Latest news with #OperationVijay
India Today
2 days ago
- Politics
- India Today
Is Modi government playing image-building politics over Op Sindoor? Experts debate
19:56 In an exclusive interview with India Today, former Chief of the Army Staff, General NC Vij, talked about the evolution of India's military strategy from Operation Vijay in Kargil to Operation Sindoor, and the shift in government's approach to dealing with Pakistan-sponsored terrorism and more.
Indian Express
6 days ago
- Politics
- Indian Express
From Kargil to Operation Sindoor, India has scored its point — without escalation
'History doesn't repeat itself, but it does rhyme.' — Mark Twain No two operations are fought under similar circumstances, or fought alike. There would be many differences: the Geopolitical environment, the will of the leadership in power and new weapons and equipment, which give rise to new tactics, strategies and doctrines. India and Pakistan tested nuclear weapons in May 1998. The 'nuclear haves' of the world condemned it and called us 'irresponsible', 'rogue' nations. On February 21, 1999, the prime ministers of India and Pakistan signed the Lahore Declaration. They committed to 'peaceful co-existence', 'responsibility to avoid conflict keeping in view the nuclear dimension', and to 'refrain from intervention and interference in each other's internal affairs'. Three months later, even before new nuclear doctrines were evolved, Pakistan violated the LoC to occupy the heights in the Dras-Kargil-Siachen sectors. The Pakistan army used the 'jihadi façade', not its 'sponsored proxies'. Our intelligence and surveillance systems failed to detect the intrusion, which added to the political and military surprise. In Operation Vijay, the political mandate to the armed forces was to throw the enemy out of our territory, but not to cross the LoC or international border, primarily due to nuclear fears and international disapproval. In Operation Vijay, the armed forces were poorly equipped. There was no Chief of Defence Staff, nor any integrated systems like the Integrated Air Defence Command and Control System, which exist today. However, at the operational level, the Army, Navy and Air Force did manage to coordinate their activities. But when the armed forces were on top of the conflict situation, India's political leadership decided to accept Pakistan's offer of a ceasefire. Soon after Operation Vijay, I was invited to address a seminar organised by the Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses. I made the following points. One, due to the nuclear factor, economic considerations, risk of high casualties and international pressure, there is a greater likelihood of limited conventional wars in the future. A limited conventional war would be limited in time, geographical area, utilisation of force levels or weaponry. There is space available below the nuclear threshold for such wars. Two, surprise and unpredictability are basic elements of a war. A limited conventional war does not mean limited capabilities. It refers to the use of those capabilities. Three, a war can be kept limited with credible deterrence. There is a linkage between credible deterrence, escalation dominance and escalation control. Four, in any future conflict, a synergised politico-military-diplomatic approach is essential for monitoring and continuous assessment. Ever since the Kargil War, there has been much discussion on the nature of conflicts below the nuclear and conventional war threshold. A new term, grey-zone warfare, has emerged — it is described as a form of conflict that operates below the threshold of traditional warfare, utilising a combination of military and non-military tools, including state-sponsored proxies, to achieve strategic objectives without triggering an open war. It is characterised by ambiguity, deniability, and the use of unconventional tactics like cyberattacks, economic coercion, and disinformation campaigns. Briefly, the key characteristics of grey-zone warfare are: One, aggressors employ non-military or less kinetic tools which may not justify a military response; two, actions may take years, thus reducing opportunities for decisive counter-responses; three, the aggressor evades accountability, making it difficult to pinpoint responsibility and formulate responses. In the past 25 years, Pakistan has avoided a conventional or limited conventional war. But it has continued to use its sponsored proxies (like the Lashkar-e-Taiba and Jaish-e-Mohammed) as an instrument of state policy. After the terror attack on Uri Camp in 2016, the Indian leadership, with superior kinetic capability at its disposal, dropped strategic restraint. The Army carried out a shallow 'surgical strike' across the LoC. In 2019, after the horrific incident in Pulwama, India took yet another step forward. The Air Force struck Jaish's training camp at Balakot deep inside Pakistan. As the targets were terrorist camps, these responses, although provocative, were pitched as non-escalatory. The Pahalgam attack of April 22 hurt the