Latest news with #RashtriyaSwayamsevakSangh
Time of India
a day ago
- General
- Time of India
Villagers plant 2,500 saplings to protect govt land
Dharwad: The villagers of Baad in Dharwad taluk celebrated Vanamahotsava by planting 2,500 saplings in just two hours to protect government land from being encroached upon. More than 500 residents of Baad, along with support from neighbouring villages, picked up shovels and pickaxes early in the morning and gave new life to the village's gomala (grazing land). They planted over 25 varieties of fruit-bearing, medicinal and eco-friendly plants. Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh's All-India Organisational head Mangesh Bhende, who inaugurated the programme, emphasised the urgent need for environmental conservation. "The time has come for villagers to once again focus on preserving nature. In other states, people dedicate at least a day to the environment. Local festivals should be celebrated in nearby forests with simple, traditional food. Villagers must take responsibility for protecting the saplings they plant," Bhende said. Siddashivayogigalu from Siddashrama, Devarahubballi, said nature is a gift from God, and it is everyone's responsibility to preserve it for future generations. "The beautiful environment gifted by God is now on the verge of destruction. The people of Baad have set an example for others through this noble act," he said. In his introductory remarks, social activist Kallanagouda Patil recalled how, in the past, farmers had to pay taxes for this Jagir land, and if they lacked money, they had to give their cattle in lieu of tax. by Taboola by Taboola Sponsored Links Sponsored Links Promoted Links Promoted Links You May Like This Trend Is Changing Bridal Beauty vividtrendlab Undo Several prominent members of RSS, including Shridhar Nadgir, Mallikarjun Jodalli, Ningappa Madivalar, Hanumanthappa Amblennavar, Nagappa Jodalli, Shivanand Menasinakai and Yallappa Madar were present at the event. The Vanamahotsava was organised by Sai Garments, Jeevana Mukti Foundation, and Aarya Grama Baad. Baad village has around 500 acres of naturally rich land, including Gomala. In recent years, land mafias have tried to illegally grab this area. But by planting saplings, the villagers have successfully protected this government property. Notably, they have also taken full responsibility for nurturing and preserving the newly planted saplings, said the villagers.
The Hindu
2 days ago
- Politics
- The Hindu
An excerpt from Believer's Dilemma:Vajpayee and the Hindu Right's Path to Power (1977-2018)
The second volume of a two-part biography, Believer's Dilemma begins with a watershed moment when India voted in its first non-Congress government at the Centre in 1977. The Sangh Parivar was in the coalition, and Atal Bihari Vajpayee got the post of External Affairs Minister. Two years later, when the coalition collapsed, Vajpayee 'publicly apportioned some of the blame to the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh,' whose ideology he believed in. After a stint in government, 'the believer now had dilemmas,' and Vajpayee's relationship with the Sangh Parivar would 'remain a convoluted affair till the very end.' An edited excerpt: Janata went to its funeral not only unsung but also unbathed. In mid-July 1979, the RSS's labour wing Bharatiya Mazdoor Sangh instigated a strike in Delhi's water supply department, demanding a pay hike and better working conditions. It led to 'choking lavatories, bursting sewers, threat of epidemics in the slums and not a drop to drink anywhere in the city'. Confined to his hospital bed, Vajpayee felt exasperated with old colleagues such as Dattopant Thengadi, who was spearheading the water strike, for worsening the chaos in the capital. Seeds of discord Away from the mayhem, undergoing physiotherapy at his private retreat, Vajpayee introspected on the previous twenty-eight months. He used the time to churn out a longish op-ed for theIndian Express, where he argued that the responsibility for the collapse of the first non-Congress government lay with leaders across all factions. Partly because he was under pressure from both sides, and divided in his loyalties, he adopted the tone of a detached referee. The highlight of this essay was Vajpayee's takedown of his own fraternity for their failure to demonstrate that they did not seek a political role: 'Patronising a press that takes sides in the sordid politics of power, involvement in youth bodies that interact with political parties, participating in trade union rivalries such as the one which recently brought enormous misery to the people of Delhi by callously cutting off the water supply – these do not help an organisation to establish its apolitical credentials. It is possible that some people genuinely feel apprehensively about the RSS. A certain onus accordingly devolved on the RSS, an onus that has not been discharged effectively by the RSS. Its repudiation of the theocratic form of the state was welcome, yet the question could legitimately be asked – why does it not open its doors to non-Hindus?' Vajpayee's unexpected outburst had an urgent purpose: it was a careful PR exercise in showcasing the Jan Sangh's independence from Nagpur, so Janata could lure back some of the MPs who had crossed over. In truth, he continued to be emotionally tied to and dependent on the RSS to bolster his political muscle. His mild criticism also evaded the more serious charges of the Sangh Parivar's involvement in anti-Muslim violence. Later, the enquiry commissions implicated the RSS. As in the past, the essay declared the riots to be a law-and-order failure (in Aligarh) or a response to provocation from the Muslims, such as an attack on a Ram Navami procession (in Jamshedpur). Power games Charan Singh had found his moment of supreme glory, but with enough hint that he could not hold on to it for long. He had agreed to withdraw Emergency cases against Indira and Sanjay Gandhi. But this demand was rebuffed by Congress-U, a