Latest news with #SSBN
Newsweek
23-05-2025
- Politics
- Newsweek
US Reveals Movements of Navy's Nuclear-Armed Submarines
Based on facts, either observed and verified firsthand by the reporter, or reported and verified from knowledgeable sources. Newsweek AI is in beta. Translations may contain inaccuracies—please refer to the original content. The United States has disclosed the movements of its submarines—armed with nuclear missiles—for the second time this month, demonstrating its deterrent capability. The Submarine Group Ten, which oversees operations of the Atlantic ballistic missile submarine (SSBN) fleet, told Newsweek that it could not discuss submarine schedules or deployments because of operational security concerns. The unit is assigned with six SSBNs. Why It Matters The U.S. Navy operates a fleet of 14 nuclear-powered Ohio-class SSBNs, each capable of carrying up to 20 ballistic missiles. Eight of these submarines are based at Bangor, Washington, while the remaining six are homeported at Kings Bay, Georgia. The SSBN fleet forms part of the U.S.'s "nuclear triad," alongside strategic bombers and land-based intercontinental ballistic missiles to deter adversaries. The U.S. Navy rarely publicizes SSBN operations as the submarines are designed for deterrent patrols and launching missiles if necessary. One of the SSBNs, USS Kentucky, conducted an escort drill with helicopters in the Pacific, the Navy said on May 2. What To Know In a set of undated photos shared by the Submarine Group Ten on Facebook on May 15, USS West Virginia was seen making final preparations to depart its home port—Kings Bay—for "routine operations" in support of the country's strategic mission. The submarine was operated by its "Blue crew," one of two crew teams that alternate manning it. This two-crew system maximizes the SSBN's availability and reduces the number of submarines needed to meet strategic requirements, according to the U.S. Navy. This marked the second publicized departure of the West Virginia in more than two months. The submarine—manned by its "Gold crew"—was seen preparing to depart on March 12 for a strategic mission, according to photos released by the Submarine Group Ten. Meanwhile, USS Tennessee, another SSBN assigned to the Submarine Group Ten, was seen exiting a dry dock at Kings Bay following "months of hard work" of maintenance, according to an undated short video released on the unit's Facebook page on Monday. The Submarine Group Ten told Newsweek that its mission is to deliver "combat ready forces" by ensuring its submarines "are properly manned, trained, equipped and certified to conduct decisive combat operations around the world." On the West Coast, the Submarine Group Nine announced that USS Henry M. Jackson, one of eight SSBNs assigned to the unit, returned to its home port at Bangor on May 15 following a routine strategic deterrent patrol, according to photos released on Thursday. Strategic deterrence relies on a safe, secure and effective nuclear deterrent force, said the Pacific Northwest-based unit, which oversees submarine operations in the region. The United States Navy ballistic missile submarine USS Henry M. Jackson arriving at Naval Base Kitsap-Bangor in Washington following a routine strategic deterrent patrol on May 15. The United States Navy ballistic missile submarine USS Henry M. Jackson arriving at Naval Base Kitsap-Bangor in Washington following a routine strategic deterrent patrol on May 15. Lt. Zachary Anderson/U.S. Navy What People Are Saying The U.S. Submarine Group Ten wrote on Facebook: "This is a testament to [Team Kings Bay's] commitment to keeping our fleet ready and capable. This Ohio-class ballistic missile submarine [USS Tennessee] is one step closer to resuming its vital role in our nation's strategic deterrence mission." The U.S. Submarine Group Nine said on its webpage: "Ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs) serve as an undetectable launch platform for intercontinental ballistic missiles. They are considered the survivable leg of the strategic deterrent triad, the others being long-range manned aircraft and land-based intercontinental ballistic missiles." What Happens Next It remains to be seen whether the U.S. SSBN fleet will conduct any test launches of its submarine-launched ballistic missiles, which can deliver nuclear warheads to targets more than 7,400 miles away, according to the Federation of American Scientists.
