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Asia Times
21-05-2025
- Politics
- Asia Times
Asia without America, part 3: liberal Taiwan in a realist world
Mornin' will come, and I'll do what's right Just give me till then to give up this fight And I will give up this fight – Bonnie Raitt Liberalism – in the Wilsonian international relations sense – has had a few very lousy decades. History has been unkind to Francis Fukuyama, and yet liberalism, with major exceptions, still maintains a vice grip on democracies across the world. Taiwan is not one of those exceptions. Frequently, regularly and obligatorily referred to as a 'vibrant' democracy by the mainstream Western media (it has got to be some kind of conspiracy), Taiwan has become the Asian darling of global liberal elites who wax lyrical over every bit of island culture. Returning the regard, the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) swallowed wholesale the entire woke progressive agenda. In 2019, Taiwan became the first Asian country to recognize same-sex marriage, despite public referendums in opposition. The DPP has since embraced LGBT… QIA2S+ even more enthusiastically. Local talent Nymphia Wind celebrated his/her win in RuPaul's Drag Race 2024 by performing a burlesque show for outgoing President Tsai Ing-wen at her official offices, right beneath a bust of Chiang Kai-shek, longtime leader of the Republic of China and the Kuomintang (KMT) party, who was surely turning over in his mausoleum. Meanwhile, average monthly People Liberation Army (PLA) aircraft traversing Taiwan's Air Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ) doubled from approximately 150 in 2022/23 to 300 in 2024/25. In the past decade, the PLA Navy has grown from 255 to 400 ships (including three aircraft carriers, four large amphibious helicopter ships and eight smaller amphibious transport docks); the PLA Air Force's fleet of 4th and 5th generation fighters has increased from approximately 600 in 2015 to 1,600 today. From 1,300 ballistic missiles in 2015, the PLA Rocket Force now has the largest arsenal in the world with over 3,000 ballistic missiles designed to hit targets as disparate as Taiwan, Japan, Guam and North America. The PLA Air Force is very publicly conducting almost weekly tests of two 6th-generation fighter prototypes concurrently with its second 5th-generation fighter, the J-35, which should be close to deployment. China also recently showcased a mammoth landing barge, which may negate the necessity of having port access in an invasion scenario. And, serendipitously, the recent India-Pakistan conflict scored major propaganda points for the PLA as its J-10C fighters and PL-15 missiles reportedly far outperformed India's French and American weapons systems. So, is realism or liberalism the arbiter of international affairs? The fate of Taiwan depends on the answer. The People's Republic of China (PRC) has been betting on realism and hard power, while the Republic of China (Taiwan) has put its money on liberalism and soft power. The PLA conducts salami-slicing operations in Asia, increasing PLA aircraft and naval patrols in the Taiwan Strait, militarizing artificial islands in the South China Sea (SCS), preventing Filipino ships from supplying marines stationed on a contested SCS atoll and daring the US Navy to do anything about it. Taiwan also slices salami but in its own way by hosting visits from Speakers of the House Nancy Pelosi and Kevin McCarthy, participating in liberal flag-waving exercises with Baltic States and playing political semantics like saying Taiwan doesn't need to declare independence because it already is independent. The risk of Taiwan betting on liberalism is that it assumes the international system is not anarchic, that there is a higher power to whose authority it can appeal – namely, the United States of America. This bet has not had a great track record. The US has a long history of stringing liberal partners along before hanging them out to dry. Think Hungary 1956, Czechoslovakia 1968, South Vietnam 1973, Lebanon 1984, Somalia 1993, Iraq 2011, Hong Kong 2019, Afghanistan 2021 and Ukraine today. Taiwan President Lai Ching-te can play his semantic games to score domestic political points, but ultimately, he must understand Henry Kissinger's warning, 'To be America's enemy is dangerous, but to be America's friend is fatal.' In 1990, according to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), the PRC spent 71% more on defense than Taiwan. Last year, the PRC spent 18 times more. Over this period, the PRC's defense spending fell from 2.4% of GDP to 1.7% of GDP while Taiwan's collapsed from 5.2% of GDP to 2.1%. Taiwan isn't just not matching the growth of PRC defense spending, it is not even pretending to care. With these numbers, Taiwan is purposefully not trying to credibly deter the PLA. This is strategic on a very paradoxical level. To preserve the status quo, Taiwan is careful not to build up defenses that could actually deter the PLA… for fear that getting close to such a threshold would trigger a PLA invasion. All of this assumes that the US can credibly deter China from invading. While the US spent three times as much on defense as China did in 2024, it is down from 39 times in 1990. Given purchasing power differences, the strength of China's industrial base and the multiple theaters the US is expected to secure, the 3x advantage should more than wash out. Since the year 2000, the US Navy ship count has fallen from 318 to 298 while China's has grown almost fourfold from 110 to 400 (although China's navy is smaller by tonnage). The US Air Force's 6th-generation fighter program, now called the F47, is seriously behind schedule