28-05-2025
The Return of Europe's Great(ish) Powers
On May 9, French President Emmanuel Macron and Polish Prime Minister Donald Tusk met in the French city of Nancy to sign a Franco-Polish friendship treaty. The agreement envisions wide-ranging economic and technological cooperation, such as on civilian nuclear power, and coordination in various policy areas from migration to infrastructure and defense.
The Franco-Polish rapprochement is interesting in itself, as Macron has for several years worked hard to mend France's ties with eastern Europe. But, more importantly, the two countries' cooperation is part of a more fundamental development within Europe: the return of the big European powers.
Over the last few years, with Russia's war against Ukraine and the breakdown of the transatlantic relationship under U.S. President Donald Trump, the bigger European countries have multiplied their joint actions. France, Germany, the U.K. and, increasingly, Poland, are stepping up—a development which might simultaneously be a curse and blessing for the smaller European nations.
In addition to the Nancy Treaty, there is the British-German Trinity House agreement on defense, signed last year, which the current governments in Berlin and London plan to extend into a full friendship treaty. In 2019, Europe's core couple, France and Germany, renewed the Elysee Treaty from 1963 with the Treaty of Aachen. Later this year, France and the U.K. are set to renew their Lancaster House treaties, and the U.K. is also in discussions with Poland to launch a new bilateral defense treaty.
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But there is more to this trend than just a rise in bilateral treaties among the main powers. In the context of the war against Ukraine, the leaders of the big European nations have played an important diplomatic role. Earlier this month, Macron, German Chancellor Friedrich Merz, U.K. Prime Minister Keir Starmer and Tusk travelled to Kyiv for what was called the 'coalition of the willing' summit.
After decades during which Europeans aimed to build up the geopolitical EU, it appears that the big European powers are back as main players in geopolitics. And as the big European countries are becoming more important, the EU as an actor diminishes. Of course, these cooperations neither explicitly nor implicitly aim to sideline the EU—there is no such plot. In fact, the Nancy treaty includes a section on cooperation within the EU, and the Treaty of Aachen notes that the cooperation between France and Germany aims to strengthen the EU. And the U.K.'s recently concluded agreement with the EU was celebrated as a reset of relations, 10 years after Brexit.
Still, it is striking how much more the big powers are looking toward each other to deal with the geopolitical challenges of the moment, having largely abandoned the aim of making the EU the prime European foreign policy representative. In at least one aspect, the bilateral treaties weaken the EU – and arguably NATO. Namely, through the creation of new security guarantees. The Aachen treaty notes that France and Germany 'shall afford one another any means of assistance or aid within their power, including military force, in the event of an armed attack on their territories,' while the Nancy treaty stipulates that 'in the event of armed aggression on their territories, the Parties shall assist each other, including by military means.' Although there is nothing wrong with these clauses per se, they raise the question of why they exist at all. After all, NATO's Article 5 and the EU's Article 42.7 already stipulate the same assurances. And while the treaties acknowledge these clauses, one is left to wonder whether the extra assurances indicate—or create—a doubt that Articles 5 and 42.7 are not sufficiently reliable after all.
That Europe's great(ish) powers are becoming more relevant again feels in line with the times. Trump's vision of the world, in which big powers dominate their spheres of influence, has aptly been called a throwback to the 19th century. A return of Europe's powers fits with this new, old world.
For smaller European states, this might be a curse and blessing in equal measure. On the one hand, their say within the EU will become less relevant if the EU is less of a relevant actor. On the other hand, less will be expected from them in terms of foreign policy, something many European governments might be perfectly happy with, given the more than sufficient demands of domestic politics, from the green transition to demographic changes and migration.
The question is what this means for Europe's overall geopolitical power. One can lament that the EU hasn't become the unifying geopolitical actor many people hoped it would be (though one should not dismiss its role in the realm of sanctions and trade). But in the absence of a unified EU power, a working alliance of the big three, four, or five European nations could be a good alternative.
Gone are the days in which France, Germany, or the U.K. can have significant geopolitical power by themselves. But together, the top European powers can still influence world politics. From this viewpoint, the recent flurry of agreements, as well as the institutionalizing of forums for further coordination prescribed in these treaties, is a positive development.
Ulrike Franke is a senior policy fellow at the European Council on Foreign Relations, based in Paris. She focuses on German and European security and defense, the future of warfare and the impact of new technologies such as drones and artificial intelligence. Her bi-weekly WPR column appears every other Wednesday.
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