Asia Times
06-05-2025
- Automotive
- Asia Times
Is N Korea cranking out tanks to help Russia in Ukraine?
North Korea may be ramping up tank production in the next possible step of its quid pro quo assistance to Russia in the Ukraine war. Multiple media outlets this month reported that North Korean leader Kim Jong Un inspected a major tank production facility, emphasizing the urgent need to modernize the country's armored forces with domestically developed tanks and self-propelled artillery. According to state media outlet Korean Central News Agency (KCNA), Kim toured the unnamed factory with senior officials, including Jo Chun Ryong and Kim Yong Hwan, to assess production progress and ongoing research into key technologies. He praised advancements in firepower, engine output, electronic warfare and crew comfort, citing them as evidence of progress toward building high-performance, Korean-style tanks. Kim called for a strategic rethinking of armored warfare and directed the development of large-scale production capacity—efforts he described as crucial to achieving the ruling party's 'second revolution in armored force.' Although KCNA did not identify the facility's location, South Korean lawmaker Yu Yong-Weon suggested it may be in Kusong, North Pyongan province, and possibly linked to the models shown at a 2023 military exhibition. Kim's factory visit underscores North Korea's broader drive to bolster its conventional forces alongside strategic weapons development, reflecting its military modernization priorities amid deepening cooperation with Russia. While North Korean tanks are outmatched by the modern armored fleets of the US and South Korea, Pyongyang may see tank production as a means of supporting Russia's forces in Ukraine. While unconfirmed, the timing and nature of the factory visit suggest this production drive may be aimed at future exports to Russia. If so, this would extend its assistance beyond munitions, ballistic missiles and troop deployments to include tanks, reinforcing its quid pro quo arrangement in return for cash, technology transfers and political backing. Newsweek reported in April 2025 that North Korea has earned an estimated US$20 billion from its involvement in the Ukraine war, mostly from munitions sales with a smaller amount for providing troops and technical personnel. Additionally, Asia Times has noted that Russian support may have significantly advanced North Korea's nuclear ballistic missile submarine (SSBN) and intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) programs. Beyond transactional motives, North Korea's support for Russia may also reflect its strategic interest in diversifying partnerships and reducing reliance on China. Choong-Koo Lee writes in a February 2025 War on the Rocks article that China's renewed dialogue with South Korea and Japan, coordination on sanctions on North Korea's nuclear program and resumption of military talks with the US could have dismayed the Kim regime, nudging it closer to Russia. North Korea's tank production capacity could prove valuable to Russia, whose armored forces have been heavily depleted by over three years of high-intensity combat in Ukraine. In a June 2023 article for the Polish Institute of International Affairs (PISM), Marcin Piotrowski notes North Korea has copied and modified Soviet-era T-62 tanks and maintains active production lines with at least 2,000 units. Piotrowski emphasizes that although Russia no longer produces the T-62, it continues to draw on this model from Soviet-era reserves, making North Korea a valuable supplier of spare parts and compatible shells for 115mm and 125mm guns. While obsolete by modern standards, these tanks use ammunition and parts compatible with Russian stockpiles. Russia's staggering tank losses and strained production capacity further raise the value of such assistance. According to open-source intelligence (OSINT) group Oryx, Russia lost 3,960 tanks between February 2022 and May 2025. Veaceslav Epureanu, writing for Insider in February 2025, states that by December 2024, Russia had depleted half of its estimated 7,342 Soviet-era tanks in open storage before the war. Epureanu also noted that Russia had 1,897 T-62s in storage in 2022, which had declined to 1,082 by 2024, with only half deemed in good or satisfactory