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Voices from the Arab press: Are we witnessing the fall of the Hezbollah state?
A weekly selection of opinions and analyses from the Arab media around the world. Nida Al Watan, Lebanon, May 23 The Hezbollah state represents the extended arm of Iran's Islamic regime in Lebanon. It has uprooted Lebanese Shi'ites from their own communities, erased their cultural and social history, and obstructed the establishment of national order by paralyzing institutional mechanisms and rendering the constitution ineffective. In its place, Hezbollah has constructed parallel regimes atop the carcass of the Lebanese state and its governing institutions. What was once a 'Shi'ite question' has metastasized into something far greater: the transformation of Lebanon into a 'society without a state' – a landscape marked by bloodshed, ideological mobilization, a sanctions-driven economy, and a culture molded by command and control. These are the defining features of the Hezbollah state. The proxy war, which exploited Lebanese Shi'ites as fodder for Iran's geopolitical ambitions, has now also precipitated Hezbollah's own deterioration. The movement has suffered staggering blows to its military and financial infrastructure, resulting in the unraveling of the very system upon which it built both its state-within-a-state and its ideological fervor. Looking ahead to the post-Hezbollah period, there must emerge from within the Shi'ite community a political project capable of challenging the prevailing reality and a cultural movement that engages with the tenets of modernity while harmonizing them with Shi'ite jurisprudence. The aim is to resolve the 'Shi'ite question' and reclaim the Lebanese state, not to allow Hezbollah's ruin to be interpreted as a Shi'ite defeat. Muhammad Hasan al-Amin, widely recognized for his moderate stance and his outspoken criticism of Hezbollah's dominance over the Shi'ite political landscape in Lebanon, once wrote with incisive clarity and conviction: 'The authority of divine right is a conspiracy against Shi'ism.' In this declaration, al-Amin articulated a visionary call for reforming Islamic religious thought, liberating it from the pursuit of political power. He saw this renewal as contingent on a reconciliation with secularism – an idea long opposed by segments of the religious establishment – while recognizing that modernity has shaped the state as a functional institution overseeing societal life. The essential principles of modernity – secularism, the state, citizenship, and coexistence – find their rightful place as enduring concepts under this framework. In such a model, religion continues to hold meaning, not as a vehicle of domination, but as a personal and cultural expression within society. Similarly, the prominent scholar Mohammad Mehdi Shamseddine made critical contributions to modern Shi'ite legal thought, advocating for a jurisprudence that could evolve into a cultural project mirroring modernity. He dismissed the doctrine of the jurist's general guardianship, instead asserting that guardianship belongs collectively to the nation. Ali al-Amin [relation to Hasan unclear – Ed.], another notable voice, emphasized the role of the state as the sole legitimate authority responsible for organizing society through its exclusive functions and mandates. From these intellectual currents emerge the possibility of a jurisprudential framework that resonates with Western political thought regarding the state, both its philosophical underpinnings and practical governance. Such a foundation would reintegrate Lebanese Shi'ites into the broader national project, reframing the burdens of Hezbollah's dominion as lessons that could ultimately yield gains for both the Lebanese state and the Shi'ite community. – Ali Khalifa Al-Ittihad, UAE, May 23 Will the Israeli government, led by Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, remain in power despite the deepening conflicts and internal turmoil it has faced since the Oct. 7 attacks? What viable alternatives exist, particularly in light of the widening rift between Netanyahu and US President [Donald] Trump, not only over the strategic direction of US policy but also over the real and mounting challenges Netanyahu must overcome to sustain his leadership? The current Netanyahu government faces 10 major crises. The first and most prominent one is Netanyahu's trial, which continues to cast a shadow over his political future. He fears that any shifts within his fragile coalition could expedite legal proceedings against him, especially as the courts consider new charges. Netanyahu has persistently tried to tether his legal woes to the war in Gaza, suggesting that the state's survival must take precedence over stalled legal accountability. Second, the judiciary remains a persistent threat, particularly in light of Netanyahu's success in pushing through a series of highly divisive laws. This suggests that the conflict has moved beyond partisan politics into a deeper institutional confrontation, one likely resolvable only through his exit from power. In a country with a clearly delineated separation of powers and a legal framework resistant to manipulation, the politicization of the judiciary now presents a genuine existential risk to the current administration. Third, protest movements across Israel have grown in both size and influence, incorporating respected political, military, and academic voices. These groups are demanding an end to the Gaza war and a recalibration of the country's political and military institutions. Their growing presence at weekly demonstrations has become a persistent thorn in Netanyahu's side. Fourth, the mounting discontent among the Israeli public suggests that opposition leaders like Benny Gantz and Yair Lapid could reclaim political momentum. While their policy differences with Netanyahu on Gaza are nuanced, Lapid's recent surge in popularity points to an increasingly credible alternative should the current crisis continue to spiral. Fifth, there is growing dissatisfaction from within Israel's religious establishment over Netanyahu's handling of critical national affairs. This discontent has manifested in friction between coalition partners and civil and military leaders. Although many still believe the country is influenced heavily by its chief rabbis, even the religious leadership is now voicing unease, further exposing cracks in the coalition's foundation. Sixth, members of Netanyahu's own ruling coalition have begun openly objecting to his decisions. Notably, figures like Finance Minister Bezalel Smotrich, along with National Security Minister Itamar Ben-Gvir, have issued veiled and explicit threats against the government's direction. Although the coalition remains intact for now, its survival appears contingent on suppressing tensions that could otherwise lead to its unraveling. Seventh, influential power centers are beginning to assert themselves outside the traditional political structure. These include powerful economic elites and former security officials operating discreetly but strategically, with interests rooted in economic stability and national security. While they do not openly declare political allegiances, their ability to shape outcomes behind the scenes poses a formidable challenge to Netanyahu's continued rule. Eighth, Israel's economy is under mounting pressure. Despite Netanyahu's public declarations that Israel can function without international economic support, domestic political forces have dismissed such claims as detached from reality. With the government initiating new wage policies and layered tax hikes, economic dissatisfaction is growing, especially as President Isaac Herzog has failed to broker a viable consensus to alleviate the crisis. Ninth, the political reemergence of former prime minister Naftali Bennett presents yet another variable. Having formed a new party with plans to run in the next election, Bennett is being watched closely by Washington, which views him as a pragmatic and viable alternative. Once