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Arab News
18-04-2025
- Politics
- Arab News
What happens in Beirut matters to Ankara
With the collapse of the Assad regime in Syria, Turkiye's relations with Syria's neighbors such as Lebanon, Jordan, and Iraq, have entered a new phase. In Lebanon last week, Turkiye and its position in the region was a significant topic of discussion. Syria lies between Turkiye and Lebanon, and both are significantly influenced by the political and security dynamics arising from the Syrian Arab Republic. Syria's path to stability is the most critical issue aligning Turkish and Lebanese interests. Turkiye has recently included Lebanon in the regional security alliance it leads alongside Syria's other neighbors, including Jordan and Iraq. Although Lebanon is a small state and not always a central focus in Turkiye's foreign policy agenda, Turkiye is keen to have a significant footprint in the country and appears poised to deepen its relations further with the new Cabinet in Beirut. Turkiye is not a newcomer to Lebanon. It played an important role in brokering a ceasefire in the Israel-Lebanon war in 2006. Since then, Turkish troops have participated in the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon, established under UN Security Council Resolution 1701, actively contributing to the peacekeeping and monitoring mission. The Turkish parliament renews the mandate for Turkish troops' presence in Lebanon each year. Turkiye was also active policy in the resolution of Lebanon's presidential crisis in 2007 and 2008. The crisis ended when Lebanese factions signed an agreement in Doha in 2008. Turkiye's diplomatic engagement in that agreement, and the formation of a national unity government in Lebanon, contributed to a positive perception of Turkiye in the country. In 2010, Turkiye included Lebanon in its initiative to create a free trade zone with Syria and Jordan. Dr. Sinem Cengiz Turkiye also financially supported the Special Tribunal for Lebanon, established through UN Security Council Resolution 1757, to investigate and prosecute those responsible for the 2005 assassination of former Lebanese Prime Minister Rafik. In 2010, Turkiye included Lebanon in its initiative to create a free trade zone with Syria and Jordan, and proposed a visa-free travel area. These plans were disrupted by the beginning of the Syrian civil war in 2011. Although Turkiye's Lebanon policy is under-prioritized, with no consistent long-term strategy, since Assad's collapse and the weakening of Iranian proxies Turkiye is recalibrating its policy toward Syria's neighbors, including Lebanon. According to Dr. Tuba Yıldız, an expert on Turkish-Lebanese relations, Turkiye has no foreign policy approach specifically tailored to Lebanon. 'The most important issue for Turkiye is Lebanon's relationship with the new Syrian leadership and the erosion of Iran's influence over Lebanon. Turkiye is closely monitoring this. While Lebanon is also cautiously aligning itself with Turkiye's policies. Turkiye's position in the new Syria has been a driving force behind this approach,' she said. Turkiye's new approach to Lebanon appears to rest on four main pillars: winning hearts and minds through soft power, deepening bilateral trade, counterbalancing the influence of Iran and Israel in Lebanon, and strengthening ties between Beirut and Damascus. Lebanon is entering a new phase that is likely to reshape its relations with regional actors. After a two-year deadlock, the election of a new president and the appointment of a prime minister are promising signs. Both leaders are perceived favorably by Turkiye and the Gulf states. To move forward, Lebanon must be fully reintegrated into the regional system. Turkiye has a key role to play here, particularly in helping Lebanon become part of new regional security and economic alliances. Lebanese politicians hold expectations for their relations with Turkiye as they view their country's relations with Ankara important, especially in the context of Turkiye's growing role in Syria. This sentiment was echoed when former Lebanese Prime Minister Najib Mikati said: 'Lebanon has been through a severe crisis, but we have learned that our trust in Allah, and in our friends, especially Turkiye, has been our strength.' Lebanese politicians hold expectations for their relations with Turkiye as they view their country's relations with Ankara important. Dr. Sinem Cengiz Lebanon and Syria share more than a border: their political and security futures are deeply intertwined. The recent visit of the new Lebanese prime minister to Damascus signals a potential turning point. For Turkiye, this visit is a positive development, reinforcing the Levantine cooperation essential for not only Syria's stability, but also Lebanon's stability. Given its current vulnerabilities, Lebanon is in no position to confront Israel directly. It requires security assurances from regional powers, including Turkiye. Regional states do not want the war to expand to Lebanon and through strengthening military cooperation with Lebanon, they could help ensure security and stability in the country. Geostrategically, Lebanon has an economic significance for Turkiye beyond its proximity to Syria. Lebanon is an actor in the eastern Mediterranean, where Turkiye has substantial interests. In the past few years, Turkiye has found itself excluded from the equation formed there by Arab and European states. Ankara is therefore seeking new partners to strengthen its position in the eastern Mediterranean, and Lebanon could be one such partner. Lebanon is a country that needs strong regional support, from both Turkiye and Arab countries. Despite its domestic challenges and security vulnerabilities, Lebanon's stability is significant not only for Syria but also for the broader region.