very soul of India. It was impossible for the Indian government not to respond. In addition to several non-military steps, Operation Sindoor, with strong political resolve and the latest defence capabilities, was launched on May 7 to destroy nine terror camps across Pakistan. India made it known that this was a measured, non-escalatory response. When Pakistan escalated the situation and targeted India's civil and military installations, Indian forces neutralised the Pakistani offensive and took the next step in escalation dominance. Eleven military installations utilised for escalation by Pakistan were destroyed with precision. And then Pakistan called for a ceasefire. It would be foolhardy to ignore the spectre of a nuclear war in the Subcontinent and assume that the nuclear factor plays no role in limited conventional or grey-zone operations. Nuclear weapons remain a significant escalatory cap that demands close monitoring of the escalatory ladder. The soldiers in us may not appreciate having to give up the opportunity to exploit and strike further when the forces are in an advantageous position. But responsible political leadership, understandably, is less prone to take a nuclear risk. Another problem here is Pakistan's nuclear bogey and attempt to blackmail. It makes the international community sit up and intervene. During Operation Vijay, US President Bill Clinton used the nuclear factor to arm-twist Pakistani Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif and Indian Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee. Sharif succumbed. Vajpayee did not. During Operation Sindoor, US Vice President J D Vance warned Prime Minister Narendra Modi about Pakistan's preparation for escalation. In both situations, India kept its cool, controlled escalation diplomatically and militarily, and achieved its political goal. Lesson: Escalation control requires a confident understanding of the adversary's escalation thresholds. The writer is a former Chief of Army Staff
Time of India
6 days ago
- General
- Time of India
'Aimed to flush out Pakistani intruders': IAF on why Operation Safed Sagar was historic
Jaguar jet (File photo) NEW DELHI: The Indian Air Force on Monday shared a commemorative video marking the anniversary of 'Operation Safed Sagar', its 1999 air campaign during the Kargil War against Pakistan. Operation Safed Sagar was the IAF's codename for its air operations conducted in support of the Indian Army's Operation Vijay, which was launched to evict Pakistani troops and infiltrators who had illegally occupied Indian positions along the Line of Control (LoC) in the Kargil sector. In a post on X, the IAF said: 'Operation Safed Sagar — the Indian Air Force's codename for its air operations during the KargilWar1999 — was launched in support of ground forces under Operation Vijay. It aimed to flush out Pakistani regulars and intruders who had occupied Indian positions along the LoC in the Kargil sector.' The operation was historic, being the first large-scale use of air power in the Kashmir region since the 1971 Indo-Pak war. The IAF executed high-altitude precision operations in some of the world's most challenging mountainous terrain, redefining the role of air power in limited conflicts. The IAF also shared the list of aircraft used during Operation Safed Sagar to take on Pakistan in the Kargil War. These included Mirage 2000s, MiG-21s, MiG-29s, MiG-23s, MiG-27s, Jaguars, Mi-17 helicopters, and Chetak helicopters. The IAF mentioned: 'Never before had an air force been tasked with such high-altitude precision operations in rugged mountainous terrain - making it a watershed moment in military aviation history.' by Taboola by Taboola Sponsored Links Sponsored Links Promoted Links Promoted Links You May Like San Salvador: Amazon CFD : Calcula cuánto podrías ganar invirtiendo solo $100 Market Sunny Reservar Ahora Undo Operation Safed Sagar also broke conventional thinking about air power. It demonstrated that limited, targeted air strikes could have a decisive impact without escalating into a full-scale war. 'The operation not only showcased the versatility and resolve of the Indian Air Force but also established the deterrent value of calibrated air strikes—even in a low-intensity conflict,' the IAF said. 'It proved that air power could decisively alter the course of battle without crossing international boundaries.' The Kargil War lasted from May to July 1999 in the Kargil district of then Jammu and Kashmir, now part of the Union Territory of Ladakh. The conflict began when Pakistani troops and militants infiltrated across the LoC. India responded with full force, and Operation Vijay led to the successful recapture of key positions. The IAF's tribute to Operation Safed Sagar comes weeks after its recent offensive under Operation Sindoor , a retaliatory strike launched on May 7 in response to the Pahalgam terror attack. In that action, nine known terrorist hubs sponsored by Pakistan were destroyed, showing India's continued calibrated use of air power in counterterror operations.
