18 hours ago
Rising Lion, True Promise: the Israel-Iran shadow war goes hot
After much back and fro posturing, Israel finally attacked Iran in the wee hours on June 13, 2025. Their last skirmish was on October 26, 2024, when Israel retaliated for Iran's October 1, 2024, missile strike that comprised some 200 missiles, fired on Israel proper.
The Israeli attack this time was more complex entailing Israeli Air Force (IAF), missiles, drones (RPVs), and sabotage. Just like in October last year, some 200 IAF jets and support aircraft, in first phase attacked over 100 targets all over Iran, focusing primarily on the Natanz nuclear enrichment site. The assault codenamed the 'Rising Lion' was an integrated operation between IDF and Israeli intelligence agency Mossad, and was echeloned in waves. As a first, SEAD operation (suppression of the enemy air defence) was undertaken ingeniously through smuggled systems, agents and commandos over Irani soil, reflecting the depth of Mossad's penetration in Iran.
Aims and objectives
The professed Israeli aim for the attack was to eliminate Iran's ability to acquire nuclear weapons in the next some month, and the potential threat these might pose to Israel. Besides de-nuclearisation, Israel also aims to 'facilitate' regime change in Tehran, where it feels the clerical order is not popular and poor economy and prolonged sanctions have resulted in mass discontent.
Strategies
Israel had been 'shaping the environment' for this 'existential' assault by constant military and diplomatic pressure over Tehran; clandestine operations targeting Irani leaders and scientists; inserting cyber tools to damage Irani nuclear plans; and in the last nearly two years degrading Iran's 3H (Hamas, Hezbollah and Houthi) proxies through constant and consecutive overt and covert military, cyber and sabotage operations including assassinations. During skirmishes last year, IDF gauged the effectiveness of Irani air defence (AD), identified military weak spots, assessed regime's response and ascertained its pain threshold.
The IDF targeting-trio spanned Iran's nuclear facilities, leadership, and military infrastructure. It also aimed at regime weakening, fomenting unrest, and gaining and maintaining regional strategic, diplomatic and military ascendancy, physically and psychologically. Iran is constrained to protect and conserve the current political dispensation and re-establish deterrence vis-à-vis Israel.
Operations
Tel Aviv launched a coordinated military operation using a mix of airpower, UAVs, cyber tools and covert sabotage operations, deep inside Iranian territory. IDF's targets included the Natanz, Iran's main underground nuclear fuel enrichment facility, Revolutionary Guards (IRGC or Pasadaran-e-Inqilab) HQ in Tehran, command bunkers, military housing and scientists' accommodations. Israel also targeted missile development complexes and air defence HQ, Command and Control (C2) centres near Tehran, Khondab, Isfahan, Shiraz and Khorramabad etc.
Up to 80 Iranian losses included around 20 senior military officials including Maj Gen Hossein Salami, Commander-in-Chief, IRGC, Maj Gen Mohammad Bagheri, Chief of Armed Forces Staff, Maj Gen Gholam Ali Rashid, Operational Commander, Khatam HQ, Ali Shamkhani, Adviser to Supreme Leader and up to nine nuclear scientists.
Targeting strategy
Israeli offensive also included Cyber/Electronic Warfare, which disrupted Iran's air defence network and communications grid, causing temporary blackouts near Natanz and Isfahan. Satellite uplinks and radar feeds were also jammed for several hours. Israel reportedly spent years preparing for attacking Irani nuclear and missile programs, including building a drone base inside Iran, smuggling precision weapons, systems and inserting commandos. The drones were activated overnight and directed at Irani surface-to-surface missile launchers aimed at Israel. The smuggled systems targeted Irani AD, helping in SEAD and giving IAF air supremacy. This audacious operation was the result of tight joint planning between IDF and Mossad. Mossad commandos deployed precision missiles near anti-aircraft sites in central Iran.
IAF used F-16I, F-15I and F-35I aircraft in the 100-plane initial offensive that needed midair refueling for the over 3,000 km roundtrip. Israel has only about 7 KC-707 Boeing refuellers, insufficient for sustained and protractive offensive without the US help. The air flotilla also lacked heavier munitions like the bunker busting GBU-43/B and commensurate bombers to carry this payload, for effectively destroying the underground nuclear infrastructure. Israeli offensive is also dependent upon the use of airspace in Jordan, Iraq, Saudi Arabia and the GCC countries, depending upon its targeting strategy.
Technically, the warplanes use light warheads apparently because of the route restrictions and the consequently reduced payloads. Due to Jordanian and Saudi airspace restrictions, IDF warplanes will take the relatively longer route over southern Syria and Iraq (under 2,000 km one way) to attack south of Iran. Loitering and attacking possibly from Iraqi airspace remain a possibility to enhance warplanes' time to remain airborne and avoid Irani AD. Both the US-supplied F-16 (cruising range 340 miles/450 kms) and F-35 (around 1,200 kms) need air-to-air refuelling, limiting their reach.
