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Putin's Victory Day parades expose reliance on Iran and North Korea
Putin's Victory Day parades expose reliance on Iran and North Korea

Yahoo

time09-05-2025

  • Politics
  • Yahoo

Putin's Victory Day parades expose reliance on Iran and North Korea

They came in behind the T-80 tanks and the Yars nuclear missiles. They were not much to look at; spindly, winged things carted on the back of a few lorries. But drones were included in Moscow's Victory Day parade for the first time on Friday, capping their rise to become the most deadly weapon on the battlefields of Ukraine. Vladimir Putin watched them roll past alongside Xi Jinping, the president of China, who has facilitated the supply of technology needed for Russia's unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) industry. Unlike the subdued parades of recent years, Putin churned out thousands of troops and dozens of tanks, while nuclear-capable ballistic missile launchers crawled over Red Square's cobblestones. The commemorations to mark the 80th anniversary of the USSR's triumph over Nazi Germany were not just about honouring the estimated 27 million Soviets who died in the Second World War. They were part of a carefully co-ordinated display of Moscow's supposed military might. Drones have revolutionised warfare, and state TV commentators lauded their effectiveness on the battlefield as they were lugged past the Kremlin. But behind the pomp and ceremony, analysts said the event served as a reminder of how much the Kremlin has come to rely on foreign backers to prop up its war machine. The Kremlin's much-vaunted drones were designed by Iran, while Putin embraced North Korean generals in thanks for their help in expelling Ukrainian forces from Kursk. Credit: Reuters China too, whose leader sat shoulder-to-shoulder with Putin, has long been accused of covertly sending weapon components for Russia to use in Ukraine. 'In previous years and decades, it would have been inconceivable to showcase the extent to which Russia is dependent on other countries for military support and sourcing equipment,' said Keir Giles, a Russian military expert at Chatham House and author of Who Will Defend Europe? 'On one hand, Russia wants to demonstrate it is not isolated, and is supported by a military and political coalition in challenging the West,' he told The Telegraph. 'On the other, it represents a normalisation of the way Russia's idea of itself as a great power that does not need allies has now been torpedoed.' Up to 11,000 Russian troops took part in the parade, including 1,500 veterans of the 'Special Military Operation' – Russia's name for the war in Ukraine. Credit: Reuters Soldiers from 13 so-called 'friendly countries' – including China, Vietnam, Egypt and Myanmar, took part – also took part, which was Putin's way of showing off global clout amid the West's efforts to isolate Moscow. The Lancet, Geran-2, Orlan-10 and Orlan-30 were among the drones that were shown off as they perched on top of their launchers, facing the sky. Orlan drones are widely used for reconnaissance and target-selection missions. Zala Lancet drones focus on surveillance and precision attacks and are responsible for destroying numerous Ukrainian tanks, a jet and other heavy equipment. The Geran-2 is a domestically-produced clone of Iran's Shahed-136 UAVs, a suicide drone that was widely used to attack Ukraine before Russia began manufacturing its own variants. The latest version, the Geran-3, is purported to use a turbojet engine that can power it to speeds of around 350mph with a range of 1,553 miles. That is a significant step-up on previous iterations – but little has been seen of them on the ground. In 2024, Ukrainian factories churned out some 2 million unmanned aerial vehicles, ratcheting up production at back-breaking speeds. Its target for 2025 is 4.5 million. The drones Ukraine produces are reputed to be better than their Russian counterparts: harder, more lethal and better able to resist electronic warfare jamming. But Moscow is catching up, at least in terms of brute force. Russia claims it can churn out 4,000 every day and is developing increasingly sophisticated – and fast – long-range drones. 'The battlefield in Ukraine is the place where military confrontation is evolving more rapidly than anywhere in the world,' said Mr Giles. The fact this evolution, particularly through UAVs, is on full display in Moscow's military parade shows the extent to which 'this new nature of warfare has been internalised and embraced by the Russian system'. During the Victory Day parades in 2023 and 2024, a solitary Second World War-era T-34 tank rolled across the Red Square. This year, a fleet of 180 tanks and armoured vehicles were paraded, up from just 60 in 2024. These included nine historic T-34s, columns of Soviet-era T-72s and T-80s, as well as more modern T-90s, the most advanced tank deployed en masse to Ukraine. The mechanised column also included Tigr armoured vehicles and BMP-2 and BMP-3 infantry fighting vehicles. Russia is reported to have lost more than 3,000 tanks in Ukraine, while Kyiv puts the figure at 10,000 with another 22,000 armoured vehicles lost. Faced with staggering losses, largely owing to the prevalence of explosive-loaded drones, Moscow sent ageing models onto the battlefield and dramatically reduced their uses in assaults. Earlier this year, analysts had noted that despite Russia churning out new tanks and armoured vehicles at a rate unmatched by the West, the newly-available vehicles were not being sent to Ukraine. 'The conclusion was that they were being held back for Russia's next attack against a neighbour, potentially a Nato member state,' said Mr Giles. 'But of course that reserve of presentable vehicles also allows Russia to indulge in vanity projects like its May 9 parade,' he added. The Ministry of Defence estimated last year that Russia had the capacity to produce 100 main battle tanks per month. As a reminder of Russia's nuclear might, huge Rs-24 Yars nuclear-tipped intercontinental ballistic missile launchers were wheeled out. The Yars ICBM is a thermonuclear missile that can be armed with four warheads that are individually programmed to strike different targets with a range of 12,000km. They were followed by Iskander ballistic missiles, Tornado-S multiple rocket launchers and Tosochka heavy flamethrower systems and advanced artillery weapons including Msta-S howitzers, Giatsint-K and Malva artillery guns – which have all been used against Ukraine. Broaden your horizons with award-winning British journalism. Try The Telegraph free for 1 month with unlimited access to our award-winning website, exclusive app, money-saving offers and more.

