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News18
2 days ago
- News18
Denial Of Inheritance To Natural Heir In Will Requires Closer Scrutiny: SC
The SC said, unlike other documents, when a will is propounded, its maker is no longer in the land of the living, which casts a solemn duty on the court The Supreme Court said on Thursday that only when the propounder dispels the suspicious circumstances and satisfies the conscience of the court that the testator had duly executed the will out of his free volition without coercion or undue influence, would the will be accepted as a genuine one. A bench of Justices Sanjay Karol and Joymalya Bagchi said, unlike other documents, when a will is propounded, its maker is no longer in the land of the living, which casts a solemn duty on the court to ascertain whether the will propounded had been duly proved. 'Onus lies on the propounder not only to prove due execution but dispel from the mind of the court, all suspicious circumstances which cast doubt on the free disposing mind of the testator," the bench said. The court pointed out a will has to be proved like any other document subject to the requirements of Section 63 of the Indian Succession Act, 1925 and Section 68 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872, that is examination of at least one of the attesting witnesses. The court dismissed an appeal filed by Gurdial Singh through his legal representatives and affirmed the findings of the Punjab and Haryana High Court. The High Court had set aside the concurrent findings of the Trial Court and the First Appellate Court, and declared Jagir Kaur, wife of Maya Singh, as the owner and in possession of the suit land. The appellant was nephew of Maya Singh, who died in 1991. He claimed Maya Singh executed a will in 1991 bequeathing land, measuring 67 karnals and 4 marlas to him. The Trial Court decreed the suit and held him as the lawful owner of the land, finding the will as genuine. The First Appellate Court at Amritsar upheld the judgment and the decree passed in the appellant's suit. The High Court, however, reversed the concurrent findings, holding that the suspicious circumstance namely, non-mention of first respondent, who was the wife of the testator Maya Singh and the reasons for her disinheritance in the will exposed absence of 'free disposing mind' of the testator. Examining the appeal, the court held, a cumulative assessment of the attending circumstances including this unusual omission to mention the very existence of his wife in the will, gave rise to serious doubt that the will was executed as per the dictates of the appellant and is not the 'free will' of the testator. The bench said deprivation of a natural heir, by itself, may not amount to a suspicious circumstance because the whole idea behind execution of the will is to interfere with the normal line of succession. However, the court emphasised, the prudence requires reason for denying the benefit of inheritance to natural heirs and an absence of it, though not invalidating the will in all cases, shrouds the disposition with suspicion as it does not give inkling to the mind of the testator to enable the court to judge that the disposition was a voluntary act. The bench pointed out in Ram Piari Vs Bhagwant & Ors (1993) this court held when suspicious circumstance exists, courts should not be swayed by due execution of the will alone. When unusual features appear in a will or unnatural circumstances surround its execution, the court must undertake a close scrutiny and make an overall assessment of the unusual circumstances before accepting the will, the bench added. In the case, the bench said, 'We have no hesitation to hold that non-mention of first respondent or the reasons for her disinheritance in the will, is an eloquent reminder that the free disposition of the testator was vitiated by the undue influence of the appellant." Court noted Jagir Kaur unequivocally stated that she was living with her husband till his death and the specious rationale given that she may have been disinherited as Maya Singh's monies had been settled in her favour and she was entitled to pension is hardly convincing. It pointed out, no evidence was led to show whether the quantum of money said to be settled in favour of 1st respondent was reasonable and would satisfy the conscience of a man of ordinary prudence with regard to her complete expungement in the will. The bench further found the appellant's case was not only to propound the will in his favour but even to deny the very status of first respondent as Maya Singh's wife. 