condition. His data shows that the T-62 remains Russia's most numerous tank in open storage despite its age. In a July 2024 Forbes article, David Axe points out that T-62s are relatively abundant and easier to restore than more modern types such as the T-72, T-80, and T-90. He argues that even though Russia's factories can produce only 500-600 new tanks annually—a rate too low to compensate for attrition—relying on T-62s may be Russia's only viable short-term solution to sustain its armored strength. However, this strategy has its limits. Pavel Luzin writes in a January 2025 article for the Center for European Policy Analysis (CEPA) that 2025 may be the final year Russia can depend on Soviet-era reserves. He cites equipment degradation, reliance on foreign components, shortages of skilled workers, inflation and a weak ruble as key constraints forcing Russia to shift toward newly manufactured equipment. Similarly, Yurri Clavilier and Michael Gjerstad, in a February 2025 report for the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), estimate that while Russia managed to refurbish around 1,500 tanks in 2024, the remaining units in storage are likely in poor condition and would require more extensive restoration efforts. Clavilier and Gjerstad say this situation complicates Russia's ability to replace battlefield losses at the current pace of attrition. Even if North Korea can supply Russia with more T-62s or similar models, their impact on the battlefield may be limited. Peter Suciu notes in a January 2025 article for The National Interest (TNI) that the T-62 is highly vulnerable to modern threats such as drones, mines and anti-tank missiles, and is being deployed primarily because Russia lacks better alternatives. Nevertheless, North Korean tank production could help Russia reconstitute its armored forces in quantity. The Robert Lansing Institute stated in a March 2025 report that it could take Russia up to a decade to rebuild its inventory of tanks, jets and armored vehicles to pre-war levels and regain the capacity for large-scale offensive operations against NATO. In this light, North Korea's vintage tanks may be less about battlefield advantage and more about buying time for Russia's defense industry. The tank transfer would be a stopgap driven by mutual need and a shared rejection of the Western-dominated international order.
Yahoo
09-04-2025
- Business
- Yahoo
Huntington Ingalls Industries, Inc. (HII): A Bull Case Theory
We came across a bullish thesis on Huntington Ingalls Industries, Inc. (HII) on Substack by Student of Value. In this article, we will summarize the bulls' thesis on HII. Huntington Ingalls Industries, Inc. (HII)'s share was trading at $187.54 as of April 8th. HII's trailing and forward P/E were 13.43 and 13.18 respectively according to Yahoo Finance. Photo by Michael Afonso on Unsplash Huntington Ingalls Industries (HII), the largest military shipbuilder in the U.S., has entered a pivotal phase following over a decade of evolution since its 2011 spin-off from Northrop Grumman. The company operates through three core segments—Newport News Shipbuilding, Ingalls Shipbuilding, and Mission Technologies—each playing a distinct role in the U.S. defense industrial base. Newport News, a critical national asset as the only producer of U.S. Navy aircraft carriers and one of just two nuclear submarine builders, remains the company's backbone, though it recently posted a 4% revenue decline due to labor shortages and cost overruns on the Virginia-class submarines. Ingalls Shipbuilding, known for its construction of surface combatants, remains operationally stable with six vessels underway but is facing declining demand in the amphibious category. The most dynamic segment is Mission Technologies, which has rapidly gained momentum since the 2021 acquisition of Alion Science. With a focus on cybersecurity, artificial intelligence, and defense systems, Mission Tech has grown 19% year-over-year, now contributing 25% of revenue and expected to reach 30% by 2027. Despite this internal growth engine, HII's stock has suffered a 45% decline, largely driven by deteriorating margins on fixed-price contracts signed prior to the inflation surge, compounded by continued labor and supply chain headwinds. In Q4 2024, operating margins dropped sharply from 