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CNA
6 days ago
- Business
- CNA
IN FOCUS: What is the Second Island Chain and how does it shape US-China's 'geostrategic wei qi'?
SINGAPORE: In the vast blue expanse of the Pacific Ocean, a new front in the great power rivalry between the United States and China is quietly taking shape. Along a string of small islands and atolls that make up what's dubbed the Second Island Chain, Washington and Beijing have stepped up military and diplomatic manoeuvring as they work to fortify their presence and deny each other unbridled access to this strategic theatre, observers note. The US under President Donald Trump is effectively doubling down on his predecessor Joe Biden's actions in this region even as a slew of other policies is rolled back, reflecting how high the area is placed on the priority list, analysts say. They add that the island chain strategy that was once a geographic footnote in Cold War strategy could now potentially recast the stakes in the contested flashpoints of the South China Sea and Taiwan Strait. The regional stakes are significant, they further warn. Further militarisation of the area could lead to misunderstandings and confrontation, raising the risks of a conflict. 'Tensions will be high (in the Pacific) if China manages to secure the Second Island Chain and establish (more) military outposts or bases … especially as other regional powers, including Australia and Japan, come into the scene as well,' said Abdul Rahman Yaacob, a research fellow in the Southeast Asia Programme at the Lowy Institute. While not directly in the line of fire, Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) states could also come under increasing pressure to choose sides as the Sino-US divide widens - an unwelcome scenario, as the bloc's leaders have repeatedly made clear. But amid the geopolitical tussle, there could be a silver lining for Pacific island nations. They have an 'unprecedented opportunity' to leverage the geopolitical climate and 'extract benefits,' Blake Johnson, a senior analyst at the Australian Strategic Policy Institute's (ASPI) Pacific Centre, told CNA. WHAT IS THE SECOND ISLAND CHAIN? The island chain strategy stems from how US military strategists visualised defence and force projection perimeters across the Pacific during the Cold War between the US and then-Soviet Union. The First Island Chain, being closer to China's coast, was seen as a front line in any potential confrontation. The line runs down Japan, past Taiwan and the Philippines, ending at Borneo. The Second Island Chain - located further east and stretching from the Ogasarawa Islands south of Japan, through the US territories of Guam and the Northern Mariana Islands, down to Palau and parts of Micronesia - was designated as the second line of defence and reinforcement. The third island chain stretches from Alaska through Hawaii and down to New Zealand, marking the outermost perimeter of US strategic interest in the Pacific. While the Cold War is decades past, the terms have endured. Instead of the Soviet Union, China is now the primary target of the island chain strategy as the US looks to contain and counter Beijing's expanding military reach in the Indo-Pacific. 'Now, the competition is very much Pacific-focused, with China as the main adversary (of the US) in the theatre,' said Malcolm Davis, a senior analyst at ASPI. 'The PLA (People's Liberation Army) now is far more capable than the old PLA of the Cold War era.' Pacific territories and states along the Second Island Chain Ogasawara Islands (Japan) Remote Japanese territory ~1,000 km south of Tokyo Population: ~2,500 Land area: ~84 sq km Northern Mariana Islands (United States) US unincorporated territory Population: ~47,000 Land area: ~464 sq km Guam (United States) US unincorporated territory Population: ~170,000 Land area: ~540 sq km Federated States of Micronesia Sovereign nation in free association with the US* Population: ~115,000 Land area: ~700 sq km (total) Palau Sovereign nation in free association with the US* Population: ~18,000 Land area: ~460 sq km *Freely associated states receive US economic assistance and grant the US access to their territories for military purposes. Collapse The spotlight on the US' island chain strategy and in particular the Second Island Chain, was intensified after remarks by its Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth on his inaugural Indo-Pacific tour that included Guam, Hawaii, the Philippines and Japan. During his stop in Hawaii on Mar 26, Hegseth said America's island chain strategy is designed for deterrence rather than aggression. 'The rehearsals, the exercises, the campaigns we're doing in and around the first island chain are not meant to be the precursor to an attack. We're here to deter. We're here to show strength with our allies,' he said. Hegseth, who also announced investments in Yap and Micronesia and reiterated American commitment to bolstering Second Island Chain defence, stressed that the US remains committed to avoiding conflict while maintaining a strong and ready posture in the Indo-Pacific. 'We don't want to see a conflict at all … but we're going to be postured forward and leaning forward as much as necessary to ensure (a conflict) doesn't happen,' he added. Hegseth reaffirmed Washington's strategic commitment to the island chain strategy during his speech at the Shangri-La Dialogue in Singapore on May 31, as he marked his first appearance as defence secretary at the security-focused forum. He said the US is implementing a multi-pronged approach to reinforce deterrence in the Indo-Pacific, including improving its forward force posture, enhancing the defense capabilities of allies, and rebuilding its defence industrial base. 'So first, the Department of Defense is prioritising forward-postured, combat credible forces in the Western Pacific to deter by denial along the first and second island chains,' he said. He highlighted a key example from his visit to the Philippines in March, where the US pledged to deploy more advanced military assets. 'We announced the inaugural overseas deployment of NMESIS, a US Marine Corps mobile anti-ship missile system, to the Philippines,' he said. The system, deployed jointly with the Philippines' military to the Batanes Islands near the Taiwan Strait, 'enhanced our interoperability and improved our readiness on cutting-edge platforms where we need them, and when we need them'. BOLSTERING AMERICA'S PACIFIC PRESENCE The US under Trump has made clear it intends to augment its Pacific presence, digging in on actions overseen by the previous administration, even as the businessman-turned-president seeks to undo Biden's other policies. Abdul Rahman Yaacob from the Lowy Institute pointed to the late-April deployment of the USS Ohio - a nuclear-powered, guided-missile submarine - to the western Pacific. The US Navy stated that it was the third deployment of an Ohio-class submarine to the region in less than a year. The move highlights Washington's drive to bolster its undersea deterrence in the Pacific amid escalating maritime competition with Beijing, Abdul Rahman said. A month before that, Hegseth, the US defence chief, reaffirmed Washington's commitment to a strong regional deterrence posture during a visit to Guam. While there, he met with President Wesley Simina of the Federated States of Micronesia (FSM), a country of about 110,000 people situated along the strategic path of the Second Island Chain. According to the US Department of Defense, both men reached a 'mutual understanding' for it to begin 'planning and construction on key infrastructure projects' in Yap, one of FSM's four states. The department said that its future investments in FSM are estimated to exceed US$2 billion. 'These projects are designed to provide strategic operational and exercise capabilities for US forces,' it said. These include airfield modernisation and seaport development, improvements to a commercial port and harbour infrastructure enhancements. The move expands an already substantial US military footprint across the Southwest Pacific, which includes air and naval bases in Guam, a ballistic missile defence test site in the Marshall Islands, and a high-frequency radar system under development in Palau. EXPANDING CHINESE OUTREACH Chinese state media, including the Global Times, have consistently framed the US' island chain strategy as a relic of Cold War-era geopolitics, arguing that it is designed to contain China's rise and undermine regional stability. The Chinese narrative portrays the strategy as part of a broader US effort to stifle China's peaceful development through military build-ups, alliance networks, and operations under the banner of freedom of navigation in the South China Sea. 'The so-called 'first island chain' is a product of Cold War geopolitics. Any attempt to block and contain China is nothing but wishful thinking,' said Wu Qian, spokesperson for China's Ministry of National Defense, at a press briefing on Apr 12 last year. In the meantime, China has equally been buttressing its Pacific presence, making inroads in a region traditionally within the US sphere of influence. While much of the strategic attention has traditionally focused on the first island chain, Beijing has quietly laid the groundwork for influence and access further east, said Ridzwan Rahmat, principal defence analyst at Janes, an intelligence firm specialising in military and national security. Steps taken include expanding satellite tracking and intelligence-gathering capabilities, and deepening ties through economic aid, infrastructure financing, and training exchanges. China has increasingly leveraged economic and infrastructure initiatives to deepen its influence among Pacific Island nations, including those situated along the Second and Third Island Chains. In countries like Vanuatu and Kiribati - both situated along or near the Third Island Chain - Beijing has invested in critical infrastructure projects, such as port developments and airstrip renovations, which analysts suggest could serve dual civilian and military purposes. In Vanuatu, for instance, China holds a significant portion of the nation's sovereign debt and has attempted to establish a military base. Similarly, in Kiribati, China has made plans to revitalise an airstrip, which some observers have viewed as efforts to project the PLA's power into the South Pacific. Diplomatically, China has also made concerted efforts to shift allegiances in the Pacific, persuading several nations to switch recognition from Taiwan to Beijing. China has also been building up its maritime presence in the Pacific. It currently ranks third in the Pacific, behind only the US and Australia, according to Anne-Marie Brady, a specialist in Chinese, Pacific and polar politics at the University of Canterbury in New Zealand. Last year, it registered 26 China Coast Guard (CCG) vessels to operate within the jurisdiction of the Western and Central Pacific Fisheries Commission. Analysts have said the CCG is often deployed in grey-zone operations in contested waters. This gives the designated CCG vessels legal authority to board foreign fishing ships operating on the high seas within an expansive area covering nearly 20 per cent of the Earth's surface. Notably, this area encompasses all three of the island chains. CCG vessels have frequently been deployed to assert Beijing's maritime claims in contested areas of the South China Sea, including near Philippine-held features. Their presence has often led to tense standoffs, with Manila accusing them of blocking resupply missions and using water cannons against Filipino boats. TUSSLE FOR STRATEGIC DOMINANCE A tussle for strategic dominance underlies the actions by the US and China in the Second Island Chain and overall Pacific, observers say. China's push into the Second Island Chain has been deliberate and multi-faceted, particularly in safeguarding what it sees as core national interests, said Ridzwan from Janes. 