Latest news with #Steinhoff
IOL News
a day ago
- Business
- IOL News
Smoke, mirrors, and a dead CEO: Who's hiding what in the Markus Jooste death mystery?
Former Steinhoff chief executive Markus Jooste. Steinhoff's Asian business has secured new funding and rebranded under the name Greenlit. Photo: Armand Hough/African News Agency (ANA) The Silence of Authorities: Investigating the Death of former Steinhof CEO Markus Jooste Image: Aemand Hough It has been over a year since the mysterious death of former Steinhoff CEO Markus Jooste. Yet, questions surrounding the circumstances of his demise remain unanswered, sparking concerns about the authorities' lack of transparency. The South African Police Service (SAPS) has maintained silence on the investigation, offering no updates or explanations about the case. Officially, Jooste was said to have died by suicide last year, but details remain scarce. Reports indicate that Jooste succumbed to a gunshot wound at his Cape Town residence in Hermanus, but crucial questions linger: Were witnesses present? Was a proper investigation conducted? And what do the post-mortem reports reveal? A day before his death, Jooste was under intense scrutiny from the Financial Sector Conduct Authority (FSCA), which had imposed a R475 million administrative fine on him for accounting irregularities linked to his former company, Steinhoff. The fallout from the scandal had already shaken South Africa's financial sector, with allegations that Jooste's actions had jeopardised billions of rand in public funds. The Progressive Civics Congress (PCC), a social justice organization, has expressed frustration over the lack of progress. Deputy Secretary Sipho Shange expressed concern over 'the unresolved questions surrounding Jooste's death' and the broader implications for public accountability. Video Player is loading. Play Video Play Unmute Current Time 0:00 / Duration -:- Loaded : 0% Stream Type LIVE Seek to live, currently behind live LIVE Remaining Time - 0:00 This is a modal window. Beginning of dialog window. Escape will cancel and close the window. 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Text Color White Black Red Green Blue Yellow Magenta Cyan Transparency Opaque Semi-Transparent Background Color Black White Red Green Blue Yellow Magenta Cyan Transparency Opaque Semi-Transparent Transparent Window Color Black White Red Green Blue Yellow Magenta Cyan Transparency Transparent Semi-Transparent Opaque Font Size 50% 75% 100% 125% 150% 175% 200% 300% 400% Text Edge Style None Raised Depressed Uniform Dropshadow Font Family Proportional Sans-Serif Monospace Sans-Serif Proportional Serif Monospace Serif Casual Script Small Caps Reset restore all settings to the default values Done Close Modal Dialog End of dialog window. Next Stay Close ✕ 'Jooste was involved in compromising the Public Investment Corporation (PIC) funds, amounting to R200 billion belonging to the Government Employees Pension Fund (GEPF),' Shange stated. 'The Steinhoff scandal was a national issue, yet we have no answers about what happened to those pension funds. 'The public deserves transparency and accountability—and the silence from authorities raises suspicion.' Shange further criticized the silence of labor unions, which traditionally advocate for workers' rights and oversight in such matters. He argued that their inaction may have contributed to the ongoing economic crisis, asserting that the loss of investment confidence and subsequent budget deficits have directly impacted ordinary citizens. Adding to the concerns, Mary de Haas, a renowned crime expert and violence monitor, pointed out the broader issues of accountability and the integrity of investigations. She said provincial police commissioners have the authority to expedite inquiries but have seemingly done little to resolve the case or uncover the truth. 'Questions about whether Jooste truly died by suicide or was murdered remain unanswered,' de Haas said. 'The only way to find out is through the post-mortem report, but access to such crucial documents is often denied or delayed. Without it, we are left to speculate.' De Haas also highlighted the broader pattern of disappearances and unexplained deaths linked to political and financial scandals in South Africa, raising fears that some cases might be deliberately obscured to protect powerful interests. As of the last official update to IOL early this year, Western Cape then acting police spokesperson Colonel Andre Traut confirmed that the case remains under investigation, with no new developments reported. 'The docket concerning Markus Jooste's death is still open, and we are awaiting further findings,' Traut stated. Once a prominent business mogul, Jooste's career was marred by scandal, culminating in the exposure of fraudulent activities that cost the South African economy nearly R200 billion. His death has left many questions about the stewardship of public funds and the accountability of those entrusted with South Africa's economic stability. As the 13-month mark passes, the public, civil society, and victims of financial misconduct continue to demand answers. However, the silence from authorities only deepens suspicion, highlighting the urgent need for transparency in uncovering the truth behind Markus Jooste's death and safeguarding public trust. National police spokesperson Athlenda Mathe and the Western Cape police spokesperson Brigadier Novelwa Potane did not respond to IOL. IOL Politics
Hamilton Spectator
06-05-2025
- Climate
- Hamilton Spectator
P.E.I. watershed groups hope to reverse declining tree swallow populations
TROUT RIVER, P.E.I. – Some local birds are getting a helping hand and a place to stay thanks to some P.E.I. watershed groups. Trout River Environmental Committee and several other watershed groups are building nesting sites to help tree swallows as the birds' population declines. In an interview with The Guardian on April 17, Trout River Environmental Committee director Shayla Steinhoff explained tree swallows face a number of challenges. Tree swallows are aerial insectivores, eating approximately 2,000 insects per day. The number of insects that the tree swallows can eat is declining due to the use of pesticides for various purposes, Steinhoff said. 'They're eating insects already impacted by pesticides, so they can be affected by this. But then they also have a decline in the insect population, so they have a decline in their food source,' Steinhoff said. As a potential result, tree swallows are declining in population. 'They decline by about 0.7 per cent a year right now,' Steinhoff said. Several local P.E.I. watershed groups are building nesting sites to track their population in the aftermath of post-tropical storm Fiona to prevent the birds from becoming endangered. 'The cross-watershed tree swallow box program started with Kensington North Watershed Association, and then we expanded the program to include five different watershed groups,' Steinhoff said. This year, the program has eight groups monitoring 90-plus nesting boxes. South Shore's local watershed group is also part of the tree swallow program. In a phone interview with The Guardian on April 22, South Shore Watershed Association manager Matt Meenik says the swallow species needs all the help it can get. 