10.4% to 3.4%, raising investor concerns. Management, however, remains confident in a recovery, guiding toward 7.5–8% margins by 2026 through renegotiated Navy contracts and targeted workforce expansion. The company is concurrently executing a $4.1 billion shipyard modernization program aimed at reducing labor reliance and enhancing productivity through automation over the next decade. Strategically, HII is well positioned within the Navy's long-term vision of a 355-ship fleet, even as short-term headwinds persist. Its $48 billion backlog, spanning 43 vessels, provides long-term revenue visibility, and flagship programs like the Columbia-class SSBN—totaling $120 billion—anchor its future pipeline. However, the FY2025 Navy budget has dampened short-term sentiment: only six new ships will be funded (versus the 10–11 required annually), while 19 are scheduled for decommissioning, shrinking the fleet to 287 ships. Compounding matters, the submarine industrial base remains constrained, unable to consistently deliver two Virginia-class submarines annually, averaging only ~1.3 since 2022. Fixes, including increased outsourcing, industrial subsidies, and new workforce initiatives, are expected by 2028. A critical emerging trend is the Navy's shift toward unmanned underwater vehicles (UUVs), which are projected to comprise 30–50% of undersea operations by 2040. These drones excel in intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance, mine clearance, and sabotage, often deployed from manned platforms like Virginia-class submarines. HII, with its unique dual exposure to both manned submarines and growing investments in unmanned technologies, stands to benefit from this evolving naval doctrine. While UUVs can't replace the strategic deterrence of SSBNs, they offer scalable and cost-effective solutions that align with shifting Pentagon priorities. Financially, the company has delivered a 5.2% revenue CAGR over the past decade and returned substantial capital to shareholders, repurchasing 20% of its shares and delivering a 5–6% annualized combined return through dividends and buybacks. Yet, its 2021 acquisition of Alion for $1.65 billion in cash ballooned debt levels, leaving $2.7 billion outstanding—double its pre-deal debt. While still within acceptable ranges for a prime contractor, annual debt servicing of $150–$200 million amid rising interest rates is putting pressure on free cash flow. This pressure culminated in a recent 20% drop in stock price, following management's withdrawal of its five-year free cash flow guidance due to continued margin strain. However, recovery remains plausible. Management forecasts capex peaking at 5% of revenue (~$600 million annually) through 2026, after which it will taper to 2–2.5%. If capex and debt service are reduced post-2026 and shipbuilding margins rebound to historical levels, free cash flow could reach $600 million, suggesting an FCF multiple of 11–17x at current prices. Valuation scenarios support this upside: assuming 4% annual revenue growth and margin normalization, discounted cash flow models yield a fair value of $287 per share, while conservative relative valuation estimates place it between $250–$260. Even with risk factors such as fixed-price contract exposure, skilled labor shortages, and shifting defense priorities, HII's restructuring efforts, strategic backlog, and exposure to both traditional and next-generation naval technologies offer a compelling long-term investment case with a favorable risk/reward profile. Huntington Ingalls Industries, Inc. (HII) is not on our list of the 30 Most Popular Stocks Among Hedge Funds. As per our database, 27 hedge fund portfolios held HII at the end of the fourth quarter which was 20 in the previous quarter. While we acknowledge the risk and potential of HII as an investment, our conviction lies in the belief that some AI stocks hold greater promise for delivering higher returns, and doing so within a shorter timeframe. If you are looking for an AI stock that is more promising than HII but that trades at less than 5 times its earnings, check out our report about the cheapest AI stock. READ NEXT: 8 Best Wide Moat Stocks to Buy Now and 30 Most Important AI Stocks According to BlackRock. Disclosure: None. This article was originally published at Insider Monkey.