'China imports 80 per cent of its energy sources via the sea. The land connection that it has with Russia and Pakistan is not enough to keep up with this demand for energy imports,' he said. 'It's very easy for the Americans to cut off China's sea lines of communication that are beyond the First Island Chain. So I think that's the emphasis on the Second Island Chain - to make sure that its sea lines of communication remain open.' Davis from ASPI believes China isn't just concerned about protecting its communication channels - it also wants to open up offensive options. 'It's about laying the groundwork for a future presence that could cut critical sea lines of communication between Australia and the US, as well as those running south of Australia through the Coral Sea up to Japan,' he told CNA. Against this backdrop, he said the US has ramped up its efforts in Micronesia to maintain control over key sea lines of communication and check China's expanding Pacific footprint. Davis described the back and forth as a 'game of geostrategic wei qi', referencing the Chinese name for the board game Go. In Go, players often disperse stones across the board to build influence and flexibility, rather than overcommitting in a concentrated area. Davis said this mirrors the US strategy of spreading forces across the Second Island Chain to reduce vulnerability and maintain operational resilience against a concentrated strike. At the same time, growing American emphasis on the defence line in the western Pacific is driven by mounting concerns over China's increasingly sophisticated anti-access and area denial (A2/AD) capabilities, he said. A2/AD is a military strategy aimed at preventing an adversary from entering or operating freely within a specific region. Tools include long-range missiles, air defences and naval assets, as well as cyber attacks and electronic warfare. China's growing wartime capabilities are making it increasingly challenging for the US and its allies to operate effectively or hold ground within the first island chain - China's immediate maritime buffer - should a conflict break out, Davis said. 'China is extending its counter-intervention capabilities further (beyond its shores) and developing more effective A2/AD capabilities, to the point where the potential cost of deploying within its near seas is becoming too costly,' he said. 'So, the US (wants) to make use of the Second Island Chain - centred on Guam - to project power from, and also to deny China the ability to project power beyond the island chain out into the far seas.' The new infrastructure and anticipated deployment of air defence systems in FSM's Yap will further solidify the US' position within the Second Island Chain, said Abdul Rahman from the Lowy Institute. 'If all your key assets are within the First Island Chain, and they are taken out by the Chinese, you will not be able to respond against the Chinese, so you'll be a sitting duck,' he said. Abdul Rahman added that the US is shifting towards a strategy of force dispersal across the Pacific, deploying smaller, more agile units throughout the region. 'Deploying in a place like (Micronesia) will enable them to be able to strike against China in return in the event of (a conflict) … having forces deployed (along the Second Island Chain) will make it a bit difficult for the Chinese to take down your forces at the same time.' China's accelerating military modernisation - especially in long-range precision strike capabilities - is reshaping the strategic landscape of the Indo-Pacific region, noted Ridzwan from Janes. According to a 2024 Pentagon report, Beijing has been expanding its missile arsenal with systems designed to reach deep into the Pacific. This includes intercontinental ballistic missiles like the Dongfeng-31AG, which can strike targets as far afield as Hawaii, and intermediate-range missiles such as the Dongfeng-26, capable of striking US bases in Guam. China test-fired an intercontinental ballistic missile into the Pacific Ocean in September last year, the first such launch in 44 years. But Ridzwan said questions remain about the real-world effectiveness of China's advanced missile systems. 'One of the biggest weaknesses that the Chinese face is that this hardware developed over the past few years has never really been tested in actual operational conflict,' he told CNA. 'Compared to the American military, which has gone to war many times - from Vietnam to Iraq and Afghanistan - the Chinese have not had this opportunity to operationally test their weapon systems or combat systems against a proper, true adversary,' Ridzwan noted. 'The kind of data you get from training is not as valuable as what you collect in real combat scenarios.' Before becoming US defence chief in January, Hegseth had already sounded the alarm over China's growing military capabilities. Speaking on a podcast in November 2024, he warned that the PLA was being built 'specifically dedicated to defeating the United States of America'. He claimed that China's hypersonic missiles could destroy all of America's aircraft carriers 'within the first minutes of a potential conflict', and pointed out that in classified Pentagon war games simulating a clash with China, 'the US lost every time'. While Hegseth's remarks focused on China's growing edge in hypersonic missile capabilities - an area where the US currently lags in - Abdul Rahman pointed out that Washington's broader posture in the Pacific goes beyond countering specific threats. Stationing forces and assets across Pacific island states, he said, allows them to function as critical command-and-control hubs, backup airfields, and logistical nodes for fuel and munitions. 'These locations also play a key role in facilitating the flow of troops and supplies from the US mainland to East Asia,' he added. PACIFIC STATES CAUGHT IN THE MIDDLE As the Sino-US contest spills increasingly over into the blue waters of the Pacific, island nations there find themselves caught in the middle. Analysts say they have a chance to seize on the current situation and eke out gains as Washington and Beijing look to court them. China leverages economic incentives and development aid to encourage nations to recognise it over Taiwan, Joshua Bernard Espena, an international relations lecturer at the Polytechnic University of the Philippines (PUP), told CNA. China regained its place as the second-biggest bilateral donor to the Pacific islands in 2022, displacing the US to come in behind Australia, according to a Lowy Institute report. It ramped up projects after a COVID-19 pandemic lull to fork out US$256 million in development support. This approach, Espena said, has been effective in swaying countries facing financial challenges, as they seek infrastructure development and economic support. 'China seeks to further turn Taiwan's international identity in the Pacific into rubble. Washington does not wish this to happen despite its own withdrawal from Taipei in 1979,' Espena said. China views Taiwan as part of its territory, to be brought under its control by force if necessary. Beijing sends warplanes and navy vessels near the self-ruled island regularly, and in recent years, it has stepped up the scope and scale of military exercises around Taiwan. Several Pacific island nations have shifted diplomatic recognition from Taiwan to China in recent years. Nauru was the latest to do so in January 2024, following similar moves by the Solomon Islands and Kiribati in 2019. These changes have reduced Taiwan's diplomatic partners in the Pacific to just three - Tuvalu, Palau and the Marshall Islands. Johnson from ASPI cautioned that drawing closer to China could have risks. 'Some are choosing to forge deeper ties with China in the economic and security space, which poses additional risks for sea lines of communication and other strategic concerns,' he said. 'It also poses risks to undermining democracy in these countries - risks that their governments might not fully appreciate.' At the same time, countries like Nauru and Tuvalu have opted for stable alignments. 'They're electing for a more comprehensive partnership with Australia to avoid the burdens of playing off competition for benefit,' Johnson said. As for the US, Espena from PUP suggested that island states like Palau could play a 'critical role' in enabling the expansion of the US military's footprint across the Pacific. He noted that they 'may be able to host dual-use runways and ports' to support a credible supply line for American and allied maritime operations - albeit on a limited scale. Espena said Taiwan's sole three diplomatic partners in the Pacific islands could serve as 'useful liaisons' for Washington to sustain unofficial lines of communication with Taipei, in line with its long-standing policy of strategic ambiguity. But analysts have warned that aid cuts and reduced climate funding under the Trump administration risk eroding goodwill among Pacific island nations - an outcome at odds with Washington's broader push to expand its regional presence. The Pacific island states are among the most vulnerable to the impact of climate change due to their geographical location and limited resources. They are also heavily reliant on foreign aid, with the US a significant donor before Trump took steps to turn off the tap. 'Nothing is more detrimental' than viewing the Freely Associated States (FAS) as merely a launchpad for military operations, said Espena, referring to the three Pacific nations of FSM, the Marshall Islands and Palau. The three countries share Compacts of Free Association with the US, arrangements that effectively give the US strategic positioning in the Pacific while providing economic and security support to the associated states. A 20-year renewal to the agreements was enacted in March last year. Espena said relative stability in the western Pacific has long depended on the US bearing the economic cost in exchange for political influence. 'While American transactionalism is now becoming the new normal, it's up to the FAS to renegotiate the terms they need to assert,' he said, adding that Washington 'must not brush off these concerns'. Echoing this, Davis from ASPI said slashing aid not only weakens America's standing but opens the door for Chinese influence. 'China will seek to exploit such cuts to Beijing's benefit,' he said. 'It may save the US some dollars, but cost them far more in the broader strategic competition that is now ongoing.' HEADING FOR CHOPPY REGIONAL WATERS? While geographically distant from much of the world and often viewed as a secondary theatre, what's playing out in the Second Island Chain could still trigger ripple effects across the broader region if tensions escalate, analysts warn. One consideration is Taiwan. Analysts have suggested that China's course of action regarding the self-ruled island hinges primarily on whether the US would intervene militarily. Noting China's steadily advancing military capabilities, Davis from ASPI said the US has had to adapt by dispersing its forces across the Pacific region. Such a move could come at a cost to existing US deployments in the region. The Wall Street Journal reported in late May, citing sources familiar with internal discussions, that the Pentagon was considering relocating around 4,500 troops from South Korea to other locations in the Indo-Pacific, including Guam. These claims, however, were swiftly dismissed by Washington. 