'When one reads the contents of the will, appellant's stand is stark and palpable in its tenor and purport. The will is a cryptic one where Maya Singh bequests his properties to his nephew i.e. the appellant, as the latter was taking care of him. However, the will is completely silent with regard to the existence of his own wife and natural heir, i.e. the first respondent, or the reason for her disinheritance," the bench said. Court further noted the evidence on record showed first respondent was residing with Maya Singh till the latter's death. Nothing had come on record to show the relation between the couple was bitter. As per the appellant, she was nominated by Maya Singh and was entitled to receive his pension which demonstrates the testator's conduct in accepting first respondent as his lawfully wedded wife. Court said, non-mention of the status of wife or the reason for her disinheritance in the will ought not to be examined in isolation but in the light of all attending circumstances of the case. Further, it held, the Trial Court erroneously observed that non-performance of last rites of Maya Singh by first respondent hinted at sour relations between the couple. 'Ordinarily, in a Hindu/Sikh family, last rites are performed by male sapinda relations. Given this practice, first respondent not performing last rites could not be treated as a contra indicator of indifferent relationship with her husband during the latter's lifetime. In this backdrop, it cannot be said Maya Singh had during his lifetime, denied his marriage with first respondent or admitted that their relation was strained, so as to prompt him to erase her very existence in the will. Such erasure of marital status is the tell-tale insignia of the propounder and not the testator himself," the bench said. About the Author Sanya Talwar Sanya Talwar, Editor at Lawbeat, has been heading the organisation since its inception. After practising in courts for over four years, she discovered her affinity for legal journalism. She has worked More Get breaking news, in-depth analysis, and expert perspectives on everything from politics to crime and society. Stay informed with the latest India news only on News18. Download the News18 App to stay updated! tags : supreme court view comments Location : New Delhi, India, India First Published: July 18, 2025, 19:34 IST News india Denial Of Inheritance To Natural Heir In Will Requires Closer Scrutiny: SC Disclaimer: Comments reflect users' views, not News18's. Please keep discussions respectful and constructive. Abusive, defamatory, or illegal comments will be removed. News18 may disable any comment at its discretion. By posting, you agree to our Terms of Use and Privacy Policy.
News18
2 days ago
- Politics
- News18
Denying ST Woman Share In Father's Property Amounts To Gender Discrimination: SC
The appellants sought partition of a property belonging to their maternal grandfather The Supreme Court on Thursday held that denying a woman from Scheduled Tribe community an equal share in her father's property with her brothers, if not otherwise prohibited under customs, would violate her right to equality and amount to gender discrimination. 'We are of the view that, unless otherwise prescribed in law, denying the female heir a right in the property only exacerbates gender division and discrimination, which the law should ensure to weed out," a bench of Justices Sanjay Karol and Joymalya Bagchi said. Applying the principle of justice, equity, and good conscience here, the court allowed a civil appeal filed by Ram Charan and others, the legal heirs of one Dhaiya, a woman belonging to a Scheduled Tribe. The appellants sought partition of a property belonging to their maternal grandfather, Bhajju alias Bhanjan Gond. Their mother was one of the six children – five sons and one daughter. They stated that their mother is entitled to an equal share in the scheduled property. In the present case, the court said, a woman or her successors, if the views of the lower courts are upheld, would be denied a right to property on the basis of the absence of a positive assertion to such inheritance in custom. 'However, customs too, like the law, cannot remain stuck in time and others cannot be allowed to take refuge in customs or hide behind them to deprive others of their right," the bench said. The court also found this to be a question of violation of Article 14 of the Constitution. 'There appears to be no rational nexus or reasonable classification for only males to be granted succession over the property of their forebears and not women, more so in the case where no prohibition to such effect can be shown to be prevalent as per law," the bench said. The court also pointed out Article 15(1) of the Constitution states that the State shall not discriminate against any person on grounds of religion, race, caste, sex, or place of birth. This, along with Articles 38 and 46, points to the collective ethos of the Constitution in ensuring that there is no discrimination against women, it noted. The bench also said this discussion on equality under Article 14, which, needless to state, included the aspect of gender equality within its fold, will be incomplete without reference to the first and most commendable step taken under the Hindu Law by way of the Hindu Succession (Amendment) Act, 2005, which made daughters the coparceners in joint family property. 