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Russia Today
12 hours ago
- Politics
- Russia Today
Fyodor Lukyanov: Here's how the West made Israel-Iran war possible
Israel's attack on Iran, which began last Friday, is the culmination of nearly 25 years of relentless transformation across West Asia. This war was not born overnight, nor can it be explained by simplistic moral binaries. What we see now is the natural outcome of a series of miscalculations, misread ambitions, and power vacuums. There are no neat lessons to be learned from the last quarter-century. The events were too disjointed, the consequences too contradictory. But that doesn't mean they lacked logic. If anything, the unfolding chaos is the most coherent evidence of where Western interventionism, ideological naivety, and geopolitical arrogance have led. For much of the 20th century, the Middle East was kept within a fragile but functioning framework, largely defined by Cold War dynamics. Superpowers patronized local regimes, and the balance – while far from peaceful – was stable in its predictability. But the end of the Cold War, and with it the dissolution of the Soviet Union, dissolved those rules. For the next 25 years, the United States stood uncontested in the region. The ideological battle between 'socialism' and the 'free world' vanished, leaving a vacuum that new forces quickly sought to fill. Washington tried to impose the values of Western liberal democracy as universal truths. Simultaneously, two other trends emerged: political Islam, which ranged from reformist to radical, and the reassertion of authoritarian secular regimes as bulwarks against collapse. Paradoxically, Islamism – though ideologically opposed to the West – aligned more closely with liberalism in its resistance to autocracy. Meanwhile, those same autocracies were often embraced as the lesser evil against extremism. Everything changed after September 11, 2001. The terrorist attacks did not just provoke a military response; they triggered an ideological crusade. Washington launched its so-called War on Terror, beginning with Afghanistan, and quickly expanded it into Iraq. Here, the neoconservative fantasy took hold: that democracy could be exported by force. The result was catastrophic. The Iraq invasion destroyed a central pillar of regional balance. In the rubble, sectarianism flourished and religious extremism metastasized. Islamic State emerged from this chaos. As Iraq was dismantled, Iran rose. No longer encircled, Tehran extended its reach – to Baghdad, to Damascus, to Beirut. Turkey, too, revived its imperial reflexes under Erdogan. The Gulf states, meanwhile, began throwing their wealth and weight around with greater confidence. The US, the architect of this disorder, found itself mired in endless, unwinnable wars. This unraveling continued with the US-imposed Palestinian elections, which split the Palestinian territories and empowered Hamas. Then came the Arab Spring, lauded in Western capitals as a democratic awakening. In truth, it hastened the collapse of already brittle states. Libya was shattered. Syria descended into a proxy war. Yemen became a humanitarian catastrophe. South Sudan, birthed under external pressure, quickly fell into dysfunction. All of it marked the end of regional balance. The end of authoritarianism in the Middle East didn't usher in liberal democracy. It gave way to political Islam, which for a time became the only structured form of political participation. This in turn triggered attempts to restore the old regimes, now seen by many as the lesser evil. Egypt and Tunisia reimposed secular order. Libya and Iraq, by contrast, have remained stateless zones. Syria's trajectory is instructive: the country moved from dictatorship to Islamist chaos and now toward a patchwork autocracy held together by foreign patrons. Russia's 2015 intervention stabilized the situation temporarily, but Syria is now drifting toward becoming a non-state entity, its sovereignty unclear, its borders uncertain. Amid this collapse, it is no coincidence that the key powers in today's Middle East are non-Arab: Iran, Turkey, and Israel. Arab states, while vocal, have opted for caution. In contrast, these three countries each represent distinct political models – an Islamic theocracy with pluralist features (Iran), a militarized democracy (Turkey), and a Western-style democracy increasingly shaped by religious nationalism (Israel). Despite their differences, these states share one trait: their domestic politics are inseparable from their foreign policy. Iran's expansionism is tied to the economic and ideological reach of the Revolutionary Guard. Erdogan's foreign escapades feed his domestic narrative of Turkish resurgence. Israel's doctrine of security has shifted from defense to active transformation of the region. This brings us to the present. The liberal order that peaked at the turn of the century sought to reform the Middle East through market economics, elections, and civil society. It failed. Not only did it dismantle the old without building the new, but the very forces meant to spread democracy often empowered sectarianism and violence. Now the appetite for transformation has dried up in the West, and with it the liberal order itself. In its place we see a convergence of systems once thought irreconcilable. Israel, for instance, no longer stands as a liberal outpost surrounded by authoritarian relics. Its political system has grown increasingly illiberal, its governance militarized, and its nationalism more overt. The Netanyahu government is the clearest expression of this change. One may argue that war justifies such measures – especially following the October 2023 Hamas attacks. But these shifts began earlier. The war simply accelerated trends already in motion. As liberalism recedes, a new kind of utopia takes its place – not democratic and inclusive, but transactional and enforced. Trump, the Israeli right, and their Gulf allies envision a Middle East pacified through military dominance, economic deals, and strategic normalization. The Abraham Accords, framed as peace, are part of this vision. But peace built on force is no peace at all. We are witnessing the result. The Iran-Israel war is not a bolt from the blue. It is the direct consequence of two decades of dismantled norms, unchecked ambitions, and a deep misunderstanding of the region's political fabric. And as always in the Middle East, when utopias fail, it is the people who pay the price.