Asia Times
21-03-2025
- Business
- Asia Times
Sinking ship: US undersea nuclear deterrent's plunging credibility
Delays and cost overruns in the US Columbia-class SSBN program threaten the credibility of its undersea nuclear deterrent and ability to match China's naval expansion.' The US Navy's plan to replace its aging undersea nuclear deterrent faces costly delays, raising concerns about the credibility of its posture and future ability to keep pace with China's naval expansion. This month, the US Congressional Research Service (CRS) released a report mentioning that the US Navy faces an estimated 12 to 16-month delay in the delivery of its first Columbia-class ballistic missile submarine (SSBN), threatening the timely replacement of aging Ohio-class SSBNs. The delay, attributed to shipyard workforce shortages, supply chain disruptions and component delivery setbacks—particularly Northrop Grumman's late turbine generators and Huntington Ingalls Industries' bow section—raises concerns about the impact on subsequent submarines. The US Navy is considering extending the service life of up to five Ohio-class boats to mitigate risks, but this strategy involves additional costs and logistical hurdles. Meanwhile, the simultaneous construction of Columbia-class SSBNs and Virginia-class attack submarines (SSNs) presents industrial-base challenges as shipyards and suppliers struggle to scale production. The US Navy and industry aim to increase Virginia-class production to two boats annually by 2028, yet the current output remains at 1.1-1.2 submarines per year. Rising costs compound the issue, with the Columbia-class program's procurement budget growing 12.1% in the past year alone. Further overruns could siphon funding from other US Navy shipbuilding programs, placing additional strain on the US Department of Defense's (DOD) long-term naval strategy. Amid ballooning costs and delays, the US may need to ramp up submarine production more urgently than ever. In an article this month for We Are The Mighty, Logan Nye mentions that, at present, China relies on anti-ship ballistic missiles (ASBM) such as the DF-21D and DF-26B to keep US carrier battlegroups at bay from Taiwan. Nye points out those ASBMs are useless against SSNs that can evade them by diving. He also emphasizes that SSNs are self-sufficient for months, which may be critical if US supply chains in the Pacific are threatened. Further, in a 2024 American Affairs article, Jerry Hendrix suggests that SSNs may be considered the 'first response force' during a Taiwan conflict due to those advantages. However, Hendrix points out that the post-Cold War peace dividend eroded the US submarine industrial base, resulting in the US not having enough submarines when most needed. The situation is not much better for the US SSBN fleet, as it too suffers from a weak US submarine industrial base. The Nuclear Threat Initiative (NTI) says that as of August 2024, 14 Ohio-class SSBNs form the foundation of the US sea-based nuclear deterrent. According to NTI, each Ohio-class SSBN has 20 missile launch tubes armed with the Trident II D5 submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM). The report also says the US Navy is replacing these older missiles with the Trident II D5LE, which has an upgraded guidance system for improved accuracy. The report mentions that assuming the US Navy has 12 operational Ohio-class SSBNs with 20 launch tubes each and four warheads per missile, they have 960 warheads. However, it mentions that only 8-10 Ohio-class SSBNs are typically deployed at one time due to regular minor repairs, so the number of active warheads in the field may be closer to 720. The US Navy's plan to retire Ohio-class SSBNs at approximately one per year starting in 2027 raises concerns about the credibility and survivability of the US undersea nuclear deterrent since they carry 54% of the US deployed nuclear arsenal. Emphasizing the importance of the US SSBN fleet, Geoff Wilson and other writers mention in a February 2025 Stimson Center article that SSBNs are the cornerstone of the US 'finite deterrence' doctrine, with SSBN stealth and survivability disincentivizing a first strike that would eliminate all other nuclear forces, creating strategic stability at lower cost. Wilson and others argue that the US SSBN fleet can maintain deterrence against multiple targets at a lower cost than intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBM), which are less critical for deterrence than other delivery options such as bombers. However, a smaller US SSBN fleet could undermine the credibility of the US undersea nuclear arsenal. In a June 2020 article for The Strategist, Thomas Mahnken and Bryan Clark argue that while the US sea-based nuclear arsenal is the most survivable leg of its nuclear triad, it is also the most brittle. Mahnken and Clark argue that if an SSBN can't launch its missiles, communicate with commanders or is destroyed, all its missiles will be lost. They also highlight that losing only one SSBN on patrol could