'I know the bank swallow is a threatened species, and barn swallows are pretty rare, too. But, we hope to keep the tree swallow away from those titles,' he said. Tree swallows are pretty, Meenik added. 'They're insect eaters, so they're really agile, flying around, chasing bugs everywhere,' he said. Last year, nearly 200 tree swallows were banded across P.E.I. 'From the 60-plus nesting boxes that we monitored, 42 of these boxes had active nests, and 36 were successful, meaning eggs were laid and fledged as well,' Steinhoff said. Fledgling is the term for recently born birds that have left their nest but still depend on their parents for food and protection. 'And we counted 238 eggs last year, with 83 per cent of these fledging,' Steinhoff said. Again, tree swallows are a declining species, and Steinhoff said it's a good idea to prevent them from getting to a worse stage than they are right now. 'I think we should be doing a lot more preventative work rather than stepping in after the fact,' she said. As the Trout River watershed group is reaching its second year in tracking these tree swallows, this year, they'll scout and see if any of them made their way back to what they call home – Prince Edward Island. The tracked tree swallows all have an identification number on the band, Steinhoff said. 'What we would do is we would write down this ID number, say this bird returned to the same location or maybe a different location, and then we upload all this data to Birds Canada — helping track the overall populations of tree swallows across the country,' she said. It's important to carefully not disturb the nests and the eggs for the banding process, Steinhoff said. 'There's kind of a perfect stage after the chicks have hatched that they're old enough that their legs aren't chubby for the bands,' she said. For adult birds, it's a different process as they'll usually band them after laying their eggs, Steinhoff added. 'This is when they're kind of sitting on their nests, and they just kind of stay there so we can reach in and carefully grab them using what's called a bander's hold. And then professionals will band them,' she said. Local P.E.I. residents can find out about joining the initiative by contacting the watershed groups that are involved in the program, Steinhoff said. 'Most of our nesting boxes are on private land, so we have what we call nesting box hosts,' she said. The watershed groups also have an online booklet available for residents to build their own birdhouses for the tree swallows. 'It's called the Cross-Watershed Tree Swallow Box Program booklet – so if they did not want to be involved in the program and they just wanted to put up their own nesting box, they can use that booklet as a guide as well,' Steinhoff said. Yutaro Sasaki is a Local Journalism Initiative reporter, a position funded by the federal government. He can be reached at ysasaki@ and followed on X @PEyutarosasaki .
Qatar Tribune
06-05-2025
- Health
- Qatar Tribune
HMC showcases world-class dermatology services in ‘Your Health, Our Priority' drive
Hanane Djoua Doha As part of its ongoing Your Health, Our Priority campaign, Hamad Medical Corporation (HMC) has spotlighted its Dermatology and Venereology Department — a regional hub of excellence in skin health that continues to gain global recognition for innovation, research, and specialised care. HMC's Dermatology Department delivers high-quality, personalised treatment for patients of all ages and conditions — ranging from eczema, psoriasis, vitiligo, and alopecia to skin cancer, rare genetic disorders, and complex autoimmune diseases. The department also stands at the forefront of technological advancement and multidisciplinary research in dermatology. 'Our dermatology services reflect HMC's broader commitment to delivering specialised, world-class healthcare to the community of Qatar,' said Prof Martin Steinhoff, chairman of HMC's Dermatology and Venereology Department. Ranked among the top two percent of researchers worldwide by Stanford University, Prof Steinhoff emphasised the department's capacity to address both common and rare skin disorders with the most updated and tailored therapies. In an interview with Qatar Tribune, Prof Steinhoff said, 'Our department is the largest of its kind in Qatar and among the most advanced in the region. With over 14 sub-specialty clinics, we see more than 300 patients a day and cover the full spectrum of dermatologic services — from medical and surgical dermatology to advanced therapies for genetic and autoimmune skin diseases.' Among the key services offered are: • Biologic and immunomodulatory therapies for inflammatory skin diseases; • Advanced laser treatments for pigmentation, scarring, and rosacea; • Dermato-surgery for skin biopsies and cancer excisions; • Hair and scalp clinics for alopecia and related disorders; • Light-based therapies for conditions such as cutaneous T-cell lymphoma; • Paediatric and geriatric dermatology clinics — the latter being one of the first worldwide; • Genetic dermatology for rare genodermatoses and haemangiomas; • Sclerotherapy and foam sclerotherapy for varicose and spider veins. 'The integration of real-time skin imaging, dermoscopy, and ultrasound in our diagnostics enables earlier, more precise detection of life-threatening conditions like melanoma and scleroderma,' Dr Steinhoff noted, adding that emergency care for severe skin conditions such as Stevens-Johnson Syndrome, drug allergies, and erythroderma is also part of their specialty. Commenting on the department's international vision, he shared, 'We are now developing aesthetic dermatology as a future service and are consistently adopting the latest minimally invasive treatments and biologic medications. Our mission is to bring the same level of care that patients would receive in leading centres like New York or Berlin — right here in Qatar.' Prof Steinhoff also revealed that the Dermatology Department offers an American-accredited residency program, ensuring that Qatari-trained dermatologists receive an education aligned with international standards. 'From day one, our residents follow a rigorous curriculum equivalent to what they would experience in the US or Germany. We host educational workshops, collaborate with global experts, and constantly bring international knowledge into Qatar,' he said. Dr Ayda Al Hammadi, senior consultant at the department, echoed this vision, saying, 'Our goal is not only to treat but to set new global standards in dermatological care.' Dr Sara Al Khawaga, specialist in dermatology, emphasised the blend of compassionate care and scientific progress, noting, 'We ensure every patient receives the most effective, evidence-based treatment.' Dr Aysha Al Malki, director of the Dermatology Residency Programme, said: 'Our strength lies in combining research, education, and clinical excellence. Through this, we continue to build a future-ready, world-class dermatology service in Qatar.'