and is seemingly in disarray. Cost inflation and delays are scourges that the Pentagon has been powerless to rectify. The higher power whose authority Taiwan is relying on has, for decades, watched its military advantage in Asia shrivel. Make what you will of reports that the US consistently loses to China in internal Pentagon war games. What we do know is that China has built and militarized seven artificial islands in the SCS unchallenged and that, last year, the US Navy removed a carrier strike group from the contested maritime area rather than risk a confrontation with the PLA Navy and Rocket Force, thereby hanging the Philippines out to dry. If realism is the ultimate arbiter of international relations, then internal politics has no effect on foreign policy. This is the billiard ball theory of state behavior. If realism is correct and China has closed the military gap in Asia, it should not make a difference which party governs Taiwan. It should not matter that Taiwan's President Lai is pro-independence or that the DPP is woke, progressive and pro LGBTQIA2S+. The preponderance of military power, or, more accurately, the projection of future military power will result in Taiwan reaching the same conclusion and implementing the same foreign policy whether the DPP or the KMT were in charge. Taiwan can choose passivity and let time and China's growing strength run its course, hoping to be rescued by unforeseen developments (e.g. China's economic collapse, US Navy AGI battleships, divine intervention). Or it can get in front of events, become emperor maker and negotiate a special place at President Xi Jinping's side. The reunification of China will make America's continued military presence in Asia far more costly if not untenable. An Asia without the distorting presence of an alien power (see here) would usher in a modern renaissance. Taiwan is a perfect conduit to channel Asia's modern renaissance between mainland China, Asian neighbors and even the West, guiding it towards an open, cosmopolitan Tang Dynasty version rather than something more insular and political like the later Ming Dynasty. The danger of passivity for Taiwan is that multiple players in the region also have the opportunity to become emperor maker. America's alliance partners South Korea, Japan, Taiwan and the Philippines are all arranged like dominoes along China's maritime borders – the fall of one threatening to topple others. Lee Jae-myung, front runner in South Korea's upcoming presidential elections, is seen as pro-China as is Japanese Prime Minister Shigeru Ishiba. Midterm election results in the Philippines favored pro-China former President Rodrigo Duterte's clan over pro-US President Ferdinand Marcos. Any one of these dominoes could decide that their alliance with the US is untenable in the long term and that they could negotiate better terms with Beijing by being the first mover. The biggest domino is not even in the region. The United States has twice elected a transactional president who specifically rejects liberalism and the rules-based international order. If President Donald Trump could hobble China's economy and military modernization, transfer trade and wealth to the US and maintain American primacy in Asia, he would. He has certainly tried with the 'Liberation Day' tariffs. Unfortunately, Trump quickly discovered that running US$1 trillion trade deficits with a deficient industrial sector does not, in fact, give the US leverage (see here and here). The US is similarly hemmed in by $36.2 trillion in government debt, a corrupt and sclerotic military-industrial complex and a litany of domestic social ills. Donald Trump could become the ultimate realist and transactional president and prove Churchill's quip, 'Americans can always be trusted to do the right thing, once all other possibilities have been exhausted.' A creature of pure id, unhindered by ideology, it is perfectly imaginable that Trump could swing from trying to hobble China's economy to striking a grand bargain that relieves the US of its Asian security burdens in exchange for, say, Chinese investment in US manufacturing and purchases of US Treasuries. For a transactional creature like Trump, a win is a win is a win. We are already hearing hints of this. After the US and China announced their tariff pause, Trump raised eyebrows with the comment, 'They've agreed to open China, fully open China, and I think it's going to be fantastic for China, I think it's going to be fantastic for us, and I think it's going to be great for unification and peace.' Officials were quick to clarify that this referred to economic unification between the US and China. Taiwan's President Lai followed up, further raising eyebrows in an interview, by comparing the PRC's 'One China' framework to a large company insisting on acquisition before engaging with a smaller company. Political opponents jumped on the statement, accusing Lai of implying that Taiwan's status was up for negotiation. Of course, in a realist world, Taiwan's status has always been up for negotiation and every semantic utterance on the subject, every dollar spent or not spent on Taiwan's defense, every foreign dignitary Taiwan receives and every mainland ancestral village opposition KMT leadership visits are all part of one giant bargaining exercise. And every Type 55 destroyer patrol of the Taiwan Strait, every PLA fighter flight through Taiwan's ADIZ, every irresponsible and unprofessional interception of Australian reconnaissance planes and every test flight of new PLAAF 6th-generation fighters are also part of the negotiation. A deal will be made – one way or another. The trick for everyone involved is to make the deal without a shot fired.