eliminate an entire leg of the nuclear triad. Further, they point out that the lethality of the US undersea nuclear deterrent has prompted near-peer adversaries like China and Russia to enhance their anti-submarine warfare (ASW) capabilities to target US SSBNs. Emphasizing the potential fragility of the US undersea nuclear arsenal, they project that during the 2030s, it is probable that only one Columbia-class SSBN will be operational at any given time in the Pacific and Atlantic Oceans, supported by one or two vessels at sea as backup. Despite those fragility concerns, Owen Cote Jr mentions in a January 2019 article in the peer-reviewed Bulletin of Atomic Scientists journal that SSBNs remain the most credible deterrent for the US due to their unmatched survivability and stealth. Cote Jr. highlights the historical effectiveness of US SSBNs, particularly during the Cold War, when they proved resilient against Soviet ASW capabilities. He also addresses concerns about emerging technologies, such as AI and quantum computing, which could make oceans transparent. Regarding those concerns, Cote Jr says these fears are largely unfounded, emphasizing the US's advanced acoustic surveillance systems, such as SOSUS and the Fixed Distributed System (FDS), that can detect Chinese or Russian submarines alongside its favorable maritime geography encompassing vast swathes of the Atlantic and Pacific, make it exceedingly difficult for near-peer adversaries to detect its SSBNs. Further, Stephen Biddle and Eric Labs mention in a Foreign Policy article this month that while China's shipbuilding capacity dwarfs the US's by a factor of 230, US warships are typically larger and have superior sensors, electronics and weapons. Contextualizing submarine capabilities, Biddle and Labs mention that China's submarine force consists of mostly conventionally powered submarines, while the US operates an all-nuclear fleet of 49 SSNs, 14 SSBNs and four nuclear cruise missile submarines (SSGN). They emphasize that, unlike their Chinese counterparts, US crews have battle experience and superior training. However, Biddle and Labs say that China is building aircraft carriers and nuclear submarines in half the time it takes the US to make the same vessels. They caution that the US places itself at serious risk by assuming future wars will be short and that debates over the US-China naval balance should be tempered by considering the dynamics of competitive production for naval wars of attrition.
Asia Times
11-03-2025
- Politics
- Asia Times
N Korea's nuclear sub engulfed in a sea of doubt
North Korea's unveiling of its first nuclear-powered submarine marks a bold leap in its military ambitions, but skepticism but its actual capabilities is already floating to the surface. This month, multiple media sources reported that North Korea has unveiled its first nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarine (SSBN), signaling a significant advancement in its military capabilities amid speculation of Russian assistance. State media released images of North Korean Supreme Leader Kim Jong Un inspecting the vessel, which experts estimate to be between 6,000 and 8,000 tons and capable of carrying up to 10 nuclear-loaded missiles. If operational, the nuclear ballistic missile submarine (SSBN) would enhance North Korea's second-strike capability, allowing it to launch missiles from undetectable underwater positions. While North Korea has tested submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBM) since 2016, these were previously launched from a single-tube, 2,000-ton test submarine. The new vessel could alter the strategic balance, particularly if North Korea perfects nuclear propulsion technology. However, full operational capability may take years, with a possible test launch within two years. The disclosure follows North Korea's intensified rhetoric against US-South Korea military drills and aligns with Kim's long-standing goal to modernize North Korea's naval forces. The US remains committed to North Korea's denuclearization, while South Korea monitors potential Russian technological transfers that could accelerate North Korea's nuclear submarine ambitions. As with many of North Korea's military advancements, these claims should be taken with a grain of salt, given the paucity of information about its military and Pyongyang's tendency to exaggerate its capabilities for propaganda purposes. In a September 2023 article for the Korean Institute for National Reunification (KINU), Hong Min says North Korea may pursue a dual track in building its sea-based nuclear deterrent. According to the writer, North Korea's first line of effort is the construction of nuclear-armed submarines, while its second is building nuclear-powered submarines. In line with its first line of effort, North Korea unveiled the Hero Kim Kun Ok 'tactical nuclear submarine' in September 2023. According to Beyond Parallel, it is a refurbished Soviet Romeo-class conventional ballistic missile submarine (SSB). Beyond Parallel says the