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Japan Today
24-05-2025
- Politics
- Japan Today
What or where is the Indo-Pacific? How a foreign policy pivot redefined the global map
By Andrew Latham Open a book of maps and look for the 'Indo-Pacific' region – it likely won't be there. Yet the Indo-Pacific is now central to how many countries think about strategy and security. It describes a region spanning two oceans and dozens of countries, encompassing much of the world's trade routes. The Indo-Pacific did not emerge from the patterns of ancient trade, nor from long-standing cultural or civilizational ties. Instead, the concept comes from the realms of political science and international relations. The term can be traced back to the work of German political scientist and geographer Karl Haushofer – a favorite of Adolf Hitler – in the 1920s. But it only really began to take hold in the think tanks and foreign policy-setting departments of Washington and other Western capitals in the late 20th and early 21st centuries. It coincided with a shift in the global balance of power from unipolarity – that is, dominated by one superpower – to multipolarity over the past decade or so. 'Confluence of the two seas' For much of the Cold War, the United States treated the Pacific and Indian oceans as separate theaters of operation. Its military forces in the area, known as U.S. Pacific Command, focused on East Asia and the western Pacific, while the Indian Ocean figured mainly in energy security discussions, tied to the Middle East and the flow of oil through the Strait of Hormuz, which connects the Persian Gulf to the Arabian Sea. Strategic maps during that era divided the world into distinct zones of interest. But China's economic rise, India's growing influence and the increasing strategic significance of sea lanes across both oceans since the end of the Cold War blurred those old dividing lines. The Indian Ocean could no longer be treated as a secondary concern. Nor could the Pacific be thought of in isolation from what was happening further west. Japan helped give political voice to this emerging reality. In 2007, Prime Minister Shinzo Abe stood before India's parliament and spoke of the 'confluence of the two seas' − an image that deliberately linked the Indian and Pacific oceans as a single geopolitical space. Abe's message was clear: The fate of the Pacific and Indian oceans would be increasingly intertwined, and democratic states would need to work together to preserve stability. His vision resonated in Washington, Canberra and New Delhi, and it helped set the stage for the revival of the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue, or Quad. In 2018, the United States made the shift official, renaming U.S. Pacific Command as U.S. Indo-Pacific Command. What might have seemed like a bureaucratic rebranding was in fact a serious strategic move. It reflected the growing recognition that the rise of China − and Beijing's growing influence from East Africato the South Pacific − required an integrated regional approach. Framing the challenge in Indo-Pacific terms allowed Washington to strengthen its ties with India, deepen cooperation with Australia and Japan, and reposition itself as a maritime balancer across a vast strategic arc. The phrase 'free and open Indo-Pacific' quickly became the centerpiece of American regional diplomacy. It emphasized freedom of navigation, respect for international law, and democratic solidarity. But while the rhetoric stressed inclusivity and shared values, the driving force behind the concept was clear: managing China's expanding power. The Indo-Pacific framework allowed Washington to draw together a range of initiatives under a single banner, all aimed at reinforcing a rules-based order at a time when Beijing was testing its limits. Rejecting zero-sum thinking Not every country has enthusiastically embraced this vision. Many Southeast Asian states, wary of being drawn into a competition between the United States and China, have approached the Indo-Pacific concept with caution. The Association of Southeast Asian Nations' document titled Outlook on the Indo-Pacific, released in 2019, deliberately avoided framing the region in confrontational terms. Instead, it stressed dialogue and the centrality of Southeast Asia − a subtle rebuke to visions that seemed to pit democracy against authoritarianism in stark, zero-sum terms. The breadth of the Indo-Pacific concept also raises difficult questions. It covers an enormous range of political, economic and security realities. The priorities of small island states in the Pacific differ sharply from those of major continental powers such as India or Australia. Treating the Indo-Pacific as a single strategic space risks flattening these differences and could alienate smaller nations whose concerns do not always align with those of the major players. The Indo-Pacific today Recent shifts in Washington's foreign policy also complicate matters. The Trump administration's skepticism toward alliances created doubts among regional partners about the reliability of U.S. commitments. Even as the Indo-Pacific idea gained traction, questions remained about whether it represented a long-term strategy or a short-term tactical adjustment. The Biden administration maintained the Indo-Pacific framework, launching the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework for Prosperity to provide an economic counterpart to the security-heavy focus of earlier years. But the central strategic challenge remains the same: how to manage China's rise without forcing the region into a rigid geopolitical divide. For now, the Indo-Pacific framing has reshaped how policymakers, military planners and diplomats think about Asia's future. It provides a vocabulary for coordinating alliances, building new partnerships and addressing the challenges posed by China's expanding influence. Yet its long-term success will depend on whether the framework can genuinely accommodate the region's diversity − and whether it can be seen as something more than just a mechanism for great power competition and a thinly veiled strategy to contain China. Andrew Latham is Professor of Political Science, Macalester College. The Conversation is an independent and nonprofit source of news, analysis and commentary from academic experts. External Link © The Conversation
Yahoo
14-02-2025
- Business
- Yahoo
Trump Offers India Path To F-35
