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Miami Herald
4 days ago
- Science
- Miami Herald
New Chinese Military Technology Could Defeat Trump's ‘Golden Dome'
Chinese scientists have developed a new material that could lead to stealthier missiles and combat aircraft. The technology could potentially compromise the effectiveness of U.S. missile defense systems, including President Donald Trump's much-hyped 'Golden Dome.' Newsweek reached out to the Pentagon and the Chinese Foreign Ministry via email for comment. The United States is concerned about the growing intercontinental missile (ICBM) stockpiles of nuclear-armed China and Russia, including faster-than-sound hypersonic missiles. These arsenals are expected to become even more capable in the coming years. Trump has ordered work to begin on the 'Golden Dome,' a satellite-based missile shield. Beijing has said it's 'gravely concerned' about the project, which draws inspiration from the Strategic Defense Initiative, or 'Star Wars,' proposed by former U.S. President Ronald Reagan in the 1980s during the Cold War. Aircraft and missiles emit strong thermal radiation, created by superheated components such as exhaust nozzles, which raises the risk of detection. These temperatures can also degrade and even destroy the structure of standard materials. A Chinese research team led by Professor Li Qiang of Zhejiang University detailed a possible solution to this problem in a study published in March. Their new material is designed to evade both microwave and infrared detection technologies widely used in modern military surveillance, even when exposed to extremely high temperatures, as reported by the South China Morning Post. To test its stealth potential, the team compared the material to a standard blackbody, or a surface that absorbs various types of radiation. Even when heated to 700 degrees Celsius (1,292 degrees Fahrenheit), the material emitted a far lower radiation temperature-422 degrees Celsius-than the blackbody's 690 degrees. The breakthrough lies in the material's layered structure, which includes a specialized 'metasurface'-a precisely engineered layer patterned to control how radar and infrared waves interact with it. The top layer shields against moisture, while the bottom ensures it stays fixed to the surface. Laser etching throughout the structure allows radar signals to pass through without compromising its heat-hiding abilities, according to SCMP. Li Qiang, professor at Zhejiang University's College of Optical Science and Engineering, wrote: 'Our device achieves a maximum operating temperature and heat dissipation capabilities that surpass the current state of the art for simultaneous high-temperature IR and microwave stealth.' Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesperson Mao Ning, at a press conference on May 21: 'The [Golden Dome] project will heighten the risk of turning the space into a war zone and creating a space arms race, and shake the international security and arms control system.' The U.S. Defense Intelligence Agency said in a threat assessment released earlier this month: 'Missile threats to the U.S. homeland will expand in scale and sophistication in the coming decade. 'China and Russia are developing an array of novel delivery systems to exploit gaps in current U.S. ballistic missile defenses, but traditional ballistic missiles-which are guided during powered flight and unguided during free flight-will remain the primary threat to the homeland.' It remains to be seen whether and how soon the new material will be integrated into Chinese weapons platforms. Trump has said the Golden Dome will be 'fully operational' by the end of his second term in 2029. Yet defense analysts have expressed doubts that the system can be completed within that timeline or under its projected $175 billion budget. Related Articles Chinese Aircraft Carrier Challenges US's Pacific War StrategyTrump's Greenland Bid Poses Global Dangers, Says the Woman Facing Him DownChina Responds to Trump Freeze on Student Visa InterviewsChina Reveals Laser Tech to Read Text From a Mile Away 2025 NEWSWEEK DIGITAL LLC.