'Granted that no such custom of female succession could be established by the appellant-plaintiffs, but nonetheless it is also equally true that a custom to the contrary also could not be shown in the slightest, much less proved. That being the case, denying Dhaiya her share in her father's property, when the custom is silent, would violate her right to equality vis-à-vis her brothers or those of her legal heirs vis-à-vis their cousin," the bench said. The court held it was of the firm view that in keeping with the principles of justice, equity, and good conscience, read along with the overarching effect of Article 14 of the Constitution, the appellant-plaintiffs, being Dhaiya's legal heirs, are entitled to their equal share in the property. In the case, the court examined whether a tribal woman (or her legal heirs) would be entitled to an equal share in her ancestral property or not. 'One would think that in this day and age, where great strides have been made in realising the constitutional goal of equality, this court would not need to intervene for equality between the successors of a common ancestor and the same should be a given, irrespective of their biological differences, but it is not so," the bench said. In the case, the appellant-plaintiffs approached the Trial Court seeking a declaration of title and partition of the suit property. By its judgment in February 2008, the suit was dismissed by the Trial Court. The First Appellate Court, by its judgment on April 21, 2009, concurred with the findings of the Trial Court that the mother of the appellant-plaintiffs had no right in the property of her father. It held so for the reason that no evidence had been led to show that children of a female heir are also entitled to property. The Chhattisgarh High Court also held that the appellant-plaintiffs seeking partition of property had failed to establish their right over such property by way of custom, showing that a female heir is also entitled thereto. The appellant-plaintiffs contended that they had adopted Hindu traditions, but the High Court held that since there was no evidence to that effect brought on record, the Trial Court as well as the First Appellate Court had rightly rejected this contention. Examining the matter, the bench said that the question of the parties having adopted Hindu customs and way of life is no longer in play. The court pointed out Section 2(2) of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956, unequivocally excludes from its application, Scheduled Tribes. 'For the application of a custom to be shown, it has to be proved, but it was not in the present case. In fact, the Courts below proceeded, in our view, with an assumption in mind and that assumption was misplaced," the bench said. In its judgment, the court also noted, in the discussion of customs, it was assumed that the daughters would not be entitled to any inheritance and expected the appellant-plantiffs to prove otherwise. 'An alternate scenario was also possible where not exclusion, but inclusion could have been presumed and the defendants then could have been asked to show that women were not entitled to inherit property. This patriarchal predisposition appears to be an inference from Hindu law, which has no place in the present case," the bench said. Since neither any particular law of a community nor custom could be brought into application by either side, the court proceeded to examine the argument advanced before the High Court, that is, the principle of justice, equity, and good conscience, which found recognition in the Central Provinces Laws Act, 1875. The court held since the parties to the instant lis are neither governed by Hindu nor Muslim laws and, therefore, would be covered by Section 6 of the 1875 Act. top videos View all 'So, the right having been accrued in favour of the appellant-plaintiffs' mother upon the death of her father, which was approximately 30 years before the filing of the plaint, became crystallised and would not be affected by the fact that the Act was no longer in the statute book," the bench said. The court said this principle of 'justice, equity, and good conscience' can be applied only when there is a void or, in other words, in the absence of any law governing that aspect. Since no custom to the effect that women were entitled to the property, the application thereof would be consistent with this position. About the Author Sanya Talwar Sanya Talwar, Editor at Lawbeat, has been heading the organisation since its inception. After practising in courts for over four years, she discovered her affinity for legal journalism. She has worked More Get breaking news, in-depth analysis, and expert perspectives on everything from politics to crime and society. Stay informed with the latest India news only on News18. Download the News18 App to stay updated! view comments Location : New Delhi, India, India First Published: July 18, 2025, 19:41 IST News india Denying ST Woman Share In Father's Property Amounts To Gender Discrimination: SC Disclaimer: Comments reflect users' views, not News18's. Please keep discussions respectful and constructive. Abusive, defamatory, or illegal comments will be removed. News18 may disable any comment at its discretion. By posting, you agree to our Terms of Use and Privacy Policy.