considered Netanyahu's Likud heir apparent before being drawn into the coalition, Bennett now commands considerable American support and could shift the political calculus significantly. Finally, the perspective of President Trump may prove to be the most decisive factor shaping the Israeli political landscape. Despite there being no major ideological schism between the two leaders, the US administration views Netanyahu as a barrier to political stability and a source of continued volatility. With Washington increasingly concerned about the risks of internal collapse, pressure from the US may well catalyze the change that many within Israel's fractured society now deem inevitable. – Tarek Fahmy Al-Masry Al-Youm, Egypt, May 24 When the Assad regime collapsed in Syria, the region was witnessing a new chapter in the long and volatile saga of change that had begun as early as mid-March 2011. Personally, I refrained from participating, even with commentary, out of respect for the Syrian people's right to self-determination. Many rushed to analyze the personality of the new president, projecting expectations onto the emerging regime, while social media buzzed with sweeping judgments before the new experiment had even begun. Yet it is only the Syrian people who hold the key to decoding a reality that has confounded even the most powerful global actors involved in the region. Only they know what is necessary and possible in the aftermath of a national fabric torn apart by foreign interventions and internal strife. Bashar al-Assad's regime was left clinging to lifelines from Iran and support from Russia, even as sanctions tightened and society bore the weight of mounting isolation. I remain steadfast in my position. I have no desire to make premature predictions or offer grand visions for the country's future. Still, I recently traveled to the Beirut Arab International Book Fair, a visit that coincided with an invitation from the United Nations Development Program and the Syrian Ministry of Energy to attend the closing ceremony of the country's energy transition program – an initiative I have been involved with for more than two years, offering my expertise in finance and investment to help launch Syria's energy transition fund. This invitation was different. The funding agency believed it was time to move operations into Syria itself, launching a new phase of the program from within the country rather than continuing to operate it from Cairo or Beirut. This decision followed President Trump's announcement of lifting sanctions on Syria. Europe quickly got the message. No sooner had we completed our visit to Damascus than the European Union declared its intention to lift sanctions, and the World Bank issued a statement praising donors for settling their arrears, enabling Syria to qualify for its programs. During our brief 48-hour visit, I captured images and impressions I now share with readers – observations that may challenge preconceived notions, though I offer them only as a visitor, not as a political analyst or a commentator on Syria's broader economic and security dynamics. Reaching Damascus from Beirut by road typically takes about two hours under favorable conditions, though traffic can easily double that time. The journey begins in Beirut, heading east over the Lebanese mountains, through towns like Beit Mery, Broumana, and Bhamdoun. After the mountain pass, the road descends into the Bekaa Valley, cutting through towns such as Aley, Chtaura, and Zahlé before arriving at the Masnaa border crossing, the formal gateway between Lebanon and Syria. On the Syrian side, the route continues through the countryside, passing Jdeidet Yabous, Al-Kiswah, and Qatana, eventually reaching the capital. Travelers cross the Anti-Lebanon mountain range, which forms the natural border between the two nations and includes prominent peaks like Mount Sannine. The road is winding and narrow, often lacking dividers, yet experienced drivers navigate it with relative ease. The Lebanese side subjected travelers to slow, often arbitrary procedures, marred by needless hassles. In contrast, the Syrian side was surprisingly warm and efficient – officials greeted us with smiles that seemed out of place in a region recently marked by intense fighting and unrest. Whether driven by strategy or genuine hospitality, the effort to welcome was evident and effective. Though Syrian roads haven't been maintained in nearly 20 years, they are remarkably solid, wide, and flanked by safety barriers. The hotel where I stayed seemed frozen in the 1990s, reminiscent of Baghdad's hotels, yet everything – from bedding and food to the furnishings – reflected Syrians' meticulous attention to cleanliness. Even the street food in Damascus, a staple I usually approach with caution, was impressive. Initially, I planned to remain in the hotel throughout the trip, as all meetings were scheduled there. But familiar faces from various ministries and institutions, now visibly relieved by the country's shifting dynamics, encouraged me to venture out. The vibrant street life lured me into night walks, even close to midnight, near the Great Umayyad Mosque and the Al-Hamidiyeh Souq with its arched metal roof and centuries-old shops. The streets of the ancient city, lined with historical landmarks, felt alive again. What did unsettle me, though, was the visible poverty – too many beggars, not for their insistence but for the depth of their misery. Perhaps the most striking transformation in Syria's public space is the near-total absence of Assad family portraits, once omnipresent. Even the 2,000-lira note still bears Bashar's image, though it now trades at around 10,000 liras to the dollar, meaning $100 in cash requires a small briefcase. Energy remains Syria's most critical crisis, but the underlying infrastructure, combined with a readiness for solar and wind projects and the willingness of Western and Gulf investors, makes a swift, viable solution within reach. Syrians are enduring hardship with remarkable grace. The homes dotting Mount Qasioun are clad with solar panels in a unique energy system. There is much more to say – about the energy transition program, the evolving role of the state, and the capacity of its institutions – but that must wait for another column. – Medhat Nafeh Asharq Al-Awsat, London, May 24 US President Donald Trump's visit to the Gulf and his speech at the Riyadh Economic Forum marked a pivotal shift in American foreign policy toward the region, unveiling for the first time the contours of the Trump Doctrine – a doctrine that stands in stark contrast to the approaches of his predecessors, particularly George W. Bush, Barack Obama, and Joe Biden. While Trump's speech was rooted in traditional elements of American strategic thought, it redefined those principles through a lens more attuned to the profound transformations underway in the Middle East. It reflected a recognition of the region's political and strategic maturity – one achieved not through foreign imposition or external aid, but forged by its own leaders, grounded in its own traditions, values, and lived experiences. Trump made clear that this evolution was indigenous, not imported. He stated, 'This great transformation has not come from Western interventionists… giving you lectures on how to live or how to govern your own affairs. No, the gleaming marvels of Riyadh and Abu Dhabi were not created by the so-called nation-builders, neocons, or liberal nonprofits, like those who spent trillions failing to develop Kabul and Baghdad, so many other cities.' In that line, Trump directly rebuked the legacy of president George W. Bush's interventionist agenda in Iraq. More broadly, Trump's message in Riyadh amounted to a wholesale rejection of two decades of US policy in the region – policies many in the Arab world blame for destruction, instability, and political chaos. After 9/11, Bush launched what he called the freedom agenda, later labeled the Bush Doctrine, encapsulated in his second inaugural address: 'The survival of liberty in our land increasingly depends