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The Hindu
23-05-2025
- Politics
- The Hindu
Introspecting counter-terrorism after Operation Sindoor
The Pahalgam terror strike, on April 22, perpetrated by Pakistan proxies, and India's retribution through Operation Sindoor, on May 7, have fundamentally altered the security landscape of the region. While Operation Sindoor represents an undeniable tactical and operational success, its strategic efficacy in diminishing the long-term terrorist threat remains uncertain. At present, the discourses across all the forums in the country, unfortunately centre exclusively on matters of foreign policy and the external application of military force. The aspects concerning internalisation of terrorism in Jammu and Kashmir (J&K) have often been given a miss, thereby missing the wood for the trees. Here, it is crucial to understand that in the overall context, it has always been about winning Kashmir rather than defeating Pakistan. The complex reality of terrorism in J&K It is beyond any doubt that Pakistan bears substantial accountability for the security situation in J&K, since Independence. After exploding in 1989, the security landscape was transformed from predominantly indigenous insurgency to significant participation of foreign terrorists, around the mid-1990s. Notwithstanding the foreign terrorists, a long-term analyses of patterns of terrorism reveal that local dynamics related to identity, marginalisation, repression and political disenfranchisement have played pivotal roles. These factors have given Pakistan the fuel to foment trouble. The interplay between external sponsorship and internal vulnerabilities creates a complex ecosystem of terrorism that defies simplistic military solutions, internally or externally. Since 1989, the security forces have achieved substantial progress in J&K. As in South Asia Terrorism Portal (SATP) data, overall fatalities have reduced from over 4,000 lives in 2001 to 127 in 2024. This achievement stems from the consolidation of the security grid, the government's outreach to local populations and Pakistan's diminishing capacity to wage a high-intensity proxy war. This positive trajectory suggests that India's multifaceted approach has yielded tangible results, even as significant challenges remain and more needs to be done in the context. Deterring Pakistan Analysing terror-related fatalities in J&K over the last decade shows that kinetic actions such as surgical strikes (2016) and the Balakot aerial strike (2019) have not deterred Pakistan. SATP data show that fatalities went up to 267 in 2016 from 175 in 2015 and continued to rise through 2019. Even after the Kargil victory (1999), terror indices in the region shot up to an all time high. In Operation Sindoor, although our military actions ascended several notches above the surgical strikes or Balakot, these may still not deter Pakistan. The government of Pakistan and the Pakistani people claim that they won the 100 hours war, from May 7 to 10. Pakistan's General Asim Munir has been elevated to the rank of Field Marshal and according to Ayesha Siddiqa, a Pakistani political scientist, military nationalism has been revived in Pakistan. Deterring Pakistan in the present circumstances seems ambitious. The participation of local terrorists in J&K, at present, is very low in contrast to the Burhan Wani days. Even though foreign terrorists are now technologically savvy and are relatively less dependent on local terrorists, the role played by local terrorists cannot be underestimated. Amid heightened security concerns following the Pahalgam attack, intelligence agencies have identified scores of local terrorists with links to their foreign counterparts. The voids in the security grid in the Jammu region, caused by troops being moved to Galwan, were exploited by terrorist cadres in new groups such as The Resistance Front, the People's Anti-Fascist Front, and the Kashmir Tigers, to name a few. The deteriorating security situation in the Jammu region has been marked by a kill ratio that favours the terrorists. What is worrying is the prevalent degree of local support for the terrorists. Human intelligence, or HUMINT, seems to have dried up, which explains the sustenance of terrorists (this includes the perpetrators of Pahalgam, who continue to be at large). Beyond kinetic operations The bipartisan support of the local population in J&K against the Pahalgam massacre was spontaneous and unprecedented. Such a swell in support presents us with a strategic opportunity that must be consolidated rather than squandered through counterproductive measures such as demolishing the houses of alleged terrorists or mass arrests. While the externalisation of terrorism through high-impact, war-like response is necessary, the caveat here is that it may end up distracting us from the primary goal — terrorism in J&K. Expert commentary following Operation Sindoor suggests a concerning tendency to oversimplify the complex challenge of terrorism in J&K, potentially numbing policymakers to harder questions regarding terrorism and its roots in both external sponsorship and internal grievances. Operation Sindoor has demonstrated India's growing prowess in kinetic non-contact warfare, but this must be complemented by non-kinetic tools to establish a more effective deterrent against Pakistan. Most critical is to contextualise the multidimensional approach to the internal dynamics, where the fundamental principle of 'people as the centre of gravity' is the driving force. Sustained political engagement, economic development and social integration, complemented by security-centric measures, can complete the picture. Deterrence can materialise only through an in-depth approach that is backed by our national resolve. Shashank Ranjan is a retired Indian Army colonel with substantial experience of serving in a counter-terrorism environment. He currently teaches at the O.P. Jindal Global University, Sonepat, Haryana
Yahoo
08-05-2025
- Politics
- Yahoo
‘No deterrent value': Will India's strikes on Pakistan stop armed attacks?
