moderate factions within al-Sudani's government, many of whom have signaled a willingness to gradually bring all armed groups under state control. A senior US official told Al-Monitor on condition of anonymity, "We are not trying to pick winners and losers. We are focused on process integrity and on ensuring the outcome doesn't escalate violence or empower spoilers." Still, US military presence remains a sensitive topic. Although combat forces have been reduced, American bases continue to draw occasional rocket fire from Iran-linked groups, who may ramp up attacks if the electoral outcome is perceived as unfavorable to Tehran. Fragmentation Within Shiite Politics The Shiite political landscape is undergoing profound fragmentation. While the Coordination Framework remains the most cohesive bloc, rifts have widened between more pragmatic wings—such as Hadi al-Amiri's Badr Organization—and ideological hardliners like Qais al-Khazali's Asa'ib Ahl al-Haq. These tensions are mirrored in the broader competition for control over the PMF's future. Muqtada al-Sadr's ambiguous political posture adds further uncertainty. Though he withdrew from formal politics following the 2022 crisis, his grassroots movement remains potent. Whether he calls for a boycott, passive endorsement, or direct engagement could shift voter turnout significantly in the South. Kurdish and Sunni Roles as Kingmakers In the north and west, the electoral landscape remains equally fluid. Kurdish politics are fractured between the KDP and PUK, with Iranian and Turkish influences pulling each side in divergent directions. Meanwhile, Sunni factions—led by Mohammed al-Halbousi and Khamis al-Khanjar—are recalibrating their alliances in anticipation of post-election coalition bargaining. Both Tehran and Washington have quietly courted Sunni leaders, recognizing their kingmaker potential in forming the next government. However, many Sunni voters remain disillusioned, skeptical that either foreign patron can meaningfully address their economic or security grievances. Security Concerns and Election Integrity The election will unfold under a heavy security footprint. IHEC and the Iraqi Security Forces are preparing contingency plans for armed violence, assassination attempts, and cyber manipulation. Given the experiences of 2021 and 2018, voter turnout is expected to be low, especially in urban centers where trust in political parties has cratered. Observers worry that contested results could trigger another wave of unrest. "There is a real danger of localized violence if any group feels disenfranchised," said a researcher at the Iraqi Institute for Strategic Studies. "The risk is not national collapse, but slow-motion fragmentation." Two Paths After the Vote If nationalist and moderate Shiite forces secure a workable majority, and Kurdish-Sunni blocs agree to power-sharing, Iraq could enter a phase of cautious stability. The PMF may be incrementally absorbed into state structures, and both the US and Iran might tolerate a status quo. If the elections result in a deadlock or perceived marginalization of key players, armed group attacks and popular protests could resume. In this case, both Tehran and Washington may double down on hardline proxies, risking further destabilization. The November vote, then, is more than a national referendum—it is a geopolitical litmus test. Whether Iraq emerges with a stronger central state or sinks deeper into fragmented sovereignty will depend not only on ballots cast but also on the maneuverings in Tehran, Washington, and the corridors of Baghdad's Green Zone.
Shafaq News
09-04-2025
- Politics
- Shafaq News
Iraq's IHEC: Ready for 2025 elections
Shafaq News/ On Wednesday, Iraq's Independent High Electoral Commission (IHEC) confirmed its readiness for the upcoming parliamentary elections, calling for clarity on any potential amendments to the Electoral Law. After the Iraqi government announced November 11, 2025, as the election date, Imad Jamil, head of the IHEC media team, told Shafaq News that there are no obstacles or reservations regarding the revealed date, although the commission has not yet received any official communication on the matter. Regarding potential changes to the Election Law, he stated, 'Any amendments to the law may or may not affect the commission's work,' stressing the importance of understanding the specific revisions Parliament intends to implement before drawing conclusions. In a meeting held on Monday, Iraq's Shiite Coordination Framework (CF) reaffirmed its commitment to the November 11, 2025, election date. While the State of Law Coalition (SLC), led by former Prime Minister Nouri Al-Maliki, advocated for law revisions, the majority favored maintaining the current legislation to adhere to the established schedule. Concurrently, the Sadiqoun bloc had expressed reservations about amending the law, citing concerns over the time required for debate and potential delays.