on the success of liberty in other lands.' This agenda justified military and political intervention in the region as a moral imperative. Obama, in contrast, sought to reset relations through diplomacy, most notably in his 2009 Cairo speech, promising 'a new beginning' with the Arab and Islamic worlds based on mutual respect and shared interests. His eloquence moved many, acknowledging Arab grievances and offering the dignity of understanding. But his words never translated into meaningful action, especially on the Palestinian issue and regional anxieties over Iran's growing influence. His administration's pursuit of the nuclear agreement with Tehran alienated key regional players, who viewed it as enabling Iran's expansionism rather than containing it. For all its rhetorical promise, Obama's strategy amounted to inertia – maintaining the status quo without confronting the difficult decisions needed to fulfill the partnership he envisioned. Biden's doctrine, if one can call it that, has been defined less by proactive policy and more by absence. For more than a year and a half, Biden's administration stood by as over 50,000 Palestinians were killed and Gaza was reduced to rubble. It neither wielded its leverage to stop the bloodshed nor presented a viable path forward. The two-state solution lay in ruins, and the administration's approach to the region appeared to be one of passive disengagement. In sharp contrast, President Trump entered his second term intent on reversing these legacies from day one. He presented himself as a peacemaker – 'not a fan of war,' as he said – but one who seeks peace through strength. His foreign policy vision was pragmatic, transactional, and grounded in strategic interests, not ideology. In his Riyadh address, Trump told the region he did not believe in permanent enemies. In a stunning move, he announced from the Saudi capital the lifting of sanctions on Syria and held a meeting with Syrian President Ahmed al-Sharaa – a decision that stirred backlash in Washington, including from Israel, and triggered accusations within Congress that members of Trump's own administration were working to undermine the move. Nonetheless, Trump proceeded, seeing the decision as a strategic necessity to preempt Iran and Russia from reasserting dominance in Syria, while also answering a request from a key ally, the Saudi crown prince, who views Syrian stability as essential to regional peace. Staying consistent with his principle of flexibility in diplomacy, Trump addressed Iran with both a warning and an invitation. In a letter to Ayatollah Khamenei and again during his Riyadh speech, he expressed willingness to improve ties: 'If I can make a deal with Iran, I'll be very happy. We're going to make your region and the world a safer place.' But he issued a clear threat if Iran continued its aggressive behavior: The US would impose 'tremendous pressure' and drive Iranian oil exports to zero, as it had before. Trump does not seek another war in the Middle East, nor does he want US troops permanently stationed there. But when he says Iran will not be allowed to acquire nuclear weapons, he means it, unlike Obama's empty redlines in Syria or Biden's broken ceasefire promises in Gaza. Trump's policy is to restore American deterrence, a concept many believe has eroded in recent years. His visit to the Gulf was designed as a signal of unwavering support for regional allies. As Reuters noted, it catalyzed the emergence of a new Sunni political order that counters the Iranian axis. It also sent a message to [Prime Minister Benjamin] Netanyahu: Unconditional backing from Washington could no longer be taken for granted. As British historian Niall Ferguson has written, America has many of the attributes of an empire, but lacks the will to act like one, causing its global power to oscillate. There are cycles of strength followed by periods of retreat. Under President Trump, America is in a phase of renewed assertiveness, with a doctrine built on economic revitalization and peace through strength. Will this new approach succeed where others have failed? The chapter Trump opened during his Gulf visit may yet redefine America's role in the Middle East – one rooted in mutual respect, equal partnership, and strategic clarity. But its success will depend on whether America can resist the temptations that have undone empires before: the lure of overreach, the loss of strategic discipline, and the mistaken belief that power is its own justification. – Amal Mudallali Translated by Asaf Zilberfarb. All assertions, opinions, facts, and information presented in these articles are the sole responsibility of their respective authors and are not necessarily those of The Media Line, which assumes no responsibility for their content.
Asharq Al-Awsat
02-05-2025
- Politics
- Asharq Al-Awsat
Iran Keeps Low Profile in Iraq's Vote, Still Pulls Strings
Iran is allowing rival Shi'ite factions in Iraq to battle it out in a wide-open political arena ahead of the country's November 2025 elections, adopting a hands-off approach as its regional influence wanes. But officials and analysts say Tehran is quietly preparing a 'Plan B' from a distance, wary of internal Shi'ite conflict and the potential return of populist cleric Moqtada al-Sadr. While Iran remains largely absent from the backrooms where election alliances are typically shaped, insiders say it is still keeping close watch — ready to step in to prevent infighting among its allies, particularly as it seeks to stay out of the spotlight of US President Donald Trump's administration in Baghdad. Since Iraq's Coordination Framework – a coalition of Iran-aligned Shi'ite parties – announced plans to run on separate lists, the race for Shi'ite votes has narrowed to two main figures: incumbent Prime Minister Mohammed Shia al-Sudani and former premier Nouri al-Maliki. A senior leader in al-Maliki's Islamic Dawa Party warned the contest could spiral beyond control. Strategists working in the campaign teams of major Shi'ite factions say Tehran's influence has notably waned. 'For the first time, we don't feel Iran's pressure in forming alliances,' said one operative. 'But they're still there, in case a political storm threatens to uproot the whole process.' This marks a turning point in Iran's role in Iraq. Rumors circulating in Baghdad suggest Tehran is willing to make sacrifices — potentially even among its Iraqi proxies — to safeguard the broader regional order, especially as its Houthi allies in Yemen face setbacks. At the same time, Iranian-linked groups in Iraq have conveyed to Tehran a desire to integrate further into state institutions — even if that means laying down their arms temporarily. Tensions between Baghdad and Tehran remain muted but persistent, particularly over how Iraq's election dynamics might impact Iran's stalled nuclear negotiations. Yet both sides appear to agree that the current political turbulence is temporary and necessary. On April 25, 2025, Iran's Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei described the talks with the United States as 'a temporary situation,' telling mourners at a ceremony in Tehran that 'the dominance of hypocrisy is not eternal, but a temporary divine test.' Earlier, Iraqi sources told Asharq al-Awsat that Iranian-backed factions in Iraq had received religious authorization from Khamenei to engage in tactical maneuvers in response to pressure from Trump's administration. Recent interviews conducted by Asharq al-Awsat with Iraqi politicians paint a picture of near-chaotic freedom in the political arena — likened to 'freestyle wrestling' — that could again spiral into street violence. Some fear a repeat of the September 2022 clashes, when Sadr's supporters stormed Baghdad's fortified Green Zone to protest their exclusion from forming a majority government. 'Iran may have stepped out of the election kitchen,' said one political figure. 