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15-04-2025
- Politics
- Yahoo
Lebanon Needs Help From the U.S. to Finish Disarming Hezbollah
For the first time in the history of the often-uneasy relations between Lebanon, Israel and the United States, all three sides agree on a common end state for Lebanon: The Lebanese state should gain a monopoly on the use of force in that country, and the Lebanese army should become its sole legitimate provider of security. In practical terms, this means the disarmament of Hezbollah and all other armed militias operating on Lebanese soil, consistent with United Nations Resolutions 1559 and 1701. The three sides still disagree on how to achieve that outcome, and U.S. President Donald Trump's administration is running out of patience with the impasse. But through U.S.-facilitated confidence-building measures between Lebanon and Israel, the current diplomatic deadlock can be broken. This is urgently needed to preserve the momentum created since the cessation of hostilities between Israel and Hezbollah last November, avert a new war and ultimately achieve a lasting peace between the two countries. But first, it's important to recognize how monumental this moment is and how the three sides got here. Hezbollah emerged severely weakened from its latest war with Israel, which began when the group started launching rockets, drones and missiles against northern Israel on Oct. 8, 2023, in support of Hamas. The conflict ended after a sustained assault by Israel last summer and fall that left Israeli forces in control of five strategic positions in southern Lebanon. The war may not have dealt a fatal blow to Hezbollah, but it is definitely not the force it once was. Israel has decapitated the group, deeply penetrated its upper-echelon leadership and destroyed much of its arsenal, thus casting serious doubt about its future as a coherent armed unit. Hezbollah's significant loss of influence—coupled with the collapse of the regime of former dictator Bashar al-Assad in Syria, which had long been a major conduit of Iranian-supplied weapons for the Shiite party—has had immediate effects on Lebanon's internal power dynamics. Because Hezbollah is no longer able to exercise a veto on political developments in the country, let alone impose its will on its domestic adversaries as it did in recent years, a pro-reform tandem is in now charge in Beirut: President Joseph Aoun—the highly respected former army chief—and Prime Minister Nawaf Salam are charting a new political course for Lebanon, one that is centered on holistic change and free of the dominance of Hezbollah and its main ally, Iran. To get more in-depth news and expert analysis on global affairs from WPR, sign up for our free Daily Review newsletter. To be sure, Lebanon is still faced with numerous challenges, including fixing a severe economic crisis, securing the independence of the judicial system, reforming the state bureaucracy and restructuring the banking sector. Yet none is more significant and urgent than identifying a viable path toward disarming Hezbollah. Indeed, Hezbollah's weapons are the biggest obstacle to any Lebanese state-building project, as they enable and sustain all of the above-mentioned problems. Brokered by the U.S. and France, the ceasefire agreement that ended the fighting between Israel and Hezbollah last year calls on the former to withdraw all its troops from southern Lebanon and the latter to move its fighters away from the northern bank of the Litani River. The Lebanese army, with the help of the U.N. Interim Force in Lebanon, or UNIFIL, is expected to substantially increase its deployment in the area and seize all arms belonging to Hezbollah. The Lebanese army has made important strides in destroying Hezbollah stockpiles in the area south of the Litani River, with little to no resistance from the group. Since the ceasefire, it has carried out more than 500 missions to inspect potential Hezbollah sites, dismantle infrastructure and confiscate weapons. It has even won praise for its efforts from the commanding officer of the U.S.-French monitoring mechanism helping it locate those sites. While the Lebanese army has admirably pursued its mission in the area south of the Litani River, it has struggled in the northern part, whose Lebanese Shiite communities have long been a base of support for Hezbollah. Indeed, it only started to move very slowly and carefully toward the area north of the Litani, where it is suspected that heavy Hezbollah stockpiles are located, last week. Beirut has argued that the lack of progress in the area is due to Israel's continued occupation of the five key high points in southern Lebanon, in violation of the ceasefire agreement. The Lebanese government is reluctant to instruct the army to dismantle Hezbollah's weapons infrastructure north of the Litani more quickly and forcibly, because Hezbollah stores many of its weapons in the area in civilian homes, meaning the army would have to enter those homes to confiscate them. It fears that, absent a full Israeli withdrawal, Hezbollah and its supporters may be less compliant than they have been to date south of the Liani. And the army, which remains one of the few state institutions to enjoy broad popular trust in Lebanon, is not about to fight the very people it is supposed to protect for the sake of Israeli security. If it does, it