Arab News
04-04-2025
- Politics
- Arab News
Turkiye's delicate balancing act in the Black Sea
The Black Sea has historically been a region of strategic value for Turkiye, Russia and the West. Russia's war on Ukraine has increased its importance as the region became the center of gravity for Western-Russian rivalry. Turkiye's navy is the strongest in the Black Sea, which is also bordered by Russia, Ukraine, Bulgaria, Romania, and Georgia. Western allies in the Black Sea, vulnerable to Russia's policies, are seeking a stronger Turkish presence to enhance NATO's deterrence and defense capabilities on its southeastern flank. However, the Black Sea is a 'gray zone' for Ankara: it cannot fully commit to one side or the other. This was evident when Turkiye did not join the Western-led sanctions against Russia, and invoked the Montreux Convention to close the Bosphorus and Dardanelles straits to the warships of 'belligerent powers.' The 1936 agreement gives Turkiye the authority to regulate naval access between the Black Sea and the Mediterranean via those straits. The decision left Moscow unable to reinforce its Black Sea Fleet against Ukrainian attacks, although it also prevented NATO warships from entering the Black Sea to help Ukraine. This is an excellent example of how Turkiye's position, as the gatekeeper of the Black Sea, is crucial for the balance of power between Russia and the West in this region. It has the ability to shape events while watching from the sidelines. For this reason, both the West and Russia have accelerated efforts to integrate Turkiye into their Black Sea policies, which will be crucial when the war finally ends. Concerned about its inability to contain a postwar Russia without US support, NATO is establishing a cooperation initiative with Turkiye through Romania and Bulgaria, both NATO members. Turkiye is also wary of antagonizing Russia, a dominant power in the Black Sea and viewed as a threat by the West — although not by Ankara Sinem Cengiz One form this takes is a proposed new NATO command HQ that will be responsible for improving operational coordination among NATO allies in the Black Sea. Last year, Turkiye, Romania and Bulgaria also established a mine countermeasures task force in the Black Sea, reflecting Turkiye's commitment to maritime safety. NATO aims to extend this cooperation. Turkiye's openness to regional cooperation with coastal states in the Black Sea and its efforts to support Ukraine's navy are crucial for postwar security. However, Turkiye is also wary of antagonizing Russia, a dominant power in the Black Sea and viewed as a threat by the West — although not by Ankara, because its perception of threats is different. For example, the eastern Mediterranean holds greater strategic significance for Turkiye than the Black Sea. Turkiye prioritizes positioning its powerful navy in the eastern Mediterranean to protect its interests, which clash with several actors. The increase in Turkiye's naval capacity in the eastern Mediterranean is not welcomed by NATO allies, while at the same time they seek Turkiye's support in the Black Sea against Russian dominance. European states have often excluded Ankara from discussions on the eastern Mediterranean. This European policy has played into the hands of Russia, which filled the void by deepening economic cooperation with Turkiye: for example, the TurkStream pipeline across the Black Sea. Russia also chose to go along with Turkiye's balancing act, for example accepting the Turkish role in negotiating the 2022-2023 Black Sea grain deal between Russia and Ukraine: this maintained communication between Moscow and Ankara, which is mostly personal rather than institutional — unlike the Turkish-European/NATO relationship. Turkiye's approach to the Black Sea is not driven solely by the current leadership: it is rooted in a long-standing strategic policy Sinem Cengiz The seemingly cozy leadership ties between Turkiye and Russia are shaping their policies in the Black Sea and beyond. For example, in 2023, when Recep Tayyip Erdogan met Vladimir Putin, he referred to the Black Sea as 'our Black Sea' to indicate common interests and destiny. However, when relations were tense in 2016, Erdogan said the Black Sea had become a 'Russian lake' and advocated a greater NATO presence in the region. Russia will remain the most important factor in Turkiye's Black Sea policy, shaped by the cooperative and competitive nature of Turkish-Russian relations. Turkiye's approach to the Black Sea is not driven solely by the current leadership: it is rooted in a long-standing strategic policy, similar to Russia's, which views the Black Sea as the gateway to warm waters and the Mediterranean. Navigational safety is therefore crucial for all. For Moscow, it would ease Russian agricultural exports; for the West, it would provide a lifeline for Ukraine's economic and military survival; for Ankara, it would increase its leverage with the other two. Thus, Turkiye's position in the Black Sea will probably affect the balance of power in the eastern Mediterranean and the Caucasus. It is, after all, Turkiye's historical backyard. If it carefully reads the situation, Turkiye will stand to be the greatest beneficiary in shaping new dynamics in the Black Sea region. • Dr. Sinem Cengiz is a Turkish political analyst who specializes in Turkiye's relations with the Middle East. X: @SinemCngz