breakaway faction of Mrs. Gandhi's party that formed the backbone of his ragtag coalition. It served Indira Gandhi well to pull the plug after twenty-three days of outside support. The way was finally clear for Jagjivan Ram, who had more than 200 Janata MPs supporting him. Vajpayee's essay helped the Janata president, Chandra Shekhar, who praised 'Atal jee on his courageous clear vision' and beseeched the defectors to return and help usher Jagjivan Ram as the first Dalit prime minister of the republic. If the plan succeeded, it would make for a profound moment of democratic deepening. On 22 August, Vajpayee had flown to Madras to induce M. G. Ramachandran of the AIADMK – All India Anna Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam – whose flock had eighteen MPs, to support the Dalit leader. Just when MGR had nearly agreed that afternoon, the bid turned infructuous. Vajpayee received news from the capital: the president of India had, rather dubiously, dissolved the Lok Sabha. Claims, counter claims It was now a three-ring circus. Touring for elections, Vajpayee's twin targets were Charan Singh and Indira Gandhi. The strategy left many voters confused, unable to distinguish between Janata and Charan Singh's new party. Vajpayee tried convincing the voters that Janata had accomplished 'a lot in its short tenure'. Everywhere he flew – now in a private plane – he made hour-long speeches reminding the crowd of Janata having restored democracy, freedom of press, and judiciary. He cited improved economic indicators: falling prices, rising food stocks, doubled foreign exchange reserves. He pointed out that Janata had boosted relations with all major countries without damaging with any. Mrs. Gandhi mocked Janata as a mishmash – a 'khichdi sarkaar' – and beseeched people to 'vote for a government that works'. The Congress-I even managed to pierce the armour of the former foreign minister: they convinced his eldest brother, Awadh Behari, who had recently retired from his government job in Bhopal, to join Mrs. Gandhi's party. Atal was obviously embarrassed, but salvaged the situation saying there was 'nothing wrong' with his elder brother joining his rivals: 'It is his personal decision. I will not mind if my other brothers joined the Lok Dal or the Congress-U.' Excerpted with permission from Pan Macmillan India
Time of India
3 days ago
- General
- Time of India
Women most important factor in nation's progress: RSS chief Mohan Bhagwat
Kolhapur/Solapur: Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh ( ) chief has said women are most important in a nation's progress and all 142 crore Indians must come together to make the country great. Tired of too many ads? go ad free now Bhagwat was speaking at the "Parivar Utsav" at Hutatma Smriti Mandir on Thursday to celebrate the silver jubilee years of Udyogvardhini in Solapur. The institution was founded by late Nanaji Deshmukh, a senior RSS pracharak. Bhagwat said that if a man is trained, he will work for his lifetime, but if a woman is trained, she will not only work but also ensure the progress of the next generation. "Women are the ones who impart values and affection, and children grow under their affectionate care. Children grow under the parents' shadow till the age of 12, which becomes their foundation. During this period, their nature and temperament are formed. Even if they wander away later in life, they return to this foundation. Making this foundation strong is crucial, and this is what mothers do," said Bhagwat. Bhagwat said that women possess qualities of affection, enabling them to perform many tasks that men cannot. "However, God has also given women the qualities given to men, so women can do whatever men do. Therefore, men should not work with arrogance thinking they will uplift women. Men should allow women to do the work they wish to do and make them capable. They should be freed from traditional constraints and given open space. Today, women are at the forefront in many fields," the RSS chief said. Over the past 24 years, thousands of women overcame various challenges and journeyed towards prosperous and dignified lives with the help of Udyogvardhini. Tired of too many ads? go ad free now The institution made hundreds of women economically self-reliant by providing employment through tailoring, food products, and cooking, creating numerous women entrepreneurs. B hagwat released the book "Udyogvardhini Ki Sevavrati" written by renowned author Nayanbehen Joshi and edited by senior journalist Arun Karmarkar, and inaugurated the documentary "Akhand Yatra", based on Udyogvardhini's work. "Even the cruelest person has a grain of compassion somewhere deep inside, which is why they are in human form. Though people may seem selfish, a time comes when their inner compassion awakens, and this is eternal. A society of good people is always secure and prosperous. This is why RSS work aims to organize society. The foundation of RSS work is belongingness. The RSS pledge contains the word "our" - our sacred Hindu dharma, Hindu culture, and Hindu society for the Hindu nation - all four words have "our", which is excellent," said Bhagwat. District collector Kumar Ashirwad, Udyogvardhini president Chandrika Chauhan, institution secretary Medha Rajopadhye, guidance committee members Ram Reddy, Suhasini Shah, Vasudev Bang, Madhavi Rayte, Ketan Vora, Anand Joshi, Dhiren Gada, Udyogvardhini vice-president Shobha Shrivastav, treasurer Varsha Vibhute, director Gitanjali Chauhan, Shantabai Take, Sulochana Bhakare, Dipali Deshpande as well as large number of Udyogvardhini's sevavrati workers were present. (With inputs from Suryakant Asbe) Kate gets bail, Maratha activist detained Deepak Kate, the BJP Yuva Morcha state secretary, who was among the two arrested for attacking Sambhaji Brigade leader Pravin Gaikwad, was released on bail Thursday. Meanwhile, the Solapur police detained seven Maratha activists associated with Gaikwad's outfit. They threatened to disrupt the event where the RSS chief was the chief guest.