Indian Express
3 days ago
- Politics
- Indian Express
Supreme Court upholds equal inheritance rights for tribal women
The Supreme Court Thursday held that a tribal woman would be entitled to an equal share in ancestral property. The SC observed that denying a female heir right in the property unless otherwise prescribed in law only exacerbates gender division and discrimination, which the law should weed out. In the absence of a specific law governing intestate succession among Scheduled Tribes, Justices Sanjay Karol and Joymalya Bagchi invoked the principle of 'justice, equity and good conscience', extending the provisions of the Central Provinces Laws Act, 1875 to the case and set aside the July 1, 2022 judgement of the Chhattisgarh HC, which had upheld the lower court order denying her the inheritance rights. The appellants, who approached the SC challenging the HC order, were legal heirs of one Dhaiya, a woman from a Scheduled Tribe. Their mother was one of the six children — five sons and one daughter, of Bhajju alias Bhanjan Gond. They sought partition of a property belonging to their maternal grandfather, stating that their mother is entitled to an equal share in the scheduled property. The court noted that the parties not being covered by any other inheritance law, the 1875 Act would apply. Though an argument was raised that the 1875 Act has been repealed in 2018. the bench pointed out that it has a clause which protects transactions before the repeal date. 'So, the right having been accrued in favour of the appellant-plaintiffs' mother upon the death of her father, which was approximately 30 years before the filing of the plaint became crystallised and would not be affected by the fact that the Act was no longer in the statute book,' Justice Karol said writing for the Bench.
News18
3 days ago
- Politics
- News18
'Use Sparingly, Obligatory With Strong Evidence': SC On CrPC Section For Prospective Accused
Last Updated: Section 319 of the CrPC empowers the court to proceed against anyone, even if not cited as an accused, based on evidence or trial that reveals the person's complicity The Supreme Court has ruled that the power under Section 319 Code of Criminal Procedure should be exercised sparingly. If evidence, however, reveals the involvement of the prospective accused, it becomes obligatory for the authority to use this power. A bench of Justices Sanjay Karol and Joymalya Bagchi allowed an appeal by Shiv Baran, the complainant in his brother's 2017 murder case, against the Allahabad High Court's order. The high court had set aside the summons issued against Rajendra Prasad Yadav, despite him being named in the FIR and not charged by the police. Section 319 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (CrPC) empowers the court to proceed against anyone, even if not cited as an accused, based on evidence collected during the inquiry or trial that reveals the person's complicity. 'The object is to ensure that no guilty person should be allowed to escape the process of law, which is based on the doctrine of judex damnatur cum nocens absolviture (judge is condemned when guilty is acquitted)," the bench observed. The bench stated that the provision imposes a duty on the court to ensure the real culprit does not go unpunished, as part of a fair trial. 'The power to be exercised, needless to add, is to be with utmost caution and not in a casual, callous or cavalier manner – for the same is only to advance the cause of justice and not be a tool to harass the individual or result into an abuse of the process of law," it said. During the trial, prosecution witnesses revealed the role of the prospective accused. The HC said a person cannot be summoned as an accused without strong motive evidence. In the absence of cogent material indicating the accused's complicity, the trial court committed an error in its order. The court highlighted that the Constitution bench in Hardeep Singh Vs State of Punjab (2014) held that the court need not wait for evidence against the proposed accused to be tested by cross-examination. The test of satisfaction laid down in Hardeep Singh was reiterated by the court in Labhuji Amratji Thakor Vs State of Gujarat (2019), requiring more than a prima facie case at the time of framing charges but less than the satisfaction warranting conviction. The bench said under this section, the court could proceed against a person named in the FIR but not implicated by the investigating officer in the chargesheet, provided statutory mandates are fulfilled. The principles the trial court should follow while exercising power under this section include: This provision protects victims and society at large, ensuring perpetrators do not escape the force of law; It is the court's duty to ensure the guilty are not unpunished; The trial court's power is broad but not unbridled, exercised only based on evidence adduced before it; The trial court can summon a person not named in the FIR or chargesheet if the evidence adduced implicates him; This power should not be used regularly or cavalierly, only with strong or cogent evidence beyond mere probability; The degree of satisfaction required is stricter than the prima facie case needed at the time of framing charges; The court should not conduct a mini-trial at this stage, focusing on whether 'such person could be tried' rather than 'should be tried'. Reverting to the case facts, the bench noted evidence from three alleged eyewitnesses suggested Rajendra's involvement, showing he was present at the scene armed with a stick. 