Daily Maverick
02-05-2025
- Business
- Daily Maverick
Analysis — has the South African Reserve Bank gone rogue?
A form of 'Trump derangement' seems to have infected the South African Reserve Bank – at least when it comes to dealing with Steinhoff. An extraordinary multibillion-rand battle is raging between the South African Reserve Bank (SARB) and the surviving rump of the Steinhoff group, now named Ibex. Despite being fought out under the watchful eye of the Pretoria High Court, this bitter 'lawfare' is largely hidden and unreported. This is mainly because of the extraordinary breadth and complexity of the litigation – and because of the SARB's insistence that much of its evidence must be redacted for public consumption, despite the fact it is being accused of using its draconian public powers in a destructive and arbitrary way. It is the SARB's resort, so far unexplained, to what seems like a crude power play to prevent Steinhoff/Ibex from repaying its foreign debts, that smacks of Trumpism. Our courts, however, have pushed back, with Judge Sulet Potterill delivering a swinging rebuke of the bank this past week in Steinhoff's so-called '0433 case', to which we'll return. Yet, as the judge noted, the SARB's attitude was on full display in a remark from the bank's counsel in open court that if the bank's case was dismissed on a lack of facts – which is what happened – they will just come back to court and try again. Consequences If it persists, the SARB's approach will have far-reaching consequences. It will likely make it far more difficult for South African companies to borrow from foreign lenders, who may fear that the SARB will intervene similarly to how they have with Steinhoff: by simply blocking cash from leaving the country and then attempting the forfeiture of multibillion-rand chunks. Of course, the SARB issue with Steinhoff is intimately bound up with the massive fraud that was perpetrated on investors, shareholders, lenders – and the SARB itself – by the previous management under the late Markus Jooste. An important aspect of that fraud were various misrepresentations that the then controllers of Steinhoff made to the SARB, especially around the offshore listing of the Steinhoff Group on the Frankfurt stock exchange in December 2016. Nevertheless, as we'll try to explain, the new management – as far as we can establish from the court records – has been diligent about consulting with the SARB and seeking its approval for a multifaceted restructuring and settlement process. After Jooste resigned and the Steinhoff share price tanked, the new management under chief executive Louis du Preez set about trying to stabilise the cross-border octopus that Steinhoff had become, which included having to unravel the massive fraud and flow-of-funds, hold creditors at bay and keep the business running. The company faced a barrage of litigation from enraged shareholders and regulators. It needed time and access to assets to negotiate a so-called 'global settlement', which eventually included partial compensation for various classes of shareholders and a rescheduling of the foreign debt. These arrangements with claimants and creditors sought, on the face of it, to prevent the liquidation and collapse of the group, which would likely have had severe consequences, including for local banks as well as Steinhoff businesses and their employees. The SARB seemingly went along, approving and authorising the necessary company restructuring, debt rescheduling and associated foreign exchange liabilities this entailed. Then, in 2023, something changed. Before we get there, however, let's take a detour through some of the other fundamental issues this matter raises. Secrecy on steroids This article is styled as an analysis and contains no comment from either Steinhoff or the SARB. That is unusual for amaBhungane because we generally seek a detailed explanation from the subjects of critical reportage. In this case, however, the SARB has taken a hostile attitude to public accountability around the far-reaching powers it wields and has used the apartheid-era secrecy provisions of the 1989 SARB Act to back up its stance. That legislation, in section 33, criminalises unauthorised disclosure of so-called 'confidential information', even by third parties like journalists. It provides for a fine, up to a year's imprisonment or both. In its legal disputes with Steinhoff, the SARB has placed its own purported interest in secrecy above the principle of open justice, insisting on a 'confidentiality' regime in which the public versions of the court papers are filled with redactions at the insistence of the bank. Steinhoff went to court in December 2023 to review the SARB's decision to impose what Steinhoff calls a 'blanket transfer ban', imposed by the bank on Steinhoff's cross-border transactions. We will get back to this crucial development. As is standard in such reviews, Steinhoff then requested the 'record of decision' – in other words, all the documents and communications the SARB relied on when deciding to issue the 'blanket transfer ban', which Steinhoff argues impermissibly revoked previous foreign exchange permissions granted in pursuit of the global settlement and restructuring. Since the 2015 Sanral judgment at the Supreme Court of Appeal (SCA), in which amaBhungane was one of the joint amici (friends of the court), the default position has been that 'all court records are… public documents that are open to public scrutiny at all times. … [A]ny departure is an exception and must be justified'. 'Secrecy,' the SCA held, 'is the very antithesis of accountability. It prevents the public from knowing what decision was made, why it was made, and whether it was justifiable.' However, without seeking a court order the SARB asserted confidentiality over the entire record of its decision and blocked access until Steinhoff agreed to treat it as confidential. The SARB has persisted with this approach in the face of a subsequent application by Steinhoff to the court, within the broader context of the review, to set aside the confidentiality regime. In an affidavit opposing the lifting of secrecy, SARB acting head of Financial Surveillance (FinSurv) Tsumbedzo Nevhutanda argues that 'Steinhoff may not disclose the SARB's written communication marked as confidential: Steinhoff's representatives who may in any way have come into possession of such document, are forbidden… from disclosing any communication the SARB has marked as confidential or secret'. 