Newsweek
4 days ago
- Politics
- Newsweek
New Chinese Military Technology Could Defeat Trump's 'Golden Dome'
Based on facts, either observed and verified firsthand by the reporter, or reported and verified from knowledgeable sources. Newsweek AI is in beta. Translations may contain inaccuracies—please refer to the original content. Chinese scientists have developed a new material that could lead to stealthier missiles and combat aircraft. The technology could potentially compromise the effectiveness of U.S. missile defense systems, including President Donald Trump's much-hyped "Golden Dome." Newsweek reached out to the Pentagon and the Chinese Foreign Ministry via email for comment. Why It Matters The United States is concerned about the growing intercontinental missile (ICBM) stockpiles of nuclear-armed China and Russia, including faster-than-sound hypersonic missiles. These arsenals are expected to become even more capable in the coming years. Trump has ordered work to begin on the "Golden Dome," a satellite-based missile shield. Beijing has said it's "gravely concerned" about the project, which draws inspiration from the Strategic Defense Initiative, or "Star Wars," proposed by former U.S. President Ronald Reagan in the 1980s during the Cold War. President Donald Trump speaks about his "Golden Dome" initiative in the Oval Office of the White House on May 20, 2025. President Donald Trump speaks about his "Golden Dome" initiative in the Oval Office of the White House on May 20, 2025. Alex Brandon/Associated Press What To Know Aircraft and missiles emit strong thermal radiation, created by superheated components such as exhaust nozzles, which raises the risk of detection. These temperatures can also degrade and even destroy the structure of standard materials. A Chinese research team led by Professor Li Qiang of Zhejiang University detailed a possible solution to this problem in a study published in March. Their new material is designed to evade both microwave and infrared detection technologies widely used in modern military surveillance, even when exposed to extremely high temperatures, as reported by the South China Morning Post. To test its stealth potential, the team compared the material to a standard blackbody, or a surface that absorbs various types of radiation. Even when heated to 700 degrees Celsius (1,292 degrees Fahrenheit), the material emitted a far lower radiation temperature—422 degrees Celsius—than the blackbody's 690 degrees. The breakthrough lies in the material's layered structure, which includes a specialized "metasurface"—a precisely engineered layer patterned to control how radar and infrared waves interact with it. The top layer shields against moisture, while the bottom ensures it stays fixed to the surface. Laser etching throughout the structure allows radar signals to pass through without compromising its heat-hiding abilities, according to SCMP. What People Are Saying Li Qiang, professor at Zhejiang University's College of Optical Science and Engineering, wrote: "Our device achieves a maximum operating temperature and heat dissipation capabilities that surpass the current state of the art for simultaneous high-temperature IR and microwave stealth." Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesperson Mao Ning, at a press conference on May 21: "The [Golden Dome] project will heighten the risk of turning the space into a war zone and creating a space arms race, and shake the international security and arms control system." The U.S. Defense Intelligence Agency said in a threat assessment released earlier this month: "Missile threats to the U.S. homeland will expand in scale and sophistication in the coming decade. "China and Russia are developing an array of novel delivery systems to exploit gaps in current U.S. ballistic missile defenses, but traditional ballistic missiles—which are guided during powered flight and unguided during free flight—will remain the primary threat to the homeland." What Happens Next It remains to be seen whether and how soon the new material will be integrated into Chinese weapons platforms. Trump has said the Golden Dome will be "fully operational" by the end of his second term in 2029. Yet defense analysts have expressed doubts that the system can be completed within that timeline or under its projected $175 billion budget.
Axios
4 days ago
- Business
- Axios
Beltway bloat could doom Trump's Golden Dome
Intercepting missiles — hitting a bullet with a bullet — is difficult. Overcoming bureaucracy may be even harder. The big picture: President Trump's Golden Dome, a continent's worth of 24/7 overhead defense, will be a jigsaw puzzle of ideas, authorities, personalities, contractors, procurements, production lines, users, fixers, technological leaps and diplomacy. Realizing even the most basic form in three years, as the president and Pentagon promised, will require intense coordination. Getting it done fast means resisting Washington's greatest vice: new offices, task forces, branches, blue-chip studies and advisers. Driving the news: Axios consulted a half-dozen analysts, businesspeople and former defense officials and tuned into some timely think-tank discussions to get a temperature check. Simply put, Golden Dome is polarizing. (And that's without asking what the Chinese or Russians think of it.) The latest: "I think there's been a lot of discussion about the capability ... and there's been little discussion about the organization and the authorities to get stuff done," Tom Karako, an expert at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, said in an interview. "We don't need to re-create the wheel." State of play: Trump this month gave the world its best look yet at Golden (née Iron) Dome during an Oval Office address. He was accompanied by Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth and a handful of lawmakers. The president tapped Gen. Michael Guetlein, the vice chief of space operations, as his lead. Folks Axios spoke with applauded that choice. Trump, who mentioned "super technology," also slapped on a $175 billion price tag. That's low, considering the costs of space-based interceptors at the heart of the concept. He also described Alaska as a key contributor to the vision. A Boeing-led team recently finished building 20 new silos for the homeland missile defense system at Fort Greely, Defense News reported. What they're saying: "There was a rollout, but there was almost no information," Laura Grego, a senior research director at the Union of Concerned Scientists, told Axios. "I think the way most people are starting to use 'Golden Dome' is synonymous with space-based missile defense. But the executive order covered every missile from every adverse area every time," she said. "I can hardly imagine potential adversaries just sitting still, not developing the ways to counter such a system." Yes, but: The defense industry is raring to go. Jordan Blashek, a managing partner at America's Frontier Fund, told Axios "breakthrough technologies have now made something like Golden Dome possible, fulfilling the Reagan administration's vision" for the Strategic Defense Initiative. Trump cited Reagan several times in his Oval Office remarks. Case in point: Apex, a satellite bus maker, is "heavily investing in internal research and development funding for this, as are our partners," CEO Ian Cinnamon said in an inteview. (The company recently announced a $200 million Series C.) Cinnamon foresees different methods for different threats: intercontinental ballistic missiles, hypersonic glide vehicles, fractional orbital bombardment systems. "There are so many pieces ... and they all need to talk," he said. "They all need to listen. They all need to be able to do that within milliseconds."