'Reports that the DoD (US Department of Defense) will reduce US troops in the Republic of Korea (ROK) are not true,' Pentagon chief spokesperson Sean Parnell posted on social media platform X a day after the WSJ report. 'Anyone who's covered the Pentagon knows that we always evaluate force posture. That said, the US remains firmly committed to the ROK. Our alliance is ironclad,' he added. South Korea's defence ministry also responded, saying Seoul and Washington had not held any discussions about withdrawing US troops stationed in the country. When asked whether an American strategic shift to the Second Island Chain would affect Taiwan's security, Ridzwan from Janes said dispersing US forces could lead to 'weaker protection' within the First Island Chain. However, he stressed that this does not automatically leave Taiwan exposed or vulnerable, as the island's defence hinges on many other factors such as air superiority and the cost of intervention. 'China doesn't yet have the bandwidth to carry out a full-scale invasion of Taiwan. And by bandwidth, I mean the ability to deploy and sustain a large number of troops within a limited time frame - without that, any landing force can easily be repelled,' Ridzwan said. He suggested that Beijing's current objective is to isolate rather than invade Taiwan. 'The best option for the Chinese at the moment is to cut Taiwan off from its sea lines of communication. And Washington knows this. That's likely why there's now more emphasis (from China) on the Second Island Chain - to support a strategy of containment rather than direct confrontation,' he said. Meanwhile, China's efforts to expand its presence in the Pacific islands are part of a calculated, step-by-step plan aimed at first building political influence, which can later pave the way for economic and military footholds, said Abdul Rahman from the Lowy Institute. 'I think they are trying to gain some political influence first,' he said, pointing to Beijing's success in persuading several island nations to switch diplomatic recognition from Taiwan to China. 'That's the first step. Once you are able to establish political influence, later on, you can have military influence, economic influence following suit. That's their strategy.' Abdul Rahman warned that the eventual goal could be access to key infrastructure. 'I'm certain that once they have strong political influence, they could have access to either port or air facilities in some of these islands,' he said. Such a scenario, he added, would carry serious strategic implications. 'If the Chinese have access to the ports and air facilities on some of these small islands, it could cut off maritime and air travels between the US and Australia, in times of a military conflict.' He added that Chinese control over the Second Island Chain could potentially limit US manoeuvrability in the event of a conflict. 'If there is a conflict in Taiwan, then it will be very difficult for the Americans to quickly assist the Taiwanese … because the Chinese will be blocking the second island chain.' However, Abdul Rahman stressed that such a scenario remains some way off. 'At this point in time, I do not think the Chinese will be able to set up any air or military outpost in the Second Island Chain in the short and medium term,' he said, noting that Beijing is still in the process of trying to 'establish strong political influence' there. Nevertheless, the extension of US-China competition into the island chains could potentially heighten the risk of confrontation - not just within those geographical lines, but across the wider Indo-Pacific region, warn analysts. For instance, increased deployments and competing military postures could exacerbate tensions in flashpoints such as the South China Sea, where overlapping claims and naval stand-offs are already common, said Ridzwan from Janes. 'I think the Philippines is a very important node in the American strategy for Second Island Chain capability,' said Ridzwan, pointing out Washington's deployment of various weapon systems in the country. The US military has deployed its NMESIS missile system to the Philippines for ongoing bilateral drills. Barely two months ago, the same system featured on Batan Island, close to the Luzon Strait, during another joint exercise. Ridzwan said this reflects a wider pattern of militarisation not only in the Pacific islands but also among South China Sea claimants. Such moves, he said, risk fuelling an arms buildup and mistrust that could raise the chances of miscalculation - particularly in contested waters where US-aligned forces and Chinese maritime assets already operate in close proximity. Countries such as the Philippines and Japan are 'understandably' wary of China's growing interest in the Second Island Chain, said Abdul Rahman from the Lowy Institute. 'The Second Island Chain actually covers the eastern part of their security zone,' he said. 'So if China manages to secure the Second Island Chain and establish either military outposts or bases, the Philippines will be stuck between the First Island Chain and the Second Island Chain - and it will be similar for Japan too.' A growing Chinese military presence in the Pacific could leave Southeast Asian nations having to make hard choices, regardless of whether they want to. 'As the PLA Navy evolves into a more capable blue-water (force) and begins projecting power more frequently through Southeast Asia into the south-west Pacific, ASEAN will come under increasing pressure to choose sides,' said Davis from ASPI. 'Their space to remain non-aligned will shrink.'
CNA
6 days ago
- Business
- CNA
IN FOCUS: How a string of remote Pacific islands is emerging as a new front in US-China rivalry
SINGAPORE: In the vast blue expanse of the Pacific Ocean, a new front in the great power rivalry between the United States and China is quietly taking shape. Along a string of small islands and atolls that make up what's dubbed the Second Island Chain, Washington and Beijing have stepped up military and diplomatic manoeuvring as they work to fortify their presence and deny each other unbridled access to this strategic theatre, observers note. The US under President Donald Trump is effectively doubling down on his predecessor Joe Biden's actions in this region even as a slew of other policies is rolled back, reflecting how high the area is placed on the priority list, analysts say. They add that the island chain strategy that was once a geographic footnote in Cold War strategy could now potentially recast the stakes in the contested flashpoints of the South China Sea and Taiwan Strait. The regional stakes are significant, they further warn. Further militarisation of the area could lead to misunderstandings and confrontation, raising the risks of a conflict. 'Tensions will be high (in the Pacific) if China manages to secure the Second Island Chain and establish (more) military outposts or bases … especially as other regional powers, including Australia and Japan, come into the scene as well,' said Abdul Rahman Yaacob, a research fellow in the Southeast Asia Programme at the Lowy Institute. While not directly in the line of fire, Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) states could also come under increasing pressure to choose sides as the Sino-US divide widens - an unwelcome scenario, as the bloc's leaders have repeatedly made clear. But amid the geopolitical tussle, there could be a silver lining for Pacific island nations. They have an 'unprecedented opportunity' to leverage the geopolitical climate and 'extract benefits,' Blake Johnson, a senior analyst at the Australian Strategic Policy Institute's (ASPI) Pacific Centre, told CNA. WHAT IS THE SECOND ISLAND CHAIN? The island chain strategy stems from how US military strategists visualised defence and force projection perimeters across the Pacific during the Cold War between the US and then-Soviet Union. The First Island Chain, being closer to China's coast, was seen as a front line in any potential confrontation. The line runs down Japan, past Taiwan and the Philippines, ending at Borneo. The Second Island Chain - located further east and stretching from the Ogasarawa Islands south of Japan, through the US territories of Guam and the Northern Mariana Islands, down to Palau and parts of Micronesia - was designated as the second line of defence and reinforcement. The third island chain stretches from Alaska through Hawaii and down to New Zealand, marking the outermost perimeter of US strategic interest in the Pacific. While the Cold War is decades past, the terms have endured. Instead of the Soviet Union, China is now the primary target of the island chain strategy as the US looks to contain and counter Beijing's expanding military reach in the Indo-Pacific. 'Now, the competition is very much Pacific-focused, with China as the main adversary (of the US) in the theatre,' said Malcolm Davis, a senior analyst at ASPI. 'The PLA (People's Liberation Army) now is far more capable than the old PLA of the Cold War era.' Pacific territories and states along the Second Island Chain Ogasawara Islands (Japan) Remote Japanese territory ~1,000 km south of Tokyo Population: ~2,500 Land area: ~84 sq km Northern Mariana Islands (United States) US unincorporated territory Population: ~47,000 Land area: ~464 sq km Guam (United States) US unincorporated territory Population: ~170,000 Land area: ~540 sq km Federated States of Micronesia Sovereign nation in free association with the US* Population: ~115,000 Land area: ~700 sq km (total) Palau Sovereign nation in free association with the US* Population: ~18,000 Land area: ~460 sq km *Freely associated states receive US economic assistance and grant the US access to their territories for military purposes. Collapse The spotlight on the US' island chain strategy and in particular the Second Island Chain, was intensified after remarks by its Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth on his inaugural Indo-Pacific tour that included Guam, Hawaii, the Philippines and Japan. During his stop in Hawaii on Mar 26, Hegseth said America's island chain strategy is designed for deterrence rather than aggression. 'The rehearsals, the exercises, the campaigns we're doing in and around the first island chain are not meant to be the precursor to an attack. We're here to deter. We're here to show strength with our allies,' he said. Hegseth, who also announced investments in Yap and Micronesia and reiterated American commitment to bolstering Second Island Chain defence, stressed that the US remains committed to avoiding conflict while maintaining a strong and ready posture in the Indo-Pacific. 'We don't want to see a conflict at all … but we're going to be postured forward and leaning forward as much as necessary to ensure (a conflict) doesn't happen,' he added. Hegseth reaffirmed Washington's strategic commitment to the island chain strategy during his speech at the Shangri-La Dialogue in Singapore on May 31, as he marked his first appearance as defence secretary at the security-focused forum. He said the US is implementing a multi-pronged approach to reinforce deterrence in the Indo-Pacific, including improving its forward force posture, enhancing the defense capabilities of allies, and rebuilding its defence industrial base. 