The Hindu
3 days ago
- Politics
- The Hindu
Bhagwat vs Modi: Is the 75-Age Rule Tearing the Sangh Parivar Apart?
Published : Jul 17, 2025 18:40 IST - 10 MINS READ The elephant in the room has reared its head and called out loud and clear. The sarsanghchalak (chief) of the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS), Mohan Bhagwat, who is no stranger to catalysing controversy with his statements, both within the Sangh Parivar and outside, caused more than a ripple or two with his reference to the late RSS stalwart Moropant Pingle's assertion that people in public life should leave the centre stage after turning 75. With this, what was discussed and commented on in political circles, also written and spoken about in the media, has now been introduced in the discourse within the Hindutva fraternity: both Bhagwat and Prime Minister Narendra Modi are soon entering that magical year when they could declare that they are now 'tired and retired', six days apart in 2025, the former on September 11 and the latter on September 17. The question after Bhagwat's stunning statement, made at a function to release a biography on the deceased leader, is direct—has the RSS publicly given a call for Modi's resignation in his 75th year to allow the BJP, after due consultation with the RSS, to choose the next Prime Minister? There is a case for the contention that the opposition and media is reading too much into Bhagwat's anecdotal rendering of an assertion by one of the tallest RSS leaders of the 1980s and early 1990s: Pingle after all oversaw the Hindutva camp's 'operation demolition' in Ayodhya, Uttar Pradesh on December 6, 1992. For starters, the RSS media affiliate, Vishwa Samvad Kendra, writes that it is incorrect to view a fragment of Bhagwat's speech 'through the lens of contemporary politics to target the age of politicians, misconstruing it as a comment directed at those currently in politics'. Second, Union Home Minister Amit Shah unambiguously declared last year that Modi would continue as Prime Minister, at least till the end of his third term (2029). The statement was made in response to Arvind Kejriwal's provocative remark that a vote for the BJP was a vote for Shah to become Prime Minister. Also Read | The RSS sends a message And there is a third factor too: that Bhagwat and Modi share a five-decade-plus relationship built on mutual admiration and trust. Additionally, Modi considered Bhagwat's father, Madhukar Rao, a revered and inspiring RSS leader. In his 2008 book, Jyotipunj, Modi profiled several iconic RSS leaders and the senior Bhagwat was featured along with luminaries such as M.S. Golwalkar and Lakshman Rao Inamdar, Modi's own guru. Modi wrote glowingly about his interactions with Bhagwat's father during his 'infancy' in the RSS and also showered praise on the son: 'The touch of the Parasmani [Philosopher's Stone] turns iron into gold, but it cannot turn a piece of iron into another Parasmani. The story of Madhukar Rao and Mohan Rao [father-son duo] overturns this. Parasmani Madhukar Rao prepared Parasmani Mohan Rao', he wrote, the lines underscoring his regard for the current sarsanghchalak. It is not that the admiration between the two flowed in one direction only. After the 2012 Assembly election in Gujarat, won by the BJP under Modi's stewardship, the party began revving up for the 2014 Parliamentary election. The most crucial issue was choosing a prime ministerial candidate and there were several actors in the fray, including veteran L.K. Advani who still fancied his chances. But few in the party backed him, as he had been bluntly asked to step aside after the party's poor performance in 2009 with Advani as the party's electoral mascot. Importantly Bhagwat, after becoming the sarsanghchalak in March 2009, had informed Advani that the election that year would be his last chance. After the BJP won the lowest number of seats it had since 1991, the unwritten rule of '75 years as the age limit for offices across (sic) the Parivar' was introduced by Bhagwat. The ideological fountainhead With Advani out of the race in the minds of all but himself, other claimants put their hands up, the most prominent being Modi. Eventually, Modi's selection—first as poll panel chief in June 2013 and thereafter as prime ministerial candidate in September 2013—was agreed upon, but only after Bhagwat's all-important nod. The RSS chief and the other leaders in the organisation and the BJP, with the exception of Advani, M.M. Joshi, Sushma Swaraj, and a handful of others, backed Modi despite his track record of seizing complete control of the BJP in Gujarat on becoming Chief Minister in October 2001. He also kept the RSS at arm's length from the party and the State government, establishing functional autonomy from the ideological fountainhead. Despite the Chief Minister consciously promoting the Modi cult—for instance with masks of his face especially designed for the 2007 assembly election and again in 2012, Bhagwat endorsed his candidature. He did so because the Sangh Parivar had been out of power for a decade and he sensed a groundswell of support for Modi across large swathes of India. As the 2014 verdict proved, Modi led the BJP into becoming the first party since 1984 to secure a Parliamentary majority on its own without depending on