Arab News
07-05-2025
- Politics
- Arab News
Aid agencies slam Israeli plans for Gaza aid distribution
What recent arrests and ban mean for political influence of Jordan's Muslim Brotherhood DUBAI: Jordan's recent ban on the Muslim Brotherhood marks a historic rupture in the kingdom's political landscape, ending decades of uneasy coexistence and raising urgent questions about the future of political Islam in the country. The Brotherhood is now outlawed after authorities uncovered arms caches and arrested last month 16 people for allegedly plotting rocket and drone attacks that authorities said 'aimed at targeting national security, sowing chaos and sabotaging within Jordan.' Interior Minister Mazin Al-Farrayeh's subsequent decision to declare membership of the organization and promotion of its ideology as illegal reinforced a 2020 court ruling that had been largely unenforced in what analysts described as a 'strategy of containment.' Jordan's announcement comes at a time of heightened regional tension and surging Islamist activism amid Israel's war on Gaza. The question on many political observers' lips since the arrests has been: Why was Jordan targeted by Islamists, and how will the kingdom respond in the coming days? The Brotherhood's resurgence in the political spotlight coincided with the eruption of the war on Gaza, as it staged nationwide pro-Palestinian demonstrations. The Brotherhood's political trajectory shifted significantly following the government's liberalization process in the wake of the April 1989 protests in southern Jordan. (AFP/File) Hazem Salem Al-Damour, director-general of the Strategiecs think tank, said the group sought to exploit strong anti-Israel sentiment and deep-rooted grassroots support to rally backing for Hamas, the Palestinian militant group founded as a Brotherhood offshoot. Pro-Hamas slogans at protests highlighted the group's transnational and pan-Islamic loyalties, often at odds with Jordan's national interests, especially since Hamas' offices were shut down in Jordan in 1999. Authorities were further alarmed when investigations revealed that the busted Brotherhood cell had ties to Hamas' Lebanese wing, which trained and funded some of the arrested militants. This followed a similar incident in May 2024, when Jordan accused the Brotherhood of involvement in a foiled plot by Iranian-backed militias in Syria to smuggle weapons through Jordan. At the time, the Brotherhood said that while some members may have acted independently, the organization itself was not involved and remained part of the loyal opposition. It also claimed that the weapons were not intended for use in or against Jordan, but were being transported to support Palestinians in Gaza in their fight against Israeli security forces. However, Jordan has also witnessed a surge in attempts to smuggle weapons and explosives from Syria for delivery to the West Bank over the past year. 'In a sense, the government, with its ban on the Brotherhood, shut down the group's external support networks, through which it had sought to exploit Jordan's geographic position in the region,' Al-Damour told Arab News, referring to the April 23 ban. According to Al-Damour, the government's decision was driven by security concerns rather than political calculations, and that the Brotherhood's dual approach — public activity paired with covert operations — had become unacceptable to the state. On April 30, four of the 16 defendants were sentenced by Jordan's state security court to 20 years in prison after being convicted of 'possession of explosives, weapons and ammunition.' Mohammed Abu Rumman, a former Jordanian minister of culture and youth, regards the perceived radicalization of the Brotherhood's activities as unprecedented. 'The production of weapons, explosives and missiles, as well as planning of drone operations marked a significant shift in the mindset of young members of the movement, signaling a clear break from the organization's traditional framework and presenting a new challenge for the state,' he told Arab News. The Jordanian Muslim Brotherhood's cross-border, partisan character dates back to its founding. Inspired by the Egyptian organization established by Hassan Al-Banna in 1928, the Jordanian branch began as a charitable entity and gradually expanded its reach, becoming deeply embedded in the country's social and political landscape. Pro-Hamas slogans at protests highlighted the group's transnational and pan-Islamic loyalties. (AFP) For more than four decades, the Brotherhood maintained a close alliance with the early Hashemite regime, backing the late King Hussein during pivotal moments, including the attempted military coup of 1957. The absence of competing political forces — such as leftist and nationalist parties — due to martial law created a vacuum. This allowed the Islamist movement to broaden its religious-ideological outreach and deepen its political engagement across Jordanian society, including among labor unions and student groups. The Brotherhood's political trajectory shifted significantly following the government's liberalization process in the wake of the April 1989 protests in southern Jordan. With the lifting of martial law and the resumption of parliamentary elections, the Brotherhood expanded its charitable network by launching its political wing, the Islamic Action Front, in 1992. It quickly seized the moment, winning a strong bloc in the 11th parliament and earning broad popular support, establishing itself as a major political