Asia Times
25-05-2025
- Politics
- Asia Times
The many holes in Trump's Golden Dome
The Trump administration's recent announcement of a 'Golden Dome' strategic missile defense shield to protect the US is the most ambitious such project since President Ronald Reagan's Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) of the 1980s. The SDI program – better known by its somewhat mocking nickname of 'Star Wars' – sparked a heated debate over its technical feasibility. Ultimately, it would never become operational. But do we now have the technologies to realize the Golden Dome shield – or is this initiative similarly destined to be shelved? A completed Golden Dome missile defense shield would supposedly defend the US against the full spectrum of air and missile threats, including long-range intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) and those with shorter ranges, any of which could be armed with nuclear warheads. But Golden Dome would also aim to work against cruise missiles and hypersonic weapons such as boost-glide vehicles, which use a rocket to reach hypersonic speeds (more than five times the speed of sound) before continuing their trajectory unpowered. The missile defense shield could theoretically also protect against warheads placed in space that can be commanded to re-enter the atmosphere and destroy targets on Earth, known as fractional orbital bombardment systems. Ballistic missiles arguably pose the biggest threat because of the sheer numbers in the hands of other nuclear-armed nations. ICBMs follow a three-phase trajectory: the boost, midcourse and terminal phases. The boost phase consists of a few minutes of powered flight as the missile's rocket engines propel it into space. In the midcourse phase, the missile travels unpowered through space for about 20-25 minutes. Finally, during the terminal phase, the missile re-enters the atmosphere and hits the target. Plans for the Golden Dome are likely to involve defensive weapons that target ballistic missiles during all three phases of their trajectory. Boost-phase missile defence is attractive because it would only require shooting down a single target. During the midcourse phase, the ballistic missile will deploy its warhead – the section that includes the explosive charge – but could also release several decoy warheads. Even with the best radar systems, discriminating between the real warhead from the decoys is incredibly difficult. One part of the Golden Dome will involve targeting ballistic missiles during their boost phase. US Air Force However, there are big questions over the technical feasibility of targeting ballistic missiles during their boost phase – and there is also a limited time window, given that this phase is relatively short. The weapons platforms designed to target a ballistic missile in its boost phase could consist of a large satellite in low-Earth orbit, armed with multiple small missiles called interceptors. An interceptor could be deployed if a nuclear-armed ballistic missile is launched at the US. One study conducted by the American Physical Society suggested that, under generous assumptions, a space-based interceptor platform might be able to destroy a target from 530 miles (850km) away. This measure is known as the weapon's 'kill radius.' Even with a kill radius of this size, a space-based interceptor system would require hundreds or even thousands of satellites, each armed with small missiles to achieve effective regional coverage. It might be possible to get around this constraint, though, by using directed-energy weapons such as powerful lasers or even particle beam weapons, which use high-energy beams of atomic or subatomic particles. A critical vulnerability of such a system, however, is that an adversary could use anti-satellite weapons – missiles launched from the ground – or other offensive actions such as cyberattacks to destroy or disable some of the interceptor satellites. This could establish a temporary corridor for an adversary's ballistic missile to pass through. An idea for a space-based boost-phase defense system called Brilliant Pebbles was proposed towards the end of the 1980s. Rather than having large satellites with multiple missiles, it entailed having around 1,000 small individual missiles in orbit. It would have also used about 60 orbiting sensors called Brilliant Eyes to detect launches. Brilliant Pebbles was cancelled by President Bill Clinton's administration in 1994. But it provides another template for technologies that could be used by Golden Dome. Options for destroying ballistic missiles during the midcourse of their trajectories include existing weapons systems such as the Ground-based Midcourse Defense system and the US Navy's ship-based Aegis platform. Unlike midcourse-phase missile defense (which must cover a large geographical area), terminal-phase interception is a last line of defense. It usually involves destroying incoming warheads that have re-entered the atmosphere from space. A plan for destroying single warheads during the terminal trajectory phase could use future versions of existing weapons platforms, such as the Patriot Advanced Capability 3 Missile Segment Enhancement or the Terminal High Altitude Area Defense. However, while there has been progress in this technology in the decades since Star Wars was proposed, the debate continues over whether these systems work effectively. Ultimately, it is the huge costs, as well as political opposition, that could pose the biggest hurdles to implementing an effective Golden Dome system. Trump's proposal has revived the idea of missile defense in the US. But it remains unclear whether its most ambitious components will ever be realized. Jack O'Doherty is a PhD Candidate in nuclear strategy, University of Leicester This article is republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons license. Read the original article.