'At the outset of the matter, the SARB was faced with competing imperatives: the need to preserve the inherent confidentiality of the SARB record – in circumstances where an outright denial of access would not have been a sustainable position in the review litigation.' The SARB therefore decided (unilaterally) that a 'confidentiality regime' would be appropriate. The court has yet to rule on this but given the SARB's aggressive tactics in litigation with Steinhoff, amaBhungane has opted not to forewarn the bank of our reporting. We have also, for the same reasons, restricted ourselves to what is on the 'public' (redacted) court record, selected parts of which we also publish today in the interests of promoting a proper public assessment of the bank's conduct. It remains to be seen whether the SARB's secretiveness is the result of bona fide public policy reasons, as it claims, or is instead a bid to hide its missteps and abuses, as Steinhoff claims. To understand that debate and the extraordinary saga it foregrounds, we need to go back to 2023 and the run-up to the 'blanket transfer ban'. When something changed Du Preez, the current Ibex/Steinhoff CEO, has set out his version of the historical narrative in what is the latest of four broad swathes of litigation between the company and the SARB, each of which include various legal subplots. This latest case is an urgent application launched in February this year and its tone conveys the remarkable breakdown in trust between Ibex and the SARB that has taken place over the past three years. Du Preez states under oath that 'this is an urgent application to review and set aside male fide administrative action taken by the Reserve Bank on Monday 10 February… in cynical disregard and contempt of the relief that Ibex sought in related pending proceedings, which were to be argued in this court just two days later on Wednesday 12 February 2025.' Du Preez was vehemently objecting to the SARB's order, issued on that Monday, freezing about R14-billion (yes, R14-billion) worth of Pepkor shares owned by Ibex through a subsidiary named Ainsley. The beleaguered company needs to sell down these shares in order to repay its remaining foreign creditors. In his affidavit in what we'll call 'the Ainsley case', Du Preez sets out how Steinhoff arrived at this point. Peering through the redactions, what we will also try to understand in this piece is how the bank got to where it is now. Du Preez states that 'since early 2018, Ibex has been engaged in a restructuring and settlement process in terms of which Ibex has sought to minimise the harm sustained by Ibex stakeholders on account of the accounting irregularities committed by the former Steinhoff management pre-December 2017… 'This process has had to be done in a number of stages, and at each stage (a) the Reserve Bank has granted various approvals, and (b) Ibex's international financial creditors, who became entitled to full repayment of the debt owed to them after the accounting irregularities were uncovered, have relied on the Reserve Bank's involvement and approvals, and on that basis agreed to defer the maturity date of their debt, allowing other stakeholders to be settled first.' Let's pause here. The resignation of Jooste, the revelation of his frauds and the crash in the share price led to the Steinhoff Group's external debt becoming due – a default in excess of €10-billion (more than R150-billion at the time). As Du Preez notes, 'these circumstances significantly threatened the Group's resources and continued existence. Catastrophic consequences would have followed for the Group and its stakeholders if an uncontrolled liquidation had taken place, including a forced sale and significant loss of value of the Group's assets, a loss to financial institutions including South African banks which were owed significant debt, and extensive job losses in South Africa and abroad.' Elsewhere Du Preez puts the exposure of South African lenders at the time at about R28.8-billion. It seems the Reserve Bank was alive to the systemic risks and supported efforts to save the company. Du Preez notes that 'before January 2023, Ibex had productive engagements with the Reserve Bank in the process of designing, getting approvals for, and implementing a variety of transactions aimed at assuaging the catastrophic consequences of the near collapse of the Steinhoff Group following December 2017'. This included repaying the full R28.8-billion owed to South African lenders. Moving target But the goalposts shifted on both sides. Du Preez says Ibex's efforts to reduce its foreign debt burden were stymied by various macroeconomic factors, including Covid, the war in Ukraine, escalating inflation and rising interest rates. The global settlement had given the group a fighting chance, but by 2022 it was clear it would not be able to repay or refinance the offshore debt due in June 2023. In December 2022, the financial creditors agreed to further extend the maturity date for the debt to June 2026, but only on condition that the group undergo an equity reorganisation that would give them the ultimate economic interest in the group's assets. Essentially this was to be a managed winding-up, implemented through a court-approved process in the Netherlands called a WHOA restructuring. In his affidavit, Du Preez asserts that 'this equity reorganisation was necessary in order to allow the debt owed to the financial creditors to be discharged to the greatest extent possible (which would be far less than the face value of the debt in December 2017)'. According to Du Preez, Ibex (Steinhoff) had already obtained SARB approval in October 2020 and November 2021 to make the payments due to the financial creditors as part of the global settlement and this was confirmed again in November 2022. However, pending the WHOA restructuring it seems that it dawned on the SARB that there would be nothing left in the kitty: Ibex planned to monetise all its international and South African assets for the repayment of the group's external debt before 30 June 2026. This included the Pepkor shares held by Ainsley, which was the group's largest asset in South Africa. This should not have been an enormous surprise to the SARB given that, as Du Preez asserts elsewhere, the bank 'was aware… since early 2018' that Steinhoff's obligations to its financial creditors exceeded its assets. Nevertheless, in other litigation the bank claims that 'the requests by the Steinhoff Group to restructure its debt and delist from the JSE were not previously proposed by Steinhoff or expected by FinSurv.' Du Preez sets out in detail the