28-05-2025
With the treaty suspended, we should use Indus waters for India
Written by Naresh Kumar and P K G Mishra
If someone says Delhi receives water from rivers governed by the Indus Waters Treaty (IWT), many would likely disagree. Yet, this is a fact. Delhi's connection to the IWT isn't just as the capital of a signatory country — it is also a direct beneficiary, drawing nearly 30 per cent of its surface water from rivers covered under this treaty.
Operation Sindoor put focus on one of Bharat's most underutilised strategic levers — the ability to restrict the flow of water to Pakistan under the IWT. Bharat has historically refrained from using this leverage. This time, however, Bharat has acted decisively by suspending the treaty.
According to recent reports, Pakistan has officially urged Bharat to reconsider and reinstate the status quo.
Looking ahead, Bharat might revive the treaty as part of a broader peace agreement — perhaps if Pakistan agrees to curb support for cross-border terrorism. But this raises critical questions: Would restoring the treaty mean surrendering our leverage? Or can we explore new ways to use the treaty to address domestic challenges — like Delhi's water scarcity?
The IWT governs six rivers flowing from Bharat to Pakistan, divided into two categories: The western rivers (Indus, Jhelum, Chenab), from which Pakistan receives 82 per cent of their water, and the eastern rivers (Ravi, Beas, Sutlej), over which Bharat retains full rights.
Even if the treaty's suspension is reversed, Bharat retains full legal control over the eastern rivers, allowing continued action to prevent their waters from entering Pakistan. This untapped potential could be redirected to meet growing domestic demand — including in Delhi.
Before the IWT was signed, a 1955 internal agreement between Punjab, the Patiala and East Punjab States Union (PEPSU), Rajasthan and Jammu and Kashmir allocated 19.55 billion cubic metres (BCM) of water from the eastern rivers among the three — 7.3 BCM to Punjab, 1.6 BCM to PEPSU and 9.9 BCM to Rajasthan and 0.8 BCM to J&K. After PEPSU merged with Punjab in 1956, their shares were consolidated, giving Punjab 8.9 BCM.
When Haryana was carved out of Punjab in 1966, it demanded 5.5 BCM from Punjab's share. Punjab objected, and the deadlock persisted until 1976, when the central government stepped in, reallocating the water as follows: 4.3 BCM each to Punjab and Haryana, and 0.3 BCM to Delhi, added as a new beneficiary. Rajasthan's share remained unchanged.
Delhi used its allocation to launch phase one of the Haiderpur Water Treatment Plant (WTP) in 1977, with a capacity of 100 million gallons per day (MGD). However, the redistribution also gave rise to the Sutlej-Yamuna Link (SYL) canal dispute between Punjab and Haryana, which remains unresolved.
Delhi's water supply today includes 496 cusecs (approximately 260 MGD) from the eastern rivers (via Nangal), 875 MGD total surface water (including from the Ganga and the Yamuna), as well as 125 MGD from groundwater. Its water treatment capacity is 826 MGD, which is expected to increase to 876 MGD by the end of the year with the commissioning of Dwarka WTP phase two (50 MGD). Despite this, Delhi faces a shortfall: Its demand stands at 1,250 MGD, far exceeding current supply.
The Upper Yamuna Board Agreement, signed in 1994, guarantees 1,050 cusecs to Delhi from the Munak regulator in Haryana, supported by Supreme Court directives. However, the agreement is due for review this year, and any increase in Delhi's share is unlikely unless three long-delayed dams — Renuka, Kishau, and Lakhwar — are completed. For now, these projects remain aspirational. Delhi also receives 240 MGD from the Ganga via Muradnagar, but increasing this allocation seems difficult, as upper riparian states may resist further sharing.
This brings us back to the eastern rivers of the Indus Water Treaty. Hydrographic data show that Bharat lacks sufficient infrastructure to utilise the full flow within its territory. As a result, surplus water from the Beas and Sutlej flows into Pakistan via the Hussainiwala Barrage, and water from the Ravi escapes from the Madhopur Headworks, also into Pakistan.
If this water can be captured and diverted to downstream states, it could help resolve not just Delhi's crisis, but also longstanding interstate water disputes. Though a bold proposition, it is technically feasible and deserves serious exploration by domain experts. Consider this: The SYL canal dispute revolves around 5.9 BCM of water — nearly equal to the volume of Ravi water that currently flows into Pakistan from the Madhopur Headworks, located in Punjab itself.
Now that Bharat has acted to suspend the IWT, we should not squander this opportunity. The treaty must serve not just as a diplomatic tool, but also as a domestic resource strategy. Northern states and Delhi are in urgent need of water. If water is a strategic asset, the question is clear: Why let it flow to the adversary, when it can help our own people?
(Kumar is former chief secretary, Delhi, and Mishra is a retired Army officer who writes on water issues, including the IWT)
