Latest news with #SCIF
Fast Company
3 hours ago
- Business
- Fast Company
The missing key for defense innovation? A good coworking space
As the director of commercial engagement for the Defense Innovation Unit (DIU), a Department of Defense (DOD) organization that funds startups developing cutting-edge weapons technology for the military, Sarah Pearson is well acquainted with keeping secrets. What's surprising is that her team often keeps secrets from the very startups it recruits. It's not for any cloak-and-dagger reason, just bureaucracy. With security clearances taking up to 18 months, Pearson's team often supplies startups with fake data—made-up enemy capabilities—to simulate real defense scenarios, so they have something to work on until they're cleared to access classified material. 'In the fast-moving world of AI, if it takes 18 months . . . I no longer need that company, their model is already obsolete,' she says. Enter Nooks, a startup that acts as a kind of coworking space for classified communication. The company's cutesy name and squirrel logo belie its purpose: to build and maintain a network of these high-tech, espionage-proof, on-demand facilities where startups can handle classified information—spaces known as SCIFs, or sensitive compartmented information facilities.
Time Business News
13-05-2025
- Business
- Time Business News
Everything You Need to Know About SCIF Rental
Sensitive Compartmented Information Facilities (SCIFs) are secure environments designed for the handling, storage, and transmission of classified national security information. As the need for secure spaces to process sensitive data continues to grow, many businesses and government agencies are looking for SCIFs for rent. The option for SCIF rental allows organizations to access secure facilities without the large upfront investment required to build and maintain a SCIF themselves. In this article, we will explore the benefits of SCIF rental, the process for finding the right SCIF for your needs, and the essential considerations when entering into a SCIF rental agreement. A SCIF rental refers to leasing a pre-existing Sensitive Compartmented Information Facility (SCIF) for use in handling classified national security information. SCIFs are purpose-built spaces designed to meet stringent physical and technical security requirements. These facilities are often required for government contractors, intelligence agencies, and organizations working with sensitive military, defense, or government data. A SCIF for rent typically comes fully equipped with the necessary security features, such as soundproofing, access control systems, video surveillance, and alarm systems. Leasing SCIF space provides businesses and contractors with a secure environment for managing sensitive data without having to worry about building, maintaining, or securing a facility themselves. Leasing a SCIF space offers several advantages over constructing and managing your own secure facility. Some of the primary benefits of SCIF rental include: Building a SCIF is a costly endeavor. The expenses involved in designing and constructing a SCIF that meets federal security standards can be prohibitive. The process requires specialized construction materials, soundproofing, advanced security systems, and ongoing maintenance. For most businesses and contractors, the costs involved in constructing a SCIF far outweigh the need. By opting for SCIF rental, companies can avoid these high initial costs and instead pay a monthly fee to access a fully-equipped, secure space. This arrangement also eliminates the need for long-term investments in facility management, security updates, and infrastructure. SCIF rentals are typically ready for immediate use, which can be a major advantage when your organization needs secure space quickly. Whether you're a contractor needing a facility for a government contract or a business working with sensitive data, a SCIF rental allows you to begin your operations without the time-consuming process of designing, building, and certifying a SCIF. Many SCIF rental facilities are designed to comply with all government regulations and security standards, so they can be utilized right away. This is especially beneficial for organizations that need to meet tight deadlines or that are dealing with time-sensitive projects. Leasing a SCIF offers flexibility and scalability that building a SCIF cannot provide. If your business is working on a short-term government contract or you need secure space for a specific project, a SCIF rental gives you the ability to rent a facility for as long as you need without being tied to a long-term commitment. Additionally, SCIF rental offers scalability. If your business expands and requires more secure space, you can easily move to a larger facility or take on additional rented SCIFs. Conversely, if your needs decrease, you can downsize without the burdens of maintaining a facility. One of the main reasons SCIFs are required is their ability to meet strict security standards. SCIFs must comply with regulations such as the National Industrial Security Program Operating Manual (NISPOM) and Intelligence Community Directive (ICD) 705. These regulations ensure that SCIFs provide the highest levels of protection for classified information. When you choose a SCIF rental, you can be confident that the space already meets these requirements. The landlord or facility manager will typically handle all the necessary certifications and security upgrades, allowing you to focus on your business operations instead of security compliance. Renting a SCIF space often includes maintenance and support services, which are typically handled by the property owner or facility manager. This includes routine security updates, system checks, and facility inspections. As the renter, you are not responsible for managing these aspects, reducing your operational burden. In addition, SCIF rental agreements often include 24/7 security and surveillance services, ensuring that the facility is monitored at all times. Having these services in place means you can trust that your SCIF is always secure and up to date with necessary protections. Leasing a SCIF is not a one-size-fits-all solution. There are several factors to take into account when deciding whether SCIF rental is the right choice for your