briefings given to the SARB between January and March 2023 about what the final debt restructuring would entail, which Ibex/Steinhoff argued was not materially different to what the FinSurv department had already approved. He states that 'on 6 March 2023… Ibex set out the cross-border cash flows that had already been paid, and cash flows that still needed to occur, pursuant to the Global Settlement.' The presentation to the SARB noted that given that three payments under the Global Settlement (EUR 212.5-million, EUR 164-million and EUR-1.581 billion) had already been specifically approved, 'we assume that we may continue with repayments without requiring further FinSurv approval'. But the bank baulked. As Du Preez puts it, 'just a few days later… no doubt prompted by this letter reminding the Reserve Bank of its prior approvals, the Reserve Bank issued the blanket transfer ban on 9 March 2023 as an unlawful method of frustrating the implementation of its prior approvals.' That set off the extraordinary chain of litigation by Steinhoff and rearguard action by the bank, which we'll get to. There was, however, another development that shifted the goalposts from the SARB side: their investigation of the violations committed by Steinhoff's previous management. While Ibex had been undergoing the restructuring and settlement process, the Reserve Bank, through their lawyers at Bowmans, had been conducting a probe into alleged exchange control contraventions during the Jooste era. Mistrust It was the Bowmans inquiry that seems to have undermined trust between the Bank and the new management at Steinhoff/Ibex and Bowmans' findings form the bedrock of the SARB's attempts since 2023 to penalise Steinhoff for its past sins. Du Preez explains that he was formally told of the bank's investigation in a SARB letter on 5 December 2018: 'over the next few years Ibex responded to some 23 request for information in terms of Regulation 19 of the exchange control regulations, providing extensive information to the Reserve Bank for the purposes of its investigation.' These requests, which were bolstered by the threat of criminal sanction, were quite invasive and included requests for access to all emails and records, stored on any Steinhoff server, pertaining to a specific list of individuals. This of course included Jooste, but also Du Preez himself, who had joined Steinhoff in mid-2017 – about six months before the crash – as general counsel. On 29 December 2020 the SARB also asked du Preez for a list of 'all bank account(s) registered in your name, on your behalf by another person or entity and/or any entity or trust directly or indirectly linked to you from 2009-01-01 to date,' as well as details of all his cross-border travel from the beginning of 2008 to the end of 2017. Despite this, the new Ibex/Steinhoff management is not, as far as we could establish, accused anywhere in court papers of not cooperating with, or being obstructive to, the bank's investigation. Ibex also provided the SARB with access to the report and working papers of its internally commissioned investigation, led by PwC, from as early as June 2019, although this was shared under a confidentiality regime. On the SARB's own version, by around March or April 2023 their own Bowmans-led investigation was substantially complete and appears, in a so far unexplained fashion, to have flipped a switch at the SARB, turning the bank from being careful but supportive to hostile and intemperate. We say unexplained for several reasons. Firstly, there are indications in the court papers that Bowmans had kept their clients at the bank in the loop throughout the process, so the outlines of what had taken place at Steinhoff under Jooste could not have come as a complete surprise to the finance technicians at the SARB. If Bowmans had uncovered some shocking new revelation implicating the new management and evidencing some kind of double dealing since Du Preez took over as CEO, then one might understand the dramatic shift. Yet as we'll see, from what can be gleaned from the redacted papers Bowmans' probe delivered nothing like this. The bank's analysis of the exchange control violations it now wants to lay at Steinhoff's door is thus in some respects quite crude, as Ibex repeatedly argues in its defence. Secondly, the SARB adopts an inexplicably heavy-handed procedural response, which has seen it conceding and flipflopping during the extraordinary series of blunt administrative manoeuvres and sharp legal skirmishes the Bowmans report unleashed. A series of unfortunate events Du Preez takes up the narrative, stating that 'as a result of the outcome of the investigation, and based on the alleged historic contraventions, the Reserve Bank issued two blocking orders in May 2023 over funds held in Ibex bank accounts, in the amount of approximately ZAR 5.7 billion.' The Reserve Bank provided reasons for the blocking orders in a letter on 15 June 2023, stating that the funds were blocked on account of the investigation findings and the reasonable suspicion that Ibex entities had engaged in various exchange control contraventions that took place before December 2017. We will return to these conclusions and Ibex's response. Du Preez's affidavit continues: 'the combination of the blanket transfer ban and the blocking of the vast majority of Ibex's available cash had the effect of undermining and revoking the prior approvals granted by the Reserve Bank with the result that Ibex could no longer rely on the approvals granted under the Global Settlement to make payments to the financial creditors as it was supposed to.' After a series of engagements with the bank, Ibex challenged the transfer ban and the blocking orders by launching review proceedings in the Pretoria high court on 1 December 2023 – the first of the four major pieces of litigation against the SARB. In what Ibex characterises as a reaction to this initial review, the bank wrote to Ibex on 13 December 2023 indicating its intention to order the forfeit of the blocked funds, along with some additional amounts termed 'the trapped funds' that were also being contested in the review. Ibex made detailed submissions on the proposed forfeiture and raised various requests for clarification. The SARB never responded. The company's lawyers also wrote to the bank requesting an undertaking not to issue a forfeiture order while the whole basis of the blocking orders on the same funds was under legal review. This undertaking would avoid Ibex having to go to court for an urgent order interdicting the