coalition partners. Both the RSS and the BJP came to terms with the Modi-centrism of the government as well as the party. An early warning sounded by Advani, Joshi, and other veterans, who wrote a publicly released letter in November 2015 to Shah, the then party president, fell by the wayside. Their accusation, that the party was 'emasculated' after 2014 and 'forced to kow-tow to a handful', and that its 'consensual character had been destroyed' fell on deaf ears, and eventually the so-called margdarshaks (guides or mentors) became mere props for Modi on their birthdays. Bhagwat and the RSS leaders accepted this, because Modi remained diligently committed to the Hindutva ideology, fulfilled key programmes and objectives, and positioned people from the Sangh Parivar in crucial state institutions and bodies, especially education and culture. Despite the grand consecration ceremony of the Ram temple on the eve of the launch of the electoral campaign, where not just the lines of separation between the state and religion were completely erased but where Bhagwat, as chief of the RSS, was given pride of place during the rituals, the RSS maintained a distance from the election campaign. The participation of swayamsevaks remained lukewarm and it cast a shadow on the results: the BJP failed to get Parliamentary majority on its own and fell back on coalition partners. Bhagwat's cutting comments Modi tried to brazen it out and, obviously at his prompting, J.P. Nadda made an overzealous declaration in the middle of campaigning that the BJP no longer 'needed' the RSS; that it was 'capable' of running its own affairs, including securing electoral victory. The claim was preceded by the central BJP slogan—'Modi Ki Guarantee'—a coinage that echoed a 1980 election slogan: 'Indira ji ki baat par, mohar lagegi haath par.' (Because Indira says so, the vote be for the Congress). While never publicly stated last year that RSS swayamsevaks had stayed lukewarm during the campaign compared to their enthusiasm in 2014 and 2019, the results underscored it. And, if doubts remained, Bhagwat made a series of cutting comments where he named no one, but even political newbies knew who he inferred was not a 'true sevak'. Not just Bhagwat, but lesser beings such as the former Vice President M. Venkaiah Naidu, and senior RSS functionaries Indresh Kumar and Ram Madhav took potshots at unnamed targets for various failures. Naidu in the early years of Modi's tenure termed him 'God's gift to India', yet had the courage to say that the verdict taught everyone that 'work for the downtrodden, taking care of the oppressed, suppressed and depressed people, should be at the top of our minds', suggesting that it was being ignored by the Modi government. After government formation, it was clear that an enfeebled Modi would require the enthusiastic participation of the RSS network in the Assembly election, then due in Haryana, Maharashtra, Jharkhand and Delhi. Not only did RSS swayamsevaks campaign for the BJP, but Modi's presence was scaled down. Despite that, it became evident that even the RSS was a beneficiary of the BJP being in power and was dependent on Modi for entrenchment in institutions and influencing policy since, notwithstanding the electoral setback, he remained India's most popular leader. The question was elementary: Would Modi secure functional autonomy, as in Gujarat, or until 2024? Or would the RSS be able to ensure that Modi agreed to a consensual or collegial style of functioning? The choice of the next BJP president emerged as a contentious issue, as Modi was of the view that his writ should run in selecting the leader, as in 2014 and 2019. In contrast, the RSS viewpoint was that the choice should be agreeable to both and for that, widespread discussions were imperative. Also Read | The Sangh-sevak reunion: A strategic recalibration for BJP and RSS In the last week of March, when Modi belatedly went to the RSS Smriti Bhavan in Nagpur and joined an RSS-linked event with Bhagwat, it appeared that he had reconciled to consensually evolving key decisions with the RSS leadership. Operation Sindoor, however, changed that and the military exchange with Pakistan after the terrorist strike, Modi believed, had restored his popularity to previous levels. Quite clearly, this has delayed the selection of the BJP president. The choice, whenever announced, will be a clear pointer to how this round of tussles has squared off. There is little doubt that despite their decades-long association, the priorities of both men are personal leverage for Modi and the supremacy of the Sangh for Bhagwat. Barring Modi's pursuit of economic neo-liberalism and his political pragmatism, there is little to distinguish between the two. Undeniably, the possibility of Bhagwat and Modi walking into the sunset at almost the same time is not imminent. From the festival of Dussehra this year, the centenary celebrations of the RSS will begin in real earnest and last until Vijaya Dashami in 2026. Bhagwat may like this to be his swansong, even if Modi displays no signs of budging, contending that 'retirement at 75' is not a firm rule and that not all sarsanghchalaks bowed out of office on completing 75. Despite undeniable ambiguity on the matter, Modi's moral standing within the Sangh Parivar will take a