organization. Here are some key considerations to keep in mind: The location of your SCIF rental is one of the most important factors to consider. The facility should be easily accessible to your team and contractors, but also in a secure location that reduces the likelihood of security breaches. Proximity to your organization's headquarters or government offices may be a factor, especially if frequent collaboration or communication with external parties is required. Additionally, the building should be in an area with strong physical security. This can include being located within a government-secured area or having nearby security services. It's also crucial to ensure the facility has reliable transportation options for your staff to access it without compromising security. Before entering into a SCIF rental agreement, you should verify that the facility complies with federal security standards. SCIFs must meet specific physical, technical, and operational requirements, including soundproofing, reinforced walls, limited access, and continuous surveillance. Make sure that the SCIF space includes: Access control systems such as biometric authentication or keycard entry such as biometric authentication or keycard entry Intrusion detection systems to alert security to unauthorized access to alert security to unauthorized access Video surveillance for monitoring the facility for monitoring the facility Environmental controls to prevent the detection of electronic emissions to prevent the detection of electronic emissions Secure communications systems to ensure all data remains protected In addition, ensure that the SCIF has been certified by the appropriate government agencies and that it is regularly inspected to maintain compliance with current security standards. Rental agreements for SCIFs can vary significantly depending on the property owner and the length of your project. It is essential to understand the terms of the lease before committing. The SCIF rental agreement should clearly outline the duration of the lease, the cost, the responsibilities of both parties, and any penalties for early termination. Make sure the lease allows for flexibility in case your needs change over time. If your company's security requirements evolve or you find that you need additional secure space, the lease should provide options for expansion. Conversely, if your project ends earlier than expected, ensure that there is an option for an early exit without severe penalties. Leasing SCIF space typically comes with higher costs than regular office space due to the specialized security features. When considering a SCIF rental in Chantilly, Virginia, it's crucial to understand the full cost structure, including base rent, maintenance fees, utilities, and any additional security or compliance charges. Be sure to ask about any hidden fees, such as charges for facility upgrades, security system updates, or special requests for additional security measures. Make sure that the total cost of leasing the SCIF fits within your project budget. Some SCIF rental properties offer additional services that can make your operations smoother. These services may include: 24/7 security and monitoring for enhanced protection for enhanced protection Technical support for managing classified data and secure communications systems for managing classified data and secure communications systems Facility management for maintenance and upkeep of the physical space for maintenance and upkeep of the physical space IT infrastructure such as secure networks or servers to handle classified information It's worth considering the value of these services when negotiating the lease, as they can significantly reduce the burden on your team. Finding SCIF rental spaces typically requires working with specialized property management companies that handle secure government and defense-related leases. These companies have experience in managing properties that meet the stringent requirements for SCIF certification. You can also reach out to defense contractors, government agencies, or security firms that may have SCIF space available for rent. Be sure to consider the following when looking for SCIF rental options: Reputation of the Facility: Choose a facility that has a proven track record of compliance and reliability in the security sector. Choose a facility that has a proven track record of compliance and reliability in the security sector. Facility Inspections and Audits: Make sure the SCIF has been inspected and certified by relevant government agencies. Make sure the SCIF has been inspected and certified by relevant government agencies. Scalability and Location: Ensure that the space is large enough for your current needs, with room to expand if necessary, and that it is in a convenient and secure location. Choosing SCIF rental is an ideal option for businesses, contractors, and government agencies that need access to secure facilities for classified operations without the expense and complexity of constructing their own SCIF. By leasing a SCIF, organizations can gain immediate access to a secure, compliant space, with the flexibility to adjust their lease terms as their needs change. When considering SCIF rental, be sure to evaluate key factors such as location, security features, lease terms, and associated costs. With the right SCIF rental, you can ensure the highest levels of security for your sensitive data while maintaining the flexibility and scalability needed for your business or project. TIME BUSINESS NEWS
The Onion
27-03-2025
- Politics
- The Onion
Pete Hegseth Blows Into Breathalyzer To Unlock Phone
WASHINGTON—Grumbling to himself as he repeatedly dropped the device, U.S. Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth was reportedly blowing into a Breathalyzer Thursday in an attempt to unlock his phone. 'Stupid fucking judge made me put this on my iPhone,' said the head of the nation's largest government agency, snapping his fingers to get the attention of his deputy defense secretary and ask his subordinate to blow into the Breathalyzer for him. 'Hey, could you do me a favor here? It's not working, I think because I used mouthwash before I left the house this morning. Please? It's really important. I got to send some war plans.' At press time, sources confirmed Hegseth was sleeping it off in a SCIF.