forfeiture. Bowmans, on behalf of the bank, gave an undertaking that the SARB would provide 'reasonable prior notice' before it acted. Du Preez explains what happened: 'some 5 months later, at approximately 15h30 on 18 July 2024, Bowmans wrote to Webber Wentzel [Ibex's lawyers] stating that the Reserve bank intended to take a decision to forfeit the blocked funds, which decision would be communicated 'in due course'… The very next morning, after this terse and opaque letter, forfeiture orders were published in the Government Gazette, with Ibex being given no realistic opportunity whatsoever, much less 'reasonable notice', to protect its rights.' As we'll see, this cavalier action appears to have come back to bite the bank. Meanwhile, Ibex was also wrangling with the SARB within the review in order to get the bank to disclose a full record of what informed its blocking decisions, eventually being forced to accept the SARB's confidentiality regime. Nevertheless, Ibex decided it could not wait for the outcome of the review to pursue the debt restructuring. So, despite the fraught legal exchanges with the bank, in February 2024 Ibex essentially reapplied to the SARB for new permission to make the foreign payments it needed to in terms of the Dutch WHOA winding up process. For this purpose, it set to one side the company's legal stance that these payments had previously been approved. This was application 0433, which sought to establish with certainty that if Ibex sold off its South African assets in an orderly fashion (predominantly the Pepkor shares held by subsidiary Ainsley) then it would be allowed by the SARB to export the proceeds to settle its foreign debt by the new deadline of June 2026. What happened with application 0433 was simply bizarre. Du Preez states that 'on 11 April 2024, having first sought and considered further detailed information regarding the implementation of the WHOA plan from Ibex in March 2024, the Reserve Bank approved Application 0433 and granted permission for Ibex to expatriate funds received by the Ibex Group in the future in respect of South African assets, to settle its foreign commitments by approving 5 categories of payments for which Ibex had sought permission'. Ibex relied on the approvals granted by the SARB and sold 500 million of its Pepkor shares, realising more than R9-billion on 24 June. However, before Ibex could begin making payments to foreign creditors the bank stepped in to prevent this, despite the 0433 approvals. On 26 June, Ibex heard from FirstRand, its forex dealer, that they had received an urgent request to refer any intended payment to the SARB first. On 2 July 2024, FirstRand reported to Ibex that the Reserve Bank claimed it was not aware that assets were to be sold and proceeds exported. FirstRand further conveyed that the deputy governor had stated that under no circumstances would money leave the country without her consent. This was a shock, since that was precisely what the 0433 application approved by the SARB had set out. The SARB then raised a series of spurious objections (they were never raised again in the subsequent 0433 court case), to which Ibex gave responses. When Ibex gave notice that it would approach a court for urgent relief, the bank responded on 25 July 2024 by issuing new blocking orders over the R9-billion Ibex had raised. The 0433 blocking orders triggered an urgent application by Ibex for the Reserve Bank to uplift the blocking orders and be prevented from taking further steps to frustrate the debt repayment plan, including the issuance of any further blocking or attachment orders. These are the '0433 proceedings' on which Judge Potterill has just pronounced and which we'll examine in more detail. Ibex also instated proceedings to set aside and review the roughly R6-billion forfeiture decisions communicated on 19 July 2024. The weakness of the SARB's 0433 case was suggested by the fact that on 19 September it reached a settlement agreement allowing the export of the R9-billion in accordance with the terms of the 0433 approval. As Du Preez explains in his affidavit, certain disputes in the 0433 case remained, including Ibex's right to sell and expatriate proceeds of the remaining Pepkor shares still held by Ainsley under the approvals granted in application 0433. The Reserve Bank, by way of a counterapplication, sought to review and set aside its own 0433 approvals on the basis that they were granted by a SARB official without the required authority. Which takes us back to the latest round of litigation, the Ainsley case. Du Preez explains that it was agreed that the 0433 proceedings and the Reserve Bank's self-review would be argued on 12 and 13 February 2025: 'it was just two days before this hearing that the Reserve Bank issued the PPH [Pepkor] prohibition order, which to the extent of R14-billion, anticipates and renders nugatory the relief sought in the 0433 proceedings.' In other words, even before the case was argued the bank sought to insulate itself from an adverse outcome by issuing a new blocking order. Du Preez asserts that 'this conduct… was part of what has emerged to be a pattern of reactive, male fide, and unlawful conduct by the Reserve Bank towards Ibex, in which the Reserve Bank abuses the powers given to it in the Exchange Control Regulations to frustrate not only Ibex acting in accordance with prior Reserve Bank approvals, but also impede court oversight of its actions'. The bank gets a bollocking While it is true that in the Ainsley case we have only heard from Du Preez and Ibex, the application traverses ground where the SARB has already had its say. In this respect the Potterill judgment on the 0433 case should be a wake-up call, given its brutal findings about the SARB's credibility and bona fides. Sadly, the bank may not listen, despite Potterill's best efforts to make it listen. Ibex had asked the court not only to uplift the blocking order but to direct the SARB not to take any steps to prevent Ibex from making further payments on the 0433 approvals, including barring the bank from issuing new attachment orders on the same assets. The SARB argued that this would be going too far. Potterill countered: 'it was made clear by counsel for the SARB that the SARB could render an order for payment of the 0443 by this Court worthless by issuing a blocking order the day after this Court issued its order. In terms of the SARB's functions and powers this is true, but a Court has to ensure that its own order is obeyed, and if it is not going to be obeyed, that there is means to ensure