New Delhi, India – As Indian military officials took the podium next to the country's foreign secretary at a media briefing on Wednesday morning, after unprecedented missile strikes into Pakistan and Pakistan-administered Kashmir, a timeline of death played out on a video screen behind them. The 2001 attack on the Indian parliament in New Delhi in which nine people were killed. An assault on the Akshardham Temple in the western city of Ahmedabad in 2002, in which 33 people died. The 2008 Mumbai attacks in which more than 160 people were killed. Several other attacks. And finally, the killings in Pahalgam, Indian-administered Kashmir, in which gunmen shot down 26 people on April 22. The May 7 missile strikes on Pakistan and Pakistan-administered Kashmir were payback, New Delhi has said, for Islamabad's refusal to crack down on armed groups that India insists have been financed, trained and sheltered by its neighbours over the past four decades. Islamabad denies that charge – though it acknowledges that some of these groups are based in Pakistan. But the missile strikes were about more than retribution, Indian Foreign Secretary Vikram Misri suggested on Wednesday. The strikes, he said, were driven by 'a compulsion both to deter and to pre-empt' attacks by armed groups launched on Indian territory. Misri accused Pakistan of failing to take 'demonstrable steps' against 'terrorist infrastructure on its territory or territory under its control'. Yet as tensions between the nuclear-armed neighbours escalate hour by hour, with Pakistan accusing India of launching a wave of drones into its territory on Thursday, military and geopolitical analysts question whether India's approach serves as a deterrent against armed groups eager to target it. They argue that New Delhi's actions are more symbolic and aimed at addressing its domestic audience rather than tactical advancement in the so-called 'fight against terror'. 'This is all a domestic theatre,' said Ajai Sahni, executive director of South Asia Terrorism Portal (SATP), a platform that tracks and analyses armed attacks in South Asia. 'The Indian strikes [in Pakistan] have no deterrent value. 'The aim of the strike has nothing to do with military takeaway – the aim [for Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi] was to speak with his own domestic audience,' Sahni told Al Jazeera. 'And [Pakistan's pledge] of retaliation is to speak with the audience of the other side. That is the genius of it – that both sides will claim victory from this.' The Indian army and Foreign Secretary Misri argued on Wednesday that the country's security forces had been precise and careful in the selection of their targets. Among them was Muridke, next to Lahore, Pakistan's second-most populous city, and what India described as the Markaz Taiba camp of the Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT), the group behind the 2008 Mumbai attacks. At the media briefing with Misri, Indian Army Colonel Sofiya Qureshi referred to the site as the place where key perpetrators of the Mumbai assault – including Ajmal Kasab, the sole gunman who was captured alive – were trained. More than 160 people died in the Mumbai attack. India also hit Bahawalpur, which New Delhi claims hosts the headquarters of the Jaish-e-Muhammad, an armed group behind the 2019 suicide bombing attack in Kashmir in which more than 40 Indian paramilitary soldiers were killed. 'Justice is served,' the Indian army noted in a post on X as early reports of the missile strikes poured in on Wednesday, 15 days after the Pahalgam killings. The Indian missile strikes killed at least 31 people in Pakistan – all civilians, according to Islamabad – including two children. India has denied that it targeted civilians. But Pakistan has threatened to hit back, and after Thursday's drone attacks, the South Asian nations are even closer to a full-blown military conflict. Any hits taken by armed groups from Indian missiles won't fundamentally change their ability to target India, said Sahni. 