Latest news with #RussianMinistryofDefense
Saba Yemen
22-05-2025
- Politics
- Saba Yemen
Russian air defenses shoot down 105 Ukrainian drones western Russia
Moscow - (Saba): Russian air defenses shot down 105 Ukrainian drones last night, Wednesday, over the country's southwestern provinces, Crimea, and the Black Sea. According to the Russia Today website, the Russian Ministry of Defense stated in a statement: "Air defenses shot down 105 drones, including 35 in Moscow Region, 14 in Oryol Region, 12 in Kursk Region, 11 in Belgorod Region, 10 in Tula Region, nine in Kaluga Region, seven in Voronezh Region, six in Lipetsk and Smolensk Regions, and one in Bryansk Region." Whatsapp Telegram Email Print
Saba Yemen
06-05-2025
- Politics
- Saba Yemen
Russia announces control of new town in eastern Ukraine, downing 202 drones
Moscow - Saba: The Russian Ministry of Defense announced on Tuesday that its forces have captured a new town in eastern Ukraine, eliminating 1,375 soldiers and downing 202 drones. The ministry stated in a statement on Tuesday that, as a result of decisive action by units of the Russian Center Group, the town of Lysovka in Donetsk Oblast was captured. It explained that its forces targeted Ukrainian Armed Forces concentrations in the Donetsk, Sumy, and Kharkiv Oblasts, noting that Ukrainian forces lost dozens of armored combat vehicles, personnel carriers, vehicles, field guns, ammunition depots, and electronic warfare stations as a result. It indicated that operational-tactical aviation, drones, missile forces, and artillery of the Russian Armed Forces targeted infrastructure facilities at a military airport and a drone production workshop. Whatsapp Telegram Email Print more of (International)
Saba Yemen
18-04-2025
- Politics
- Saba Yemen
Russian Forces Announce Liberation of Town in Donetsk
Moscow - Saba: The Russian Ministry of Defense announced on Friday that Russian forces had liberated the town of Valentinovka in the Donetsk People's Republic. The Russian Defense Ministry said, according to Sputnik News Agency, "The town of Valentinovka in the Donetsk People's Republic was liberated thanks to active operations by units of the Russian Southern Group." The Russian Defense Ministry added in its weekly report for the period from April 12 to 18: "During this period, seven mechanized brigades, one mobile air brigade, three assault brigades, one artillery brigade, and two drone regiments of the Ukrainian Armed Forces, three territorial defense brigades, three National Guard brigades, and one brigade of the Azov Special Forces (a terrorist organization banned in Russia) were targeted." The statement continued: "From April 12 to 18, the Russian Armed Forces carried out nine combined strikes using high-precision weapons and attack drones, destroying Ukrainian military-industrial complex facilities, military airfield infrastructure, weapons and ammunition depots, missile and attack drones, and unmanned boats, drone operator training centers, and temporary deployment points of Ukrainian armed groups and foreign mercenaries." It added: "This morning, a combined strike using long-range precision weapons and unmanned aerial vehicles was carried out against key drone production sites and Ukrainian military airfield infrastructure. All strike objectives were achieved." Whatsapp Telegram Email Print
Saba Yemen
12-04-2025
- Politics
- Saba Yemen
Russia: Our fighter jets target Ukrainian armored vehicles
Moscow - (Saba): The Russian Ministry of Defense announced on Saturday that a strike group of the Russian Aerospace Forces destroyed armored vehicles belonging to the Kyiv regime forces concealed in a forest area in the border region of the Kursk Oblast, Russia. Sputnik quoted the ministry as saying in a statement: "The air strike group of the Army Aviation of the Aerospace Forces, consisting of a Ka-52M Alligator reconnaissance and attack helicopter, a Mi-28NM Night Hunter attack helicopter, and a Mi-8 multi-purpose helicopter, destroyed armored vehicles belonging to the Ukrainian Armed Forces concealed in a forest area in the border region of the Kursk Oblast." The statement added that after the strike, the crews carried out an anti-missile maneuver using the aircraft's onboard defense system and successfully returned to the takeoff airport. Whatsapp Telegram Email
Memri
09-04-2025
- Business
- Memri
Important New Trends In The Russian Military
In recent weeks, many sources – predominantly, but not solely, Ukrainian – have voiced concerns about a prospective Russian advance toward Sumy and Kharkiv. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky also confirmed that such an advance might happen in the coming months. [1] Some military analysts say that Russia lacks the resources that might be used for such a massive assault even though some troops became available to Moscow after the end of hostilities in the Kursk region, from which the Ukrainian forces had mainly withdrawn. [2] The most recent developments on the ground prove that Moscow faces serious problems with both fresh military personnel and much-needed armaments and equipment. Hence, Russia continues to wage a war of attrition, as the Ukrainian army manages to contain the Russians on most sections of the front. Nevertheless, there are intriguing trends that may add food for thought about the stance of the Russian army in early 2025. (Source: Press Service of the Russian Ministry of Defense / TASS) Not A Single Russian Region Rose The Conscription Bonuses Since 2023, I have been continuously arguing that the basic element of the Kremlin's new military policy is a