compliance. This is especially so where this Court has found that the SARB has not been candid in these applications and the blocking order issued was unlawful. A blocking order's purpose is not to prevent payments that the SARB had approved. If a further blocking is issued as a means to prevent the payment that the SARB had approved it is not the Court usurping the powers of the SARB, but the SARB abusing its powers.' This is presumably why, even prior to the matter being argued, the bank did exactly that: it pre-empted Potterill's decision by freezing the remaining Pepkor shares. The bank is now de facto in contempt of Potterill's order. Will it recognise this and lift the freezing order, or will it instead dig in and lodge an appeal, relying on the fact that the Ainsley case is at an early stage and is to be heard by a different judge? The signs are not hopeful. Put another way, Potterill's adverse inferences are not drawn from thin air but from a pattern of behaviour by the bank that the judge found wanting. In seeking to review its own 0433 approvals, the SARB refused to examine the merits of the approvals and chose instead to rely solely on the claim that the decision was taken by one senior official, the luckless Johan Kruger, who lacked the necessary authorisation and who has now, according to the bank, been suspended. This got short shrift from the judge. She noted that 'the full extent of the facts set out by the SARB is that it received 0443 in February 2024 and the approval was granted in April 2024. Not a single fact is set out as to who received or considered it… 'The SARB did not set out the conduct of Kruger to enable a determination of what he did. The averment that Kruger granted the approval is not supported by a single document, least of all by Kruger himself… The deponent to the answering affidavit, Mr Nevhutanda, the acting Head of Department of Finsurv, does not say that he was unaware of 0443. 'There are no affidavits from Kruger, the unidentified Divisional Head and any of the members of the GEC [the SARB Governor's Executive Committee] to confirm that they had no knowledge of 0443. There are no supporting affidavits from the…[other] respondents to support the version of Nevhutanda.' Elsewhere she noted that 'there is not a single document supporting the contention that the approval was granted without authority by Kruger or the DH. There are no internal emails, no minutes of meetings or any document attached that [show] Kruger granted the 0433 and in a rogue manner.' The judge said she understood that in order to achieve some of its objectives and ensure compliance with its purpose, mandate and regulations, the SARB wields draconian powers, and that the Ibex group's actions stood to be scrutinised. 'However, I am mystified that an organ of state, when confronted with reviews… relating to its approvals and blocking order, sets out none of the required facts to enable a Court to decide whether these decisions were lawful, procedurally fair and should not be reviewed and set aside. An organ of state is not above the law and a Court can only decide on what is on the papers before it.' Reading the judgment, one is left with the strong impression that the bank did not present a case because it did not have one and was instead content to resort to an administrative Stalingrad strategy by simply issuing the Ainsley freezing order. Where does this intransigence come from? To answer this, you have to look at what the bank investigated, what it looked for, what it found and what it is perhaps still looking for. The case against Steinhoff, Jooste et al The first thing to note is that despite the opening up of the economy after 1994, the Reserve Bank is still enmeshed in the cross-border economy to a Byzantine extent that outsiders may not be aware of. Potterill's judgment quotes from the landmark South African Reserve Bank case against Mark Shuttleworth, in which the Constitutional Court noted that 'here we are dealing with exchange control legislation. Its avowed purpose was to curb or regulate the export of capital from the country. The very historic origins of the Act, in 1933, were in the midst of the 1929 Great Depression, pointing to a necessity to curb outflows of capital. The Regulations were then passed in the aftermath of the economic crises following the Sharpeville shootings in 1960. The domestic economy had to be shielded from capital flight… The plain dominant purpose of the measure was to regulate and discourage the export of capital and to protect the domestic economy.' Much of that murky architecture is still in place: the bank's edicts are binding, its internal processes are obscure and its reliance on secrecy is sustained, with great tracts of the SARB evidence in the four Steinhoff matters redacted for public consumption. Nevertheless, thanks to the Ibex litigation there are several places where the SARB case against Steinhoff – as well as the outline of its broader investigations – appear unredacted. In particular, there is the SARB's 13 December 2023 communication setting out its reasons that the R6-billion it had frozen should be forfeited. This runs to 40 pages, while Ibex's detailed rebuttal on behalf of Steinhoff (to which it apparently never received a reply) runs to 136. It is beyond our scope to unpick the two versions, but some impressions stand out. If one has regard for the PwC forensics, then Jooste and his tight group of cronies created a highly complex financial hall of mirrors wherein following the money and separating the genuine from the fake was purposefully made difficult. Although this process was often done on the fly between a few selected conspirators, it was also frequently backed up by sophisticated legal and financial expertise and instruments. Ibex itself says in its submissions that 'it has become apparent to Steinhoff that, in the years before December 2017, Mr Jooste caused the Group under his direction to engage in certain fictitious and irregular accounting and transactions that formed part of a scheme of mismanagement, market manipulation, misstatements and misrepresentations which substantially and artificially inflated the Group's profit and asset values'. It is clear that the SARB has struggled to pin down the detail of what exactly this meant for the prospect of isolating exchange control violations, and that it has in some cases resorted to broad brushstrokes that do not seem to have much traction in the face of Ibex's counterarguments. As Ibex notes: 'FinSurv references transaction values that are extremely large, and which bear no relation to amounts that actually left South Africa in each transaction, even if there may have been contraventions of the Regulations in certain respects…' The core problem for the bank, however, is that, quite responsibly, it elected early on to try to help clean up the mess created by Steinhoff rather than pick apart the bones. Nevertheless, the SARB granted approvals necessary for the restructuring and repaying the foreign debt even though it already had access, with the new Steinhoff management's assistance, to the facts that underlie most, if not all, of the alleged transgressions. Ibex argues that 'the Reserve Bank therefore had sufficient information before it, in relation to the alleged past transgressions, to be in a position withhold the approvals if those transgressions in any way impacted those approvals'. Although Ibex concedes that the SARB did reserve its rights along the way, it argues that the bank cannot just rewind history. 