The Print
01-05-2025
- Politics
- The Print
Any cross-border strike by India faces a potential drawback. It may be seen as underwhelming
There are three primary reasons for this—military dynamics, international stakes, as well as a political off-ramp that has the potential to be satisfactory. Let us explain. India could instead be increasingly drawn toward a response that stacks up coercive pressure while constructing a form of crisis termination that is mostly political and emphasises the bigger picture. Since the Pahalgam terror attack of 22 April, there have been expectations of an Indian 'retaliatory' attack against Pakistan—making the present situation an acute crisis between two nuclear states. However, a cost-benefit calculation reveals that India's response could be somewhat unexpected. India could stop short of an escalatory military assault similar to the Balakot airstrike of 2019. Military dynamics and brinkmanship There are three ways in which 2025 is not 2019. First, and the most regrettable aspect—Pakistan has modernised, equipped and integrated its ground and air forces, which leaves India with high-risk choices in terms of escalation control/management. Marked by a crisis of legitimacy and resultant siege mentality, Pakistan's posture has also been one of greater desperation—giving it some psychological advantage in a twisted sense. In 2019, Imran Khan expressed willingness to conciliate and temper escalation. In 2025, Pakistan, under COAS Asim Munir, has sought to frontload military preparedness to engage in an escalatory spiral (to deter India) instead of advocating for a politico-military climbdown based on talks and cooperation. Second, Balakot 2019 had the element of novelty. Such an air strike had not been executed before, giving India the advantage of strategic surprise—as well as impact. Given that Pakistan appears to have a stronger deliberate hand in the recent terror attack, Pakistan is better prepared for military escalation now, than in 2019. Moreover, Asim Munir can ill afford a strategic humiliation, given the scale of political troubles at home. This implies high resolve to respond and escalate. It is worth noting that Balakot has been interpreted differently in Pakistan compared to India—as evidence of the PAF's coming of age and ability to both intercept as well as deliver payloads into Indian territory with relative accuracy. Hence, the state of deterrence between India and Pakistan is contested owing to differing perceptions of the last military face-off. This makes Pakistan more confident in the present. Its Air Force in particular has modernised further since 2019, benefiting significantly from joint exercises with the PLA Air Force and a significant upgradation in its air-to-ground strike capabilities. Moreover, the fog of war and spectre of military mishaps will weigh heavily on the Indian government's mind. During previous crises, India could rely on US intervention and mediation to put the brakes on uncontrolled escalation. That aspect is more uncertain this time—raising the risks further. Also read: What Operation Parakram taught us—deterrence requires more than just mobilisation or rhetoric International stakes and Pakistan's objectives There is a greater variation in terms of stakes and objectives as well, and a strong divergence between Indian and Pakistani trajectories. India has reason to maintain the de-hyphenation of India and Pakistan, so well managed since 2019. The same could be said about India's interest in the de-internationalisation of the Kashmir issue, toward a preference for the bilateral and eventually toward it becoming simply a non-issue. This part of India's Pakistan strategy has been wholly internal. It has entailed steps towards good governance, economic development and closer integration between Kashmir and India. It has, in fact, also entailed deliberately ignoring Pakistan altogether in the aftermath of smaller scale terror attacks over the last few years. As EAM S Jaishankar noted in January last year, 'We have made Pakistan's policy irrelevant by not playing their game'. Pakistan's motive, after all, is to sow division between Hindus and Muslims, between Jammu and Kashmir and finally between Kashmir and India. A military option by India that does not achieve efficient success has the potential to drag matters in a direction that suits Pakistan's Kashmir strategy and delay the inevitable—India's rise on the world stage as well as the resolution of the Kashmir 'dispute' in India's favour. Pakistan's frustration with India's approach has also grown over the years, especially at three levels. First, Islamabad expected the 2021 DGMO-led ceasefire to lead to broader talks with India, especially with Bajwa (who was Army Chief at the time) having megaphoned his geo-economic focus for ties with neighbours. This did not happen. Second, the Shehbaz