Israel could have hit the targets of its choice in Iran through Jericho missile system, especially Jericho-3 with a range over 4,800km, however, that missile system reportedly is not yest field-tested, and Jericho-2 is short in range (around 1,700km). And through an aerial attack, IDF demonstrates its audacity and potency.
Iran's response
Iran on Friday morning responded to the Israeli aggression through its own Operation Wada-e-Sadiq (The True Promise) in echelons, initially launching over 100 drone systems, and then augmenting its punch using around 200 ballistic and cruise missiles, some in the hypersonic categories aimed mostly at military targets. By Saturday morning reports suggested, some missiles had penetrated the Israeli AD, the Iron Dome causing men and material losses. Most Irani drones and missiles were intercepted. The Irani offensive continues. Iran claims to have downed two F-35 fighters and capturing one female IAF pilot.
Besides, in 'missile economics', Irani arsenal comprises relatively inexpensive missiles (around US $0.15 million apiece) compared to the IDF's limited array of very expensive missiles (US $2-3 million apiece). Iran's tactics of swarming the 'Iron Dome' with inexpensive drones, allowing its ballistic and cruise missiles to sneak-in, is also a formidable military capability that Israel cannot fight without Western especially the US and UK's support, as was the case during the last year.
Irani compulsions
Iran under its prolonged clerical order is weakened due to expensive skirmishes with Israel, its own over-reach in the Middle East, loss of influence and relevance by its proxies, and economic difficulties due to continued sanctions. Aggressive and robust response, hence, is an Irani compulsion for regime survival, domestic support and regional relevance.
In his twilight years, Supreme Leader Khamenei faces a myriad of domestic challenges, Israel being a major one. The shift from fighting through proxies to direct military involvement with Israel is politically and economically costly. Moreover, the growing domestic noise for Iran to go nuclear also puts the ruling clerics in a dilemma, as nuclearisation would mean ceding control of nukes to the military ultimately, much to their chagrin.
International reaction
Whereas Houthis vowed to target Israeli/US naval assets in the Red Sea, Hezbollah reportedly decided to stay neutral under pressure from the Lebanese government. Hamas and Hezbollah had been severely degraded by the IDF in its over 600 days military operations, and their consequent loss of logistics through Syria.
Iraq, Jordan, Iran and Israel closed their airspaces, forcing aviation traffic to reroute over Gulf and Caspian zones. Commercial shipping is also rerouted given the mobilisation of IRGC naval assets in the Strait of Hormuz, and the repositioning of the US 5th Fleet.
Oil Markets saw volatility and a sharp (+8.1%) rise for feared closure of the Strait of Hormuz. Gold and defence stocks surged, and global risk premiums increased. Major countries like China, Russia, Turkey, Japan, Germany, the UK etc, and international organizations the UN and the EU have called for restraint and offered mediation.
Looking ahead
The conflict is likely to remain limited, with the US/Israeli Combo trying to force an unfavourable nuclear deal on Iran that would effectively cap and roll back its nuclear programme. Military degradation of Iran under the tacit approval and support of Washington is, therefore, likely to continue.
Irani nuclear capability, although degraded, is likely to survive the onslaught due to lack of heavy bombers with the IDF, non-availability of heavier ordnance, IAF's compulsion to revisit frequently in fighter jet mode as against bombing runs, and the tyranny of geography i.e the distance that necessitates refuelling and decreases payloads. The almost two and a half years long military operations have also imperceptibly set fatigue among the IDF rank and file. Unfavourable international reaction, lack of domestic popularity for continued military involvement, and the consequent stresses within the Israeli society would play out in short to mid-term, limiting the scope and effects of operations. Mass mobilisation and the refusal by the ultra-orthodox Jews to undertake compulsory military service under draft, is already causing instability in the Israeli politics. Netanyahu, who plays up on fear and warmongering may soon be cast aside given his destructive politics.
Tehran may paradoxically emerge united and standing behind its religious leadership, at least in the near future. This conflict and the recent Indo-Pakistan skirmish are redefining the nature of warfare, shifting focus from the conventional mass operations to multi-dimensional, multi domain niche operations in technology and stand-off weaponry.
The US
Secretary Rubio distanced the US from Israeli operation, presumably to protect US personnel and interests against attacks and backlash from Iran and Tehran's proxies. This is also necessitated due to domestic sentiment within the US, where US support for Israel's genocidal war in Gaza is deeply contested. Although Washington shares the Israeli objective against Iran's nuclearisation, it prefers the politico-diplomatic and economic coercion of Iran, rather than the military means that Tel Aviv is using. America's robust economic, military and diplomatic support would, however, continue for Israel, given the pervasive, deep-seated presence of the Jewish influence and control over the contemporary US policies.
Inam ul Haque is a retired Pakistan Army major general who writes on defence, global affairs and political sociology. He can be reached at tayyarinam@ and his Twitter handle @20_Inam
All facts and information are the sole responsibility of the author