Hindustan Times
11-05-2025
- Politics
- Hindustan Times
Was it a war or conflict? A battle of semantics
Were we in a war with Pakistan? Depends on who you ask. The government's preferred term for the military exchanges with neighbour Pakistan that started May 7 and ended May 10 is 'limited conflict'. This choice of semantics has its advantages. Academic and editor, INDIA'S WORLD, a foreign affairs magazine, Happymon Jacob points out that when you call a conflict a war, it becomes legal phraseology. International bodies get involved, which has all kinds of bilateral and legal implications. 'Calling it 'limited conflict' makes it easier for the government to navigate things as they deem fit,' says Jacob. According to him, another reason the war tag was avoided is that it would in some respects put the two countries on a par, which India wanted to avoid at any cost. Then there are the technicalities. Neither the Indian Army, nor the Navy, nor the Air Force, crossed the international border or the Line of Control (LoC). The modern weaponry used meant that India hit targets deep inside Pakistan, such as Bahawalpur in Pakistan's Punjab province, without ships or planes crossing over or using troops on the ground. Second, unlike a traditional war, there isn't any territory at stake. India's clear objective was to disable terror infrastructure that enables attacks like Pahalgam. There wasn't a defined area of conflict unlike in the 1999 Kargil War which India had to recapture or dismantle. Operational manoeuvres were characterised as proportional responses to previous attacks. Sometimes, the semantics change over the course of a conflict. During the Kargil War, the Pervez Musharraf-led Pakistan Army sent in troops across the LoC to take over strategic high-altitude positions in Kashmir. This led to a conflict that lasted two months and ended only in July 26 of that year, when the Army regained control of key positions such as Tiger Hill. If we go through the news reports at the time, the terms used to describe Kargil in May 1999 were 'conflict' or 'crisis'. As the details emerged, India also referred to it as incursions or simply referred to it as Operation Vijay. But as the conflict extended, as the troops moved in and the casualties started climbing, the term 'war' became unavoidable. And by the time India claimed back its positions and evicted the enemy from Kashmir in July 1999, the Kargil War was sealed in our collective memory for good. It was a good association: After all, we had won the war. The term was then made official as India announced war-time gallantry awards for the soldiers who died fighting it. 'No two wars are the same, so comparisons are unfair; every war has its own intensity and dynamic,' says retired Lt General Syed Ata Hasnain. The 2025 exchanges between India and Pakistan were indeed a 'limited conflict', he says, since the definition of war and conflict is on a spectrum. But away from the semantics, two things stand out in contrast to Kargil. The attacks and retaliation in 2025 spanned the length of the international border and the LoC — from shelling in Baramulla in Kashmir in the north to downed drones in Sir Creek in Gujarat in the west. That scale is comparable to the last major war of 1971, the last time the international border was breached. The second difference is that Kargil's isolation limited the scope of civilian casualties. This time, given the advanced munitions deployed and extended range of their deployment, there were greater chances of more civilians being caught in the line of fire, had the conflict dragged on. Thankfully, the debate now will be on the semantics of a ceasefire. The views expressed are personal
Time of India
10-05-2025
- Politics
- Time of India
Retired Col lauds India's military progress
Bhubaneswar: Retired Colonel Laxmidhar Parida , who fought in the 1971 war against Pakistan , expressed happiness that India has made remarkable progress in modern warfare, claiming that the neighbouring country cannot withstand the full force of Indian armed forces .The 77-year-old war veteran participated in several critical operations, including the 1971 liberation war (Operation Cactus Lily) at Chittagong with the 184 Light Regiment Pack (120 mm artillery unit), counter-insurgency operations against militants in 1979, and the Kargil war (Operation Vijay) in the Daraj veteran, a native of Balipatna here, was commissioned as a lieutenant in the Remount Veterinary Corps (RVC) of the Indian Army in 1970. "I was posted at Siliguri at the start of the Bangladesh liberation war. First, we were deployed at Khyber pass to prevent Chinese entry to rescue East Pakistan (later Bangladesh)," he a week, Parida said his regiment was asked to move inside at Khulna and operated there till the end of the war. "We helped the Mukti Bahini, and the whole world knows how Pakistan surrendered before the Indian Army with thousands of troops," he said they were fighting in very difficult conditions. "We were moving in Bangladesh by horses and mules. I remember how leeches were entering our clothes while passing through the forested areas. Indian Air Force planes were not equipped with modern technology like now," he added."I Operation Sindoor Pak drones enter Indian airspace, explosions heard just hours after truce deal Sirens, explosions in border districts after Pak breaks deal: What we know so far 'What happened to ceasefire?' J&K CM after explosions heard across Srinagar feel proud when Indian armed forces detect, intercept and destroy drones, missiles and fighter planes in no time. The precision and measured attack on terrorist camps in Pakistan was a sign of mature, experienced, intelligent, and fighting armed forces," he said preparing for a conflict or war is not easy. "People get worried if the govt takes time for action against a rogue country. But everything takes time to plan and execute. The armed forces know where and how to attack and when to pause," he service was recognised through multiple medals and honours, including the Purvi Medal, Sena Seva Medal, and the High Altitude Medal. He also played an active role in Operation Parakram in 2001 and undertook multiple deployments in high-risk zones such as Jammu and Kashmir and the Siachen glacier, until his retirement in Feb 2004.