Sharif government in Pakistan has made several calls for dialogue with India, post-Imran Khan's removal. However, such calls have been accompanied by a re-assertion of Pakistan's demand that India roll back its abrogation of Article 370. This, along with Pakistan's continued sponsorship of cross-border infiltration for terrorism, has meant that India has had no incentive to respond positively. Third, the incidents of unknown gunmen killing known terrorist leaders in Pakistan have been frequent across the past few years—with the killing of a retired Brigadier (of the ISI) in June 2024 crossing almost a sanctimonious red line for Pakistan. Hence, given the failure of Pakistani attempts thus far to sway India's hand, Pakistan has enough incentive (out of desperation) to impose costs on India. The arena for this is Kashmir—where New Delhi has not just used booming tourism as a yardstick of success for its post-2019 policies, but also where even Pakistan's Gulf allies have emerged as India's partners for developmental projects. Hence, a constant effort by Pakistan through Lashkar/Jaish proxy groups has been long underway—the Reasi attack on Hindu pilgrims last year would arguably have reached Pahalgam's intensity had the bus not plummeted into a gorge after terrorists (from the TRF) opened fire. Also read: Striking back at Pakistan is full of risks. India must master choreography of escalation A highly calibrated kinetic response is still possible, but… In terms of a military response, then, India has to find an option that achieves the right balance of its three-headed objective. It has to be spectacular/impactful enough to satisfy domestic sentiment, controlled enough to avoid a hard-to-control escalatory spiral and meaningfully costly for Pakistan in order to repair deterrence. Hence, India's options include strikes against terror infrastructure in Pakistan proper or PoK using stand-off weapons from the air or surface, combined with possible action by Border Action Teams along the LoC/IB, which is dispersed across both time and space. Essentially, a sustained effort that is larger in scope, with an effort to manage escalation. Yet, despite such options entailing costs and risks that are somewhat more manageable, any cross-border strike faces a key potential drawback. In the domain of perceptions, such actions may be seen as 'underwhelming' (except for covert operations over the coming months). This risks the perception that India chose an overly-calibrated response that is not 'proportionate' to the dastardly nature of the attack itself. This might fail to meet the criteria of military domination as well as proportionate cost-imposition—leaving India's deterrence stock value in a weakened state. Most analysts that we have spoken to state that they expect at least 'something'. And even though 'something' may be better than 'nothing', 'something else' may be even better than something. Also read: Kashmir's Leepa Valley is on fire. Is a new war brewing on the Line of Control? The something else option The recent terror attack is a desperate spoiler move by a nervous Pakistani establishment that has reasons to worry about the existential politico-ideological threat it faces. This comes mainly from ongoing trends (since 2019) on the Indian side of the LoC. The increased normalisation in Kashmir and its people's reconciliation with democratic India is the main story. On this ground, the government has reasons to stand and demonstrate self-assurance. The response of Kashmiris from all walks of life—from pony riders to police to political parties and civil society—has been an outcome that is a true game-changer in this 77-year ideological contest between democratic India and Army-ruled Pakistan. The present government has an opportunity to claim ownership over this final and happy chapter. In fact, the outpouring of solidarity and grief from ordinary Kashmiris is an enormous political opportunity to further cement the region and people's bond with India. Future historians may indeed see it as such. As hawks, we would prefer a situation in which India is both prepared with immediate and conclusive military options while also justifiably claiming political and moral victory. If such an option based on reasonable military dominance is still available and presented, then nothing like it. However, this may not be the case owing to the fact that the Indian military is undergoing strong transitions—with the future contest with China in mind. Sidharth Raimedhi is a Fellow at the Council for Strategic and Defense Research (CSDR), a New Delhi-based think tank. He tweets @SRaimedhi. Bashir Ali Abbas is a Research Associate at CSDR. Views are personal. (Edited by Theres Sudeep)
American Military News
24-04-2025
- Politics
- American Military News
Pics: Egypt holds military drills with China in historic first