Arab News
21-03-2025
- Politics
- Arab News
Turkiye's influence in NATO poised to increase
For the first time in its history, Turkiye will on July 1 assume command of the NATO Allied Reaction Force Amphibious Task Force Command and the Landing Force Command, marking a significant milestone for the country within the alliance. Its year-long command will oversee several critical operations aimed at bolstering NATO's collective defense capabilities. The Turkish Defense Ministry emphasized that this leadership position is a testament to the country's increasing role in NATO operations and its contribution to the alliance's defense structure. From the beginning, Turkiye's relationship with NATO was transactional. Ankara initially sought membership in 1948 but was only offered 'associate status' in 1950. It did not secure strong support for its NATO membership until it sent thousands of soldiers to fight alongside the US during the Korean War. In May 1951, Washington proposed Turkiye's membership and, soon after, NATO backed the move and Turkiye was admitted to the alliance in 1952. Being part of NATO is seen as a rational foreign policy move in Turkiye. During the Cold War, NATO was key to Turkiye's defense against the Soviet threat. Being a NATO member gave Turkiye a national security identity and a voice in European defense matters, while also creating opportunities for its economic growth as a Western ally. In return, Turkiye took on the responsibility of protecting the alliance's southern flank, serving as a strategic buffer against Soviet expansion in the Mediterranean and the Middle East. Turkiye's cooperation was essential in NATO's strategy to counter Soviet influence. The symbolic fall of the Iron Curtain and the collapse of the Soviet Union raised concerns that NATO might become irrelevant and that Turkiye's importance to its Western allies would decrease. However, that did not happen. Today, Russia remains a significant player and Turkiye's growing ties with Moscow enhance Ankara's strategic value to its Western allies — despite their unease over Turkish-Russian relations. Turkiye's policies do not always align with those of its NATO and EU partners, particularly regarding the Middle East. Dr. Sinem Cengiz Despite being one of the longest-lasting military alliances in history, NATO is going through tough times in adapting to changes in global security. There are challenges to its unity, such as the weakening military strength of many members and the shift in the US' focus from Europe to the Pacific. There are also differences among members in how they perceive threats, their varying interests and how to cope with the issues. Turkiye, which has the second-largest military in the alliance after the US, also hosts NATO facilities. These facilities are significant in terms of giving NATO a timely response capability in the region. Turkiye is also one of the top-five contributors to NATO missions, participating in operations such as those in Afghanistan and Kosovo. It continues to play an important role in securing NATO's southern flank, especially in the Mediterranean, Black Sea and broader Middle East. However, Turkiye's policies do not always align with those of its NATO and EU partners, particularly regarding the Middle East. While NATO and the EU prioritize expanding their influence, advancing economic interests and securing Israel, Turkiye places greater emphasis on regional peace and stability. For Ankara, fostering a stable region and having good ties with its neighbors is a higher priority than fully adhering to its Western allies' policies. As a result, Turkiye pursues an autonomous foreign and security policy in its neighborhood, while carefully balancing its relations with both Russia and Iran, avoiding the confrontational stance that its NATO and EU partners often adopt. Turkiye has learned lessons from being dependent on the US and NATO and it realized the limits of this dependence during its fight against terrorism in Syria, when NATO allies imposed arms embargoes on it, irking Ankara. Moreover, within NATO, Turkiye was not always on equal terms with its Western allies. Ankara often felt that its national interests and security concerns were secondary to those of the US and other allies. One example was when Washington continued to cooperate with the Syrian Kurds at the expense of Turkiye's security concerns. A closer look at European policies against Turkiye in the pre-Ukraine war period would also be relevant. As