'But it's still very much inside the house.' Fluid alliances A fluid and shifting map of alliances is taking shape in Iraq's Shi'ite political landscape ahead of the November 2025 parliamentary elections, as Iran adopts an unusually low profile, leaving its allies to grapple with strategy and rivalry on their own. On April 10, 2025, Asharq al-Awsat revealed that Esmail Qaani, the commander of Iran's Quds Force, had quietly left behind a small team in Baghdad to oversee political files, including preparations by Shi'ite factions for the elections. But within two weeks, Iraq's Iran-aligned Coordination Framework announced it would run as separate lists – a familiar tactic under Iraq's electoral law, which divides the country into multiple constituencies and often amplifies internal rivalries. Despite the presence of Qaani's operatives, Iranian influence appears largely absent from the coordination rooms of the Shi'ite bloc. 'Tehran is going through a delicate moment,' said a senior leader in the Islamic Dawa Party. 'It's focused on defending its own political system and legacy, which explains why its presence in Baghdad is barely visible.' That vacuum, according to the official, has allowed greater freedom among Shi'ite parties to explore alliances independently — though not without risk. 'Operating without supervision has its dangers,' they added. Over the past two weeks, a flurry of negotiations among Shi'ite parties has yielded little consensus, with many attempts to build joint electoral lists stalling amid shifting loyalties and strategic feints. The result is what observers describe as a 'liquid map' — alliances that form and dissolve without resolution. Deputy Speaker of Parliament Mohsen al-Mandalawi drifted toward former Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki's State of Law Coalition before backing away. Likewise, Hadi al-Amiri, head of the Badr Organization, drew close to Prime Minister Mohammed Shia al-Sudani, only for the two to part ways after a brief convergence — a pattern that could easily repeat. Hisham Dawood, a researcher at the French National Center for Scientific Research, says Iraq's Shi'ite political community has been fracturing since 2009, when al-Maliki chose to run independently to assert his leadership, triggering tensions that were only later resolved under Iranian pressure amid the rising challenge from the secular Iraqiya bloc led by Ayad Allawi. Today's fragmentation of the Coordination Framework, Dawood argues, is part of a broader regional unraveling. 'The Gaza war, Hezbollah's setbacks in Lebanon, the collapse of Assad's regime in Syria, and the intensified strikes on the Houthis in Yemen — all point to a shifting Middle East,' he said. These changes are forcing Iran to re-evaluate its strategy in Iraq. 'How does it preserve its strategic gains?' Dawood asked. A senior Dawa figure close to al-Maliki suggested Iran may be deliberately signaling non-interference, focusing instead on internal stability and recalibrating its foreign policy. 'Iran might be letting its allies clash now, confident they will come back to it in the end,' said another senior Shi'ite leader. 'Only Iran knows how to tie the final knots.' Iraq seen as Iran's potential 'Sacrifice' amid regional retreat A senior figure in Iraq's Dawa Party believes Iran may be prepared to let Iraq become the next 'sacrifice' in a string of strategic retreats, following Syria, Lebanon, and Yemen — all in a bid to protect Tehran's political system from collapse. 'To avert a major threat, Tehran could even offer up Iraq,' the politician told Asharq al-Awsat. 'But the Iranians never truly change. They will never accept pulling back from the region. They will return — it's only a matter of time.' Despite Iran's subdued profile in Iraq's pre-election landscape, many within the Shi'ite-dominated Coordination Framework remain unconvinced that Tehran has really stepped away. 'There are key interests here that require a watchful eye,' one member of the alliance said, speaking on condition of anonymity. 'And Iran's network is far from absent,' they added. According to insiders, multiple power centers within Iran are involved in the Iraq file — including the Quds Force, the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), Iranian intelligence, the office of Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, and even individuals within his family. 'Each has its own preferences and interests when it comes to Iraq's elections,' one official said. Dawood underscored Iraq's strategic weight for Tehran: 'Iraq is not Syria, and not even Lebanon. It is Iran's largest commercial market and a vital land bridge to the Mediterranean.' Indeed, while Iran's presence may no longer dominate Baghdad's political scene, Qaani's team has held discreet meetings with key Shi'ite figures to ensure 'everything remains under control.' Negotiators working on election alliances say Tehran is still involved — but from a distance. 'They have two clear priorities,' one strategist said. 'Reducing the number of competing lists to avoid fragmentation, and ensuring that major armed factions are integrated into broad alliances.' When Asharq al-Awsat asked leaders of armed groups whether they planned to participate in the elections, most said they had not yet decided — or that the vote was not their concern. Kazem al-Fartousi, a leader in the Kata'ib Sayyid al-Shuhada Brigades, acknowledged the tension: 'We don't readily accept participating in the elections, even if we're convinced that they are the foundation of Iraq's political system.' 'The kids have grown' Iran's waning influence in Iraq is not only the result of a weakening 'Axis of Resistance' across the region — it's also because 'the kids have grown up,' says Dawood, referring to Iraq's powerful Iran-backed militias and factions. 'These groups now have their own patronage networks and strong local interests inside Iraq,' Dawood told Asharq al-Awsat. 'They can no longer be controlled through blind loyalty to Tehran.' Until recently, Iran-aligned factions were more responsive to pressure from Tehran, Dawood explained. 'At the time, their interests aligned closely with Iran's. These factions lacked a social base, funding, and military experience — they were reliant on Iranian backing.' Today, many of those same groups form the core of al-Sudani's government — 'no longer operating on the sidelines, but from within,' Dawood said. The evolution presents what he calls a 'structural crossroads' for Iraq's armed groups. 'They now face a stark choice,' he said. 'Either preserve their strategic gains by dismantling their armed wings and integrating their fighters into state institutions, or risk mounting regional and international threats — particularly after the political earthquakes in Syria.' This growing assertiveness is already visible within the Coordination Framework, where Shi'ite parties are increasingly engaging in open political competition with fewer restraints. According to senior Shi'ite officials, these intra-Shi'ite rivalries continue to play out under 'remote Iranian monitoring,' but with far less direct interference than in the past. Power struggle between Maliki and Sudani A simmering rift within Iraq's ruling Shi'ite coalition has spilled into public view, as al-Sudani and al-Maliki clash over control of the government and the future of the Coordination Framework ahead of the 2025 elections. In early January, Ammar al-Hakim, leader of the Shi'ite 'National Wisdom Movement,' broke the silence over tensions brewing inside the coalition. He pointedly reminded allies that al-Sudani, who once held a lone parliamentary seat, owes his rise to the premiership to the Coordination Framework — and should not attempt to chart his own course. 'Some coalition leaders are asking: why empower someone who now seeks to outgrow us?' Hakim said, framing al-Sudani's independence as a betrayal. According to a political advisor who served in previous Iraqi cabinets, the coalition is grappling with what he calls 'the Prime Minister complex' — the tendency among Shi'ite leaders to resist any premier who gains too much personal influence. al-Maliki, who held office from 2006 to 2014, is among those alarmed by al-Sudani's growing stature and regional outreach. 