Latest news with #Pyeongtaek
South China Morning Post
23-05-2025
- Politics
- South China Morning Post
Inside South Korea's secretive air defence hub that aims to scramble jets in 2 minutes
South Korea has lifted the veil on a key nerve centre of its air defences, offering a rare look inside the facility tasked with responding to threats from North Korea and beyond in as little as two minutes. On Wednesday, local media were given access to the Korea Air and Space Operations Center (KAOC), a highly secured command post located within Osan Air Base in Pyeongtaek, about 60km south of Seoul. From here, South Korean and US forces monitor and coordinate aerial responses across the Korean peninsula – a capability that has become increasingly vital as North Korea advances its missile and nuclear programmes. The unveiling comes amid growing alarm in Seoul over Pyongyang's push to develop smaller, tactical nuclear weapons and diversify its delivery platforms. On May 15, North Korea carried out its first publicly acknowledged live-fire test of a medium-range air-to-air missile, fired from a MiG-29 fighter jet during drills attended by leader Kim Jong-un South Korean officials are also concerned that the North's weapons development may be receiving a technological boost from Russia, in exchange for Pyongyang's reported support for Moscow's war in Ukraine – a relationship that has triggered fresh unease in Washington and Tokyo. Then-US President Joe Biden and then-South Korean President Yoon Suk-yeol visit the Korea Air and Space Operations Centre at Osan Air Base in Pyeongtaek on May 22, 2022. Photo: Reuters Meanwhile, South Korea's air defence identification zone has seen a growing number of incursions by Chinese and Russian military aircraft, adding to the operational strain on KAOC personnel.
CNA
21-05-2025
- Politics
- CNA
Commentary: What to make of the restart in Russia-Ukraine ceasefire negotiations
PYEONGTAEK, South Korea: Last week, Russian and Ukrainian ceasefire negotiators met face-to-face for the first time since March 2022. The location for the talks was the same as three years ago, some of the negotiators were the same, but the circumstances were vastly different from what they were. Before, the full-scale invasion was barely a month old, the two sides had already engaged in multiple negotiating sessions, and Russian forces were still marching further into Ukrainian territory. Now, Ukraine has recaptured territory and held Russia to a stalemate through three long years of defence. The latest talks were over relatively quickly – lasting less than two hours – and while questions abound, the two most common are what happened, and what comes next? To answer those questions, it is first important to understand Russian behaviour vis-a-vis the restarted talks. The Kremlin has shown a bad faith approach to the resumption of ceasefire negotiations. RUSSIA'S NEGOTIATION STRATEGY Russian President Vladimir Putin regime waited until its forces had recaptured most of occupied Kursk before signalling its willingness to talk face-to-face with the Ukrainians. The unspoken truth was that this was to take Kursk off the table and to strengthen the Russian negotiating position. Putin then called for a temporary ceasefire; however, unlike the Ukraine-proposed comprehensive 30-day ceasefire, it was for only three days. Rather than indicating a sincere willingness to stop the bloodshed from the conflict, the Kremlin's unilateral declaration was tied to its Victory Day march in Moscow, a move assuredly aimed at mitigating risk to the proceedings. During his closing speech to the Victory Day festivities, Putin called for negotiations to begin on May 15 in Istanbul. He did not identify who the Russian negotiating team would be or what they would seek to achieve. From a basic negotiating standpoint, this was a move designed to take the initiative in the ceasefire negotiation process without committing to anything. Along the way, Russia has repeated its maximalist positions – the same terms it has parroted since 2022. These include things like Ukraine staying out of NATO; Ukraine's 'neutral and non-aligned status'; recognition of Russian sovereignty over Crimea, Donetsk, Luhansk, Zaporizhzhia, Kherson and Sevastopol; imposing 'anti-Nazi' provisions in Ukraine; and forcing the Russian language to be included as an equal in Ukraine, among others. OUTCOME OF THE NEGOTIATION Eventually, the Kremlin picked Vladimir Medinsky to reprise his role as lead negotiator. Medinsky served in the same role for ceasefire talks from March to May 2022, signalling the Kremlin's attempt to pick up where they left off three years earlier when Ukraine was in a much more dire position. Such was the setting for the latest Istanbul talks. Ukrainians assumed that Medinsky would not be coming into the latest negotiation with authority to do much, so they focused on three core objectives for the talks. Defence Minister Rustem Umerov represented the Ukrainian side in working to secure a 30-day ceasefire, an all-for-all prisoner of war exchange and a meeting between Presidents Volodymyr Zelenskyy and Putin. Predictably, Medinsky used the session to repeat Russia's maximalist demands. He rejected the 30-day ceasefire and later remarked that 'war and negotiations have always happened at the same time.' Despite the two sides being far apart on broader issues, they did manage to come to some agreements. Most notably was securing a 1,000-for-1,000 prisoner of war exchange, which is progress on a key focus area for the Ukrainian Peace Formula. They also agreed to exchange their respective lists of positions vis-a-vis the ceasefire and, importantly, that the two sides will meet again. UKRAINE'S MISSED OPPORTUNITIES While any progress is better than no progress, there were missed opportunities. First, Ukraine and its partners could have anticipated that Russia would reject the 30-day ceasefire proposal and had some form of punitive response prepared. While many have decried the Russians for prolonging the killing, the behaviour will go unchecked until there are additional costs imposed. Second, the Ukrainians could have delivered a fully formed draft agreement to serve as a new anchor for the talks. This draft would create a new starting point for discussions and would have been an effective means of shifting initiative in the negotiation to the Ukraine side. Third, Ukraine's partners could have had some announcement about aid ready to deploy upon completion of the Istanbul talks. The objective would have been to signal to the Russian side that the longer it drags out ceasefire negotiations, the more support the Ukrainians will have. In the days since the talks wrapped up, movement has been slow. The European Union is reportedly looking at new sanctions packages, but nothing has been implemented. US President Donald Trump held a two-hour call with Putin where they reaffirmed the importance of negotiations but did not indicate any fundamental shift in Russia's approach to the ceasefire process. Meanwhile, the safe money says that Russia will try to ratchet up military pressure while holding firm on its demands. The Kremlin is probably gambling on the notion that they do not need to outlast Ukraine, they just need to outlast foreign support to Ukraine.
