Latest news with #Shuiqiao-class
Asia Times
16-05-2025
- Business
- Asia Times
China's invasion barges play military mind games with Taiwan
China is constructing more large amphibious barges, sending ominous signals about an invasion to come across the Taiwan Strait. The three modular Shuiqiao-class landing barges, painted in the People's Liberation Army-Navy (PLAN) colors, are currently undergoing sea trials near Nanshan Island, the Wall Street Journal reported. They are equipped with jack-up legs and ramps and designed to integrate with civilian ferries, significantly extending the People's Liberation Army's (PLA) logistics reach in a conflict scenario over Taiwan. Each modular barge segment has unique capabilities. One is around 360 feet long with a 400-foot bow bridge and four 105-foot jack-up legs. A second segment measures about 440 feet and features two drop-down loading ramps on each side. A third segment, the largest, is approximately 600 feet long and has eight 180-foot jack-up legs. The WSJ report says the barges can support even China's heaviest armored vehicles. That allows the PLA to multiply potential landing zones, forcing Taiwan to spread its limited forces across a wider front. While many beaches are fortified and closely monitored, Taiwan's ability to defend all simultaneously remains constrained. The WSJ report adds that a second set of these platforms is under construction. This activity suggests China is accelerating efforts to meet President Xi Jinping's directive for the PLA to be capable of operating against Taiwan by 2027, even if full-scale invasion capability remains aspirational. These barges are neither game-changers nor decisive assets on their own, but they enhance existing capabilities as enablers. J Michael Dahm and Thomas Shugart state in a March 2025 China Maritime Studies Institute (CMSI) report that the Shuiqiao-class barges significantly enhance the PLA's over-the-shore logistics capacity. They argue the system allows for the transfer of heavy vehicles and equipment in austere areas without fixed port infrastructure. According to Dahm and Shugart, a single three-barge set can offload anything from light vehicles to 50-ton tanks. However, they point out that the narrow 6-meter-wide bridges limit throughput to single-lane, unidirectional traffic. They estimate offloading a heavy combined arms battalion—about 150 vehicles—would take 40–60 minutes, making the barges valuable but potentially bottlenecked during high-intensity landings. These throughput limits draw attention to China's larger sealift capability challenges. Dennis Blasko notes in an April 2022 CMSI report that despite modernization, the PLA Ground Force (PLAGF) operates only six amphibious combined arms brigades. Blasko says this accounts for just 7% of the PLAGF's total brigade force and lacks the lift capacity needed to move an estimated 30,000 troops and more than 2,400 vehicles. Blasko also says PLA exercises rarely exceed the battalion level and that most sea movement drills rely on civilian roll-on/roll-off ferries or limited PLAN support. Moreover, Blasko points out that China's amphibious brigades are geographically dispersed, meaning assembling them near embarkation points would require days or even weeks. Yet, some analysts argue that China has already overcome key transport hurdles. Thomas Shugart writes in an October 2022 War on the Rocks article that China's sealift capacity is no longer a critical limitation. He argues that China's use of civilian roll-on/roll-off ferries and vehicle carriers significantly augments its military transport capability. Shugart notes that China's civilian shipping now offers over 2.4 million tons of transport capacity, far surpassing the PLAN's amphibious fleet. He asserts these vessels, designed for fast loading and unloading, could deliver eight heavy brigades and 60,000 troops in an initial wave, with more reinforcements in the following days. Ian Easton notes in a July 2021 Project 2049 report that Taiwan has 14 beaches suitable for amphibious landings. Bloomberg adds that these locations are well-defended and surrounded by rough terrain and military installations. Bloomberg also notes that barricades may hinder access. Still, Newsweek reported in December 2023 that more cautious defense analysts believe there could be close to two dozen viable landing sites. Yet operational viability also depends on environmental conditions. Andrew Erickson writes in an April 2025 article for 1945 that Shuiqiao barges are limited in rough weather and adverse beach conditions. Erickson says the platforms have only been observed in calm waters, suggesting their use may be confined to favorable environments. Erickson adds that even if the barges deliver vehicles to shore, they do not assist with moving them inland. Poorly located landing sites or inadequate road access could negate any tactical advantage. More critically, the PLA's ability to establish and hold a beachhead would face fierce resistance. Ralph Bentley writes in a 2021 Journal of Indo-Pacific Affairs article that Taiwan's defense strategy focuses on denying China a landing foothold. Bentley says Taiwan uses dense littoral defenses, including naval mines, coastal engineering, mobile anti-ship missiles and long-range artillery. Bentley emphasizes that these tools are designed to attrit Chinese amphibious forces before they can consolidate ashore. He notes that this strategy focuses on destroying vulnerable transport ships as they cross or approach the Strait. At the strategic level, China's barge program signals more than military readiness. It projects political resolve and reflects a high-risk, high-reward mindset. Joel Wuthnow writes in an October 2024 article for the Institute for National Strategic Studies (INSS) that a failed invasion would likely lead to prolonged instability. Wuthnow suggests that in the case of a Chinese military defeat, Beijing might resort to a long-term blockade, cyberattacks, anti-satellite strikes or even nuclear demonstrations. While the collapse of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) in such a scenario is unlikely, a failed invasion of Taiwan may lead to military purges and reorientation of capabilities, Wuthnow writes. From this angle, the Shuiqiao barges may matter more as symbols of readiness than systems to actually invade. Vincent So, writing this month for The Interpreter, draws a parallel with 1949, when Nationalist commander Fu Zuoyi peacefully surrendered Beijing to avoid its destruction. While the contexts differ, So argues that China may now be trying to convince Taiwan's leaders and people that unification is inevitable by combining military posturing with cyber operations, economic pressure and the implicit threat embodied by its amphibious buildup. In this calculus, the barges matter less for what they can do and more for their psychological effect.
