23-04-2025
Opinion China is turning the heat on Taiwan
Since the inception of Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) leader Lai Ching-te's presidency in Taiwan, China's policy signalling vis-à-vis the island has become much harsher and more aggressive.
China's stance on Taiwan has taken a more urgent and assertive turn in recent months. The unveiling of the new Shuiqiao amphibious vessels at Zhanjiang port in Guangdong, coupled with heightened activity and aggressive posturing by the PLA's Eastern Theater Command — including the recent Strait Thunder 2025A exercises — signals a sharpened focus on readiness and control. At the same time, internal probes into top military figures such as Central Military Commission (CMC) Vice-Chairman He Weidong, former Political Work Department head Miao Hua, and Eastern Theater Commander Lin Xiangyang have effectively dismantled what was known as the 'Taiwan-Fujian' faction within China's military leadership. Adding to the sense of impending conflict, some outlets, citing unnamed intelligence sources, have suggested that a Chinese invasion of Taiwan could occur within six months — further fueling anxiety and speculation.
Further, Beijing's critique of Taiwanese President Lai Ching-te and his party, the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), has intensified, with official rhetoric often referring to him as a 'Thoroughly Dangerous Instigator' or 'Absolute Danger Maker', and calling out the DPP for spreading 'green terror.' This points to a significant lack of political will to resolve tensions through open lines of communication. In this regard, three politico-military developments from the last few months demand attention to understand the messaging from China on Taiwan.
China has recently published a revised Cadre Reader on the Taiwan Issue of China (2024 Edition), compiled by the Taiwan Affairs Office of the CPC Central Committee and the Taiwan Affairs Office of the State Council. Launched at the National Library in Haidian, Beijing (the hub for China's armed forces) on March 18, the Cadre Reader is aimed at implementing the Central Committee's decisions and arrangements on Taiwan-related work, unifying ideological understanding, and strengthening publicity and education on Taiwan policies.
At the launch event for the Reader, Song Tao, Director of both the Taiwan Affairs Offices of the Party and the government, stated that cadres involved in Taiwan-related work should deeply understand the historical context of the Taiwan issue in a bid to strengthen their 'sense of responsibility and mission,' and 'improve their competence and capabilities in handling Taiwan-related affairs.' In this light, the instruction to political cadres of the CPC on understanding the vitality of reunification with Taiwan, has become firmer.
Further, as Beijing marked the 20th anniversary of the adoption and enactment of the 2005 Anti-Secession Law on March 14, China's top legislator, Zhao Leji, spelled similar (but not unusual) rhetoric on curbing Taiwan's 'independence' and getting rid of 'external interference.' Here, it is important to note that Article 8 of the Law stipulates: 'In the event that the 'Taiwan independence' secessionist forces should act under any name or by any means to cause the fact of Taiwan's secession from China, or that major incidents entailing Taiwan's secession from China should occur, or that possibilities for a peaceful reunification should be completely exhausted, the state shall employ non-peaceful means and other necessary measures to protect China's sovereignty and territorial integrity.'
In this light, it is quite interesting that a People's Daily commentary from April 2, authored by a 'Zhong Yiping' (a pen-name for a CPC member and reunification activist writing for the mouthpiece), refers to the Anti-Secession Law as a 'looming sword.' If mobilised, Zhong argued, it will lead Lai to 'dig his own grave.' These are strong words, in that in the recent past, the provisions of the Law regarding the use of non-peaceful means have rarely been used to incite fear and deterrence. At the Taiwan Affairs Work Conference that took place in February 2025, too, the phrase 'peaceful reunification' was newly missing from the government work report, even as CPPCC Chairman Wang Huning emphasised 'advancing the cause and trajectory of reunification.' To that, Chen Binhua had clarified that China will 'strive for peaceful reunification with the greatest sincerity' as long as Taiwan separatists do not 'provoke, coerce, or challenge the bottom line and cross red lines.'
To further involve the public in its Taiwan strategy, the Party and State Council's Taiwan Affairs Offices recently launched a new grassroots mechanism: A special platform where citizens can report individuals accused of persecuting pro-China Taiwanese. Introduced on March 26, this reporting column reportedly received 323 submissions within its first nine hours, according to Taiwan Affairs Office spokesperson Chen Binhua. The early targets of these reports span a wide spectrum — from government officials and legislators like Liu Shih-fang, Shen Boyang, Wu Sih-yao, and Huang Chieh, to prosecutors, activists, and internet personalities including Black Bear Academy's Tsao Hsing-cheng and prominent influencers Wen Ziyu and Chen Boyuan. Even a politically outspoken dentist, Shih Shuhua, was named, underscoring the wide net cast by this campaign.
The decision to publicise citizen complaints against Taiwanese politicians and influencers appears to serve a dual purpose: Rallying domestic sentiment against perceived mistreatment of pro-China voices in Taiwan, and portraying Beijing's tough stance as rooted in public will rather than solely directed by the party-state. This strategy aligns with the enforcement of a legal directive issued in June 2024 — The Opinion on Lawfully Punishing Stubborn 'Taiwan Independence' Separatists — which was jointly released by China's top judicial and security bodies. The document outlines a strict legal framework for punishing separatist activity, with penalties ranging from multi-year prison terms and loss of political rights to life imprisonment or even capital punishment in the most severe cases.
Finally, and most importantly, China's large-scale military drills and advancements in the PLA Eastern Theatre Command's defence systems, have continued to ring alarm bells for Taiwan. The most recent of the drills that kicked off in August 2022 has been the 'Strait Thunder-2025A', conducted on April 1/ 2, 2025. We know from the 'Joint Sword' Exercises of 2024 that if there is an 'A', there will also be a 'B', and potentially also a 'C', for the Strait Thunder series. What is different about these exercises is also that they were much more comprehensive, widespread, and involved different components — Carrier Battle Group exercises and PLA Rocket Force demonstrations — along with a relatively usual spike in joint sea- and air-related sorties, including beyond the median line of the Taiwan Strait and into the island's Air Defence Identification Zone (ADIZ).
The PLARF testing involved testing of its 'cross-Straits killing machines'— multiple modular long-range rocket artillery systems — to carry out live-fire ammunition exercises. These were likely the PHL-16/ PCL-191 Multiple Launch Rocket Systems (MLRSs) that have a range of about 300 km, and can easily target sites in the Strait and on Taiwan proper. It is widely reported that the schematics of the target the barrage of 16 missiles was launched at, resemble an LNG storage facility in Kaohsiung's Yong'an District. As much as 40 per cent of Taiwan's electricity grid is powered by LNG — making such energy facilities and key port areas like Kaohsiung province strategically vital targets for the PLA.
The assessment of these drills can be combined with more static developments such as the sudden building of commercial Shuiqiao ships in Guangdong province, whose main characteristic are the tusk-like 'Bailey Bridge' extensions that can deploy forces for an amphibious campaign. Analysts have likened these to the artificial floating Mulberry Harbours created by the British to support their D-Day operations against France in 1944.
A preliminary assessment suggests the Strait Thunder 2025A set of drills was not as gigantic as the Joint Sword 2024B exercises. While a few targeted simulations were undertaken to demonstrate resource control and choking, the focus was not on testing the 'actual combat capabilities' of troops (as was the case with the latter, which included establishing strike positions, conducting land and naval live-fire exercises, and conducting joint assaults). Nonetheless, the routine of the drills demonstrates that China continues to take the threshold of conflict higher, and its brinkmanship has created a new, dangerous normal in the Strait that makes peace seem elusive.