Egypt and China are conducting military drills in Egyptian airspace after launching the 'Eagles of Civilization 2025' on April 19. Last week, China's Ministry of National Defense published a press release, saying, 'According to the consensus between the Chinese and Egyptian militaries, the Chinese PLA Air Force will send a detachment to Egypt to take part in the China-Egypt joint air force training code-named 'Eagles of Civilization 2025' from mid April to early May in 2025.' China's Ministry of National Defense added, 'This is the first joint training between the Chinese and Egyptian militaries, which is of great significance to promoting pragmatic cooperation and enhancing mutual trust and friendship between the two militaries.' According to The War Zone, China's People's Liberation Army Air Force has deployed J-10B/C fighters, a KJ-50 AWACS aircraft, and a Y-20U aerial refueling tanker for the military drills, while Egypt is flying MiG-29M/M2 Fulcrum fighters. In a post on Facebook, an Egyptian military spokesperson confirmed that 'a number of multi-role fighter aircraft of various models' are being featured in the joint military drills and that the 'Eagles of Civilization 2025' exercises are aimed to 'unify combat concepts between the two sides through a series of theoretical and practical lectures.' READ MORE: China's military buildup poses 'real and serious threat,' Pentagon warns The Egyptian military spokesperson said, 'The training will also involve joint aerial sorties, planning exercises, and simulated air combat management operations to exchange expertise and enhance the skills of the participating forces.' The spokesperson added that the current military drills are 'within the framework of strengthening military cooperation relations between the Egyptian and Chinese armed forces.' Mohammed Soliman, a Middle East Institute senior fellow, told Breaking Defense that the joint military drills featuring Egypt and China represent a 'pivotal shift in Middle Eastern geopolitics' as a United States ally is partnering with China on military exercises. Soliman noted that by hosting the Chinese People's Liberation Army's Air Force, Egypt is signaling to the United States that it is frustrated by 'US restrictions on modernizing its F-16 fleet' and that the U.S. ally is 'poised to diversify its defense procurement.' David Des Roches, a professor at the Near East South Asia Center for Security Studies, told Breaking Defense that the joint military exercises come as Egypt is growing increasingly concerned regarding military aid annually provided by the United States. Roches said, 'The Trump administration is more skeptical towards foreign aid than previous administrations in the past, and the aid to Egypt is always viewed with skepticism within the United States, even when relations with Egypt are generally favorable.' Pictures of the joint Egyptian and Chinese military drills were shared Sunday on X, formerly Twitter. The 1st training day of the "Eagle of Civilization 2025" China & Egypt joint training began on April 19, PLAAF training group consisted of J-10C/S fighters, a KJ-500 AWACS a/c, YY-20A tanker and helio. — dafeng cao (@dafengcao) April 20, 2025
South China Morning Post
20-02-2025
- Health
- South China Morning Post
PLA Air Force uses AI-powered biometric screening to find China's next top guns
Published: 5:05pm, 20 Feb 2025 China's air force has deployed AI-powered biometric tests to screen potential pilots as part of a rigorous hiring process, according to state media. State broadcaster CCTV reported on Wednesday that the People's Liberation Army Air Force had begun using artificial intelligence to assess the biological signals of pilot candidates to determine long-term health risks and human-machine adaptability. 'AI now plays a crucial role in interpreting candidates' biological signals, revealing underlying health risks that might not be immediately apparent to human evaluators,' the report said. 'This data-driven approach allows the air force to predict long-term risks, ultimately ensuring that only the most suitable candidates are chosen.' The final stage of the pilot selection involves rigorous medical and psychological evaluations. More than 100 tests are conducted to assess a candidate's health prospects and their ability to adapt to technology. The PLA Air Force is using AI in its 2025 pilot recruitment drive to assess long-term health risks and human-machine adaptability of candidates. Photo: CCTV Zhang Yishuang, an expert on PLA Air Force recruitment, said the AI system was now deeply integrated into the process, enabling technology to interpret physical data while human experts focused on personality traits. 'This shift enables a more accurate, comprehensive approach to selecting future pilots, creating a 'dual-engine' selection model that blends data intelligence with personal insight,' Zhang told CCTV.