'So first, the Department of Defense is prioritising forward-postured, combat credible forces in the Western Pacific to deter by denial along the first and second island chains,' he said. He highlighted a key example from his visit to the Philippines in March, where the US pledged to deploy more advanced military assets. 'We announced the inaugural overseas deployment of NMESIS, a US Marine Corps mobile anti-ship missile system, to the Philippines,' he said. The system, deployed jointly with the Philippines' military to the Batanes Islands near the Taiwan Strait, 'enhanced our interoperability and improved our readiness on cutting-edge platforms where we need them, and when we need them'. BOLSTERING AMERICA'S PACIFIC PRESENCE The US under Trump has made clear it intends to augment its Pacific presence, digging in on actions overseen by the previous administration, even as the businessman-turned-president seeks to undo Biden's other policies. Abdul Rahman Yaacob from the Lowy Institute pointed to the late-April deployment of the USS Ohio - a nuclear-powered, guided-missile submarine - to the western Pacific. The US Navy stated that it was the third deployment of an Ohio-class submarine to the region in less than a year. The move highlights Washington's drive to bolster its undersea deterrence in the Pacific amid escalating maritime competition with Beijing, Abdul Rahman said. A month before that, Hegseth, the US defence chief, reaffirmed Washington's commitment to a strong regional deterrence posture during a visit to Guam. While there, he met with President Wesley Simina of the Federated States of Micronesia (FSM), a country of about 110,000 people situated along the strategic path of the Second Island Chain. According to the US Department of Defense, both men reached a 'mutual understanding' for it to begin 'planning and construction on key infrastructure projects' in Yap, one of FSM's four states. The department said that its future investments in FSM are estimated to exceed US$2 billion. 'These projects are designed to provide strategic operational and exercise capabilities for US forces,' it said. These include airfield modernisation and seaport development, improvements to a commercial port and harbour infrastructure enhancements. The move expands an already substantial US military footprint across the Southwest Pacific, which includes air and naval bases in Guam, a ballistic missile defence test site in the Marshall Islands, and a high-frequency radar system under development in Palau. EXPANDING CHINESE OUTREACH Chinese state media, including the Global Times, have consistently framed the US' island chain strategy as a relic of Cold War-era geopolitics, arguing that it is designed to contain China's rise and undermine regional stability. The Chinese narrative portrays the strategy as part of a broader US effort to stifle China's peaceful development through military build-ups, alliance networks, and operations under the banner of freedom of navigation in the South China Sea. 'The so-called 'first island chain' is a product of Cold War geopolitics. Any attempt to block and contain China is nothing but wishful thinking,' said Wu Qian, spokesperson for China's Ministry of National Defense, at a press briefing on Apr 12 last year. In the meantime, China has equally been buttressing its Pacific presence, making inroads in a region traditionally within the US sphere of influence. While much of the strategic attention has traditionally focused on the first island chain, Beijing has quietly laid the groundwork for influence and access further east, said Ridzwan Rahmat, principal defence analyst at Janes, an intelligence firm specialising in military and national security. Steps taken include expanding satellite tracking and intelligence-gathering capabilities, and deepening ties through economic aid, infrastructure financing, and training exchanges. China has increasingly leveraged economic and infrastructure initiatives to deepen its influence among Pacific Island nations, including those situated along the Second and Third Island Chains. In countries like Vanuatu and Kiribati - both situated along or near the Third Island Chain - Beijing has invested in critical infrastructure projects, such as port developments and airstrip renovations, which analysts suggest could serve dual civilian and military purposes. In Vanuatu, for instance, China holds a significant portion of the nation's sovereign debt and has attempted to establish a military base. Similarly, in Kiribati, China has made plans to revitalise an airstrip, which some observers have viewed as efforts to project the PLA's power into the South Pacific. Diplomatically, China has also made concerted efforts to shift allegiances in the Pacific, persuading several nations to switch recognition from Taiwan to Beijing. China has also been building up its maritime presence in the Pacific. It currently ranks third in the Pacific, behind only the US and Australia, according to Anne-Marie Brady, a specialist in Chinese, Pacific and polar politics at the University of Canterbury in New Zealand. Last year, it registered 26 China Coast Guard (CCG) vessels to operate within the jurisdiction of the Western and Central Pacific Fisheries Commission. Analysts have said the CCG is often deployed in grey-zone operations in contested waters. This gives the designated CCG vessels legal authority to board foreign fishing ships operating on the high seas within an expansive area covering nearly 20 per cent of the Earth's surface. Notably, this area encompasses all three of the island chains. CCG vessels have frequently been deployed to assert Beijing's maritime claims in contested areas of the South China Sea, including near Philippine-held features. Their presence has often led to tense standoffs, with Manila accusing them of blocking resupply missions and using water cannons against Filipino boats. TUSSLE FOR STRATEGIC DOMINANCE A tussle for strategic dominance underlies the actions by the US and China in the Second Island Chain and overall Pacific, observers say. China's push into the Second Island Chain has been deliberate and multi-faceted, particularly in safeguarding what it sees as core national interests, said Ridzwan from Janes. 'China imports 80 per cent of its energy sources via the sea. The land connection that it has with Russia and Pakistan is not enough to keep up with this demand for energy imports,' he said. 'It's very easy for the Americans to cut off China's sea lines of communication that are beyond the First Island Chain. So I think that's the emphasis on the Second Island Chain - to make sure that its sea lines of communication remain open.' Davis from ASPI believes China isn't just concerned about protecting its communication channels - it also wants to open up offensive options. 'It's about laying the groundwork for a future presence that could cut critical sea lines of communication between Australia and the US, as well as those running south of Australia through the Coral Sea up to Japan,' he told CNA. Against this backdrop, he said the US has ramped up its efforts in Micronesia to maintain control over key sea lines of communication and check China's expanding Pacific footprint. Davis described the back and forth as a 'game of geostrategic wei qi', referencing the Chinese name for the board game Go. In Go, players often disperse stones across the board to build influence and flexibility, rather than overcommitting in a concentrated area. Davis said this mirrors the US strategy of spreading forces across the Second Island Chain to reduce vulnerability and maintain operational resilience against a concentrated strike. At the same time, growing American emphasis on the defence line in the western Pacific is driven by mounting concerns over China's increasingly sophisticated anti-access and area denial (A2/AD) capabilities, he said. A2/AD is a military strategy aimed at preventing an adversary from entering or operating freely within a specific region. Tools include long-range missiles, air defences and naval assets, as well as cyber attacks and electronic warfare. China's growing wartime capabilities are making it increasingly challenging for the US and its allies to operate effectively or hold ground within the first island chain - China's immediate maritime buffer - should a conflict break out, Davis said. 'China is extending its counter-intervention capabilities further (beyond its shores) and developing more effective A2/AD capabilities, to the point where the potential cost of deploying within its near seas is becoming too costly,' he said. 'So, the US (wants) to make use of the Second Island Chain - centred on Guam - to project power from, and also to deny China the ability to project power beyond the island chain out into the far seas.' The new infrastructure and anticipated deployment of air defence systems in FSM's Yap will further solidify the US' position within the Second Island Chain, said Abdul Rahman from the Lowy Institute. 'If all your key assets are within the First Island Chain, and they are taken out by the Chinese, you will not be able to respond against the Chinese, so you'll be a sitting duck,' he said. Abdul Rahman added that the US is shifting towards a strategy of force dispersal across the Pacific, deploying smaller, more agile units throughout the region. 'Deploying in a place like (Micronesia) will enable them to be able to strike against China in return in the event of (a conflict) … having forces deployed (along the Second Island Chain) will make it a bit difficult for the Chinese to take down your forces at the same time.' China's accelerating military modernisation - especially in long-range precision strike capabilities - is reshaping the strategic landscape of the Indo-Pacific region, noted Ridzwan from Janes. According to a 2024 Pentagon report, Beijing has been expanding its missile arsenal with systems designed to reach deep into the Pacific. This includes intercontinental ballistic missiles like the Dongfeng-31AG, which can strike targets as far afield as Hawaii, and intermediate-range missiles such as the Dongfeng-26, capable of striking US bases in Guam. China test-fired an intercontinental ballistic missile into the Pacific Ocean in September last year, the first such launch in 44 years. But Ridzwan said questions remain about the real-world effectiveness of China's advanced missile systems. 'One of the biggest weaknesses that the Chinese face is that this hardware developed over the past few years has never really been tested in actual operational conflict,' he told CNA. 'Compared to the American military, which has gone to war many times - from Vietnam to Iraq and Afghanistan - the Chinese have not had this opportunity to operationally test their weapon systems or combat systems against a proper, true adversary,' Ridzwan noted. 'The kind of data you get from training is not as valuable as what you collect in real combat scenarios.' Before becoming US defence chief in January, Hegseth had already sounded the alarm over China's growing military capabilities. Speaking on a podcast in November 2024, he warned that the PLA was being built 'specifically dedicated to defeating the United States of America'. He claimed that China's hypersonic missiles could destroy all of America's aircraft carriers 'within the first minutes of a potential conflict', and pointed out that in classified Pentagon war games simulating a clash with China, 'the US lost every time'. While Hegseth's remarks focused on China's growing edge in hypersonic missile capabilities - an area where the US currently lags in - Abdul Rahman pointed out that Washington's broader posture in the Pacific goes beyond countering specific threats. Stationing forces and assets across Pacific island states, he said, allows them to function as critical command-and-control hubs, backup airfields, and logistical nodes for fuel and munitions. 