could lose that societal consensus on its role and see defections within its ranks. That's a recipe for disintegration along sectarian lines, which has happened twice in Lebanon's recent history, in 1976 and 1984. For its part, Israel cites security concerns for keeping its troops in Lebanon, claiming that Hezbollah—also in violation of the ceasefire—is attempting to rebuild in the south as well as in Beirut's southern suburbs. There have also been several instances of rockets having been fired against Israel from southern Lebanon since the ceasefire. In addition to remaining in southern Lebanon, the Israeli military has been conducting periodic attacks against Hezbollah operatives and facilities anytime it sees a threat. Israel has at least three reasons for wanting to maintain a troop presence in southern Lebanon: first, to create a buffer zone that might alleviate the concerns of Israelis who had to flee their homes in the north during the 13 months of fighting with Hezbollah; second, to exercise political pressure on the Lebanese government to expedite the process of Hezbollah's disarmament; and third, to maintain the unity and cohesion of the ultra-rightwing Israeli government, which opposes making any concessions in Gaza and Lebanon. The standoff ultimately comes down to an understandable lack of trust between the two sides, which only an incremental approach that includes confidence-building measures can fix. The Lebanese government can do its part by formally announcing that it is committed to a verifiable process to disarm Hezbollah, as well as a fixed timetable of at most a few months to do so. In addition, it should immediately instruct the Lebanese army to formulate and publicly communicate a comprehensive strategy for securing both its southern and northeastern borders. To make it politically credible and militarily effective, such a strategy would need to be developed with the help of U.S. Central Command and the U.S. Embassy's Defense Attache Office in Beirut. Over the years, U.S. military assistance has helped improve the capabilities of the Lebanese army, allowing it in 2017 to successfully evict scores of ISIS fighters in the north and pursue a range of counter-smuggling operations along the border with Syria. But even if the Lebanese government were to order the army to step up, it lacks the experience and the necessary funding, personnel, training and equipment to secure the borders with both Israel and Syria. Indeed, that the army has been able to survive at all despite years of political crises in Beirut and the collapse of the Lebanese economy is nothing short of a miracle. This is where U.S. engagement becomes crucial. If Washington significantly upgrades its military assistance program with Lebanon, it will enable the Lebanese army to deploy 15,000 troops south of the Litani in accordance with the terms of the U.S.-French roadmap, which itself could alleviate the security concerns of Israel and incentivize it to withdraw from the five hilltops it now occupies. The troops aren't a the Lebanese army lacks in particular to fulfill its duties is a multidomain awareness concept and system to carry on and expand the disarmament of Hezbollah along the southern border with Israel, and to prevent the smuggling of goods, arms and people across the northeastern border with Syria. Some of the requirements for implementing such a strategy include enhanced capabilities in intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance, or ISR, such as unmanned aerial surveillance and targeting systems, radars, ground sensors and human intelligence assets. But that only covers data collection. The Lebanese army would also have to analyze, fuse and disseminate that data effectively, which would require AI-driven threat analysis, a joint operations intelligence center and improved connectivity. Finally, to act on this data, the Lebanese army would have to create two additional Land Border Regiments as well as a Quick Reaction Force equipped with tactical and reconnaissance vehicles, helicopters and maritime assets. All of this would require U.S. security cooperation. But in addition to helping to build the capacity of the Lebanese army, the U.S. must also try to bridge the divide between the Lebanese and Israeli positions and push both sides to make concessions in the interest of a common end state and regional security. Indeed, it is uniquely positioned to do so, but as mentioned already, the Trump administration's patience is wearing thin. Israel must realize that it is shooting itself in the foot by continuing to occupy Lebanese territory without a clear security rationale, while Lebanon must appreciate that the new strategic environment has dramatically shifted in favor of Israel and that the window of opportunity for U.S. engagement will not remain open forever. The worst-case scenario for Lebanon would be if the U.S. loses interest in the country. We're not there yet, but unlike in the past, it's no longer an unthinkable scenario, especially if Lebanon continues to avoid the hard decisions on disarming Hezbollah and kick the can down the road. Bilal Y. Saab is the senior managing director of TRENDS US, an associate fellow with Chatham House and an adjunct professor with Georgetown University. The post Lebanon Needs Help From the U.S. to Finish Disarming Hezbollah appeared first on World Politics Review.