Yahoo
25-03-2025
- Politics
- Yahoo
Opinion - The ‘Houthi PC small group' chat and the tragedy that was barely averted
Jeffrey Goldberg's lengthy account in The Atlantic of his inclusion into a highly sensitive war planning discussion at the most senior levels of government has quickly made the rounds of both national and international media. Reactions have ranged from total incredulity to hilarity and ridicule. No one can understand, much less justify, how National Security Advisor Mike Waltz could have enabled a journalist, the editor-in-chief of The Atlantic, to be privy to highly classified conversations that Waltz and his Cabinet-level colleagues held in what was called 'the Houthi PC small group.' It was this group that debated and ultimately recommended that the president approve a carrier-based aerial strike against the Yemeni Houthis. Even more shocking was that these conversations took place over Signal, an encrypted messaging service that nevertheless is vulnerable to penetration by any sophisticated foreign intelligence service. Equally puzzling is why none of the 17 other members of the group — which included Vice President JD Vance, Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth, Secretary of State Marco Rubio, Secretary of the Treasury Scott Bessent, Middle East negotiator Steve Witkoff, Director of National Intelligence Tulsi Gabbard and CIA Director John Ratcliffe — alerted their counterparts that Signal was insufficiently secure. Some of those involved had experience during the first Trump administration and knew, or should have known, that such conversations, if conducted face-to-face, would normally take place in a Secure Compartmented Information Facility (SCIF). They should also have recalled that if participants in classified discussions could not gather in one place, as was the case with the preplanning for the operation against the Houthis, those involved would all be located in various secure offices and linked via Secure Video Teleconferencing (SVTC), pronounced 'civits,' or on secure government devices. Goldberg initially, and not surprisingly, thought that the 'Houthi PC small group' wasn't real and simply an elaborate and sophisticated hoax. When the plans to which he had inadvertently been made privy actually took place, he dropped out of the conversation. As he writes, 'no one seemed to notice that I was there. And I received no subsequent questions about why I left — or, more to the point, who I was' since he was only identified by his initials 'JG.' Goldberg reported the conversations in considerable detail. In particular, he documented Vance's opposition to the operation. That Vance was unable to sway his colleagues and went with the consensus, and that the president sided with their recommendation rather than his, may indicate the limits of the vice president's influence. Although he was privy to all the discussions leading up to the first attack on the Houthis on March 15, Goldberg carefully avoided revealing elements of the conversations that, as he put it, 'if they had been read by an adversary of the United States, could conceivably have been used to harm American military and intelligence personnel.' All told, however, he concludes that 'I have never seen as breach quite like this' and he argues that Waltz and others may have violated the Espionage Act, federal records laws and other provisions relating to the dissemination of classified information. Goldberg does not address the question of why those members of the 'Houthi PC small group,' or their deputies who had prior executive branch experience, did not raise a red flag as soon as Signal began to be used. Nor does he query why Hegseth's various military and civilian assistants, and those who supported the other members of the group, did not inform their respective bosses that it is improper, if not illegal, to use Signal for anything other than unclassified routine information. There can be no denying that responsibility for the security breach must rest with the principals who actually used Signal on their cell phones to discuss highly classified matters. Nevertheless, if a military or civilian assistant fails to keep the boss out of trouble, he or she is not doing his or her job. There is more than enough blame to go around in what can only be termed a fiasco. It was saved only by the fact that Goldberg acted responsibly even before he realized that he had been included in a conversation to which he did not belong. Someone else might not have been as careful. If the attack plans on the Houthis had fallen into the wrong hands, the result of the leaked discussions could well have been the tragic and unnecessary loss of American military lives. Dov S. Zakheim is a senior adviser at the Center for Strategic and International Studies and vice chairman of the board for the Foreign Policy Research Institute. He was undersecretary of Defense (comptroller) and chief financial officer for the Department of Defense from 2001 to 2004 and a deputy undersecretary of Defense from 1985 to 1987. Copyright 2025 Nexstar Media, Inc. All rights reserved. This material may not be published, broadcast, rewritten, or redistributed.
