26-02-2025
The Nuclear Weapons Ban Treaty Matters Now More Than Ever
Representatives of states and civil society organizations will gather in New York next week at United Nations headquarters for the Third Meeting of State Parties to the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons, or TPNW. The event brings together high-level diplomats and a massive global network of civil society organizations under the leadership of the International Campaign to Abolish Nuclear Weapons, aimed at strengthening and implementing the nuclear weapons ban treaty, which prohibits both the possession and use of nuclear weapons.
To some, it is a challenging moment to make the case for the power of multilateralism and international treaty law. U.S. President Donald Trump is actively withdrawing from or threatening to violate international treaties, as well as shutting down government agencies involved in implementing them. At the Munich Security Conference earlier this month, Vice President JD Vance indicated the U.S. would be pulling back from its security guarantees for Europe, possibly ushering in a new era of European defense spending due to resurgent fears of Russian aggression. At times it seems as if the power of international treaty law is weak at best, given its voluntary nature and limited enforcement mechanisms, and possibly crumbling altogether.
Perhaps no place is this skepticism more frequently heard than in the area of nuclear weapons. After all, the TPNW has been created, signed and ratified by the world's non-nuclear states. Those with nuclear weapons have either ignored or openly opposed the treaty. Since the treaty's inception, nuclear threats and brinksmanship have been on the rise; the U.S. and Russia are aiming to modernize their nuclear forces; and rumblings about creating a nuclear deterrent have begun to be heard from some non-nuclear states.
Still, the gathering in New York to affirm the world's abhorrence of nuclear weapons showcases the power and importance of international legal standards, even—and perhaps especially—in the absence of great power support, for at least three reasons.
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First, there is the symbolic impact of many nations showing up in New York to celebrate and affirm a treaty that envisions a world free of nuclear weapons. With Trump openly attempting to 'break' the rules-based international order, Russia seemingly being rewarded for violating it and China eager to reinterpret it, the visibility of a wide swath of governments and global civil society actively building stronger ethical rules to ameliorate nuclear risk is important in itself as what scholars of social movements refer to as a 'focusing event' for awareness-raising. The gathering will coincide with a march to abolish nuclear weapons, a Catholic Mass in downtown Manhattan to pray for disarmament, and film screenings and art exhibits designed to focus attention on the power of ordinary citizens to question the nuclear orthodoxy.
Second, such meetings are opportunities for non-nuclear states and global civil society actors to mobilize, connect and strategize about expanding the treaty. The plenary statements on the dangers and threats of nuclear weapons and the nuclear weapons industry—as well as the conversations that take place in U.N. headquarters hallways, over dinners and at side events organized by civil society—are expected to galvanize additional signatures and ratifications, each of which puts political pressure on nuclear and near-nuclear countries.
The event is also an opportunity to coordinate strategies for actually implementing the treaty's provisions. Plenary discussions include victim assistance strategies and how to resolve tensions between nuclear non-use, nonproliferation and disarmament norms as the effort to expand the TPNW continues. Civil society side events include how to advocate against nuclear weapons financing, the role of cities in implementing the TPNW and lessons that climate activists can take from the TPNW process.
But perhaps the most important reason this Meeting of State Parties matters is that public awareness of the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons affects perceptions that nuclear weapons use would be unlawful, even in those states not party to the treaties. This matters, not only among the wider public but among those who could find themselves in the nuclear chain of command.
At University of Massachusetts-Amherst's Human Security Lab, which I direct, two separate studies are finding that learning about the very existence of the TPNW causes significant shifts in attitudes toward the lawfulness of nuclear weapons among those Americans who previously believed they were legal—even when they are informed that the U.S. is not party to the treaty. It also reduces the likelihood that citizens would prefer the U.S. to use nuclear over conventional weapons even in a situation where they are told it could end a hypothetical ground war and save troops' lives.