force. Although the Brotherhood and its political wing retained distinct leaderships and organizational structures, the line between the two remained blurred. Tensions between the movement and the government first emerged over the 1994 peace treaty with Israel and deepened in 1997, when the IAF chose to boycott the parliamentary elections. By 2007, the Brotherhood viewed the regime's policies as increasingly restrictive, particularly changes to the electoral law. The group participated in that year's elections only symbolically, winning just six seats — a disappointing result that triggered a leadership crisis within the organization. The 2011 'Arab Spring' revolts marked another period of tense relations in Jordan between the organization and the state, as the ascent of Islamist regimes to power in Egypt and Tunisia sparked alarm in the kingdom. In 2015, Jordan passed a law dissolving the Brotherhood and transferring its assets to a newly established entity, the 'Muslim Brotherhood Association,' in a move widely seen as an attempt to split the more hardline 'hawks' from the moderate 'doves.' This new group was formed by leaders who had either been expelled from the original organization or resigned amid an increasingly bitter internal power struggle. The 2011 'Arab Spring' revolts marked another period of tense relations in Jordan between the organization and the state. (AFP/File) Abu Rumman, the former minister, says that Jordan's decision to reinforce the 2020 court ruling aims to regulate political activity and ensure transparent participation, potentially benefiting the Brotherhood by pushing it away from the dualities that previously defined Islamist politics and caused internal divisions. 'The strict application of the rule of law requires the Brotherhood to clearly define its identity and role within the national framework, while cutting all foreign ties that raise ambiguity and suspicion,' he said. The future now hinges on the findings of ongoing security investigations and the extent of the IAF's links to the Brotherhood's suspected activities. Soon after the activities of the Brotherhood were outlawed on April 23, Jordanian security forces raided the premises associated with it, acting in line with the new directive. The IAF has not been officially banned, though the authorities also carried out raids on its offices. Al-Damour, from the think tank Strategiecs, outlined three possible scenarios: the ban remains limited to the Brotherhood, it extends to the IAF if its involvement is proven, or both are fully dismantled. Under the Political Parties Law, the IAF could face a ban if its involvement in the plot is confirmed, a possibility that has grown after it suspended the membership of three accused members. This would mark a fundamental shift in Jordan's political landscape and alter the course of reform announced in 2022. If the IAF survives, Al-Damour said, it would need to formally sever ties with the banned Brotherhood, shrinking its size and influence by cutting off its traditional electoral base, mobilization network, and campaign funding. Alternatively, the party may attempt to circumvent the ban by quietly absorbing sympathizers and non-involved members of the banned group. 'Individuals from the banned group or its affiliated party may establish new licensed political parties, associations, or civil society organizations; and second, they may seek membership in already licensed Islamic parties. Their motivations could vary from genuine political participation and reform to quietly infiltrating these parties,' he said. In 2015, Jordan passed a law dissolving the Brotherhood and transferring its assets to a newly established entity, the 'Muslim Brotherhood Association.' (AFP) However, according to him, a purely legal approach may not be enough to eradicate threats to national security. 'This casts doubt on the likelihood that all members of the banned group will comply with the law,' Al-Damour said. 'Instead, the radical elements of the group may intensify covert activity similar to what the group practiced in Egypt during the 1950s and 1960s, and again after the July 30, 2013, revolution, as well as in Syria during the 1980s and Algeria in the 1990s.' Security and intelligence efforts will likely remain active and focused on tracking the organization's radical remnants, their networks, and alignment with regional counterparts invested in their continued activity. Amer Al-Sabaileh, a geopolitical and security expert, stresses the need for a clear state strategy that extends beyond security measures to address social and media aspects. 'The organization has enjoyed freedom of operation for years, building extensive support networks,' he told Arab News. 'To contain these implications, the state should construct a strong, solid narrative that clearly communicates the risks associated with the Muslim Brotherhood's activities within Jordan.' Jordan's break from the Muslim Brotherhood, then, is both a response to immediate security threats and a reckoning with the movement's complex legacy. The question posed at the outset — why was Jordan targeted by Islamists? — finds its answer in the confluence of history, ideology and the shifting sands of Middle Eastern geopolitics. The kingdom's next steps may determine not only the fate of political Islam within its borders, but also the broader trajectory of reform, stability and national identity in a region where the lines between domestic dissent and regional conflict are increasingly blurred.