'A forfeiture at this stage is a punishment imposed not only on Steinhoff, but also on the financial creditors of whom the Reserve Bank is aware, on account of inter alia the prior approvals and the information provided by Steinhoff to the Reserve Bank in relation to those approvals, and to whom the majority of the funds proposed to be forfeited are due… The massive, proposed forfeiture has to, but does not, take account of these factors and will therefore be disproportionate and unlawful.' Yet in some ways the SARB's frustrations are understandable. Jooste was a conman on an enormous scale who persuaded the SARB – as well as the markets and the Public Investment Corporation – that he was going offshore to create a global African champion when he was really running a very sophisticated Ponzi scheme while lining his pockets and those of his friends. Now he and the money are gone and the SARB finds itself without real recourse. Yet there may be another way. Like most conmen, much of Jooste's play relied on exploiting the greed of his 'marks', pre-eminently the group of super-rich businessmen who invested much of their wealth in Steinhoff shares. Given the circumstances, it is hard not to suspect that Jooste's promise of effectively offshoring their assets via Steinhoff's reverse listing on the Frankfurt stock exchange was not an effective lure. And the man who famously invested more and lost more than anyone else was former Steinhoff chair Christo Wiese. Wiese is still alive and he's still rich. What the Steinhoff documents show us is that he is still being investigated by the SARB.
Yahoo
01-05-2025
- Politics
- Yahoo
Missouri bill allowing homeschoolers to participate in school sports nears passage
The Missouri House chamber during debate on March 12, 2023 (Tim Bommel/Missouri House Communications). A Senate bill allowing homeschooled student participation in public and charter school activities and athletics passed the Missouri House on Wednesday. Sponsored by state Sen. Ben Brown, a Republican from Washington, the bill would prohibit public and charter schools from banning homeschooled or full-time virtual students from taking part in school athletics and activities. A similar bill proposed by Brown in the last session stalled in the House. This year, Brown's bill passed unanimously out of the Senate and passed the House Wednesday on a 91-53 vote. Because the House made minor changes, it will return to the Senate for a final vote. Brown said he anticipates the bill will pass should it be taken up by the full Senate. The legislative session adjourns May 16. State law allows public school districts to ban or restrict the participation of homeschoolers in athletics. The policy of the Missouri State High School Activities Association, which many schools follow, is to allow homeschoolers to participate in sports if they are enrolled in one credit hour of coursework at a public school. State Rep. Ben Baker, a Republican from Neosho, said the bill 'ensures that every child has access to opportunities that add to and foster their academic, social and personal growth.' Baker, whose children have been homeschooled, argued that homeschoolers' parents who pay taxes should be able to send their children to programs in publicly funded schools. State Rep. Kathy Steinhoff, a Democrat from Columbia and former teacher, said she was sympathetic to the bill's intent, but expressed concerns that the passage could lead to an unfunded mandate. State funding for education is partially determined by the level of enrollment in a school. Steinhoff's concern is that potential homeschoolers who take part in public school programs or utilize school resources would not be considered in enrollment counts. '(Schools) will not be getting state money to support these students participating in these activities,' Steinhoff said. Baker said the strain brought by increased participation would likely be minimal, as few homeschoolers would be likely to participate in each school. Several Democrats also expressed concerns that the bill could be unfair to public school students as homeschoolers may not have to meet the same standards as public school students. Steinhoff pointed specifically to grade and attendance requirements for some athletic programs in schools. 'There's also some requirements and conditions in accessing the privileges provided by our schools,' Steinhoff said. 'Often you have to keep your grades up, you have to keep your attendance up, you have to maintain positive relationships with peers and adults.' Rep. Dirk Deaton, a Republican from Noel, spoke to the long history of this legislation, beginning with its first proposal in 2014 by former House Speaker Elijah Haahr. Deaton, along with other legislators, have taken up the bill unsuccessfully since then. Deaton also pointed out a provision of the bill which allows schools to require homeschoolers to attend courses, rehearsals or practices related to their participation in school activities. 'For example, if you're going to be involved in a band, and there's a band class directly related to that, you absolutely should have to play in that band class,' Deaton said. Another concern, voiced by Rep. Michael Burton, a Democrat from Lakeshire, involved vaccine requirements. Missouri public school students are required to have several vaccines to attend school. Burton said he worries that unvaccinated homeschoolers participating in school activities could put public school students at risk. This story originally appeared in the Columbia Missourian. It can be republished in print or online.
