01-04-2025
What Was Learned from Building New Nuclear Reactors?
Georgia Power's Plant Vogtle 3 and 4 are the only new reactors that have been built in the U.S. in over 30 years. At the start, Georgia Power executives claimed that, unlike the first two reactors, Vogtle 3 and 4 would be completed on time and on budget. At completion, however, both the final cost of $36 billion and 15-year schedule were more than double original estimates. As a nuclear professional with decades of construction and operations experience, I was the lead construction monitor for Georgia's Plant Vogtle Units 3 and 4, and reported to the Georgia Public Service Commission. Also, I led a consultant study for a less developed country in its consideration of having nuclear as part of its future power generation. Having closely watched and documented the enormous cost and schedule overruns that took place in Plant Vogtle, I urge others to understand that the following issues that plagued Vogtle, and adversely impacted Georgia rate payers, could just as likely be repeated elsewhere.
COMMENTARY
High Capital and Operating Costs of Nuclear. Due to the necessary nuclear safety requirements, the inherent design of current generation nuclear plants makes them very expensive. The recently completed Vogtle reactors exceeded $35 billion for construction and financing. This excessive cost was due in large part to the inherent design, plus an inability to control the environment required to control costs, and with these changes an inability to more properly manage completion of the project. In addition, large numbers of staff are required to protect and operate a nuclear plant, so the operating costs are also significant. Comparing Generation Types. In the case of Vogtle 3 and 4, these two reactors provide roughly 2,200 MW of electricity. Georgia Power's 45.7% share of the output deliver 1,020 MW of new capacity at a cost of $11 billion, a far greater cost than what was expected, and resulted in a 25% rate increase on Georgia Power's residential bills. Highly reliable (and more responsive to load changes) combined cycle gas turbine (CCGT) plants with a 1,020 MW capacity would have cost only about $1 billion and require far few operating staff. While nuclear reactors have no carbon emissions, CCGTs have roughly half the carbon emissions as a coal plant. Renewables, such as utility-scale solar and wind (when available and in demand) are even less expensive and have zero carbon emissions. However, their inherent characteristics are such that the exact path forward as to how to most economically and effectively integrate them into the grid is still evolving, as are other, more longer-term yet unproven energy alternatives. Repeating Nuclear Plant History. The necessary assumptions for reducing nuclear capital costs include multiple plant orders (to spread the common costs among multiple plants), a factory like production line building of common modules to better assure quality and reduce costs, and the availability of nuclear construction labor and expertise. These assumptions are not new, but in the past always changed. For example, in 1969, Westinghouse and Newport News Shipbuilding and Drydock Co. formed a joint venture to produce floating nuclear plants. However, roughly 10 years later, with decreased future demand forecasts and after the Three Mile Island accident, that effort was terminated. These same original assumptions were made at the start of Vogtle Units 3 and 4. This time, with reduced natural gas prices and decreased future demand forecasts, of the originally intended 14 AP1000 reactors, only Vogtle was pursued to completion. When the pipeline of nuclear reactor orders dried up, it resulted in cancellation of the modular facility and high costs drove the construction contractor, Westinghouse, into bankruptcy. Those factors, coupled with limited nuclear construction labor and expertise, meant that Vogtle's construction costs exceeded even the worst projections. Also, even if one could better control the environment within which the plants are to be constructed, given the high cost of the inherent design, it is questionable as to what percentage cost reduction would be achievable and whether that would be sufficient to make nuclear cost competitive with other energy generation choices. In going forward with nuclear, there is increased emphasis on building smaller plants, again having multiple orders and a factory like facility for manufacturing modules to support the multiple orders. However, lessons learned from the past would show that economies of scale from larger plants could be lost. This was the case when Westinghouse had previously cancelled the smaller AP600 plant in favor of the larger AP1000 design. These same economies of scale would most likely be lost not only with respect to construction costs, but also with respect to operations costs. This is due largely to the required large staff to protect and operate a nuclear plant. More than 15 years after the Plant Vogtle expansion project first was licensed, the enormous cost overruns, the prolonged construction timeline, and the significant burden on ratepayers in Georgia reveal that nuclear reactor technologies cannot be relied on as a cost-effective solution to our growing energy needs, as the evidence points to more affordable, faster, and readily available near-term alternatives.
—Don Grace, PE has more than 50 years of experience in nuclear and fossil fuel plants. He served as the Plant Vogtle Construction Monitor from 2017 to 2024, providing oversight and testifying semi-annually before the Georgia Public Service Commission.