'Al-Sudani is replicating al-Maliki's first term,' the advisor told Asharq al-Awsat, 'leveraging a strong central state and public sector to cultivate loyalty.' That strategy, however, has triggered anxiety inside the Framework. A senior figure in al-Maliki's Dawa Party said al-Maliki is uneasy with how al-Sudani manages the cabinet and bypasses consensus mechanisms. 'We are now dealing with a prime minister with unchecked authority,' he said. The tensions reached new heights when al-Sudani traveled to Qatar and met Syrian President Ahmed al-Sharaa without coordinating with his political allies — moves seen by some as an attempt to position himself as a regional powerbroker. The Dawa official warned that 'landmines are planted in al-Sudani's path,' and he will need 'considerable strength' to navigate them ahead of the vote. Iraq's political arena is no stranger to explosive conflicts, but al-Sudani is testing these waters for the first time — and with competing agendas in his head, according to a veteran political figure. 'He's trying to manage opposing plans simultaneously,' the source said. Despite Tehran's reduced visibility, Iranian actors continue to wield influence, often behind the scenes. One source said Iran has pressured al-Sudani to include certain armed factions in his circle as a means of securing his position and protecting Tehran's interests. 'Iran sees al-Sudani as a difficult but valuable figure — not someone to discard easily.' Members of al-Sudani's Furatain Bloc declined to comment on his election strategy. However, sources close to coalition talks confirmed that al-Sudani has clashed with Badr Organization leader Hadi al-Amiri over the leadership of a joint electoral list. According to these sources, al-Sudani demanded to head the alliance and called for a pledge supporting his bid for a second term — conditions viewed as excessive by Amiri's camp. Political analysts say al-Sudani is seeking to break free from the shadow of the Coordination Framework's first-generation leadership, especially those associated with hardline regional agendas such as the 'Al-Aqsa Flood' rhetoric. Yet, aware of the political landmines ahead, he is carefully courting allies who can shield him from the fallout. 'Color of the cat doesn't matter': Iran adapts its Iraq strategy amid shifting regional dynamics Iran appears to have recalibrated its approach to Iraq, learning from past overreach and embracing a more pragmatic stance that reflects regional shifts and American influence, analysts and political insiders say. Tehran's introspection dates back to the tenure of former Iraqi Prime Minister Adel Abdul Mahdi (2018–2019), a period viewed by Iraqi protesters and civil movements as 'tragic.' At the time, Iran was emboldened by what it saw as the decline of US influence in West Asia and pushed to consolidate its hold over Iraq, according to a former Iraqi government advisor. Abdul Mahdi, a seasoned figure with roots in the Tehran-founded Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq, oversaw a period during which pro-Iran factions expanded their parallel state structures. But the October 2019 protest movement disrupted that momentum, triggering a political realignment — despite the deaths of over 600 demonstrators. 'Tehran realized it had overplayed its hand,' the former advisor told Asharq al-Awsat. 'Since then, it's returned to a more measured formula.' Dawood said Iran has spent the past two decades convincing — or compelling — Washington to share responsibility for Iraq's political management. 'This dual oversight between the US and Iran often drives the reconfigurations we see in Iraqi politics,' he said. The former advisor likened Iran's flexibility to Deng Xiaoping's famous adage: 'It doesn't matter what color the cat is, as long as it catches mice.' Iran, he said, demonstrated this mindset during the war against ISIS, and even earlier. He recalled how, before the 2003 US-led invasion of Iraq, Iran issued religious rulings allowing Shi'ite factions to cooperate with the United States — despite Tehran's official position branding it the 'Great Satan.' That green light cleared the way for opposition figures to travel to Washington in preparation for the Gulf War. On the other side of Iraq's fractured Shi'ite landscape, secular-leaning politicians see an opportunity. One such figure, who spoke to Asharq al-Awsat on condition of anonymity, said he had visited Washington twice — before and after Trump's inauguration in January 2025. 'The next elections must reflect the transformations sweeping the region,' he said. 'If they don't, Iraq risks being left behind in the emerging Middle East order.' Iran's 'plan B': quiet calculations in Iraq ahead of 2025 elections Iran is recalibrating its presence in Iraq, balancing public restraint with behind-the-scenes maneuvering as it braces for a pivotal election season. While Tehran's footprint appears subdued, political sources say its operatives are quietly managing a fallback strategy — 'Plan B' — from the shadows. Two competing narratives dominate assessments of Iran's current posture. One holds that Tehran is intentionally keeping a low profile in Baghdad to avoid provoking Washington and to demonstrate its commitment to ongoing negotiations. The other suggests Iran is overstretched at home but will inevitably return to assert itself more forcefully. But behind the scenes, commanders aligned with Esmail Qaani, head of Iran's Quds Force, are actively adjusting political calculations in Baghdad, according to Shi'ite political insiders. Leaked details from high-level meetings in the Iraqi capital indicate that Tehran is seeking to secure three key objectives before the November 2025 elections: prevent the emergence of a Shi'ite faction that could challenge its influence in the future, preserve a carefully curated balance of electoral competition among Iraq's Shi'ite parties, and keep both al-Sudani and al-Maliki politically viable — even if they remain rivals. "Al-Sudani could be Tehran's strategic bet if talks with Washington succeed, while al-Maliki may prove crucial if they fail," a senior figure in Iraq's Dawa Party told Asharq al-Awsat. Iran is currently working to keep Shi'ite political rivalries from escalating into violence, but the same Dawa official warned that 'Plan B' would see Tehran decisively back one faction — particularly if the powerful Sadrist movement reenters the political fray. Sources familiar with the thinking inside the Sadrist camp said the bloc is deliberately delaying any announcement on whether it will contest the elections, hoping to catch its rivals off-guard and reduce their ability to mobilize against it. A business of politics Iraqi elections increasingly resemble a high-stakes entrepreneurial summit, where political newcomers and veterans alike jockey to raise their stakes in power. 'Everyone is in it to boost their influence,' said a former Shi'ite candidate who ran in Iraq's first two post-2003 elections. 'For many newcomers, this is their shot at entering the club of political elites.' The retired candidate, now observing from the sidelines, said Tehran is grappling with a generation of loyalists who have matured into power brokers. 'Some of them now have access to state contracts and resources. They're strong enough to donate to the Revolutionary Guard — not the other way around.' This complex and shifting power dynamic alarms researchers like Dawood, who warned that two decades of Shi'ite rule have delivered disappointing outcomes. 'What we've seen is a rentier economy entirely dependent on oil, a complete absence of economic vision, and little understanding of how to govern a complex society,' Dawood said. 'Add to that a lack of market knowledge, limited regional or global connectivity, and a systemic fusion of diplomacy with ideology — plus entrenched corruption.' As Iraq approaches its next election, Dawood sees two parallel tracks hurtling toward November 2025: the failure to build a rational state model, and intensifying regional and international pressure.