Asharq Al-Awsat
18-03-2025
- Politics
- Asharq Al-Awsat
UNIFIL Demands Lebanon, Israel to Authorize New Surveillance Technologies
UN Security Council members on Monday inquired about the request of UNIFIL to possess new technologies that would guarantee the mission's freedom of movement and access throughout its area of operations along the Blue Line in the south of Lebanon. In closed consultations held on Monday, the UN Council members received a briefing on UN Secretary General Antonio Guterres' latest report on the implementation of resolution 1701, which was circulated to Council members on 11 March. The report urged prioritizing UNIFIL's monitoring and verifying mechanisms, and enhancing tactical response in implementation of the resolution. Adopted in 2006, Resolution 1701 called for a cessation of hostilities between Israel and Hezbollah. At the session on Monday, Council members listened to briefings by Special Coordinator for Lebanon Jeanine Hennis-Plasschaert and Under-Secretary-General for Peace Operations Jean-Pierre Lacroix on developments in UNIFIL area of operations from south of the Litani River to the Blue Line in accordance with the Taif Accord and Security Council Resolutions 1559, 1701 and 1680. The resolutions stipulate the disarmament of armed groups in Lebanon, including Hezbollah and the full control of territories by the Lebanese government. In his 35-page report, the Secretary-General welcomed the 'continued holding of the cessation of challenges.' The report registered progress towards the objective outlined in the cessation of hostilities arrangement of the withdrawal of the Israeli army south of the Blue Line and the deployment of the Lebanese armed forces. It notes, however, that the 'situation remains fragile' and that the Israeli army has 'not yet completely withdrawn from Lebanese territory, remaining at five locations, and designating two areas as so called 'buffer zones' along the Blue Line.' The Secretary-General also noted that the Lebanese Army has started to dismantle military infrastructure and confiscate weapons 'believed to have belonged to Hezbollah south of the Litani River.' Israel's Withdrawal In his report, Guterres urged parties to effectively implement their side of the cessation of hostilities arrangement and resolution 1701. He notes that the Israeli army's presence north of the Blue Line is a violation of Lebanese sovereignty and territorial integrity, as well as of resolution 1701, and undermines the efforts of the Lebanese authorities to extend state authority throughout its territory. The UN Chief also rejected the continued occupation of the northern part of the town of Ghajar and the adjacent area north of the Blue Line, condemning 'all violations of Lebanese sovereignty.' Aoun and Salam's Efforts Guterres welcomed recent political developments in Lebanon, such as the election of President Joseph Aoun on January 9, the designation on 13 January of Nawaf Salam as prime minister and the formation of the government on 8 February. The Secretary-General spoke about the dramatic human impact and the utter level of destruction caused by the recent conflict in Lebanon, calling on donors to fully fund the 2025 Lebanon Response Plan and the Emergency Appeal. Guterres expressed 'optimism about Aoun's pledge to take control of all arms outside state authority and fully implement the ceasefire deal with Israel.' He called on the Lebanese Government to 'facilitate the full implementation of the relevant provisions of the Taif Agreement and resolutions 1559, 1701 and 1680.