the US appears to be distancing itself from NATO, Turkiye wants to fill this void to bolster its influence. Dr. Sinem Cengiz Given the immense challenges facing NATO, the roadmap is clear: NATO's European allies must collaborate with Turkiye to ensure the future of European security, while acknowledging Turkiye's desire for autonomy in its foreign and security policy. In the region, Turkiye is using its influence in NATO to block any new cooperation with Israel. Ankara reportedly stated that it will continue this policy until a permanent ceasefire is reached in Gaza. It has previously blocked Israel from obtaining observer status at NATO — a stance it lifted during a reconciliation process between the two countries in 2023. As the US appears to be distancing itself from NATO, Turkiye wants to fill this void to bolster its influence. Turkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan stated that Ankara is willing to engage in a new security accord in Europe and proposed protecting Ukraine in the event of a future ceasefire or peace agreement. In the post-Ukraine war period, NATO should focus on establishing a partnership with Ankara in the Black Sea, where Russia is the dominant actor. Nevertheless, NATO today remains as important to Turkiye as it was in the past, while Ankara remains a crucial member of the alliance whose role no other country could replicate because of its unique geopolitical position. Turkiye is both a European and a Middle Eastern country in several aspects. This dual role presents both opportunities and challenges, particularly in balancing tensions between the West and Russia. However, Turkiye's commitment to NATO is strong and, as such, it will host the 2026 NATO Summit.
Arab News
15-03-2025
- Business
- Arab News
Turkiye and its outreach in Africa
Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan once stated: 'Turkiye wants to walk alongside Africa as a new world order is being established.' This statement clearly reflects Ankara's policy on Africa amid the geopolitical shifts that have implications for the continent. Africa, a continent increasingly known for rivalries among global powers, is going through a period of change in power dynamics. France's recent military withdrawals from the Sahel and West Africa have created a power vacuum that several actors, such as the US, China, and Russia, seek to fill. Turkiye is carefully reading this regional zeitgeist in an attempt to secure economic and diplomatic dominance. Although a power play in Africa gives Turkiye limited room for maneuvering, its position as a middle power offers some advantages over global powers that have been affected by recent geopolitical shifts in the Middle East and beyond. The regime change in the Syrian Arab Republic, for example, has jeopardized Russia's use of the country for its Mediterranean and African outreach. Both Syria and Ukraine have forced Russia to revise its strategy in Africa at a time when Western powers are gradually withdrawing from the continent. While this Western withdrawal should play into the hands of the Kremlin, it has also opened the door for other actors, such as Turkiye, to enter the game. Thus, the growing Turkish geopolitical influence in Africa is challenged not only by the Russian presence but also by that of the Chinese, who view the continent as a 'base' from which a rising China might best extend its global power. In 2017, Turkiye established a military base in Somalia's capital, Mogadishu, at a cost of $50 million. Like American and Chinese military sites in Djibouti, the Turkish base offers proximity to the Indian Ocean. Turkiye is also looking to fill the void left by the US across the Horn of Africa and into the Sahel. It is important to understand Turkiye's motives for all of this, especially as some African countries have ordered Western powers, including the US, to withdraw military personnel from their countries. Diplomatic leverage, economic gains, security commitments, status-seeking, and global power competition are five major drivers behind Ankara's policy on Africa. As a G20 member, Turkiye evidently feels the need to engage with the continent, as have many other G20 powers. By building closer relations with African states, Turkiye seeks their potential support within international platforms, including the UN General Assembly. In line with this aim, Ankara has increased the number of its embassies on the continent from 12 to 44 in two decades. It also holds an annual Turkiye-Africa Summit, at which it gradually institutionalizes its Africa policy. Turkiye has been applying a combination of soft and hard power to expand its role in the Sahel and West Africa. Dr. Sinem Cengiz Through bilateral trade and investment, Turkiye also seeks to build South-South cooperation. The total volume of trade between Turkiye and African nations increased substantially between 2003 and 2023, from $1.35 billion to $12.4 billion. African