so-called "Deathonomics," [3] meaning that the government avoids another forced mobilization relying instead on increasing payments for the military: both the monthly salary for those already on the frontline and signing bonuses for those who in enlist. There are also significant death gratuities , but I assume most people sign up still hoping that they may return alive. [4] For more than two years, this strategy has been paying off as tens of thousands of Russian citizens constituted those killed and wounded in action (that number is constantly growing toward a million people) [5] – but this came at a price: both federal, regional, and even municipal premiums for the enrollment went up significantly, reaching four million rubles, [6] and the government introduced some more bonuses – including a write-off of household debts of up to 10 million for either the volunteer or for his spouse or parents. [7] What happened in early 2025 looks like a correction of this trend. On the one hand, many Russian sources pointed out that the pace of recruiting has accelerated significantly, and it might be that the military command now has up to 200,000 reserve troops ready to be used for a new attack on Ukraine . [8] On the other one, the local authorities – who engaged in a fierce competition among themselves for most of 2024 – as the enrollment premiums rose from 1-1.2 million rubles to more than four million in less than a year, [9] had discontinued the rally for some unknown reason. The regional budgets for 2025 are even more balanced than they were last year; their debt burden stays at a 10-year low, [10] but not a single region has elevated the conscription bonuses since December 2024, when the government of the Samara region announced a record four-million ruble figure. [11] Furthermore, the authorities in the Rostov region voiced their willingness to lower the bonus from Rub 1.6 to 1 million effective till June 30, 2025, [12] when this sum might be lowered again (similar moves, in some cases driving the bonuses down by more than two times in value, were announced in the Belgorod and Samara regions, among others). [13] Many regional governments had announced that the elevated bonuses are in effect only till specific dates from February to May 2025 but some on them had already extended their deadlines. Of course, one may believe that the Kremlin dreams of an upcoming peace and does not want to overpay for new servicemen, but since the trend became visible well before President Donald Trump's inauguration, I would argue that a satisfactory situation with the new enrollment seems a much better explanation. Russian Policemen Quit Their Service And Enlist In The Military Another visible shift that was put into focus by many observers reinforces such reasoning. For some time, the Russian military and the police have been two separate services with rather different payroll systems. Even as the Defense Ministry proclaimed its willingness to expand the contract army since the late 2000s, the wages for the soldiers in 2011 remained quite low, never exceeding 30-35 thousand rubles. [14] On the contrary, the police underwent a major reform in 2011, changing its name from that of the old Soviet militia, and has been funded much better, these changes leading to an impressive inflow of new servicemen into the police forces in 2012-2018. [15] For some time it was difficult to enroll – in many cities competitions were even organized between those who wished to get the job. However, since at least late 2023, the top officials from the Interior Ministry started to complain that they are facing mounting problems with new recruitment, aggravated by a growing number of people quitting. In 2023, the shortage of servicemen was estimated at 100,000 people, and the most recent claims put it at 172,000 in the Interior Ministry and at around 54,000 at the prisons and jails service (ФСИН, or Federal Penitentiary Service, with is formally subordinated to the Ministry of Justice) [16] – if these numbers are accurate and if one counts on the official estimates of both ministries' staffing schedules, the shortage of employees amounts to 19 and 23 percent of the total, [17] correspondingly. The most convenient explanation for this is the wage difference between the military and police forces that emerged after the 2022 mobilization and Putin's decree introducing the 195,000 ruble salary for those serving at the frontline. [18] Yet, policemen have not experienced any significant pay hikes for at least the last decade, and the ongoing war has changed a lot, since it pushed up not only the incomes of military personnel, but wages across the country as well. Therefore, by last autumn, the salaries managed by the Interior Ministry for the most in-demand positions were 1.7–2.5 times lower than the national average: a patrol police officer was offered 38,000 rubles per month, a district police officer – 49,000 rubles, and an operative officer – just 51,000 rubles. [19] The contrast is even more striking in Russia's poorest regions, where almost no one could earn anything close to 200,000 rubles before the start of the war and long-term poverty is pushing people into the military service. This temptation, as many admit, is so strong that in the recent months some policemen quit to enlist in the military – which, I would say, appears to be an entirely new phenomenon, since for years, service in police has been seen as a relatively secure and lucrative position to which fighting the Ukrainian army cannot be even compared. The Drain From The Interior Ministry To The Army Such a