beating, however slight, in the event of Bhagwat bowing out of office and Modi staying put amid a cacophony of prompted 'requests'. Consternation in the Modi camp A key factor that could make the path bumpy for Modi is the RSS reaching the conclusion that support for Hindutva among the people has acquired a critical mass, making the role of an individual leader less crucial. Modi's continuance in office depends on being considered absolutely essential for securing the BJP's victory in 2029 and maybe even ahead. Given Modi's instinctive character and the tenets of the RSS, especially its principle of putting sangathan over vyakti, it is extremely unlikely that the two can work harmoniously for long periods. Consequently, the only conclusion that can possibly be drawn at this point is that the RSS, and more so Bhagwat, will continue to make statements that cause awkwardness and consternation in the Modi camp. Internal dynamics within the Sangh Parivar have been unsettled since early 2024 and will likely remain so over the year. Author and journalist Nilanjan Mukhopadhyay has authored several books including a biography of PM Narendra Modi, on the RSS, and on the Ayodhya dispute.
The Wire
3 days ago
- Politics
- The Wire
Preparing for a Post-Modi Era? Why Ram Madhav's Book Matters
Bharatiya Janata Party and Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh leader Ram Madhav's latest book, The New World: 21st Century Global Order and India, can be read on three levels. The first part tells the story of the world since the dawn of time in a relatively descriptive manner, so I will not refer to it much in this review. In the second part, devoted to India, Madhav presents his worldview in a very interesting way. He also expresses reservations about India's chances of becoming a great nation and, implicitly, criticises government policies, while rehabilitating an important part of the Congress's legacy – a first for a Sangh Parivar leader since 2014. Hindu nationalism, its enemies and its new friends Ram Madhav is now regarded as an organic intellectual of the Hindu nationalist movement, and this book provides insight into several facets of that movement. However, he never refers to its founding fathers (there is no mention of V.D. Savarkar) or its organisations. There is no mention of the RSS and its affiliates either. The aim here is to show that Hindutva is just one variant of a broader phenomenon that affects the whole world and which Madhav calls "national conservatism," echoing the National Conservatism Conference in which he participated in 2024. This book therefore contains key elements of this movement, starting with the idea that India is the source of many inventions that have enabled humanity to prosper: in ancient times (no date is specified), "led by the Hindus and the Greeks, a moral order began to take shape in the early centuries before the beginning of the Christian era" (p. xii). The author adds, in an equally vague and peremptory manner: "Around the same time, the Hindus also came forward with their Vedas, Upanishads and other classical literature, leading to the evolution of a superior social order in the East" (p. xiii). The result: "India was the largest economy in the world in the first millennium" (p. xiv). In fact, it was under the Mughals that India became one of the leaders of the world economy. But Ram Madhav rewrites history and, in line with Hindu nationalist dogma, claims that this golden age was followed by an era of decline due to the Mughals: "Colonization, first by the Mughals and other Central Asians, then by the British for over 800 years, had left the country pulverized and pauperized" (p. xiv). If India, according to Madhav, experienced such a Golden Age, it is because Hinduism cultivates an ethic of tolerance. In contrast, Christianity and Islam led humanity to its downfall because they promoted "a religion-centric world order in European lands. Both Christianity and Islam dominated every aspect of human existence, including science, art, and culture. Anything that went against the precepts of religion was violently rejected and suppressed. The domination of the world became the singular mission of the Semitic faiths, leading to wars and conquests that caused enormous human suffering' (p. xiv). These sentences are very interesting because of the mistrust of religion they express: for Hindu nationalists, who readily claim to be Hindus and oppose secularism, Hindus are not defined by religious beliefs but by their ethnicity, so that they form a people descended from the first humans, the Aryans. The analogy with Zionism is all the clearer here, since not only are Jews a people descended from the tribes of Israel, but they also appeared on sacred land, a notion that is equally omnipresent in Hindutva, where Bharat forms what Savarkar calls a " punyabhoomi," a sacred territory. The ancient splendour of India fuels Ram Madhav's civilisational narrative, according to which his country can now reconnect with its past glory and regain international greatness beyond even the areas it once dominated: "The extended neighbourhood offers India a great opportunity because of its millennia-long historical and civilisational ties with the subcontinent. Unlike China, India enjoys enormous goodwill in this extended