Scientific American
22-05-2025
- Business
- Scientific American
Why Some Experts Call Trump's ‘Golden Dome' Missile Shield a Dangerous Fantasy
During a briefing from the Oval Office this week, President Donald Trump revealed his administration's plan for 'Golden Dome'—an ambitious high-tech system meant to shield the U.S. from ballistic, cruise and hypersonic missile attacks launched by foreign adversaries. Flanked by senior officials, including Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth and the project's newly selected leader, Gen. Michael Guetlein of the U.S. Space Force, Trump announced that Golden Dome will be completed within three years at a cost of $175 billion. The program, which was among Trump's campaign promises, derives its name from the Iron Dome missile defense system of Israel—a nation that's geographically 400 times smaller than the U.S. Protecting the vastness of the U.S. demands very different capabilities than those of Iron Dome, which has successfully shot down rockets and missiles using ground-based interceptors. Most notably, Trump's Golden Dome would need to expand into space—making it a successor to the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) pursued by the Reagan administration in the 1980s. Better known by the mocking nickname 'Star Wars,' SDI sought to neutralize the threat from the Soviet Union's nuclear-warhead-tipped intercontinental ballistic missiles by using space-based interceptors that could shoot them down midflight. But fearsome technical challenges kept SDI from getting anywhere close to that goal, despite tens of billions of dollars of federal expenditures. 'We will truly be completing the job that President Reagan started 40 years ago, forever ending the missile threat to the American homeland,' Trump said during the briefing. Although the announcement was short on technical details, Trump also said Golden Dome 'will deploy next-generation technologies across the land, sea and space, including space-based sensors and interceptors.' The program, which Guetlein has compared to the scale of the Manhattan Project in past remarks, has been allotted $25 billion in a Republican spending bill that has yet to pass in Congress. But Golden Dome may ultimately cost much more than Trump's staggering $175-billion sum. An independent assessment by the Congressional Budget Office estimates its price tag could be as high as $542 billion, and the program has drawn domestic and international outcries that it risks sparking a new, globe-destabilizing arms race and weaponizing Earth's fragile orbital environment. On supporting science journalism If you're enjoying this article, consider supporting our award-winning journalism by subscribing. By purchasing a subscription you are helping to ensure the future of impactful stories about the discoveries and ideas shaping our world today. To get a better sense of what's at stake—and whether Golden Dome has a better chance of success than its failed forebears— Scientific American spoke with Jeffrey Lewis, an expert on the geopolitics of nuclear weaponry at the James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies at the Middlebury Institute of International Studies. [ An edited transcript of the interview follows.] It's been a while, but when last I checked, most experts considered this sort of plan a nonstarter because the U.S. is simply too big of a target. Has something changed? Well, yes and no. The killer argument against space-based interceptors in the 1980s was that it would take thousands of them, and there was just no way to put up that many satellites. Today that's no longer true. SpaceX alone has put up 7,000 Starlink satellites. Launch costs are much cheaper now, and there are more launch vehicles available. So, for the first time, you can say, 'Oh, well, I could have a 7,000-satellite constellation. Do I want to do that?' Whereas, when the Reagan administration was talking about this, it was just la-la land. But let's be clear: this does not solve all the other problems with the general idea—or the Golden Dome version in particular. What are some of those other problems? Just talking about space-based interceptors, there are a couple [of issues that] my colleagues and I have pointed out. We ran some numbers using the old SDI-era calculation from [SDI physicists] Ed Teller and Greg Canavan—so we couldn't be accused of using some hippie version of the calculation, right? And what this and other independent assessments show is that the number of interceptors you need is super-duper sensitive to lots of things. For instance, it's not like this is a 'one satellite to one missile' situation—because the physics demands that these satellites ... have to be in low-Earth orbit, and that means they're going to be constantly moving over different parts of the planet. So if you want to defend against just one missile, you still need a whole constellation. And if you want to defend against two missiles, then you basically need twice as many interceptors, and so on. You probably have to shoot down missiles during the boost phase, when the warheads