Japan Times
15-04-2025
- Politics
- Japan Times
China's new bridge-forming barges offer new options for Taiwan invasion
If anyone was wondering what Chinese troops and armored vehicles disembarking onto Taiwan's shores could potentially look like, then footage of drills in China's southern Guangdong province showing barges equipped with interconnected landing bridges might provide a clue. Posted briefly last month on the Chinese microblogging site Weibo, the images show how three specially designed Shuiqiao-class barges can be linked up one behind the other to form a long, relocatable pier that extends from deeper waters nearly a kilometer out at sea onto a beach. The trials, held near the city of Zhanjiang, suggest Beijing is not only working on new tools to ramp up its amphibious sealift capacity, but also devising ways to overcome the limited number of suitable locations for amphibious landing operations in Taiwan, as the barges could enable Chinese troops to disembark at a wider range of locations across the self-ruled island. 'This relocatable pier system can deliver large volumes of (personnel), equipment and materiel into unimproved amphibious landing areas, damaged or blocked ports, or possibly across seawalls or other obstacles onto coastal roads,' according to a report published by the U.S. Naval War College's China Maritime Studies Institute. With a total of five areas around the barge where roll-on, roll-off ships could dock alongside, the relocatable pier could potentially transfer hundreds of vehicles ashore per hour, wrote the authors of the report, J. Michael Dahm and Thomas Shugart. The barges also feature retractable legs that can be lowered onto the seafloor to lift the entire vessel out of the water. The legs function like massive stilts forming a raised, stable platform that is less subject to the influence of currents or waves. China regards Taiwan as a breakaway province and has vowed to unite it with the mainland, either by negotiations or through force. Taiwan's military planners have long considered the island's geographic characteristics — including the rugged terrain that restricts the number of beaches suitable for amphibious landings to fewer than 20 — as key elements of their defense strategy. But Beijing's latest engineering feat could prompt them to partially reevaluate their plans, especially as the newly developed vessels appear meant for the China's People's Liberation Army (PLA) Navy to use. 'Based on their function, paint scheme and lack of automatic identification system (AIS) transmissions, the barges are very likely PLA Navy auxiliaries and not civilian vessels,' wrote Dahm and Shugart. Images of the first three landing barges emerged in January, but Beijing appears keen on expanding this capability as soon as possible, with the authors of the report saying that a second, identical set of three is already under construction in southern China. This, the experts argue, suggests the PLA may have significantly advanced its timetable to field sufficient capabilities for a large-scale cross-strait operation against Taiwan. 'This newest logistics capability is further evidence of the PLA's efforts to meet Chairman Xi Jinping's reported mandate to have military capabilities necessary to conduct a large-scale invasion of Taiwan by 2027,' they wrote. Some top U.S. military commanders have repeatedly referred to that year as Xi's "preferred timeline' for annexation, pointing to a secretive directive from Xi calling on the PLA to be ready. It's important to note, however, that no public evidence has emerged that Beijing is planning to invade Taiwan by 2027. Just how prepared the PLA will be two years from now will also depend on the combined — and growing — deterrence and defense capabilities of Taiwan, the United States and like-minded countries such as Japan, which could make it difficult for the PLA to launch an invasion, let alone conduct a successful one. Notwithstanding the debate about Beijing's sense of urgency, experts stressed that while the new barges, also known as landing platform utility (LPU) vessels, do expand China's invasion toolkit, they are not the type of assets the PLA would use to initiate an amphibious assault, particularly in highly restricted and potentially contested areas. 'These landing barges are probably too vulnerable to spearhead an amphibious invasion of Taiwan,' Shugart, a former U.S. Navy submarine commander now with the Center for a New American Security think tank, told The Japan Times. The vessels wouldn't just be vulnerable to attacks from land, air and sea, but also to underwater mines in the 'surf zone,' or the shallower parts of the water close to shore, which would have to be cleared before any landing. 'If a Shuiqiao barge were damaged or destroyed, for example, that might neutralize the landing capability of the entire three-barge composite pier system,' Shugart added. The part to be played by these vessels would come at a later stage, Shugart and his co-author noted, namely after PLA amphibious armored brigades or airborne troops established a secure location for an 'amphibious landing base.' The barges would then come in to enable the transport of other forces, such as heavy combined arms brigades. 'Landing forces are always vulnerable to shore defenses,' said John Bradford, a naval expert and executive director of the Yokosuka Council on Asia Pacific Studies, adding that the key to an invasion is to achieve the right mix of speed and mass. 'In wargames, Chinese forces are consistently able to establish a beachhead with amphibious and airborne forces, but they are sometimes unable to amass enough forces to fight their way beyond the beach,' he said. 'These systems can change that equation.' More details are expected to emerge in the coming months and years as the PLA puts the vessels into service and uses them in increasingly complex exercises. One thing is already clear, though: Their development, experts say, alongside China's growing integration of military, paramilitary and civilian resources, reflects the PLA's rapidly growing capabilities to conduct a large-scale, cross-strait operation sooner rather than later.