Ya Libnan
30-04-2025
- Politics
- Ya Libnan
Syria's Alawites evicted from their homes at gunpoint
A family member waits for workers to move his family's belongings, following evacuation orders from factions of Hay'at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), after Syria's Bashar al-Assad was ousted, on the outskirts of Damascus, in Syria, December 29, 2024. REUTERS/Amr Abdallah Dalsh/File Photo By Amina Ismail DAMASCUS – Early one evening in late January, 12 masked men stormed the Damascus home of Um Hassan's family, pointed AK-47 assault rifles in their faces and ordered them to leave. When they presented ownership documents, the men arrested Um Hassan's oldest brother and said they could only have him back once they had moved out. The family surrendered the house 24 hours later and picked him up, battered and bruised, from the local General Security Service headquarters, said Um Hassan, giving only her nickname for fear of reprisals. Her family is part of Syria's minority Alawite community, an offshoot of the Shi'ite faith and the sect of former strongman Bashar al-Assad. Their story is not unique. Since Syria's President Ahmed al-Sharaa seized power in December, hundreds of Alawites have been forced from their private homes in Damascus by the security forces, according to Syrian officials, Alawite leaders, human rights groups and 12 people with similar accounts who spoke to Reuters. 'We're definitely not talking about independent incidents. We are talking about hundreds, if not thousands, of cases of evictions,' said Bassam Alahmad, executive director of human rights group Syrians for Truth and Justice (STJ). The mass evictions of Alawites from privately owned homes have not been previously reported. For more than 50 years, Assad and his father before him crushed any opposition from Syria's Sunni Muslims, who make up more than 70% of the population. Alawites took many of the top positions in government and the military and ran big businesses. They now accuse supporters of Sharaa, who once ran an al Qaeda affiliate, of systematically abusing them as payback. In March, hundreds of Alawites were killed in Syria's western coastal region and sectarian violence spread to Damascus in apparent retribution for a deadly ambush on Syria's new security forces by armed Assad loyalists. Two government officials said thousands of people had been kicked out of homes in Damascus since Assad was toppled by Sharaa's rebel force, with the majority being Alawites. The officials said most resided in government housing associated with their jobs in state institutions and, since they were no longer employed, they had lost their right to stay. But hundreds more, like Um Hassan, were evicted from their privately owned homes simply because they are Alawites, Reuters interviews with multiple officials and victims show. The interior ministry, which oversees the GSS, and Sharaa's office did not respond to requests for comment. 'WAR SPOILS COMMITTEE' Sharaa has vowed to pursue inclusive policies to unite a country shattered by a 14-year sectarian civil war and attract foreign investment and aid. But Alawites fear the evictions are part of systematic sectarian score settling by Syria's new rulers. An official who declined to be named at the Damascus Countryside Directorate, which is responsible for managing public services, said they had received hundreds of complaints from people who had been violently evicted. An Alawite mayor in a Damascus suburb, who also asked not to be named due to the sensitivity of the matter, said in March that 250 families out of 2,000 there had been evicted. The mayor shared with Reuters a call recorded in March with someone claiming to be a member of the General Security Service (GSS), a new agency made up of rebel fighters who ousted Assad. The GSS official demanded the mayor find an empty house for a family relocating from the north. When the mayor said there were no apartments for rent, the official told him to, 'empty one of those houses that belong to one of those pigs', referring to Alawites. Muslims consider pigs unclean and impure and calling someone a pig is highly offensive. According to three senior GSS officials, the new authorities have established two committees to manage properties belonging to individuals perceived to be connected to the previous regime. One committee is responsible for confiscations, the other addresses complaints, the people said. Reuters was unable to determine to what extent Sharaa was aware of how homeowners were being evicted, or whether his office had oversight of the committees. They were created as Sharaa's forces closed in on Damascus in December and were modelled on a similar entity known as the'War Spoils Committee' in his former stronghold Idlib, the GSS sources said. 'These evictions will certainly change the demographics of the city, similar to the changes that Assad implemented against his opponents in Sunni areas. We are talking about the same practice, but with different victims,' said Alahmad at STJ. On April 16, STJ filed a complaint with the Damascus Suburbs Directorate, calling for an end to 'sectarian-motivated' property violations and the return of looted properties. TWO MINUTES TO LEAVE Assad's father Hafez al-Assad moved Alawites from coastal areas to urban centres to help cement his powerbase. Assad set up military installations and housing units for troops and their families around Damascus, where Alawites, who were over-represented in the army, made up a significant portion of the population, according to Fabrice Balanche, a Syria expert and an associate professor at the University of Lyon 2. Balanche estimated that half a million Alawites have moved to coastal areas after being evicted from the capital, Homs, Aleppo, and other parts of Syria following Assad's fall. In the Alawite neighbourhood of Dahyet al-Assad, civil servant and mother of four Um Hussein said two armed masked men came to her privately owned home on January 16 and identified themselves as GSS members. The newly created GSS deployed by Sharaa seems to be an extension of the security force that ruled Idlib province, said Syria expert Joshua Landis, head of the Center for Middle East Studies at the University of Oklahoma. The GSS now seems to be the Police, FBI, CIA and national guard, all rolled into one, he said. Um Hussein said the men gave her 24 hours grace to leave, because of her son's dependence on a wheelchair. She appealed to numerous government bodies to keep her home, and received some assurances. The next day at about 10 a.m., the men returned and gave her two minutes to leave. Um Hussein said they also confiscated a shop her family owned in the neighbourhood and were renting out. 'We have been living in this house for more than 22 years. All our money and savings have been invested in it. We cannot afford to rent elsewhere,' said Um Hussein. Reuters spoke with two members of the security forces at the private homes they had occupied. One had seized two houses – including Um Hussein's – after evicting the owners. Hamid Mohamed, meanwhile, said his unit had taken over four empty homes belonging to Shabiha, a notorious pro-Assad militia. He said the security forces had not seized anything that wasn't theirs and recalled angrily that his home in a Damascus suburb was destroyed during the civil war. Mohamed said he moved to the capital after Assad's fall and had nowhere else to stay. 'TRANSITIONAL INJUSTICE' On February 12, the Damascus governor called on citizens who say property has been unjustly confiscated to submit complaints at directorates. Reuters visited one in March where the official who declined to be named confirmed a pattern: armed individuals evicted people without a court order, prevented them from taking their belongings – and then moved in. The majority of confiscations targeted low- to middle-income Syrians who had lost their jobs and lacked the resources to pay their way out of the situation, the sources said. Another official in another Damascus directorate said the evictions happened overnight without due process. 'It's chaotic, but there is a method to the madness, which is to terrify people and to let the whole world know that Alawites are no longer (in power),' said Landis. 'There is no transitional justice. There's only transitional injustice.' Seven armed men came to Rafaa Mahmoud's apartment on February 20 and threatened to kill her and her Alawite family unless she handed over the keys to the property they had bought 15 years earlier, she said. Mahmoud shared a 2 minute 27 second video with Reuters showing her standing behind her door, desperately arguing with the men, who warned the family to leave by nightfall. The men, who identified themselves as state security agents, called Mahmoud and her family 'infidels and pigs'. When Mahmoud asked for a court order, the men replied: 'We only do things verbally here. (Reuters)