region, from ASEAN to Africa to the South Pacific, due to the ancient cultural connection, which it should be able to turn into a diplomatic advantage" (p. xxxviii). In fact, the author's main objective is to restore India's status as a great power and even its "greatness" (p. 311). To achieve this, the "soft power" on which Nehru relied – described as "romantic" and "idealistic" – will not be enough: "It is time for India to make strenuous efforts to build 'Brand Bharat'—a benign global influence. The era of soft power is passé, and the time has come for 'smart power' to create a unique brand identity for nations" (p. xxxviii). This quest for power requires closer ties with "like-minded countries" and the development of industrial, military, and scientific capabilities. India's potential friends are defined in negative terms: they are primarily political forces that share the same enemies as Hindu nationalists. These adversaries form a heterogeneous group – called the "deep state" (p. 158) – ranging from "liberals" to "leftists," "cultural Marxists," "Islamists," and "woke" individuals, who are mainly found among NGOs. Of all these, Soros is the most feared. Madhav's discourse is primarily defensive: India must resist destabilisation efforts on all fronts. This has resulted in a whole repertoire of victimisation that national-populists are currently cultivating around the world: "In India, Soros is accused of supporting and sponsoring anti-Modi government campaigns such as the 2020–21 farmers' uprising and a recent attack on Indian business tycoon Gautam Adani by a lesser-known outfit called Hindenburg Research. In fact, the farmers' agitation launched against the Modi government's agricultural policies was the latest example of India's brush with global NGOs (GNGOs). The Indian government suspected the role of some GNGOs in supporting and sponsoring this agitation. 'Toolkit' as a disruptive concept became popular during this agitation with the likes of Greta Thunberg jumping in. Thunberg inadvertently put a toolkit in the public domain before hastily withdrawing it. The toolkit, allegedly created by a Canada-based organisation called the Poetic Justice Foundation (PJF) with links to separatist groups such as the Khalistanis, not only contained seditious material but also highlighted the modus operandi of some of the GNGOs' (p. 140). This conspiracy theory may raise a smile, but it lies at the heart of the nationalist-conservative phenomenon, whose proponents seek to thwart plans that would ruin the social order (and therefore the domination of the traditional elites) and destroy morality by destroying the family (hence their opposition to homosexuality, for example). What they fear is seeing their civilisation destabilised from outside. The words "chaos" and "anarchy" appear repeatedly in Madhav's writing. To resist, he wants to align himself with Donald Trump, Viktor Orban, Giorgia Meloni, Marine Le Pen, and others. Madhav's social conservatism goes beyond defending the family to encompass the caste system, which he sees as just one expression of India's diversity: "India's demographic diversity in terms of its castes, languages, and religions adds great color and celebration to it" (p. 265). How, moreover, does Madhav measure respect for religious diversity in India, when Muslims are victims of discrimination, segregation, and violence on a daily basis? He bases it on demographic growth – estimated at 7.81% in a highly controversial Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development study – because surely an oppressed community cannot have many children: "In India's context, a 7.81 percent increase in the populations of Muslims, Christians, Sikhs, and Buddhists (Parsis and Jains saw a decline) indicated that contrary to propaganda, especially in the Western media, minorities enjoy relative comfort in the country" (p. 281). Any social science student knows that the primary explanatory variable for female fertility is lack of education, hence the correlation between socio-educational development and population growth. Madhav's national conservatism involves a degree of authoritarianism that only appears in the epilogue, but which is particularly radical. For him, India must transition to "Dharmocracy," which he refers to as "democracy, the Bharat way" (p. 320). Madhav defines Dharma here as an "ethical-spiritual order" and "the only supreme authority," whose guardians are the Rajgurus (the Brahmins who guide rulers in the Hindu tradition). In Dharmocracy, as in any theocracy, those who exercise power are therefore not accountable to the people (the demos) but to the Dharma, represented by priests. For Madhav, Modi led India down this path in 2023 when he installed in the new parliament the sacred sceptre called sengol, which was used by the Rajguru of the Chola dynasty in southern India in medieval times. Why India is not necessarily on the rise If, for Madhav, India must therefore return to a type of authoritarian regime in order to be stronger, at the same time, by combining the old with the new, it must become a modern power, and it is above all to this project that the second part of his book is devoted, the tone of which is surprisingly measured, even pessimistic. Admittedly, Modi's India has broken with Nehru's "romantic