partners are actively seeking further Turkish engagement. For instance, Tanzanian Foreign Minister Mahmoud Thabit Kombo recently asked Turkiye to support a project that aims to provide electricity to 300 million people across the continent by 2030. Uganda has invited Turkish firms to invest in shipbuilding and port development to help boost tourism activities. While the economy and trade are the primary motivating factors behind Turkiye's outreach to Africa, along with its historical and cultural ties to the region, in recent years the engagement has also taken on a military aspect. Maintaining economic gains is not easy, as it requires security commitments. The transformation of the Turkish defense industry, with a clear shift from arms procurement to manufacturing and sales, plays a key role in Turkiye's Africa policy. For example, Niger, Mali, Burkina Faso, and Chad have acquired Turkish drones, while other Sahelian countries have acquired a variety of other Turkish military equipment. Turkiye has signed security cooperation agreements with most countries on the continent. It has also reportedly deployed military advisers and drones at the Abeche base in Chad, following the departure in late January of the French garrison that had been stationed there. However, Turkiye wants to avoid being viewed predominantly as an actor that engages with the continent through military or security activity. Therefore, it adopts a more holistic approach to its relations with Africa, encompassing more than only military projects, including investments in education, such as scholarships for Africans to study in Turkiye. As Joseph Nye, the political scientist who coined the term 'soft power' in the early 1990s, pointed out, there is no difference between hard power and soft power in terms of the intended goals. Aware of this, Turkiye has been applying a combination of soft and hard power to expand its role in the Sahel and West Africa, in order to widen its sphere of influence. This is paying off; African ambassadors and students who work or study in Turkiye have found that their time there can serve as a springboard that helps them rise to the level of ministers, as seen in Somalia, or even presidents, as in Ethiopia. Mediation is another soft power tool that Turkiye aims to employ while pursuing its economic goals and maintaining its security commitments. After brokering a deal between Ethiopia and Somalia, Ankara now seeks a role in efforts to end the civil war in Sudan as well. It has also declared its intention to help resolve the dispute between Rwanda and the Democratic Republic of Congo, if both sides desire the assistance. Turkiye's African outreach is considered, in diplomatic terms, an 'overstretch,' which means it brings with it both challenges and opportunities. Given the country's military and economic capabilities, and the disquieting risks the continent poses, Turkiye must therefore navigate its African policy carefully to ensure its strategy is sustainable. The African continent, and in particular the Sahel and West Africa regions, are theaters for both global and regional powers, which offers Ankara incentives to get involved but also limits its room for maneuver.
Arab News
31-01-2025
- Business
- Arab News
Turkiye's compartmentalized approach to the Maghreb
The Maghreb, a region that serves as a crucial bridge between the Middle East, Africa and Europe, occupies a significant place in the foreign policy agenda of several regional actors, including Turkiye. Its connections to the Mediterranean, in particular, make it an important region for Ankara's geopolitical ambitions. Thus, Turkiye's policy in the Maghreb, which includes the countries of Algeria, Tunisia, Morocco and Libya, is part of its broader 'opening up to Africa' initiative, involving economic, energy and military motives. Turkiye is gradually developing its relations with Algeria, despite several differences, while building stronger ties with Libya, where it is involved both politically and militarily. Ankara also continues to foster economic and security relations with Tunisia and Morocco. However, Turkiye's engagement with these countries varies based on both sides' specific interests and the nature of their bilateral relations. Some of these states view Turkiye's growing engagement in their region as an opportunity, while some approach it with caution. If we were to categorize Turkiye's relations, we could argue that it enjoys strong ties with Tunisia and Libya, while its relations with Algeria and Morocco are still developing. Yet, Morocco is a step further forward than Algeria as it seeks to strengthen its defense ties with Turkiye. However, this motive could potentially cause concern in Algeria, as the two Maghreb states remain at odds, particularly over the Western Sahara issue. Morocco has recently emerged as one of the leading customers of Turkiye's defense industry and defense cooperation has become