Shafaq News
09-04-2025
- Politics
- Shafaq News
Iraq's CF reaffirms support for 2025 vote
Shafaq News/ The Iraqi Shiite Coordination Framework (CF) convened a leadership meeting to address the 2025 parliamentary elections, focusing on the electoral timeline and proposed amendments to the Election Law, a CF source told Shafaq News on Wednesday. The source, speaking on condition of anonymity, pointed out that the meeting took place on Monday and lasted several hours, during which leaders emphasized the importance of holding elections on schedule. However, the State of Law Coalition (SLC), led by former Prime Minister Nouri Al-Maliki, renewed its demand to revise the Election Law—a proposal that reportedly divided the Shiite alliance. 'A vote was held on whether to proceed with changes to the law, and the majority ultimately sided with keeping it unchanged and adhering to the previously agreed timetable,' the source added. Participants also discussed strategies for forming electoral alliances and aligning on national priorities, including policies addressing security and economic challenges, he noted. The CF has publicly reaffirmed its commitment to holding elections on schedule, stressing that no political party has the authority to delay or modify the electoral timeline. Earlier today, Iraq's cabinet formally approved November 11, 2025, as the official date for the parliamentary elections.
Shafaq News
15-02-2025
- Politics
- Shafaq News
Al-Maliki warns of 'chaos' as Al-Bashaer Movement demands reform
Shafaq News/ On Saturday, former Prime Minister Nouri Al-Maliki, leader of the Al-Bashaer Movement, warned against the dangers of media-driven instability while his movement delivered a sharp critique of Iraq's government, calling for sweeping reforms. Speaking at the movement's ninth anniversary event, Al-Maliki accused certain media outlets of seeking to 'sow chaos' in Iraq, warning of instability. 'We are witnessing chaos in the world today; there are confrontations between states and societies,' he said, emphasizing the need for a law-governed state. Praising the Iraqi people's resilience, he referenced their ability to withstand past struggles against Saddam Hussein and ISIS, declaring they are 'capable of writing the most wonderful epics and deterring the most severe attacks.' Al-Maliki urged all political forces to uphold the constitution and work toward a just, secure Iraq, stressing, 'The constitution is the supreme reference for a state governed by the rule of law. Without law and constitutional governance, there is no guarantee for a nation's prosperity.' Meanwhile, Member of Parliament Mohammed Al-Rumaithi, representing the Al-Bashaer Movement, condemned Prime Minister Mohammed Shia Al-Sudani's administration, criticizing its policies as 'hostage to randomness and short-term fixes.' Regarding the Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF), he called on Parliament to fulfill its 'national and moral duty' by passing long-delayed legislation to protect PMF fighters from exploitation and political manipulation, blaming the delay on 'personal desires and regional interests that override legal obligations.' The Al-Bashaer Movement reaffirmed its commitment to Al-Maliki's vision, emphasizing ideological organization, grassroots mobilization, and strategic media engagement as a "model for political action."
Shafaq News
10-02-2025
- Politics
- Shafaq News
State Administration Coalition meeting derailed due to Kurdish, Sunni boycott
Shafaq News/ The State Administration Coalition postponed its emergency meeting for the second time after Kurdish and Sunni blocs boycotted both the originally scheduled Saturday session and its rescheduled Sunday meeting. The State Administration Coalition, which includes Shiite parties from the Coordination Framework, Sunni blocs such as Taqadum and Sovereignty, and Kurdish factions including the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) and the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK), was formed to 'maintain political stability' and 'implement agreements' among Iraq's major politicalforces. A political source confirmed that most coalition members arrived at the government palace for the meeting, which was called by Prime Minister Mohammed Shia Al-Sudani. However, the Kurdish and Sunni blocs, who did not notify organizers of their absence in advance, later conditioned their participation on the Federal Supreme Court's ruling on the recently passed controversial laws. The meeting was attended by leaders of the Shiite Coordination Framework (CF), who discussed key political issues and emphasized the need for a 'unified stance and coordinated movement,' warning that 'undermining the agreement could destabilize the political process.' Attendees also included State of Law Coalition leader Nouri Al-Maliki, Wisdom Movement leader Ammar Al-Hakim, First Deputy Speaker of Parliament Mohsen Al-Mandalawi, National Approach Bloc leader Abdul Sada Al-Fariji, and CF Secretary Abbas Al-Ameri, along with other senior figures. On Sunday, the Federal Supreme Court set Tuesday, February 11 as the date for considering the appeals submitted against the vote on the three laws. Legal expert Ali Al-Tamimi noted that this session could 'result in multiple outcomes,' including 'postponing the case, ordering a revote on some laws, or dismissing the appeal for lack of jurisdiction,' warning, 'Interfering in court matters is a criminal offense under Article 235 of the Penal Code.' Notably, the political crisis escalated following Parliament's approval of the three controversial laws; General Amnesty, Personal Status Amendment, and Property Restitution, which were passed collectively in a single vote, leading dozens of lawmakers to boycott the session and challenge the vote's legitimacy before the Federal Supreme Court. The court later issued an injunction suspending the laws, but the Supreme Judicial Council ruled that 'legislation cannot be halted before publication in the official gazette,' intensifying tensions with the Kurdish and Sunni blocs.