are still attached. For SDI, the U.S. was dealing with Soviet liquid-fueled missiles that would boost, or burn, for about four minutes. Well, modern ones burn for less than three—that's a whole minute that you no longer have. This is actually much worse than it sounds because you're probably unable to shoot for the first minute or so. Even with modern detectors [that are] much better than [those] we had in the 1980s, you may not see the missile until it rises above the clouds. And once it does, your sensors, your computers, still have to say, 'Aha! That is a missile!' And then you have to ensure that you're not shooting down some ordinary space launch—so the system says, 'I see a missile. May I shoot at it, please?' And someone or something has to give the go-ahead. So let's just say you'll have a good minute to shoot it down; this means your space-based interceptor has to be right there, ready to go, right? But by the time you're getting permission to shoot, the satellite that was overhead to do that is now too far away, and so the next satellite has to be coming there. This scales up really, really fast. Presumably artificial intelligence and other technologies could be leveraged to make that sort of command and control more agile and responsive. But clearly there are still limits here—AI can't be some sort of panacea. Sure, that's right. But technological progress overall hasn't made the threat environment better. Instead it's gotten much worse. Let's get back to the sheer physics-induced numbers for a moment, which AI can't really do much about. That daunting scaling I mentioned also depends on the quality of your interceptors, your kill vehicles—which, by the way, are still going to be grotesquely expensive even if launch costs are low. If your interceptors can rapidly accelerate to eight or 10 kilometers per second (km/s), your constellation can be smaller. If they only reach 4 km/s, your constellation has to be huge. The point is: any claim that you can do this with relatively low numbers—let's say 2,000 interceptors—assumes a series of improbable miracles occurring in quick succession to deliver the very best outcome that could possibly happen. So it's not going to happen that way, even if, in principle, it could. So you're telling me there's a chance! No, seriously, I see what you mean. The arguments in favor of this working seem rather contrived. No system is perfect, and just one missile getting through can still have catastrophic results. And we haven't even talked about adversarial countermeasures yet. There's a joke that's sometimes made about this: 'We play chess, and they don't move their pieces.' That seems to be the operative assumption here: that other nations will sit idly by as we build a complex, vulnerable system to nullify any strategic nuclear capability they have. And of course, it's not valid at all. Why do you think the Chinese are building massive fields of missile silos? It's to counteract or overwhelm this sort of thing. Why do you think the Russians are making moves to put a nuclear weapon in orbit? It's to mass kill any satellite constellation that would shoot down their missiles. Golden Dome proponents may say, 'Oh, we'll shoot that down, too, before it goes off.' Well, good luck. You put a high-yield nuclear weapon on a booster, and the split second it gets above the clouds, sure, you might see it—but now it sees you, too, before you can shoot. All it has to do at that point is detonate to blow a giant hole in your defenses, and that's game over. And by the way, this rosy scenario assumes your adversaries don't interfere with all your satellites passing over their territory in peacetime. We know that won't be the case—they'll light them up with sensor-dazzling lasers, at minimum! You've compared any feasible space-based system to Starlink and noted that, similar to Starlink, these interceptors will need to be in low-Earth orbit. That means their orbits will rapidly decay from atmospheric drag, so just like Starlink's satellites, they'd need to be constantly replaced, too, right? Ha, yes, that's right. With Starlink, you're looking at a three-to-five-year life cycle, which means annually replacing one third to one fifth of a let's say Golden Dome is 10,000 satellites; this would mean the best-case scenario is that you're replacing 2,000 per year. Now, let's just go along with what the Trump administration is saying, that they can get these things really cheap. I'm going to guess a 'really cheap' mass-produced kill vehicle would still run you $20 million a pop, easily. Just multiply $20 million by 2,000, and your answer is $40 billion. So under these assumptions, we'd be spending $40 billion per year just to maintain the constellation. That's not even factoring in operations. And that's not to mention associated indirect costs from potentially nasty effects on the upper atmosphere and the orbital environment from all the launches and reentries. That, yes—among many other costly things. I have to ask: If fundamental physics makes this extremely expensive idea blatantly incapable of delivering on its