globalism," but what has it achieved in ten years? In the second part, the book oscillates between pretension and thinly veiled criticism. This gives rise to recurring contradictions: on the one hand, Madhav condemns the policies implemented by the Congress Party, while on the other, he constantly cites the achievements of Nehru and his descendants, whether in the IITs or in regional diplomacy. This last example deserves closer examination. First, Madhav admits that" "Prime Minister Nehru played an important role in the transition of power in Nepal from the Ranas to a constitutional monarchy under King Tribhuvan Bir Bikram Shah Dev" (p. 288). The same is true of Sri Lanka: 'With Sri Lanka, too, India's relations began on a friendly and cordial note after the former's independence from the British in February 1948. The post-Independence Sri Lankan leadership, under S.W.R.D. Bandaranaike, joined the NAM and supported India on issues ranging from domestic ones like the accession of Goa, Diu and Daman, to international ones like the Suez crisis. Nehru's death in 1964 was also declared a public holiday in Sri Lanka in his honour" (p. 288). Madhav then reviews the rest of South Asia and acknowledges the excellence of Nehru's diplomacy and that of his successors: 'India's ties with Myanmar also began on a friendly and cordial note after Independence. Prime Minister Nehru enjoyed a good personal rapport with U Nu, the Burmese prime minister. Both countries signed a Treaty of Peace and Friendship in 1951. "Bangladesh owed its birth to India when Prime Minister Indira Gandhi decided to send the Indian Army to help the Mukti Bahini rebels secure freedom from Pakistan in the final phase of the war in 1971 (p. 289). Beyond the Nehru-Gandhi family, other Congress leaders stand out, such as Narasimha Rao: 'India's romance with the Indian Ocean began in 1992 when PM Narasimha Rao enunciated what became famous as the Look East policy' (p. 299). Even Manmohan Singh, so disparaged by Narendra Modi, receives praise from Ram Madhav: "In 2008, the UPA government led by PM Dr. Manmohan Singh promoted the Indian Ocean Naval Symposium (IONS), the first initiative of its kind to bring together the navies of the IOR. A decade later, IONS boasted of the participation of 35 navies from the region in its activities" (p. 301). It is on this interesting question of neighbourly relations that Ram Madhav contradicts himself most and in the most instructive way: on the one hand, he gets carried away, caught up in his desire for power for India; on the other, ceasing to believe his own lies, he opens his eyes to reality in a flash of lucidity. See for yourself. On the one hand, he writes: 'India has already emerged as a regional leader by building architectures such as SAARC and BIMSTEC with varying degrees of success. In the Indian Ocean Region, India commands enormous respect due to its longstanding cultural and civilizational ties with many countries. Once a leader in the NAM, it now champions the cause of the Global South, attracting substantial traction in Asia and Africa' (p. 113-114). On the other hand, ceasing to mistake his desires for reality, he admits: 'Both SAARC and BIMSTEC failed to promote coherent regionalism like the ones witnessed among CIS countries, ASEAN, or even the EU. SAARC became a victim of Indo-Pak rivalry, and has remained dysfunctional for a decade now. The last summit-level meeting of the SAARC countries took place in Kathmandu in November 2014. Since then, the regional body has remained dormant. On the other hand, although India attached strategic importance to the BIMSTEC arrangement, it didn't acquire the required momentum either' (p. 287). Does this mean that Modi's 'neighbourhood first' policy has failed? But regional issues are not the only area where criticism of the Modi government is evident. When he seeks to highlight Modi's achievements, he finds nothing but symbols, or even political marketing: "PM Modi understands the importance of India presenting itself [my emphasis] to global powers as a regional leader – one that enjoys the goodwill and support of its neighbours." Worse still, neutralism – which is denounced when equated with Nehru's non-alignment – becomes a paradoxical virtue, even in the case of the war in Gaza (during which India systematically abstained at the UN, even when it came to calling for a ceasefire). Incomprehensibly, Madhav describes this policy as "strategic autonomy," a term introduced into the lexicon of international relations by De Gaulle to refer to the absence of military dependence on foreign powers: "The strategic autonomy doctrine is evident in India's response to conflicts in Ukraine and Gaza. In both conflicts, the Indian leadership refused to take sides and maintained proactive neutrality, engaging with all sides of the conflict. India was among the 32 other member countries of the UN Security Council, including China, that abstained from voting when the UN General Assembly adopted a resolution in February 2023 demanding that Russia should 'immediately, completely and unconditionally withdraw all of its military forces from the territory of Ukraine" (p. 258). But the most important point lies elsewhere: in Madhav's skepticism when it comes to economic, scientific, and military development, given