'The high court tried to apply the same standard in deciding this application as is ordinarily used at the end of the trial in determining the conviction or otherwise of the accused. Whereas it ought to have considered that the standard of satisfaction required is short of the standard necessary for passing a final judgment after trial," the bench said. The court noted that Rajendra, although not charge-sheeted, was named in the FIR, and the evidence thus far suggests his involvement. At this stage, sufficient material exists to put him on trial, with his conviction to be determined by a full inquiry at the trial's end. Commenting on his conviction now would be premature. The first informant specifically mentioned Rajendra as one who came with others, sharing common intent, abusing and beating, causing his brother's death and serious injuries to others. 'In our considered view, the High Court proceeded to conduct a mini trial solely relying upon the affidavits submitted before the Superintendent of Police qua the innocence of respondent No.2. It erred in giving a categorical finding on the merits of PW1, the injured eyewitness not to have named respondent No.2, which we find is based on erroneous assumption and contrary to the factual position emerging from the record," the bench said. It observed that the HC erred in noting witnesses stated nothing about the crime's motive, were silent on common intention, absence of the incident's sequence, and who the aggressor was. 'All these questions, amongst others, are relevant or not is a matter to be considered at the stage of final adjudication," it said, setting aside the HC order and restoring the summons issued against the respondent no 2. The court directed the parties to appear before the trial court on August 28 to fully cooperate and avoid unnecessary adjournments. The trial was expedited to be completed within 18 months. About the Author Sanya Talwar Sanya Talwar, Editor at Lawbeat, has been heading the organisation since its inception. After practising in courts for over four years, she discovered her affinity for legal journalism. She has worked More Get breaking news, in-depth analysis, and expert perspectives on everything from politics to crime and society. Stay informed with the latest India news only on News18. Download the News18 App to stay updated! tags : Code of Criminal Procedure view comments Location : New Delhi, India, India First Published: July 18, 2025, 02:58 IST News india 'Use Sparingly, Obligatory With Strong Evidence': SC On CrPC Section For Prospective Accused Disclaimer: Comments reflect users' views, not News18's. Please keep discussions respectful and constructive. Abusive, defamatory, or illegal comments will be removed. News18 may disable any comment at its discretion. By posting, you agree to our Terms of Use and Privacy Policy.
The Hindu
3 days ago
- Politics
- The Hindu
Supreme Court upholds right to share in property of tribal woman's heirs
The Supreme Court on Thursday (July 17, 2025) upheld the right of the legal heirs of a Scheduled Tribe woman to an equal share in their maternal grandfather's ancestral property. 'There appears to be no rational nexus or reasonable classification for only males to be granted succession over the property of their forebears and not women, more so in the case where no prohibition to such effect can be shown to be prevalent as per law… Article 15(1) states that the state shall not discriminate against any person on grounds of religion, race, caste, sex or place of birth. This, along with Articles 38 and 46, points to the collective ethos of the Constitution in ensuring that there is no discrimination against women,' a Bench of Justices Sanjay Karol and Joymalya Bagchi held. The court said refusing a woman her right of share in a property only deepened gender discrimination. The judgment was based on an appeal filed by the legal heirs who had sought the partition of a property belonging to their maternal grandfather. The judgment authored by Justice Karol observed that customs too, like the law, could not remain stuck in time. 'Others cannot be allowed to take refuge in customs or hide behind them to deprive others of their right,' the court observed. The lower courts had dismissed the plea by the legal heirs saying their mother had no right in the property of her father on the ground that Scheduled Tribes were not governed by the Hindu Succession Act. The trial court and the appellate court had held that there was no evidence that the children of a woman heir were also entitled to property. The top court, allowing the appeal, said denying the woman's heirs a share of their maternal grandfather's property would violate their right to equality.