'These locations also play a key role in facilitating the flow of troops and supplies from the US mainland to East Asia,' he added. PACIFIC STATES CAUGHT IN THE MIDDLE As the Sino-US contest spills increasingly over into the blue waters of the Pacific, island nations there find themselves caught in the middle. Analysts say they have a chance to seize on the current situation and eke out gains as Washington and Beijing look to court them. China leverages economic incentives and development aid to encourage nations to recognise it over Taiwan, Joshua Bernard Espena, an international relations lecturer at the Polytechnic University of the Philippines (PUP), told CNA. China regained its place as the second-biggest bilateral donor to the Pacific islands in 2022, displacing the US to come in behind Australia, according to a Lowy Institute report. It ramped up projects after a COVID-19 pandemic lull to fork out US$256 million in development support. This approach, Espena said, has been effective in swaying countries facing financial challenges, as they seek infrastructure development and economic support. 'China seeks to further turn Taiwan's international identity in the Pacific into rubble. Washington does not wish this to happen despite its own withdrawal from Taipei in 1979,' Espena said. China views Taiwan as part of its territory, to be brought under its control by force if necessary. Beijing sends warplanes and navy vessels near the self-ruled island regularly, and in recent years, it has stepped up the scope and scale of military exercises around Taiwan. Several Pacific island nations have shifted diplomatic recognition from Taiwan to China in recent years. Nauru was the latest to do so in January 2024, following similar moves by the Solomon Islands and Kiribati in 2019. These changes have reduced Taiwan's diplomatic partners in the Pacific to just three - Tuvalu, Palau and the Marshall Islands. Johnson from ASPI cautioned that drawing closer to China could have risks. 'Some are choosing to forge deeper ties with China in the economic and security space, which poses additional risks for sea lines of communication and other strategic concerns,' he said. 'It also poses risks to undermining democracy in these countries - risks that their governments might not fully appreciate.' At the same time, countries like Nauru and Tuvalu have opted for stable alignments. 'They're electing for a more comprehensive partnership with Australia to avoid the burdens of playing off competition for benefit,' Johnson said. As for the US, Espena from PUP suggested that island states like Palau could play a 'critical role' in enabling the expansion of the US military's footprint across the Pacific. He noted that they 'may be able to host dual-use runways and ports' to support a credible supply line for American and allied maritime operations - albeit on a limited scale. Espena said Taiwan's sole three diplomatic partners in the Pacific islands could serve as 'useful liaisons' for Washington to sustain unofficial lines of communication with Taipei, in line with its long-standing policy of strategic ambiguity. But analysts have warned that aid cuts and reduced climate funding under the Trump administration risk eroding goodwill among Pacific island nations - an outcome at odds with Washington's broader push to expand its regional presence. The Pacific island states are among the most vulnerable to the impact of climate change due to their geographical location and limited resources. They are also heavily reliant on foreign aid, with the US a significant donor before Trump took steps to turn off the tap. 'Nothing is more detrimental' than viewing the Freely Associated States (FAS) as merely a launchpad for military operations, said Espena, referring to the three Pacific nations of FSM, the Marshall Islands and Palau. The three countries share Compacts of Free Association with the US, arrangements that effectively give the US strategic positioning in the Pacific while providing economic and security support to the associated states. A 20-year renewal to the agreements was enacted in March last year. Espena said relative stability in the western Pacific has long depended on the US bearing the economic cost in exchange for political influence. 'While American transactionalism is now becoming the new normal, it's up to the FAS to renegotiate the terms they need to assert,' he said, adding that Washington 'must not brush off these concerns'. Echoing this, Davis from ASPI said slashing aid not only weakens America's standing but opens the door for Chinese influence. 'China will seek to exploit such cuts to Beijing's benefit,' he said. 'It may save the US some dollars, but cost them far more in the broader strategic competition that is now ongoing.' HEADING FOR CHOPPY REGIONAL WATERS? While geographically distant from much of the world and often viewed as a secondary theatre, what's playing out in the Second Island Chain could still trigger ripple effects across the broader region if tensions escalate, analysts warn. One consideration is Taiwan. Analysts have suggested that China's course of action regarding the self-ruled island hinges primarily on whether the US would intervene militarily. Noting China's steadily advancing military capabilities, Davis from ASPI said the US has had to adapt by dispersing its forces across the Pacific region. Such a move could come at a cost to existing US deployments in the region. The Wall Street Journal reported in late May, citing sources familiar with internal discussions, that the Pentagon was considering relocating around 4,500 troops from South Korea to other locations in the Indo-Pacific, including Guam. These claims, however, were swiftly dismissed by Washington. 'Reports that the DoD (US Department of Defense) will reduce US troops in the Republic of Korea (ROK) are not true,' Pentagon chief spokesperson Sean Parnell posted on social media platform X a day after the WSJ report. 'Anyone who's covered the Pentagon knows that we always evaluate force posture. That said, the US remains firmly committed to the ROK. Our alliance is ironclad,' he added. South Korea's defence ministry also responded, saying Seoul and Washington had not held any discussions about withdrawing US troops stationed in the country. When asked whether an American strategic shift to the Second Island Chain would affect Taiwan's security, Ridzwan from Janes said dispersing US forces could lead to 'weaker protection' within the First Island Chain. However, he stressed that this does not automatically leave Taiwan exposed or vulnerable, as the island's defence hinges on many other factors such as air superiority and the cost of intervention. 'China doesn't yet have the bandwidth to carry out a full-scale invasion of Taiwan. And by bandwidth, I mean the ability to deploy and sustain a large number of troops within a limited time frame - without that, any landing force can easily be repelled,' Ridzwan said. He suggested that Beijing's current objective is to isolate rather than invade Taiwan. 'The best option for the Chinese at the moment is to cut Taiwan off from its sea lines of communication. And Washington knows this. That's likely why there's now more emphasis (from China) on the Second Island Chain - to support a strategy of containment rather than direct confrontation,' he said. Meanwhile, China's efforts to expand its presence in the Pacific islands are part of a calculated, step-by-step plan aimed at first building political influence, which can later pave the way for economic and military footholds, said Abdul Rahman from the Lowy Institute. 'I think they are trying to gain some political influence first,' he said, pointing to Beijing's success in persuading several island nations to switch diplomatic recognition from Taiwan to China. 'That's the first step. Once you are able to establish political influence, later on, you can have military influence, economic influence following suit. That's their strategy.' Abdul Rahman warned that the eventual goal could be access to key infrastructure. 'I'm certain that once they have strong political influence, they could have access to either port or air facilities in some of these islands,' he said. Such a scenario, he added, would carry serious strategic implications. 'If the Chinese have access to the ports and air facilities on some of these small islands, it could cut off maritime and air travels between the US and Australia, in times of a military conflict.' He added that Chinese control over the Second Island Chain could potentially limit US manoeuvrability in the event of a conflict. 'If there is a conflict in Taiwan, then it will be very difficult for the Americans to quickly assist the Taiwanese … because the Chinese will be blocking the second island chain.' However, Abdul Rahman stressed that such a scenario remains some way off. 'At this point in time, I do not think the Chinese will be able to set up any air or military outpost in the Second Island Chain in the short and medium term,' he said, noting that Beijing is still in the process of trying to 'establish strong political influence' there. Nevertheless, the extension of US-China competition into the island chains could potentially heighten the risk of confrontation - not just within those geographical lines, but across the wider Indo-Pacific region, warn analysts. For instance, increased deployments and competing military postures could exacerbate tensions in flashpoints such as the South China Sea, where overlapping claims and naval stand-offs are already common, said Ridzwan from Janes. 'I think the Philippines is a very important node in the American strategy for Second Island Chain capability,' said Ridzwan, pointing out Washington's deployment of various weapon systems in the country. The US military has deployed its NMESIS missile system to the Philippines for ongoing bilateral drills. Barely two months ago, the same system featured on Batan Island, close to the Luzon Strait, during another joint exercise. Ridzwan said this reflects a wider pattern of militarisation not only in the Pacific islands but also among South China Sea claimants. Such moves, he said, risk fuelling an arms buildup and mistrust that could raise the chances of miscalculation - particularly in contested waters where US-aligned forces and Chinese maritime assets already operate in close proximity. Countries such as the Philippines and Japan are 'understandably' wary of China's growing interest in the Second Island Chain, said Abdul Rahman from the Lowy Institute. 'The Second Island Chain actually covers the eastern part of their security zone,' he said. 'So if China manages to secure the Second Island Chain and establish either military outposts or bases, the Philippines will be stuck between the First Island Chain and the Second Island Chain - and it will be similar for Japan too.' A growing Chinese military presence in the Pacific could leave Southeast Asian nations having to make hard choices, regardless of whether they want to. 'As the PLA Navy evolves into a more capable blue-water (force) and begins projecting power more frequently through Southeast Asia into the south-west Pacific, ASEAN will come under increasing pressure to choose sides,' said Davis from ASPI. 'Their space to remain non-aligned will shrink.'