The Hill
25-03-2025
- Politics
- The Hill
The ‘Houthi PC small group' chat and the tragedy that was barely averted
Jeffrey Goldberg's lengthy account in The Atlantic of his inclusion into a highly sensitive war planning discussion at the most senior levels of government has quickly made the rounds of both national and international media. Reactions have ranged from total incredulity to hilarity and ridicule. No one can understand, much less justify, how National Security Advisor Mike Waltz could have enabled a journalist, the editor-in-chief of The Atlantic, to be privy to highly classified conversations that Waltz and his Cabinet-level colleagues held in what was called 'the Houthi PC small group.' It was this group that debated and ultimately recommended that the president approve a carrier-based aerial strike against the Yemeni Houthis. Even more shocking was that these conversations took place over Signal, an encrypted messaging service that nevertheless is vulnerable to penetration by any sophisticated foreign intelligence service. Equally puzzling is why none of the 17 other members of the group — which included Vice President JD Vance, Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth, Secretary of State Marco Rubio, Secretary of the Treasury Scott Bessent, Middle East negotiator Steve Witkoff, Director of National Intelligence Tulsi Gabbard and CIA Director John Ratcliffe — alerted their counterparts that Signal was insufficiently secure. Some of those involved had experience during the first Trump administration and knew, or should have known, that such conversations, if conducted face-to-face, would normally take place in a Secure Compartmented Information Facility (SCIF). They should also have recalled that if participants in classified discussions could not gather in one place, as was the case with the preplanning for the operation against the Houthis, those involved would all be located in various secure offices and linked via Secure Video Teleconferencing (SVTC), pronounced 'civits,' or on secure government devices. Goldberg initially, and not surprisingly, thought that the 'Houthi PC small group' wasn't real and simply an elaborate and sophisticated hoax. When the plans to which he had inadvertently been made privy actually took place, he dropped out of the conversation. As he writes, 'no one seemed to notice that I was there. And I received no subsequent questions about why I left — or, more to the point, who I was' since he was only identified by his initials 'JG.' Goldberg reported the conversations in considerable detail. In particular, he documented Vance's opposition to the operation. That Vance was unable to sway his colleagues and went with the consensus, and that the president sided with their recommendation rather than his, may indicate the limits of the vice president's influence. Although he was privy to all the discussions leading up to the first attack on the Houthis on March 15, Goldberg carefully avoided revealing elements of the conversations that, as he put it, 'if they had been read by an adversary of the United States, could conceivably have been used to harm American military and intelligence personnel.' All told, however, he concludes that 'I have never seen as breach quite like this' and he argues that Waltz and others may have violated the Espionage Act, federal records laws and other provisions relating to the dissemination of classified information. Goldberg does not address the question of why those members of the 'Houthi PC small group,' or their deputies who had prior executive branch experience, did not raise a red flag as soon as Signal began to be used. Nor does he query why Hegseth's various military and civilian assistants, and those who supported the other members of the group, did not inform their respective bosses that it is improper, if not illegal, to use Signal for anything other than unclassified routine information. There can be no denying that responsibility for the security breach must rest with the principals who actually used Signal on their cell phones to discuss highly classified matters. Nevertheless, if a military or civilian assistant fails to keep the boss out of trouble, he or she is not doing his or her job. There is more than enough blame to go around in what can only be termed a fiasco. It was saved only by the fact that Goldberg acted responsibly even before he realized that he had been included in a conversation to which he did not belong. Someone else might not have been as careful. If the attack plans on the Houthis had fallen into the wrong hands, the result of the leaked discussions could well have been the tragic and unnecessary loss of American military lives. Dov S. Zakheim is a senior adviser at the Center for Strategic and International Studies and vice chairman of the board for the Foreign Policy Research Institute. He was undersecretary of Defense (comptroller) and chief financial officer for the Department of Defense from 2001 to 2004 and a deputy undersecretary of Defense from 1985 to 1987.