change is of profound importance, since it signals two quite important trends that have occurred in Russia since the start of the war in Ukraine. On the one hand, it seems that the Russian siloviki [20] have already become a special caste possessing a very limited sense of duty but pretending to be paid several times more than the average salary a worker or clerk may earn in the country. I would insist that this phenomena has nothing to do with a "contract army" as it exists in many nations, since in most of them the servicemen's salary in fact equals the average income in this or that country or exceeds it in case the soldier is deployed to a war zone. In the U.S., for example, the total monetary and non-monetary compensation for a private stationed inside the United States is now set at around $67,000 per year, [21] while the average wage in the country stays around $77,600 . [22] In France, the numbers are €1,500 to €1,550 per month compared to the average wage in France of €2,580 in 2024. [23] In case of deployment the figures rise by at least 50 to 70 percent. In Russia, the difference between the salary of a fresh soldier deployed in Ukraine and the average pay in the country is at least two and half times larger, and such a service should be called "mercenary" rather than a "contract." It should be mentioned that these days in Russia one may sign up not only for the armed forces, but also for private military companies, operating, e.g., in Africa, which looks like mercenary business in its purest form. [24] On the other hand, nowadays we see that this trend, previously established in the military forces, will most probably be replicated by other enforcement services. The drain from the Interior Ministry to the army signals that money has became such an important driver that the appetite for risk has increased dramatically. People familiar with any kind of service in the military or enforcement structures seem to be ready to take the risk of being killed at the frontline if they are paid several thousand dollars a months and given guarantees that their families will rise from poverty if they perish in action. I would predict that this should become an alarming signal for the Kremlin, which may soon be forced to increase the payments for police officers quite significantly or face incredible problem with the staffing of its ranks. If this is done, other categories of public servants may follow, causing a serious rise in government spending. Moreover, while one may think the wages for the military may be cut if the war is over and brought down to "peacetime standards," this would not be the case if the race broadens to police force and/or to other kinds of silovikis like, e.g., bailiffs of tax officers. Many Russians Are Ready To Fight In Ukraine For Money In general, it seems that Russian society is changing rapidly and seriously. Last year, the Center for Analysis and Strategies in Europe conducted a field study in Russia in which 2000 people aged between 18 and 55 were interviewed in railway stations, wholesale markets, cheap bars, and many other places where members of the lower middle-class may be encountered. [25] Shockingly, it appeared that close to one third of all people surveyed expressed their readiness to join the Russian army fighting in Ukraine – and the check obtained for the service was the most important factor of their choice (on average, the respondents had asked for twice the current payment – both as the enrollment bonus and as the monthly pay). This represents a strong contrast with the first months of the war when only convicted criminals were ready to take the risk of military service in Ukraine, and "partial mobilization" caused hundreds of thousands to exit the country. Nowadays, it seems that many Russians have overcome their fears and become ready to sacrifice their lives for money. What this means for the Russian government and for its further ability to command its subjects, no one can say for sure these days. In some part, all this may explain Putin's ambivalence toward the armistice negotiations President Trump is wishing to evaluate "in a matter of weeks, not months." [26] Even while Russian businesses and consumers express clear enthusiasm about the peace talks, the Kremlin remains much more concerned. I would say, Russian President Vladimir Putin has some reason for that. For Putin, it is much easier to command people that have no moral sentiments but are greedy for money than somehow return Russian society to its "normal" condition and to integrate all those ready to kill for a paycheck into ordinary life. It might appear a difficult task – especially if one considers that this contagious disease is seemingly spreading from the outcasts who filled the army ranks in 2023-2024 to the broader mass of silovikis, who for years have been Putin's major support group. *Dr. Vladislav Inozemtsev is the MEMRI Russian Media Studies Project Special Advisor, and Founder and Director of the Moscow-based Center for Post-Industrial Studies. [1] March 26, 2025. [2] April 6, 2025. [3] July 11, 2023; November 13, 2024. [4] July 25, 2023. [5] April 3, 2025. [6] January 14, 2025. [7] November 23, 2024. [8] February 25, 2025. [9] December 2, 2024. [10] February 24, 2025. [11] January 14, 2025. [12] March 26, 2025. [13] March 26, 2025. [14] September 30, 2011. [15] June 26, 2019. [16] March 5, 2025; March 12, 2025. [17] March 12, 2025. [18] October 19, 2022. [19] September 16, 2024. [20] An employee of any government organization authorized to use force. [21] [22] [23] [24] April 5, 2024. [25] [26] April 4, 2025.