Newsweek
14-05-2025
- Politics
- Newsweek
US Reveals Nuclear Submarine in China's Backyard
Based on facts, either observed and verified firsthand by the reporter, or reported and verified from knowledgeable sources. Newsweek AI is in beta. Translations may contain inaccuracies—please refer to the original content. The United States has deployed a nuclear-powered submarine, armed with over 100 long-range missiles, to the Western Pacific Ocean amid China's rapid naval fleet expansion. The deployment of USS Ohio, a guided-missile submarine, reflected America's commitment to the Indo-Pacific region, the U.S. Submarine Group Seven, which commands submarines deployed in the Western Pacific Ocean, Indian Ocean, and Arabian Sea, told Newsweek. Newsweek has also reached out to the Chinese Defense Ministry for comment by email. Why It Matters Photos released by the U.S. Submarine Group Seven on Tuesday show the Ohio arrived at Naval Base Guam on April 23. The island of Guam is home to several U.S. military bases, serving as a major staging area to project America's power against China, which is 1,800 miles away. Under a U.S. containment strategy, Guam is part of the Second Island Chain, which aims to restrict China's naval access to the Pacific Ocean by leveraging U.S.-aligned territories. The United States guided-missile submarine USS Ohio arrives at Naval Base Guam on April 23, 2025. The United States guided-missile submarine USS Ohio arrives at Naval Base Guam on April 23, 2025. Lt. James Caliva/U.S. Navy What To Know The Ohio is one of four U.S. Navy Ohio-class guided-missile submarines, along with USS Michigan, USS Florida, and USS Georgia. These submarines were converted from nuclear-armed ballistic missile submarines to carry conventional Tomahawk cruise missiles. Each of these submarines can be armed with up to 154 Tomahawk cruise missiles, capable of hitting land targets precisely from 1,000 miles away. They are also designed to support special operation missions by accommodating up to 66 personnel and their equipment. The Chinese navy—the largest in the world by hull count, with over 370 vessels, including 12 nuclear-powered submarines and 48 diesel-electric-powered submarines—has highly prioritized modernizing its submarine force, the Pentagon said in a report. The missile-armed submarine, which is homeported in Bangor, Washington, was conducting what it called "routine operations" in the U.S. Seventh Fleet, according to a photo caption. The Fleet's area of operations covers both the Western Pacific Ocean and Indian Ocean. The submarine was still in Guam as of May 6, when it conducted an exercise with the U.S. Marine Corps at the base. The drill was part of ongoing efforts to provide "flexible, forward-postured, and quick-response options" to regional commanders, another photo caption read. United States marines conduct an exercise aboard the guided-missile submarine USS Ohio at Naval Base Guam on May 6, 2025. United States marines conduct an exercise aboard the guided-missile submarine USS Ohio at Naval Base Guam on May 6, 2025. Mass Communication Specialist Seaman Henry Sohl/U.S. Navy The Ohio and its sister ships provide "unprecedented strike and special operation mission capabilities" from a stealth, clandestine platform, the U.S. Submarine Group Seven said in response to a Newsweek inquiry, adding that they are ready to operate globally at any time. According to ship spotters, the Ohio left its homeport in late February for a westward voyage to Hawaii. It set sail again in early April, departing from Pearl Harbor en route to Guam. This marked the third deployment of an Ohio-class guided-missile submarine to the Western Pacific Ocean in less than a year. The Florida and the Michigan made port calls in Guam in early July and early November in 2024, respectively, Newsweek previously reported. While the Michigan shares its homeport with the Ohio, the Florida and the Georgia are based out of Kings Bay in Georgia. A satellite image captured in mid-April appears to show the Georgia docked at the island of Diego Garcia, a remote U.S. base in the Indian Ocean. 🇺🇸NSF Diego Garcia🇺🇸 ho hum... 6x KC-135, 6x B-2 Spirit Stealth Bombers More interesting though is the Ohio Class sub alongside at the bravo wharf - likely USS Georgia (SSGN 729) 📷 src: @SkyfiApp | @Satellogic 19 April 2025@Schizointel — MT Anderson (@MT_Anderson) April 28, 2025 What People Are Saying The U.S. Navy said: "The [guided-missile submarine] is a key element of the Navy's future fighting force. With its tremendous payload capacity, dual crew deployment concept, and inherent stealth, each [guided-missile submarine] brings mission flexibility and enhanced capabilities to the warfighter." The U.S. Submarine Group Seven said: "Submarine Group [Seven] will advance the interests of the United States and the security of prosperity of the region by effectively employing forward deployed, combat capable forces across the full spectrum of undersea warfare. We will endeavor to prevent conflict but remain prepared to win decisively." What Happens Next It remains to be seen whether the Ohio will continue its deployment in the Western Pacific Ocean or transit toward the Middle East to supplement American naval forces in the region.