the main point of the two countries' developing relations. Morocco's military has integrated a fleet of 19 Bayraktar TB2 drones, which it acquired from Turkish defense company Baykar in September 2021. These drones have proven their operational effectiveness. Some of these states view Turkiye's growing engagement as an opportunity, while some approach it with caution Dr. Sinem Cengiz In November last year, Morocco confirmed its plan to acquire the Akinci model — a high-altitude, long-range drone also produced by Baykar — with the first deliveries expected soon. Rabat has also submitted a request to purchase 200 Turkish Cobra II armored vehicles, valued at about $136 million. For Morocco, strengthening its defense capabilities is part of a broader strategy to modernize its military infrastructure and enhance its security. For Turkiye, gaining Morocco as a new customer bolsters its footprint in the Maghreb's defense sector. The strong indications of growing defense collaboration were clear after a recent visit to Morocco by a delegation from Aselsan, Turkiye's leading defense company. The discussions with Aselsan were centered on the potential acquisition of a next-generation combat management system, which is expected to significantly enhance Morocco's naval defense capabilities. Aselsan this week secured a $50.7 million contract to supply Morocco with the Koral electronic warfare system. The strengthening of defense relations with Turkiye is not just about acquiring advanced weaponry — it also reflects Morocco's ambitions for a stronger position in the Maghreb. Signaling its commitment to this issue, Morocco also recently appointed a military attache to its embassy in Ankara. While strengthening its ties with Morocco, Turkiye should carefully balance its relations with Algeria, which is neither distant nor an ally for Ankara but plays a crucial role as a strategic gate to Turkiye's Maghreb policy, in which it has economic, energy and military objectives. Algeria shares a border with Libya, where Turkiye is trying to consolidate its political and military presence. Within this context, ignoring Algeria would not be a rational policy, but developing closer ties with it is equally complex. While Turkiye's relationship with Algeria presents opportunities, it also has challenges — particularly concerning defense ties with Morocco, Iran's influence in Algeria and Turkiye's growing presence in the Maghreb. Despite its more distant relations with Algeria, Turkiye places importance on the energy dimension of their ties. Last November, the liquefied natural gas supply deal between Turkish energy company Botas and Algeria's state-owned Sonatrach was extended for an additional three years, until 2027. In fact, there have been talks about increasing defense cooperation between Turkiye and Algeria in the past few years, though relations in this sector remain somewhat cautious. Despite its more distant relations with Algeria, Turkiye places importance on the energy dimension of their ties Dr. Sinem Cengiz Libya occupies a central role not only in Turkiye's Maghreb policy but also in its Mediterranean strategy, serving as a gateway for projecting Turkish influence. In 2020, Turkiye signed a military cooperation agreement with Libya, which allows Turkiye to deploy troops and provide military training, as well as to establish military bases in the North African country. Turkish military contractors have been involved in training and equipping Libyan forces and Turkiye has used its advanced Bayraktar TB2 drones. Turkish firms are pursuing major construction projects. Moreover, a recent energy agreement aims to tap into Libya's substantial oil reserves, estimated at 48 billion barrels. But in a significant shift from its traditional oil-based economy, Libya is also launching an ambitious renewable energy initiative with Turkish technology and expertise at its core. In addition to Libya, Tunisia is often considered one of Turkiye's closest allies in the Maghreb, marked by their cooperation in both the defense and economic sectors. Turkish construction company Biltek was last year awarded a contract to establish a regional maritime center of excellence in Bizerte, Tunisia. This contract reflects the growing defense ties between Turkiye and Tunisia, as well as the latter's openness to collaborating with Turkiye on strategic projects. The fragmented regional order and ongoing Ukraine crisis have made it increasingly difficult for European states to address the needs of the Maghreb countries. This situation has pushed these states closer to Turkiye, which is actively seeking new partners in Africa to fill the vacuum left by the declining Western involvement. In doing so, Ankara has compartmentalized its relations with each state to maintain a balanced approach across the region. • Dr. Sinem Cengiz is a Turkish political analyst who specializes in Turkiye's relations with the Middle East. X: @SinemCngz