AsiaOne
30-04-2025
- Politics
- AsiaOne
Minutes to leave: Syria's Alawites evicted from private homes at gunpoint, Asia News
DAMASCUS — Early one evening in late January, 12 masked men stormed the Damascus home of Um Hassan's family, pointed AK-47 assault rifles in their faces and ordered them to leave. When they presented ownership documents, the men arrested Um Hassan's oldest brother and said they could only have him back once they had moved out. The family surrendered the house 24 hours later and picked him up, battered and bruised, from the local General Security Service headquarters, said Um Hassan, giving only her nickname for fear of reprisals. Her family is part of Syria's minority Alawite community, an offshoot of the Shi'ite faith and the sect of former strongman Bashar al-Assad. Their story is not unique. Since Syria's President Ahmed al-Sharaa seized power in December, hundreds of Alawites have been forced from their private homes in Damascus by the security forces, according to Syrian officials, Alawite leaders, human rights groups and 12 people with similar accounts who spoke to Reuters. "We're definitely not talking about independent incidents. We are talking about hundreds, if not thousands, of cases of evictions," said Bassam Alahmad, executive director of human rights group Syrians for Truth and Justice (STJ). The mass evictions of Alawites from privately owned homes have not been previously reported. For more than 50 years, Assad and his father before him crushed any opposition from Syria's Sunni Muslims, who make up more than 70 per cent of the population. Alawites took many of the top positions in government and the military and ran big businesses. They now accuse supporters of Sharaa, who once ran an al Qaeda affiliate, of systematically abusing them as payback. In March, hundreds of Alawites were killed in Syria's western coastal region and sectarian violence spread to Damascus in apparent retribution for a deadly ambush on Syria's new security forces by armed Assad loyalists. Two government officials said thousands of people had been kicked out of homes in Damascus since Assad was toppled by Sharaa's rebel force, with the majority being Alawites. The officials said most resided in government housing associated with their jobs in state institutions and, since they were no longer employed, they had lost their right to stay. But hundreds more, like Um Hassan, were evicted from their privately owned homes simply because they are Alawites, Reuters interviews with multiple officials and victims show. The interior ministry, which oversees the GSS, and Sharaa's office did not respond to requests for comment. 'War spoils committee' Sharaa has vowed to pursue inclusive policies to unite a country shattered by a 14-year sectarian civil war and attract foreign investment and aid. But Alawites fear the evictions are part of systematic sectarian score settling by Syria's new rulers. An official who declined to be named at the Damascus Countryside Directorate, which is responsible for managing public services, said they had received hundreds of complaints from people who had been violently evicted. An Alawite mayor in a Damascus suburb, who also asked not to be named due to the sensitivity of the matter, said in March that 250 families out of 2,000 there had been evicted. The mayor shared with Reuters a call recorded in March with someone claiming to be a member of the General Security Service (GSS), a new agency made up of rebel fighters who ousted Assad. The GSS official demanded the mayor find an empty house for a family relocating from the north. When the mayor said there were no apartments for rent, the official told him to, "empty one of those houses that belong to one of those pigs", referring to Alawites. Muslims consider pigs unclean and impure and calling someone a pig is highly offensive. According to three senior GSS officials, the new authorities have established two committees to manage properties belonging to individuals perceived to be connected to the previous regime. One committee is responsible for confiscations, the other addresses complaints, the people said. Reuters was unable to determine to what extent Sharaa was aware of how homeowners were being evicted, or whether his office had oversight of the committees. They were created as Sharaa's forces closed in on Damascus in December and were modelled on a similar entity known as the "War Spoils Committee" in his former stronghold Idlib, the GSS sources said. "These evictions will certainly change the demographics of the city, similar to the changes that Assad implemented against his opponents in Sunni areas. We are talking about the same practice, but with different victims," said Alahmad at STJ. On April 16, STJ filed a complaint with the Damascus Suburbs Directorate, calling for an end to "sectarian-motivated" property violations and the return of looted properties. Two minutes to leave Assad's father Hafez al-Assad moved Alawites from coastal areas to urban centres to help cement his powerbase. Assad set up military installations and housing units for troops and their families around Damascus, where Alawites, who were over-represented in the army, made up a significant portion of the population, according to Fabrice Balanche, a Syria expert and an associate professor at the University of Lyon 2. Balanche estimated that half a million Alawites have moved to coastal areas after being evicted from the capital, Homs, Aleppo, and other parts of Syria following Assad's fall. In the Alawite neighbourhood of Dahyet al-Assad, civil servant and mother of four Um Hussein said two armed masked men came to her privately owned home on Jan 16 and identified themselves as GSS members. The newly created GSS deployed by Sharaa seems to be an extension of the security force that ruled Idlib province, said Syria expert Joshua Landis, head of the Centre for Middle East Studies at the University of Oklahoma. The GSS now seems to be the Police, FBI, CIA and national guard, all rolled into one, he said. Um Hussein said the men gave her 24 hours grace to leave, because of her son's dependence on a wheelchair. She appealed to numerous government bodies to keep her home, and received some assurances. The next day at about 10 a.m., the men returned and gave her two minutes to leave. Um Hussein said they also confiscated a shop her family owned in the neighbourhood and were renting out. "We have been living in this house for more than 22 years. All our money and savings have been invested in it. We cannot afford to rent elsewhere," said Um Hussein. Reuters spoke with two members of the security forces at the private homes they had occupied. One had seized two houses — including Um Hussein's — after evicting the owners. Hamid Mohamed, meanwhile, said his unit had taken over four empty homes belonging to Shabiha, a notorious pro-Assad militia. He said the security forces had not seized anything that wasn't theirs and recalled angrily that his home in a Damascus suburb was destroyed during the civil war. Mohamed said he moved to the capital after Assad's fall and had nowhere else to stay. 'Transitional injustice' On February 12, the Damascus governor called on citizens who say property has been unjustly confiscated to submit complaints at directorates. Reuters visited one in March where the official who declined to be named confirmed a pattern: armed individuals evicted people without a court order, prevented them from taking their belongings - and then moved in. The majority of confiscations targeted low- to middle-income Syrians who had lost their jobs and lacked the resources to pay their way out of the situation, the sources said. Another official in another Damascus directorate said the evictions happened overnight without due process. "It's chaotic, but there is a method to the madness, which is to terrify people and to let the whole world know that Alawites are no longer (in power)," said Landis. "There is no transitional justice. There's only transitional injustice." Seven armed men came to Rafaa Mahmoud's apartment on February 20 and threatened to kill her and her Alawite family unless she handed over the keys to the property they had bought 15 years earlier, she said. Mahmoud shared a 2 minute 27 second video with Reuters showing her standing behind her door, desperately arguing with the men, who warned the family to leave by nightfall. The men, who identified themselves as state security agents, called Mahmoud and her family "infidels and pigs". When Mahmoud asked for a court order, the men replied: "We only do things verbally here." [[nid:716914]]
