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Indian Express
3 days ago
- Politics
- Indian Express
Trust deficit is the stumbling block in the Russia-Ukraine peace talks
Written by Rajoli Siddharth Jayaprakash After multiple rounds of negotiations between Russia and the US, Russia and Ukraine began direct talks in May. These have led to prisoner exchanges so far, not a ceasefire. Despite Trump's commitment to bringing about a definitive resolution to the conflict, the chances in the near future aren't very high. A fundamental contradiction persists in how each side perceives its core security interests. Europe, on the other hand, has reiterated its commitment to defending Ukraine's sovereignty and subsequently enlarged its military budget. In the recent talks in June, Ukraine and Russia submitted a memorandum of their demands. Moscow's demands remain unchanged. It is calling for Ukrainian forces to withdraw from the regions of Kherson, Zaporizhzhia, Luhansk, and Donetsk, and wants the recognition of the territory of Crimea, which Russia annexed in 2014. Further, Russia demands Ukraine's neutrality — that it gives up its claims to joining the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO), and maintains a limited armed force. Other demands included the lifting of martial law and elections in Ukraine within 100 days after an end to the conflict. Ukraine, on the other hand, cites its membership in NATO and the European Union as central for its security guarantees. It also seeks the frozen Russian assets to be used as reparations. In the past, both sides have vehemently rejected these demands, citing them as a non-starter in the talks. In an abandoned 2022 draft deal, one condition laid out was that Ukraine would maintain neutrality in return for security guarantees from five permanent members of the United Nations, as well as other countries like Belarus, Germany, Turkey, Israel, Poland, and Canada. The talks failed. Three years on, while the framework of the deal has remained the same, Ukraine's negotiating heft has considerably reduced, despite the conclusion of the US–Ukraine critical minerals agreement, giving the US privileged access to Ukraine's mineral extraction. With Russia regaining territory in the Kursk region, its forces have now entered Sumy, with the plan of creating a buffer zone. Ukraine, in response, has launched a salvo of drone attacks on Russia on critical infrastructure to slow down its advance. The Russian delegation not pulling out of the talks after the biggest Ukrainian drone attack of the war (Operation Spider's Web) on 1 June reflects a degree of pragmatism on Moscow's part. Both sides are aware of the complexity of bringing the conflict to an end. For Russia, seeking the neutrality of Ukraine remains its primary interest, and its demands for territory secondary. Sanctions relief also comes under secondary interests. Ukraine, on the other hand, sees security guarantees as the most important, and the status of territories on the right bank of the Dnipro River as secondary. Moscow controls more than 75 per cent of the territories of Donetsk and Kherson, and more than 90 per cent of Luhansk. Apart from reaching an agreement on these territorial and security factors, other concerns remain with respect to how both sides plan to administer a ceasefire, as it would require a huge number of troops to secure the demilitarised zone. Then there is the issue of funding such a force. One reason for Moscow's reticence in pushing for a ceasefire stems from the fear that Ukraine will regroup and launch a counterattack. Thus, both sides are aiming to build trust, which can be reflected in their stepping up efforts to release an equal number of POWs. Both sides are aware that bringing an end to the hostilities will take place in a piecemeal fashion, with long-drawn negotiations and the prospects of further escalation. History shows us how, in the Vietnam War, the US and the erstwhile North Vietnam began negotiations in the summer of 1968, and the conclusion of the peace accord took more than five years to culminate in 1973. If Ukraine capitulates, it will be a significant blow to NATO allies, as Russia's dominance can alter the European security architecture. Thus, with both Russian and Ukrainian positions being divergent, with Europe backing Ukraine, and with earlier attempts in resolving the conflict across the span of 11 years failing (Minsk and Istanbul), it is unlikely that peace will return anytime soon. The writer is a Research Assistant at the Observer Research Foundation
Indian Express
06-05-2025
- Business
- Indian Express
Opinion The critical minerals deal has a weak economic rationale, but it justifies further US involvement in Ukraine