Reuters
01-05-2025
- Politics
- Reuters
Inside the U.S. battle with China over an island paradise deep in the Pacific
PALAU, Western Pacific - The brilliant blue waters, thick foliage and bucolic atmosphere on this seemingly idyllic archipelago deep in the Pacific Ocean belie the key role it now plays in a titanic geopolitical struggle. Palau, where brutal World War Two clashes once unfolded, is again on the frontline as China and the United States and its allies prepare their forces in an intensifying contest for control over the Asia-Pacific region. The democratic island nation of just 17,000 people hosts American-controlled airstrips and soon-to-be-completed radar installations that the U.S. military describes as 'critical' to monitoring vast swathes of water and airspace. It is also a key piece of the Second Island Chain, a string of strategically located islets that America is fortifying in an effort to deny China access to the Western Pacific. Now, that outsized strategic value has made Palau the target of a concerted influence campaign by individuals with ties to the Chinese government, according to intelligence reports, police files, court records and land filings reviewed by Reuters, as well as interviews with more than 20 diplomats and local law enforcement officials. At the same time, the once-sleepy island nation has been transformed into a hub of illegal activity, rife with drug smuggling, online gambling operations, money laundering and prostitution allegedly linked to Chinese individuals and syndicates. This activity has brought with it a gruesome killing – including the transporting of a corpse in a suitcase – and a well-orchestrated kidnapping whose target is believed to be in a Chinese prison after having been forcibly smuggled out of Palau by boat. Some of these Chinese individuals have cultivated close ties to senior political figures on Palau, making 'donations' to some of them, according to two intelligence reports distributed to Palauan officials by the local U.S. embassy. These individuals have also allegedly facilitated meetings between Chinese officials and Palauan politicians. In one instance, a Chinese official associated with the United Front Work Department, the body that oversees Beijing's foreign influence activities, met with Palau's current vice president, according to one of the U.S. intelligence reports. The vice president, Raynold Oilouch, didn't respond to questions about the alleged meeting. An effort also appears to be underway to block the expansion of U.S. military installations on Palau, which include radar stations and airstrips built to service military aircraft. A review of land records by Reuters reveals that Chinese businesspeople and Chinese-linked businesses have leased land overlooking or adjacent to some of these American military facilities. Joel Ehrendreich, the U.S. ambassador to Palau, says China is using the same tactics in Palau that it has deployed elsewhere in the Pacific. Sitting in an office packed with baseball memorabilia and Palauan carvings of dugongs, a chubby sea mammal, he warns that Beijing is using organized crime to infiltrate Palau, buy the backing of political leaders and establish a foothold on the island. It's illegal for foreigners to make political donations, but the only evidence my office has received is via anonymous sources... Everyone knows foreigners give money, but without evidence our hands are tied. 'We've seen the playbook over and over again throughout the region, and it's been very effective,' Ehrendreich said in an interview. 'Get in with predatory investment, corrupt officials through elite capture, and try to destabilize the society through drug and human trafficking and other crime. And it's easy to do when you go one by one through these little countries that you can overwhelm.' Claims that China is undermining Palau's stability or interfering in its elections 'are far-fetched, slanderous, and completely fabricated nonsense,' a spokesperson for China's foreign ministry said in response to questions from Reuters. 'Who is building military bases in Palau? Who wants to turn Palau into a strategic military outpost?' the spokesperson added. 'We urge the U.S. side to stop smearing and slandering China … and stop provoking trouble in the region.' The island, which is geographically closer to China than any other Pacific Island nation, is also one of the few countries that still formally recognize Taiwan. China has spent decades successfully persuading countries not to recognize democratically governed Taiwan, which Beijing views as part of China. Asked about Palau's relationship with Taipei, the Chinese foreign ministry spokesperson urged countries that 'still maintain so-called 'diplomatic relations' with the Taiwan region not to be blindly arrogant and stubborn.' Surangel Whipps Jr., Palau's president, didn't respond to questions for this story. Speaking at a think tank in Sydney earlier this month, he addressed the issue of crime on the island: 'Drugs, human trafficking, all of these kinds of activities have a way of undermining the political structure,' he said. 'Online scamming or gaming that happens, they end up influencing politicians and things that go on in Palau.' A tangled web of Chinese influence efforts and illicit activity emerges from the U.S. intelligence reports and other documents reviewed by Reuters, and from interviews with local law enforcement officials. Take Hokkons Baules, the president of the Palauan Senate, who has been one of the island's most vociferous advocates for China. Under his leadership, the senate has passed resolutions criticizing U.S. military activity in Palau, while he has personally advocated for expanded ties with China. 'We want to go with China, because we need a lot of help with infrastructure,' Baules told Reuters. He added that Palau should drop its recognition of Taiwan. At the same time, Baules has allegedly built relationships with Chinese investors, including a man named Sun Maojin, who runs a technology company that lists state-controlled research centers and universities in China as partners on its website. In November 2023, Sun flew to the island with several associates and $119,000 in cash, according to flight records, photos reviewed by Reuters, and three Palauan law enforcement officials. When Sun was questioned by customs officials for failing to disclose the money, Baules called one customs officer to ask for his release, according to the officials. 'These guys are my friends,' Baules allegedly said, and added that they were in Palau to lease land. The officials said Sun was released after paying a fine. Palau's Land Court has no records of a transaction between Baules and Sun. Baules said he doesn't recall the incident. Sun didn't respond to questions sent to his company. Baules pleaded guilty to heroin trafficking in 1989. Corporate records reviewed by Reuters show that his family operates a local business called Fuji Restaurant, which Palauan authorities have linked to Chinese criminal activity. The family rented out space in the building between 2018 and 2020 to Chinese brothels masquerading as massage parlors, according to legal filings related to another case that were submitted by Palau's anti-corruption office. None of the Baules family face charges in that case. Baules insisted that the brothels were massage parlors. 'It's not my business, it's their business,' he said of the Chinese businesspeople his family rented space to. The address of Fuji Restaurant was also on a package of methamphetamine that was intercepted at Manila airport last year, according to local press reports in the Philippines. The reports stated that the intended recipient was a Chinese man in Palau. Based on an estimate from Palauan law enforcement officials, the stash had a street value of at least $83,000. No charges were filed in the case. Baules dismissed the allegations, telling Reuters he was the target of a smear campaign aimed at ruining his name. The senate leader also has ties to prominent Chinese figures on the island, including Hunter Tian, the president of Palau's Overseas Chinese Association, which promotes the interests of Chinese residents on the island. Baules has leased land to Tian for a hotel Tian runs, land court records show. In 2023, Tian participated in training courses in Beijing and Nanjing that were organized by the Chinese government for overseas Chinese leaders, according to promotional material from three pro-Beijing Chinese diaspora groups. The course in Beijing was run by a group under the authority of the United Front Work Department, the body that oversees China's foreign influence efforts, according to the material. The course in Nanjing was attended by United Front officials. Tian didn't reply to questions sent to a lawyer who has done legal work for him. Baules described Tian as 'a good guy.' The authorities 'have not filed any case against him,' Baules said. The U.S. intelligence reports, one from last September and the other from November, also assert that Chinese businesspeople gave tens of thousands of dollars in cash to politicians ahead of elections last year in Palau. According to one of the reports, Wang Yubin, a Chinese citizen who is secretary of Palau's Overseas Chinese Association, agreed to donate $20,000 to Thomas Remengesau Jr, a former president seeking another term, and donated $10,000 to Oilouch, who was running to be vice president. Remengesau lost his race. Oilouch won and is now Palau's vice president. Wang didn't respond to questions for this story. Many Palauans rely on the surrounding sea for food and for pleasure. Now, many worry that their strategic position in the Pacific Ocean has made them a target. REUTERS/Hollie Adams Palau's economy is heavily reliant on tourists, the bulk of whom come from Asian nations. REUTERS/Hollie Adams Hundreds of Palauans serve in the U.S. military, which has left a patriotic imprint on many residents. Here, a local in a U.S. Army hat watches customers at a popular bakery. REUTERS/Hollie Adams Even as criminal activity intensifies, Palau often maintains an idyllic atmosphere, with many residents taking advantage of its beaches and warm waters. REUTERS/Hollie Adams The intelligence reports describe the donations as 'illegal' or 'illicit' campaign funding. Tamara Hutzler, the country's anti-corruption prosecutor, said political donations by foreign nationals are illegal in Palau. 'The only evidence my office has received is via anonymous sources,' she said. 'Everyone knows foreigners give money, but without evidence our hands are tied.' 