'All these strikes will result in are certain tactical and operational adaptations,' said Sahni. That – an adapted strategy on the part of armed groups – is precisely what was on display on April 22, when gunmen attacked tourists in Pahalgam, say experts. In February 2019, after the suicide attack on Indian troops, Indian warplanes pierced Pakistani airspace and bombed Balakot in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, where New Delhi claimed it hit 'terrorists' camps'. As Pakistan scrambled jets in response, a dogfight ensued, and an Indian Air Force jet was shot down. Pakistan captured the Indian pilot before returning him 60 hours later. Both nations claimed victory – the Modi government in New Delhi said it had entered Pakistan and bombed 'terrorists', while Pakistan highlighted its downing of an Indian jet and the capture of a pilot as evidence that it came out on top. And so neither side, say experts, felt the need to really change. That's why Sahni said he believes no matter how the current tit-for-tat threats and attacks play out, they won't alter long-term calculations for any of the actors involved. Instead, 'the tensions will resurface, perhaps in different forms.' A Kashmiri political analyst – who has seen India-Pakistan wars in 1965, 1971, and 1999, and three decades of Kashmiri armed rebellion against Indian rule – agreed. 'If it was supposed to work, then Kashmir would not be standing where we are today,' they said, requesting anonymity, fearing reprisal from Indian forces. 'One of the world's most volatile flashpoints.' Six months after the Pulwama attack, New Delhi unilaterally revoked the disputed Kashmir region's partial autonomy and broke down the erstwhile state into two federally governed territories in August 2019. China and Pakistan, India's neighbours that both control parts of Kashmir, condemned the move. India then imposed a clampdown in Kashmir and arrested dozens of political leaders, journalists, and human rights activists, even as the Modi government claimed the region was returning to 'normalcy'. Despite that – and the hundreds of armed rebels killed by Indian security forces over the years, 'the armed movement continues,' Sahni pointed out. 'The movement keeps on renewing itself [despite India's countermeasures for three decades],' noted Sahni. 'In the current attack, there has been a certain loss of material – buildings have been blown up – but if there is implicit support for these groups in Pakistan, they will always come back.' In the early hours of Wednesday, the Pakistani military claimed it had downed at least five Indian warplanes that had been involved in the missile strikes. Local Indian officials and security sources confirmed to Al Jazeera and other media outlets that at least two fighter jets had 'crashed', though Indian officials have not commented on the issue publicly. If the jets indeed belonged to the Indian fleet, 'it will become difficult for India to make a decision in the future about sending in aircraft to impose punitive strikes on Pakistan,' said Ajai Shukla, a defence and strategic affairs commentator, who served in the Indian Army from 1976 to 2001. Shukla noted that while a planned and rehearsed strike would have deterrent value, 'the realities eventually depend on how much loss has been inflicted, compared to losses incurred. 'It's a moment where India needs to pause and think,' added Shukla. 'Even when both countries claim victory, at least one of them in their heart of hearts knows that this was not a victory. This was something that turned out to be a fiasco. 'If there is going to be an attitude that we will not admit anything and we will declare victory, then probably that weakness will never be eradicated,' Shukla said. To Sahni, there's a more imminent danger that has arisen from the strikes over the past two days. Previously, he said, both sides acted within unspoken but accepted 'calibrated limits'. Not any more. 'There are no clear lines on what is 'escalation' now,' he said. 'And that's the classic slippery slope, on the edge of a risky spiral.'