A glimpse inside Putin's secret arms empire
A glimpse inside Putin's secret arms empire

Economist

time08-05-2025

  • Business
  • Economist

A glimpse inside Putin's secret arms empire

The Economist tracks mobile signals to plot the Kremlin's build-up General Chris Cavoli, NATO's top commander, recently told the Senate Armed Services Committee that Russia was replacing troops, tanks and munitions 'at an unprecedented pace'. Its factories would roll out 1,500 tanks this year, compared with America's 135. It would produce 3,000 armoured vehicles; America produces no new infantry fighting vehicles. Russia would produce 250,000 shells per month, putting it 'on track to build a stockpile three times greater than the United States and Europe combined'. To understand the scale of Russia's defence-industrial expansion, The Economist consulted a Western company which uses artificial intelligence to sift through data from a variety of mostly commercially available sources. This shows how the number of electronic devices, such as mobile phones, present at an industrial site has changed over time. The data capture only a fraction of total devices present—perhaps 2% to 10% of the number—but they serve as a proxy for the level of activity. The firm asked to remain anonymous owing to the sensitivity of the topic. OmskOmskRUSSIA Image: Airbus, Google Consider Omsktransmash, or the Omsk tank plant, one of the largest tank factories in Russia. The facility takes old T-80 tanks, which were produced decades ago, and upgrades them, working around the clock. The level of activity at Omsktransmash grew slightly prior to Russia's invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, before dropping. But since the invasion, the number of people at the factory has climbed dramatically. The level of activity has remained particularly high since the middle of 2023, when the Kremlin realised that it would need to mobilise for a long war. The same story can be seen across Russia's defence-industrial facilities. Vehicles Uralvagonzavod tank facility Arzamas plant Kurganmashzavod plant Motovilikha plant Uralvagonzavod, Russia's largest tank facility, saw significantly higher activity in 2024 than in 2023. The Arzamas plant, which produces armoured personnel carriers, and the Kurganmashzavod and Motovilikha plants, which make infantry fighting vehicles, are also booming. Artillery Yekaterinburg Factory No.9 NPO Novator Volgograd Titan-Barrikady NPO Splav The Yekaterinburg Factory No.9 produces the barrels for howitzers and tanks. Artillery pieces and cannons can be seen parked in the open on satellite images. A few kilometres away lies NPO Novator, which develops Iskander ballistic missiles. There are also signs of strong growth at Volgograd Titan-Barrikady, where Iskander launch systems are built, and at NPO Splav in Tula, which makes Grad, Uragan and Smerch rockets. Explosives Sverdlov plant Selmash plant Kazan gunpowder plant Perm gunpowder plant Filling 3m shells per year requires prodigious amounts of explosives. The Sverdlov plant in Dzerzhinsk is Russia's largest explosives plant, producing chemicals for shells and glide bombs. The number of monthly devices there has shot up in recent months. Activity has also increased at the Selmash plant in Kirov, which makes casings for munitions, according to Julian Cooper of the University of Birmingham. Aircraft Alabuga factory Begishevo airport Kazan helicopter plant Zala Aero Kalashnikov (Lancet) The Iranian-designed Shahed-136 suicide drone is an increasingly familiar sight in Ukraine's skies. There were almost 140 daily attacks in February, far above levels seen in 2024. That is consistent with rising activity at the Alabuga factory in Tatarstan, where the drones are made, as well as at Begishevo airport nearby. The scale of recent construction work at Alabuga is apparent in photographs. Alabuga drone plant March 2024 Buildings under construction September 2024 Buildings added Building work started Satellite images ©2025 Maxar Technologies These are not the only signs of Russia's hyperactive defence industry. The Economist has also seen a range of other indicators. In Biysk, for instance, home to an important plant that produces oleum, which is used in explosives, and a centre of military research, average daily traffic between dormitory areas and districts with chemical plants rose 19% in 2023. 'Dwell time'—how long people remain in one place—rose by 32% during periods associated with second and third working shifts. Strava, an app which logs exercise, showed new clusters of running and cycling in areas near those plants, a sign that new workers had arrived in the area—which might also explain why housing rental costs grew by 21% a year. Similar patterns can be seen at sites associated with Russia's planned expansion of military forces on NATO's borders. In Luga, for instance, where Russia began forming a new division last year, mobile-phone location data showed increases in population density around industrial zones, an increase in dwell time from 10pm to 6am, pointing to night shifts, and new commuter corridors between dormitories and military plants. There are still constraints on Russian industry. Last year the country relied on North Korea to provide a significant proportion of artillery ammunition used in Ukraine; those stocks are not limitless. Key inputs to the artillery supply chain—chromite for barrels and cotton cellulose for propellant—still have to be imported, according to research by the Open Source Centre and the Royal United Services Institute (RUSI) in London. But Russia is now able to produce some important components at home. 'In principle, there would seem to be no reason why this mobilised defence effort cannot be maintained for quite a long period of time,' writes Mr Cooper, in a recent study for the RUSI Journal which surveys many of the facilities discussed above. 'It is not without irony,' concludes Mr Cooper, 'that advanced Western economies may now find the need to look closely at Russia to understand how to adapt.' This article appeared in the Briefing section of the print edition under the headline 'Putin's secret arms empire' More from

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