'The corruption is just pervasive,' added Hutzler. It is tough to combat, she said, in part because law enforcement lacked resources. Oilouch told Reuters he had 'never received a penny' from a foreigner for his political campaigns. As an attorney, he said, he had represented foreign clients, but as vice-president he was 'actively removing' himself from all cases. Remengesau said accusations he had received donations from Chinese businesspeople were 'ridiculous.' People in Palau, he said, 'know that I don't mix government with business.' The family of at least one top politician has benefited from American investment in Palau. A company registered under the name of the father of Surangel Whipps Jr., Palau's president, has been awarded at least 41 Department of Defense contracts worth approximately $6 million, largely related to construction services, according to a Reuters review of a federal database. This makes the company one of the largest commercial Palauan beneficiaries of U.S. contracts. Remengesau, who is Whipps' brother-in-law and ran against him for the presidency last year, said 'conflict of interest' situations should be avoided. Whipps didn't respond to questions about the contracts. Ehrendreich, the U.S. ambassador, said that 'given the small size of Palau and the significant role of the Whipps family's businesses in this country, contracting and procurement with them is inevitable.' Ann Singeo, Palau's most prominent environmentalist: 'You just feel like they're using you as a war shield.' REUTERS/Hollie Adams AMERICAN INFLUENCE Palau feels as if it has been transplanted from the United States, which administered the country's 300 or so islets for half a century after capturing them from Japan in World War Two. The former colony won independence in 1994, but remains deeply tied to and dependent on the U.S. Many locals speak with an American accent after having spent years working in the U.S. – or the 'mainland,' as many Palauans refer to it. Palauans can work without a visa in the U.S. due to a treaty called the Compact of Free Association. Similar agreements bind the island states of Micronesia and the Marshall Islands to the U.S. Together, the compacts give Washington responsibility for defending these territories and funding large parts of their governments. In exchange, the U.S. gets exclusive military access to vast swathes of the Pacific. The connections to America are particularly resonant on Palau's southern islands of Peleliu and Angaur. The two isles were sites of bloody World War Two battles in which more than 12,000 U.S. soldiers were killed or wounded while trying to displace Japanese troops. Scattered through the jungle, the blackened and rusted remnants of Japanese tanks and fortifications can still be seen today. Many of the 100 or so residents of Angaur have relatives serving in the American military. U.S. law permits citizens of Palau and two other former colonies in the Pacific to enlist like Americans. In a nod to that relationship, residents have nicknamed their island 'the United States of Angaur.' Japanese fortifications and weapons like this tank speckle the islands: a legacy of the vicious clashes that consumed Palau during World War Two as Japan and the United States fought for control of the Pacific. REUTERS/Hollie Adams The American flag flies at the U.S. embassy. Despite its status as an independent country, Palau remains deeply tied to and dependent on the United States. REUTERS/Hollie Adams In 2017, the U.S. military announced plans to build radar facilities in Angaur and other Palauan islands. Later, it began redeveloping multiple airstrips. The facilities will allow the U.S. to disperse its forces in anticipation of a strike by China on American strategic hubs like Guam, and to monitor air traffic in the region without tying up ships or aircraft to do so. Soon, Angaur began attracting attention from Chinese entities. Multiple media outlets reported that in 2019, Wan Kuok Koi, a former leader of the powerful Chinese triad called 14K, visited Palau with the goal of leasing land on Angaur and opening a casino there. Foreign nationals cannot purchase land in Palau, but they can lease it for decades-long periods. In 2020, the U.S. Treasury identified Wan, known as Broken Tooth, as a leader of the triad and sanctioned him for leading an entity engaged in 'corruption.' The sanctions notice alleged that he was a member of the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference, a largely ceremonial advisory body of China's parliament. A photo published in local media shows Broken Tooth meeting with Remengesau, who was president of Palau at the time. Remengesau said he wasn't aware of Broken Tooth's identity during their meeting. 'You don't know who these people are, but you have to be polite and give them the time of day,' he said. Broken Tooth's efforts were stymied when Palauan officials learned he was a triad leader, according to Remengesau. The former triad boss didn't respond to questions sent to a lawyer who has represented him in criminal cases. Erik Vereen is a state legislator and boat captain on Angaur, the site of a U.S. military development and focus of significant Chinese attention. 'We're afraid that we've painted a big bullseye on our island,' he said. REUTERS/Hollie Adams Angaur residents interviewed this month said no Chinese nationals have succeeded in acquiring land there. 'It would never happen,' said Erik Vereen, an Angaur legislator. 'There's no land to be leased.' Court records, however, show that Chinese individuals have leased large swathes of communally owned land on Angaur. Tian, the president of the Overseas Chinese Association, has acquired roughly 280,000 square meters of land on Angaur, including a large plot abutting the island's airstrip. The U.S. subsequently announced plans to develop a radar station next to the airstrip. Another set of land registry documents show that an investor named Zhuang Cizhong leased a further 380,000 square meters of land near the airstrip. Zhuang acquired the land after the U.S. announced its development plans. Together, Tian and Zhuang's holdings amount to about 8% of Angaur's landmass. Neither appears to have developed the land. When told about the leases, Angaur legislator Vereen said he felt 'a hundred percent betrayed.' Reuters was unable to contact Zhuang. Lease records and interviews with environmental regulators also reveal that a company connected to the Prince Group, a Chinese-Cambodian conglomerate, has acquired an islet near a new U.S. coastal monitoring station in the Palauan region of Kayangel. Lease records and a visit to the site by Reuters revealed that another company connected to the Prince Group is also developing a piece of land near Palau's airport, which the U.S. uses for military exercises. Corporate filings show that the local agent in Palau for one of these companies is Rose Wang. She is a former vice president of Palau's Overseas Chinese Association, according to one of the U.S. intelligence reports. In 2019, according to the association's social media, Wang was among prominent diaspora Chinese representatives to attend celebrations in Beijing's Great Hall of the People to celebrate the 70th anniversary of the founding of the People's Republic of China. Wang and the Prince Group didn't respond to questions for this story. Some of the companies tied to the Prince Group in Palau were first flagged in a recent report by Pacific Economics, an American consultancy that has studied foreign investment in Palau. The U.S. military is building new facilities from the tip of Palau to its tail. On the islet of Peleliu (left), it has redeveloped an old World War Two airstrip. On the isle of Angaur, it is constructing a radar station. REUTERS/Hollie Adams Ehrendreich, the U.S. ambassador, said the leases were almost certainly strategic. 'All around there are various plots of land that are now being leased to Chinese interests,' he said of Angaur. 'I don't think it's any coincidence at all that it happens to be physically close to our projects.' The land-lease tactic, he said, was 'how they maybe are able to keep an eye on what we're trying to do here.' China's foreign ministry didn't respond to specific questions about the land leases. BODY IN A SUITCASE Since 2019, hundreds of foreign nationals from China and Southeast Asia have travelled to Palau to work in online gambling and scam centers. Despite regular busts by Palauan law enforcement, the centers have continued to thrive. At the same time, there has been a boom in methamphetamine trafficking and violent crime. Women finish their night at a bar on Koror's waterfront. REUTERS/Hollie Adams Late one evening in February 2023, a black Mazda pulled up in Koror, the main town, according to local media reports and a law enforcement official who described CCTV footage of the incident. Two men got out and seized a Chinese expatriate named Chen Liyan. They bundled Chen into their car and drove to a marina packed with private boats on the outskirts of town. They parked beside a fishing vessel, which later headed out to sea. Palau's government later learned that China had issued an arrest warrant for Chen, a local law enforcement official told Reuters. According to Chinese media reports, police accused Chen, a former Chinese village official, of overseeing organized criminal gangs. The reports said China had offered a bounty of roughly $68,000 for Chen. The official told Reuters that China had informed them Chen was now imprisoned in the Chinese province of Jiangxi. Chen's disappearance is still under investigation in Palau. His kidnapping is one of several recent incidents that have spooked locals. Leilani Reklai, the editor of Palau's main newspaper, is scared by the surge in Chinese crime. REUTERS/Hollie Adams In 2023, a Chinese man named Fang Ye disappeared from the American Pacific territory of Saipan, where prosecutors accused him of smuggling methamphetamine. Several months later, according to Palauan police files reviewed by Reuters, Fang surfaced in Palau, where he took an upstairs room at an apartment building in central Koror. There, Fang met Li Peng, a Chinese boat captain and longtime Palauan resident. A tenant of the room below later told police that she heard noises 'like a bowling ball rolling across the floor,' which continued for at least 40 minutes. In CCTV footage from that evening reviewed by Reuters, three men – whom investigators identified as Fang and two associates – can be seen carrying a suitcase to a car. The next day, at least two of the men drove into the Palauan wilderness with the suitcase. In 2023, a man wanted in Saipan for methamphetamine smuggling surfaced in Palau and met with a local Chinese boat captain in CK Mansion, shown here. The captain's corpse was later found half-burned in the Palauan wilderness. REUTERS/Hollie Adams CCTV footage shows three men carrying a large suitcase out of CK Mansion. The suitcase was later found with a dead body. Reuters verified the location and date of the footage. A local Palauan spotted the men and reported them to police – who later discovered the suitcase with boat captain Li's dead body, which had been set on fire. According to a written briefing prepared for Palau's president, which Reuters reviewed, the killing was motivated by a dispute over a drug smuggling route between Saipan and Guam. Related Content Palau, escaping Trump tariffs, says strong US good for Pacific Fang was arrested and accepted a plea deal in which he did not contest a manslaughter charge. He has since been extradited back to Saipan, where he pleaded guilty to methamphetamine trafficking. Reuters was unable to contact Fang or a legal representative. Palauan authorities have taken some steps in recent months to combat Chinese organized crime. In December, President Whipps empowered his national security advisor to scrutinize visa applications and renewals. The advisor subsequently barred at least 91 people from the country, according to a review of government lists of prohibited people. Surangel Whipps Jr., the country's president, told a Sydney thinktank this month that the surge in crime on Palau ends up "influencing politicians.' REUTERS/Jeremy Piper A Palau-Taiwan friendship plaque in front of the island nation's Capitol Building. Palau is one of a small number of countries that still formally recognize Taiwan. REUTERS/Hollie Adams 'Whether that organized crime is government-sanctioned or whether it's just those individuals, we need to work together to stop them,' Whipps said about the country's crime problem during his recent visit to Sydney. 'We do know China has one goal, and that is for us to renounce Taiwan. But we hope that they understand that that decision is a sovereign decision and no country tells us who we should be friends with.' Related Content T-DAY: The battle for Taiwan US Pacific commander to advocate 'most strongly' for USAID to Pacific Islands Ehrendreich lauded the Palau crackdown as evidence of 'a new level' of the island's willingness and ability 'to start dealing with their Chinese organized crime problem.' The crime boom, however, has spooked residents who wonder whether the latest measures will be effective. Some also worry about getting caught between the two superpowers. 'The U.S. military presence in Palau is a good thing,' said Vereen, the state legislator, who works as a boat operator at the radar facility on Angaur. But, he added, Palauans still remember from World War Two how they can be drawn into a ferocious conflict. 'We're afraid that we've painted a big bullseye on our island,' he said. Reuters traveled to Palau to see the reality of a contest for regional supremacy between the United States and China. REUTERS/Hollie Adams and Zachary Goelman Reporting by Pete McKenzie. Additional reporting by the Beijing newsroom. Photos and video by Hollie Adams. Video editing by Zachary Goelman, Francesca Lynagh, Holly Murtha and Mía Womersley. Photo editing by Edgar Su. Graphics by Jitesh Chowdhury and Vijdan Mohammad Kawoosa. Design by Catherine Tai. Edited by Peter Hirschberg. Our Standards: The Thomson Reuters Trust Principles., opens new tab Suggested Topics: Investigates