Indian Express
24-04-2025
- Politics
- Indian Express
Opinion After Pahalgam, patience and precision must guide the way forward
The attack at the Baisaran meadow near Pahalgam, where at least 25 tourists and a Valley resident were killed, reflects a significant departure in the trajectory of terrorism in Jammu & Kashmir (J&K). It is a breakdown of the unwritten compact between virtually all terrorist groups operating in the now Union Territory and the larger population there — that tourists would not be targeted. Virtually every family in the Valley is directly or indirectly dependent on tourism, and a collapse of the industry would inflict unendurable hardships on the entire population. Thus, even at the peak of terrorism in J&K, through the 1990s and early 2000s, tourists were excluded as targets of terrorist operations. Even in several years that saw high levels of violence, tourism was not allowed to collapse entirely. There were, of course, occasional aberrations. The South Asia Terrorism Portal (SATP), for instance, records a total of 24 incidents targeting tourists since 2000, of which 13 were incidents of killing, resulting in 44 fatalities. This excludes the latest incident in Pahalgam. Significantly, these numbers include Hindu pilgrims, who have never been part of the 'implicit compact' excluding tourists as targets of terrorism. Beyond this — and the inevitable impact the Pahalgam incident will have on the tourist industry in J&K — this most recent terrorist outrage represents no radical departure from the trajectory of the past. The incident will certainly trigger a process of adaptation on the part of the security forces, as well as at least temporary circumscription of tourist activities. Beyond this, it is unlikely to have any lasting impact on the trajectory of terrorism in the state. It is useful to recall, here, that the flurry of incidents in the Jammu region in June-July 2024, including the attack on a bus carrying Hindu pilgrims at Reasi, had provoked widespread commentary on the 'strategic shift' from the Valley to the Jammu region, which had purportedly been 'peaceful' before these attacks. Jammu had, in fact, recorded 59 fatalities in 2023. So there is no evidence for such a shift. There was a dilution of the forces' deployment in the region, and a consequent weakening of the security grid. Terrorists were facing an increasingly difficult operational environment in Kashmir, and found a few opportunities to remind the Indian state of their presence in Jammu. The security vulnerabilities were addressed, and preceding patterns of terrorism — with the Valley dominating — persisted. The most significant damage the Pahalgam incident will inflict is on the Centre's narrative of the restoration of 'normalcy' in J&K after the abrogation of Article 370 in August 2019. At the time, the Ministry of Home Affairs (MHA) promised 'zero terrorism' in the Union Territory, and boastful assertions of burgeoning tourism as an index of such success were made — 23.6 million tourists visited J&K in 2024. The number was expected to be exceeded in the current year before the Pahalgam incident. Clearly, however, such 'normalcy' and 'zero terrorism' remain elusive. But what is 'normalcy'? J&K has been a theatre of terrorism for over 35 years — and at least 16 of these years saw a high-intensity conflict, with each of these recording at least 1,000 fatalities. The violence peaked in 2001, with 4,011 fatalities (all data from SATP), and bottomed out at 121 in 2012 — the point at which major political initiatives should have been launched. Instead, fatalities escalated from this point, hitting 452 in 2018, going down to 283 in 2019 — with a complete lockdown after the Centre's action on Article 370 — to rise again to 321 in 2020. Thereafter, a steady trajectory of decline has been registered, down to 127 fatalities in 2024. There can be no magical 'solution' to the 'Kashmir issue' as long as Pakistan continues to provide support to separatism and a measure of alienation persists in the UT. But a 'solution' is already in play. The drop in fatalities from 4,011 to 127 is, itself a 'solution', a major success, and within a theatre of protracted conflict, a measure of 'normalcy'. Significantly, from a situation where up to 7,000 terrorists rampaged across the state, often in individual armed groups numbering in the 100s, authorities estimate the total strength of active terrorists in J&K at 76 in March 2025, including 59 foreign and 17 local terrorists. This, again, given the background, represents 'normalcy' in a long-troubled region. The Pahalgam attack is, no doubt, an unacceptable outrage, and there will be consequences. Pakistan has sought to deny involvement, but all present indications suggest the involvement of The Resistance Front (TRF), a front organisation of the Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT). The scale and nature of the operation, as well as the profile of the participating terrorists, at least three of whom have already been named by authorities, clearly indicate TRF/LeT involvement, built on Pakistani state support, if not immediate planning and oversight. A number of options for retaliation exist, and it may be tempting to resort to patterns preferred by the current administration in the past — the surgical strike in the wake of the Uri terrorist attack (2016), or the Balakot air strike in the wake of the Pulwama bombing (2019). These would be theatrical events that could be exploited for partisan political purposes, but with dubious operational or strategic consequences. Hysterical elements in the electronic and social media have also raised cries for open war, with little concern for capacities, capabilities and costs, or for the wider regional security environment. It is, however, covert retaliation that has the largest potential for impact, without the risks of sliding down the slippery slope to unforeseen escalation. These are decisions that must be taken unhurriedly, within a strategic framework, and not within a mindset of vengeful rage or a calculus of domestic political advantage.