The first of these studies, presented last year at the International Studies Association's annual conference, showed that survey respondents who initially believed that nuclear-bombing civilian cities could be legally justified under some circumstances were likelier to change their mind on a later survey and view nuclear weapons as 'never permissible' after learning about the TPNW. The team also found that even those respondents most predisposed to supporting an actual nuclear strike were much less likely to say so on the second survey if they were first asked to recall the legal status of nuclear weapons after learning about the TPNW.
The second study, whose initial toplines were released last November, is finding a similar result. In this case, a team of researchers compared the shift in attitudes when learning only of the Geneva Convention to the added impact of the TPNW if respondents were told about both treaties. The group that learned about the Geneva Conventions rule against the use of indiscriminate weapons changed their minds more often than the control group, and those who learned about both the Geneva Conventions and the TPNW changed their minds most of all. This shows that information about the TPNW indeed strengthens the nuclear taboo.
This second study also compared attitudes from the general population with the attitudes of veterans and active-duty military personnel—in order words, those who would potentially be in a position to participate in a nuclear strike. The added impact of learning about the TPNW seems even stronger for military personnel than for ordinary citizens: While the TPNW information changed civilian minds 65 percent of the time, it changed military beliefs 71 percent of the time.
Whether military personnel believe a nuclear strike would be manifestly unlawful is not an academic question: They are required to disobey unlawful orders. When asked whether they would participate in a nuclear strike against a civilian city, barely half of military respondents said they would follow such an order if given. Over a third said they would refuse outright. Another 15 percent of Americans with military training chose 'other,' with many of those responses saying they would obey only under certain conditions, in particular that they would not support a first strike.
'It would depend on if we've been attacked by a nuclear weapon already or not,' one answered.
'I would have to be certain the person giving the order had authority to do so as well as … determine the order was not a knee jerk reaction but well thought out beforehand,' another wrote, before adding, 'Even then, I'm not sure my conscience would allow it.'
'Do not know. Cannot say,' a third replied. 'I hope to God I would TRY to stand up, resist, and disobey.'
Early findings suggest that Americans who learned about the TPNW are actually slightly more likely to choose 'other' than those in the other groups. Some who learned about the TPNW and chose that 'other' option wrote things like, 'I could not be part of a genocide,' or 'I would question the order and argue against it. If unsuccessful I would probably have to refuse to obey.' While the data is still being analyzed to determine conclusive patterns, these descriptive results suggest that international treaties can and do strengthen ethical and legal standards—and that important actors pay attention.
The way in which learning about the very existence of the TPNW affects the views of rank-and-file military personnel matters even more in a moment when the Trump administration is openly purging the military of top brass known for their commitment to the rules of war as well as judge advocates general whose job it is to advise them on the balance between humanitarian ideals and military necessity.
President Trump and Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth appear to hope this will create a permissive atmosphere for a 'tough hand' in foreign affairs. But what it may well do is undermine the trust of those in the chain of command that orders coming down from the top have been lawfully vetted. As one survey respondent said in deciding whether or not to follow a nuclear launch order, 'It depends on the trustworthiness of the chain of command.'
In the case of nuclear affairs, where the conditions under which Americans would view a nuclear strike as consistent with international law are vanishingly small, this could make all the difference. Even before the U.S. presidential election in November, when this survey data was gathered, the TPNW already appeared to be tipping the scales in favor of a 'stop and think' response among troops just by its very existence as well as the fact that enough other countries have signed it to bring it into force.
This makes sense because, as political scientist James Morrow argues, treaties are fundamentally less about actually enforcing laws on states and more about articulating ethical and social standards. And as political scientist Margarita Petrova shows, norms often get created and spread not at the behest of the great powers or even despite their obstructionism but rather because of that very opposition.
If so, the TPNW is already serving the purpose for which it was likely created: to increase the stigma against nuclear weapons and decrease the likelihood they will ever be used, whether or not nuclear states retain their arsenals. Trump's efforts to 'break' international law may well only increase the strength of these norms.
Charli Carpenter is a professor of political science and legal studies at University of Massachusetts-Amherst, specializing in human security and international law. She tweets at @charlicarpenter.
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