that, as he repeatedly states, a nation's power can only be based on strong industry and cutting-edge technology. In this regard, everything remains to be done, and the author regrets that so little has been accomplished. The word "unfortunately" appears more than 10 times in the last 100 pages. When it comes to technological advances, the situation is critical because India: "...suffers from challenges such as a shortage of talent in quantum physics, limited funding, an infrastructure gap, and weak collaboration between industry and academia. India must approach this technological challenge with urgency and seriousness. It needs to revamp its education and research infrastructure completely. It needs to invest heavily in areas of innovation in frontier technologies. It should focus on building a strong culture of R&D and institutions that support innovation to ramp up its technological prowess. In the past, we achieved noteworthy progress in areas like nuclear fusion and space. Indian nuclear fusion research is making remarkable progress at an impressive pace" (p. 268). Madhav cites the achievements of the Indian Space Research Organisation (ISRO), which was created during the Congress era, and the first supercomputer, the CDC 6600, which appeared under Nehru. Even when the Modi government took initiatives, they appear insufficient to the author: '[Modi's] government took the important initiative of establishing the National Mission on Quantum Technologies & Applications (NM-QTA) in 2020 with a five-year budget outlay of about $1 billion. India became the seventh country to have a quantum mission. However, much needs to be done in terms of actual research and output. Capital investments have to increase manifold, and private equity also has to step in' (p. 270). The heart of the problem lies in the training of the elite: "India's education infrastructure remains lacklustre in terms of academic research and innovation rigor. India produces 1.5 million engineers every year, but what it needs is not just engineers but 'imagineers' – engineers with the power of imagination and innovation" (pp. 271-272). Madhav concludes: "Imitation is not innovation, and copying is not creativity" (p. 275). In terms of defence, Indian industry is so underperforming that, Madhav points out, the air force is still waiting for delivery of 40 Tejas fighter jets, whose development began in 1984. Madhav repeatedly compares India's delays with China's advances, which fuel his concerns. The Indian navy also appears to be in a poor state with its two aircraft carriers and 16 submarines. It needs to acquire 200 additional ships and 24 submarines. As Madhav states: "Achieving that capability is critical to India's future global role" (p. 310). The social consequences of India's economic weakness, and in particular the difficulties faced by its industry (once again in competition with China), do not escape the author's keen insight. He admits that "India faces the challenge of unemployment and underemployment" (p. 277), once again lamenting the mediocrity of education in a context of rapid population growth: "India's challenge is its low-skilled, semi-skilled and unskilled labor workforce. In the age of frontier technologies, a population boom without adequate skilling infrastructure will be a recipe for disaster" (p. 277). Under these conditions, India's demographic dividend is nothing more than a pipe dream. Conclusion: "India needs to tackle this demographic challenge diligently" (p. 282). At this stage, one is tempted to ask: what is the government doing about this? The question is all the more pressing given that Madhav seems to find answers by quoting another Congress leader, Lal Bahadur Shastri: "Shastri said the following in his first Independence Day speech in 1964 that stirred the conscience of the entire nation: ""We can win respect in the world only if we are strong internally and can banish poverty and unemployment from our country. Above all, we need national unity. Communal, provincial, and linguistic conflicts weaken the country""(p. 317). Should we conclude that, for Madhav, the way in which the Modi government has played the identity polarisation card needs to be revisited? Overall, while Madhav believes that 'the new Indian leadership is looking towards building a nation capable of becoming an important player on the global stage' (p. 315), for the moment, after more than ten years, the results are mixed at best. This criticism, coming from one of the most prominent Hindu nationalist leaders, is unprecedented. But given his responsibilities, it could even be seen as self-criticism. How far can this shift go? Should we expect a change of course, with the organisation of a "caste census" as the first sign, or is this initiative purely tactical? Only time will tell, but if it turns out that in Modi's India, "the more things change, the more they stay the same," Madhav's book may be paving the way for the post-Modi era – a highly anticipated milestone for the RSS. Christophe Jaffrelot is Senior Research Fellow at CERI-Sciences Po/CNRS, Paris, Professor of Indian Politics and Sociology at King's College London, Non resident Scholar at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace and Chair of the British Association for South Asian Studies.