Written by Rajoli Siddharth Jayaprakash and Amoha Basrur The global demand for critical minerals has rapidly surged as they fuel the development of industrial technology, renewable energy, and military applications. With supply chain security becoming a major concern for countries since the COVID-19 pandemic, they have been turning to new markets to secure uninterrupted access to these minerals. One of them is Ukraine, Europe's largest country, with more than 20,000 mineral deposits and five per cent of the world's critical mineral reserves. The US has expressed considerable interest in Ukraine's minerals, signing the much-awaited minerals deal on April 30. The agreement called for an investment partnership fund between the two countries, a part of which would be used for the reconstruction of Ukraine. It grants the US preferential rights to mineral extraction in Ukraine, while granting greater agency to Ukraine than the previous draft in regulating the mineral extraction process in accordance with its interests. Despite the lack of explicit security guarantees, the deal is an umbilical cord for Kyiv that ensures continued American aid. But with the agreement in place, key questions remain on the rationale and feasibility of the deal. Mapping Ukraine's critical minerals Ukraine has reserves of 116 types of minerals, valued at $14 trillion. The country has vast reserves of titanium (used in aerospace, defence, and chemical industries), manganese (an alloy used for steel production), lithium and graphite (critical components for batteries and green technologies), uranium, zirconium and beryllium (crucial for nuclear reactors and weapons), coal, and iron ore. Ukraine's minerals profile also consists of rare earths such as neodymium, yttrium, cerium, and lanthanum, vital in the production of electric vehicles, electronic components, laser guidance systems, satellites, and wind turbines. The majority of Ukraine's mineral reserves are concentrated in two areas. The first is the Ukrainian Shield, a geological structure covering the central and northern regions of the country, and the second is the Dnipro-Donets Depression, which is close to Ukraine's de jure borders with Russia. About 20 per cent of Ukraine's potential mineral reserves are now in areas occupied by the Russian armed forces. While not all the reserves have been well studied or developed, they have significant potential given Ukraine's existing robust mining industry. The year before Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine saw the metals and mining industry contributing 10 per cent to Ukraine's GDP. But since the war began, operations of a number of plants have shut down, resulting in supply chain disruptions, especially in the hi-tech sectors. Core drivers of the agreement China's dominance and weaponisation of its critical minerals supply chains is a mounting cause of concern for the United States. Beijing has a comparative advantage in the upstream (extraction technology), midstream (processing and refining), and downstream (its use in manufacturing) that it has used to counter any moves it views as contrary to its sovereign interests. In recent years, the growing belligerence of China and concerns over the proliferation of dual-use technology have led to the US imposing export control regulations to hinder China's technological development. In response, Beijing restricted and banned the export of a number of critical minerals and rare earths. Thus, Washington is looking for new and reliable sources for critical minerals, and Ukraine has 22 of the 50 minerals classified as critical by the US Geological Survey. The initial deal, which President Zelenskyy walked out of, went against Ukrainian interests; there was an absence of US security guarantees, and there was a debt burden on Ukraine for the military aid it received under the Biden administration. The current deal gives more agency to Ukrainian interests, such as the emphasis laid on Ukraine's possession of the subsoil and Ukraine's rights to block a project. Further, this deal does not give US businesses privileged access to Ukraine's critical minerals over European investors, which could have hampered Ukraine's EU membership bid. Lastly, there are no debt obligations, and a part of the funds have been committed to the reconstruction of the country. Feasibility of the agreement While there is huge potential in Ukrainian reserves, the face value of elements does not capture the significant investment and lead time it requires to reach the end products. The average time taken from exploration to extraction is 16 years, notwithstanding the time taken in ascertaining the commercial viability of the minerals. Damage from Russian attacks, disrepair in inactive plants, and power instability due to the destruction of Ukraine's energy system cast serious doubt on the industry's ability to quickly turn a profit even after the conflict ends. This means that the deal has no short- to medium-term gains for either country. Extraction aside, Ukraine does not possess mineral refining capacity that is crucial to achieve true mineral independence. This would leave Ukraine and the US reliant on China in the interim. Moreover, some of the mineral assessments currently under discussion were conducted under the USSR government, raising questions about the obsolescence of the data. Another crucial factor is the jurisdiction and management of the critical minerals deposits in Donetsk, Lugansk, Kherson, and Zaporizhzhia, which are said to have $350 billion worth of critical minerals. With failing war talks, Russia has offered mineral exploration deals to the US in Eastern Ukraine, casting huge doubt on the future of the region. Moreover, getting businesses to invest will be difficult as private companies will be deterred by the volatility in the region. Thus, the deal has a weak economic rationale, but it justifies further US involvement in Ukraine to the domestic electorate, and in the absence of security guarantees, the continued access to American aid, American involvement in mineral extraction and post-war reconstruction of Ukraine guarantees further US presence and possibly stability in post-war Ukraine.