submarine's unveiling aligns with North Korea's SLBM program, with its newer Pukguksong-3, Pukguksong-4, Pukguksong-5 and an unnamed SLBM unveiled in April 2022 too big to fit its current Gorae-class SSB. According to the Nuclear Threat Initiative (NTI), as of August 2024, North Korea had one Gorae-class SSB. NTI notes that the submarine is limited by its reliance on diesel engines and lack of air-independent propulsion (AIP) systems. Its range is capped at 2,778 kilometers—sufficient to hold targets in South Korea and Japan at risk but insufficient to threaten the US mainland. However, Min says that remodeling Soviet-era submarines, as in the Hero Kim Kun Ok and Gorae-class SSBs' case, could introduce structural and engineering problems, which could take significant time and resources to correct, rendering these efforts impractical for North Korea. Further, in a 2017 article in the Strategy journal, Oh Soon-Kun mentions that North Korea's Gorae SSBs will face significant command and control challenges and combat service support as they operate further from their home bases. Oh also says that the Gorae SSB, a variant of the Soviet Golf-class SSB, has high noise levels, making it vulnerable to anti-submarine warfare (ASW) operations. Given those limitations, Oh says North Korea could limit its SSBs to operations close to its shore bases, following a Soviet-style bastion strategy. However, he mentions that the approach limits their deterrent value by precluding forward operations. Alternatively, he states that North Korea could attempt to infiltrate its SSBs into the Sea of Japan, risking detection and destruction by South Korea, the US, and Japan's ASW capabilities. As for North Korea's second line of effort, Thomas Newdick mentions in an October 2024 article for The War Zone (TWZ) that nuclear propulsion would give North Korea a credible second-strike capability, ensuring unlimited underwater endurance and possibly reduced acoustic signature. However, Newdick points out that North Korea's ability to build a nuclear-powered submarine is questionable. He notes that building submarine reactors is challenging to master, given their demanding integration and power generation requirements. Despite those challenges, in an October 2024 Heritage Foundation report, Robert Peters mentions that North Korea has been seeking nuclear submarine propulsion technology for over a decade, with US officials speculating that Russia may have provided North Korea with such in exchange for supporting its Ukraine war effort with soldiers and materiel. While Alex Luck notes in TWZ that a North Korean nuclear-powered submarine is not an unexpected development, the technical challenges of building such a submarine are daunting. Luck says North Korea hasn't developed a suitable reactor design, but it may focus on building 'hybrid' submarines, combining nuclear and conventional propulsion, as seen in the sole 1980s Project 651E Juliett-class cruise missile submarine (SSG). Including a small auxiliary nuclear reactor in its Romeo and Golf-class retrofits could help North Korea simultaneously achieve its two lines of effort in building an underwater nuclear deterrent. A small auxiliary nuclear reactor could offset the range limitations of North Korea's Hero Kim Kun Ok and Gorae-class SSBs and increase their submerged endurance. However, taking Project 651E as a precedent, this approach was less than successful, achieving only a sustained speed of six knots underwater for 11,200 kilometers. This poor performance made chemical-based AIP technology, such as fuel cells and lithium-ion batteries, more practical. The Project 651E reactor was disposed of in 2005. Sukjoon Yoon mentions in an October 2023 article for the S Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS) in Singapore that North Korea's submarine force will likely depend on quantity over quality to match US and South Korean forces. According to the US Defense Intelligence Agency's (DIA) 2021 North Korea Military Power report, North Korea has about 70 conventional submarines, but they are of older design and limited endurance. Yoon argues that since North Korea's nuclear submarine projects seem half-baked, the best response for South Korea is to put diplomatic pressure on the former and Russia. However, he says that South Korea's popular media prefers a military response, noting that the country has already built the sophisticated KSS-III SSB, which could have nuclear propulsion. Yoon mentions that South Korea's KSS-III submarines could perform an 'anti-exit' strategy against North Korea's SSBs, preventing them from leaving their bases and going out to sea. However, he says that South Korea constructing a nuclear-powered submarine is still a big request for the US. Cautioning about North Korea's submarine developments, Yoon says that while the country's efforts may be odd and flawed, the Kim regime's determination to acquire weapons that can threaten South Korea, Japan and the US should not be underestimated and should be addressed urgently.