Yahoo
30-04-2025
- Politics
- Yahoo
Minutes to leave: Syria's Alawites evicted from private homes at gunpoint
By Amina Ismail DAMASCUS (Reuters) - Early one evening in late January, 12 masked men stormed the Damascus home of Um Hassan's family, pointed AK-47 assault rifles in their faces and ordered them to leave. When they presented ownership documents, the men arrested Um Hassan's oldest brother and said they could only have him back once they had moved out. The family surrendered the house 24 hours later and picked him up, battered and bruised, from the local General Security Service headquarters, said Um Hassan, giving only her nickname for fear of reprisals. Her family is part of Syria's minority Alawite community, an offshoot of the Shi'ite faith and the sect of former strongman Bashar al-Assad. Their story is not unique. Since Syria's President Ahmed al-Sharaa seized power in December, hundreds of Alawites have been forced from their private homes in Damascus by the security forces, according to Syrian officials, Alawite leaders, human rights groups and 12 people with similar accounts who spoke to Reuters. "We're definitely not talking about independent incidents. We are talking about hundreds, if not thousands, of cases of evictions," said Bassam Alahmad, executive director of human rights group Syrians for Truth and Justice (STJ). The mass evictions of Alawites from privately owned homes have not been previously reported. For more than 50 years, Assad and his father before him crushed any opposition from Syria's Sunni Muslims, who make up more than 70% of the population. Alawites took many of the top positions in government and the military and ran big businesses. They now accuse supporters of Sharaa, who once ran an al Qaeda affiliate, of systematically abusing them as payback. In March, hundreds of Alawites were killed in Syria's western coastal region and sectarian violence spread to Damascus in apparent retribution for a deadly ambush on Syria's new security forces by armed Assad loyalists. Two government officials said thousands of people had been kicked out of homes in Damascus since Assad was toppled by Sharaa's rebel force, with the majority being Alawites. The officials said most resided in government housing associated with their jobs in state institutions and, since they were no longer employed, they had lost their right to stay. But hundreds more, like Um Hassan, were evicted from their privately owned homes simply because they are Alawites, Reuters interviews with multiple officials and victims show. The interior ministry, which oversees the GSS, and Sharaa's office did not respond to requests for comment. 'WAR SPOILS COMMITTEE' Sharaa has vowed to pursue inclusive policies to unite a country shattered by a 14-year sectarian civil war and attract foreign investment and aid. But Alawites fear the evictions are part of systematic sectarian score settling by Syria's new rulers. An official who declined to be named at the Damascus Countryside Directorate, which is responsible for managing public services, said they had received hundreds of complaints from people who had been violently evicted. An Alawite mayor in a Damascus suburb, who also asked not to be named due to the sensitivity of the matter, said in March that 250 families out of 2,000 there had been evicted. The mayor shared with Reuters a call recorded in March with someone claiming to be a member of the General Security Service (GSS), a new agency made up of rebel fighters who ousted Assad. The GSS official demanded the mayor find an empty house for a family relocating from the north. When the mayor said there were no apartments for rent, the official told him to, "empty one of those houses that belong to one of those pigs", referring to Alawites. Muslims consider pigs unclean and impure and calling someone a pig is highly offensive. According to three senior GSS officials, the new authorities have established two committees to manage properties belonging to individuals perceived to be connected to the previous regime. One committee is responsible for confiscations, the other addresses complaints, the people said. Reuters was unable to determine to what extent Sharaa was aware of how homeowners were being evicted, or whether his office had oversight of the committees. They were created as Sharaa's forces closed in on Damascus in December and were modelled on a similar entity known as the "War Spoils Committee" in his former stronghold Idlib, the GSS sources said. "These evictions will certainly change the demographics of the city, similar to the changes that Assad implemented against his opponents in Sunni areas. We are talking about the same practice, but with different victims," said Alahmad at STJ. On April 16, STJ filed a complaint with the Damascus Suburbs Directorate, calling for an end to "sectarian-motivated" property violations and the return of looted properties. TWO MINUTES TO LEAVE Assad's father Hafez al-Assad moved Alawites from coastal areas to urban centres to help cement his powerbase. Assad set up military installations and housing units for troops and their families around Damascus, where Alawites, who were over-represented in the army, made up a significant portion of the population, according to Fabrice Balanche, a Syria expert and an associate professor at the University of Lyon 2. Balanche estimated that half a million Alawites have moved to coastal areas after being evicted from the capital, Homs, Aleppo, and other parts of Syria following Assad's fall. In the Alawite neighbourhood of Dahyet al-Assad, civil servant and mother of four Um Hussein said two armed masked men came to her privately owned home on January 16 and identified themselves as GSS members. The newly created GSS deployed by Sharaa seems to be an extension of the security force that ruled Idlib province, said Syria expert Joshua Landis, head of the Center for Middle East Studies at the University of Oklahoma. The GSS now seems to be the Police, FBI, CIA and national guard, all rolled into one, he said. Um Hussein said the men gave her 24 hours grace to leave, because of her son's dependence on a wheelchair. She appealed to numerous government bodies to keep her home, and received some assurances. The next day at about 10 a.m., the men returned and gave her two minutes to leave. Um Hussein said they also confiscated a shop her family owned in the neighbourhood and were renting out. "We have been living in this house for more than 22 years. All our money and savings have been invested in it. We cannot afford to rent elsewhere," said Um Hussein. Reuters spoke with two members of the security forces at the private homes they had occupied. One had seized two houses - including Um Hussein's - after evicting the owners. Hamid Mohamed, meanwhile, said his unit had taken over four empty homes belonging to Shabiha, a notorious pro-Assad militia. He said the security forces had not seized anything that wasn't theirs and recalled angrily that his home in a Damascus suburb was destroyed during the civil war. Mohamed said he moved to the capital after Assad's fall and had nowhere else to stay. 'TRANSITIONAL INJUSTICE' On February 12, the Damascus governor called on citizens who say property has been unjustly confiscated to submit complaints at directorates. Reuters visited one in March where the official who declined to be named confirmed a pattern: armed individuals evicted people without a court order, prevented them from taking their belongings - and then moved in. The majority of confiscations targeted low- to middle-income Syrians who had lost their jobs and lacked the resources to pay their way out of the situation, the sources said. Another official in another Damascus directorate said the evictions happened overnight without due process. "It's chaotic, but there is a method to the madness, which is to terrify people and to let the whole world know that Alawites are no longer (in power)," said Landis. "There is no transitional justice. There's only transitional injustice." Seven armed men came to Rafaa Mahmoud's apartment on February 20 and threatened to kill her and her Alawite family unless she handed over the keys to the property they had bought 15 years earlier, she said. Mahmoud shared a 2 minute 27 second video with Reuters showing her standing behind her door, desperately arguing with the men, who warned the family to leave by nightfall. The men, who identified themselves as state security agents, called Mahmoud and her family "infidels and pigs". When Mahmoud asked for a court order, the men replied: "We only do things verbally here." (Writing by Michael Georgy; Editing by David Clarke)