promises, what's really going on when the U.S. president and the secretary of defense announce their intention to pump $175 billion into it for a three-year crash program? Some critics claim this kind of thing is really about transferring taxpayer dollars to a few big aerospace companies and other defense contractors. Well, I wouldn't say it's quite that simple. Ballistic missile defense is incredibly appealing to some people for reasons besides money. In technical terms, it's an elegant solution to the problem of nuclear annihilation—even though it's not really feasible. For some people, it's just cool, right? And at a deeper level, many people just don't like the concept of deterrence—mutually assured destruction and all that—because, remember, the status quo is this: If Russia launches 1,000 nuclear weapons at us—or 100 or 10 or even just one—then we are going to murder every single person in Russia with an immediate nuclear counterattack. That's how deterrence works. We're not going to wait for those missiles to land so we can count up our dead to calibrate a more nuanced response. That's official U.S. policy, and I don't think anyone wants it to be this way forever. But it's arguably what's prevented any nuclear exchange from occurring to date. But not everyone believes in the power of deterrence, and so they're looking for some kind of technological escape. I don't think this fantasy is that different from Elon Musk thinking he's going to go live on Mars when climate change ruins Earth: In both cases, instead of doing the really hard things that seem necessary to actually make this planet better, we're talking about people who think they can just buy their way out of the problem. A lot of people—a lot of men, especially—really hate vulnerability, and this idea that you can just tech your way out of it is very appealing to them. You know, 'Oh, what vulnerability? Yeah, there's an app for that.' You're saying this isn't about money? Well, I imagine this is going to be good for at least a couple of SpaceX Falcon Heavy or Starship launches per year for Elon Musk. And you don't have to do too many of those launches for the value proposition to work out: You build and run Starlink, you put up another constellation of space-based missile defense interceptors, and suddenly you've got a viable business model for these fancy huge rockets that can also take you to Mars, right? Given your knowledge of science history—of how dispassionate physics keeps showing space-based ballistic missile defense is essentially unworkable, yet the idea just keeps coming back—how does this latest resurgence make you feel? When I was younger, I would have been frustrated, but now I just accept human beings don't learn. We make the same mistakes over and over again. You have to laugh at human folly because I do think most of these people are sincere, you know. They're trying to get rich, sure, but they're also trying to protect the country, and they're doing it through ways they think about the world—which admittedly are stupid. But, hey, they're trying. It's very disappointing, but if you just laugh at them, they're quite amusing. I think most people would have trouble laughing about something as devastating as nuclear war—or about an ultraexpensive plan to protect against it that's doomed to failure and could spark a new arms race. I guess if you're looking for a hopeful thought, it's that we've tried this before, and it didn't really work, and that's likely to happen again. So how do you think it will actually play out this time around? I think this will be a gigantic waste of money that collapses under its own weight. They'll put up a couple of interceptors, and they'll test those against a boosting ballistic missile, and they'll eventually get a hit. And they'll use that to justify putting up more, and they'll probably even manage to make a thin constellation—with the downside, of course, being that the Russians and the Chinese and the North Koreans and everybody else will make corresponding investments in ways to kill this system. And then it will start to really feel expensive, in part because it will be complicating and compromising things like Starlink and other commercial satellite constellations—which, I'd like to point out, are almost certainly uninsured in orbit because you can't insure against acts of war. So think about that: if the Russians or anyone else detonate a nuclear weapon in orbit because of something like Golden Dome, Elon Musk's entire constellation is dead, and he's probably just out the cash. The fact is: these days we rely on space-based assets much more than most people realize, yet Earth orbit is such a fragile environment that we could muck it up in many different ways that carry really nasty long-term consequences. I worry about that a lot. Space used to be a benign environment, even throughout the entire cold war, but having an arms race there will make it malign. So Golden Dome is probably going to make everyone's life a little bit more dangerous—at least until we, hopefully, come to our senses and decide to try something different.