In something of a surprise announcement, President Donald Trump has offered the F-35 stealth fighter to India as he seeks to forge more defense deals and deeper strategic cooperation with New Delhi. The pitch comes at a time when the Indian Air Force is weighing up its options for buying new combat aircraft, with a diverse range of types already under consideration. In the past, the F-35 had widely been seen as a less likely option, based on its sensitive technologies and the fact that India operates significant quantities of advanced Russian defense systems. Trump made the F-35 offer yesterday during the visit of Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi to Washington, DC. It also comes during the Aero India 2025 international airshow, taking place at Air Force Station Yelahanka in Bengaluru, southwestern India, and also featuring the F-35, as you can read about here. 'Starting this year, we'll be increasing military sales to India by many millions of dollars, we're also paving the way to ultimately provide India with the F-35 stealth fighter,' Trump said. Speaking after Trump at a joint White House news conference, Modi made no mention of the F-35, although a joint media statement referred to a review of U.S. policy on releasing fifth-generation fighters and other high-end systems to India. Even before Trump took office, the United States was increasingly looking to India as a major arms customer. Last year, Indian arms deals worth almost $4 billion were secured by the Biden administration, including 31 MQ-9B Sky Guardian drones, up to 170 AGM-114R Hellfire air-to-ground missiles, and 310 GBU-39B/B Laser Small Diameter Bombs. Separately, India has also agreed to buy six more P-8I Neptune maritime patrol aircraft, as well as Javelin anti-armor missiles and Stryker infantry combat vehicles. India has also struck deals to manufacture the last two items locally. It's also worth noting that U.S. officials have previously suggested that the F-35 could be offered to India. Most notably, back in 2018, the then-head of U.S. Pacific Command supposedly stated that he supported the sale of the stealth fighter to India. As to how realistic Trump's F-35 offer is, that remains to be seen, but there's meanwhile no doubt that India is in the market for new fighters. In a statement provided to TWZ, Lockheed Martin also welcomed the statement: 'We are encouraged by the recent announcement by President Trump to provide the F-35 to India. Lockheed Martin stands ready to support these government-to-government decisions. We look forward to working closely with both governments on upcoming strategic procurements including the fighters, Javelin, and helicopters that will further empower the Indian Armed Forces with 21st-century security solutions and deterrence capabilities to address their pressing needs. This will be a huge step forward in the growing U.S.-India comprehensive strategic partnership.' Lockheed Martin says it has been 'a trusted and strategic partner to India for over three decades and has been instrumental in establishing the foundation of the aerospace and defense ecosystem. We've proven our commitment through various production programs like the C-130J, S-92 cabin, and the fighter wings feeding into the global supply chain.' Most prominent among the Indian Air Force's fighter requirements is the Multirole Fighter Aircraft (MRFA) competition, seeking 114 new foreign-made jets. So far, candidates for the MRFA competition include the Dassault Rafale, 36 examples of which India previously acquired, under a separate program. When the 114-aircraft requirement was launched it was billed as being specifically for single-engine types, ruling out the French product. Since then, however, the competition appears to be wide open, with the F-15EX, for example, now also being offered, and the F/A-18E/F Super Hornet also in the running. Other European options comprise the Eurofighter Typhoon and the Saab Gripen E/F, while Russia is pitching its Su-57 Felon, which is also appearing at Aero India this week, and which appears to have finally won its first export order. If India decides to procure another single-engine fighter, after all, the Indian-specific F-21 configuration of the F-16 is also a viable candidate. Of course, the F-35 is also a single-engine fighter, but offers an altogether different level of capabilities and high-end technologies than the other options. Reports in the Indian media suggest that a request for proposals for the MRFA competition will be issued this year. As part of Modi's 'Make in India' initiative, the manufacturers vying for MRFA will need to offer local production and technology transfer. In the past, there was a plan to buy a portion of the new fighters off-the-shelf purchases and build the others under license in India — this is something that Russia has offered specifically as part of its Su-57 bid. Local manufacture of the F-35 might not be an option for India, especially in the near term and it's by no means clear if New Delhi would drop this requirement. However, the stealth fighter could potentially be offered with other offsets, including component production and the transfer of certain technologies. This could be particularly interesting for India as it embarks on its own next-generation fighter program, the Advanced Medium Combat Aircraft (AMCA), but it would likely still be limited to a significant degree based on India's close military ties with Russia. Ultimately, the MRFA program seeks to field interim equipment to help address a contracting Indian Air Force combat fleet and to fill the gap before the planned arrival of the AMCA, India's homegrown fifth-generation fighter. Like other warplanes in this category, the AMCA will feature a low-observable design, including internal weapons bays, new-generation active electronically scanned array (AESA) radar, and advanced avionics, and will be intended, from the outset, to operate alongside drones as part of 'manned-unmanned' teaming concept. The latest reports indicate that the AMCA is not expected to enter service until 2036, although there remains a question as to whether a potential F-35 deal could come to fruition within this timeframe. Were it to be made possible, the F-35 would offer an off-the-shelf means of drastically enhancing Indian Air Force capabilities at a time when the service is being rapidly outpaced by developments in China. It could even have the potential to completely transform the Indian Air Force and its future fighter procurement plans. On the Indian side, the government would still have to approve funds for what would be a hugely costly investment. 'There is a process by which platforms are acquired,' Indian Foreign Secretary Vikram Misri told reporters in Washington, sounding a word of caution about a potential F-35 deal. Intergovernmental negotiations have not started and the U.S. Congress would also still need to approve any potential sale. Bearing in mind the sensitive military technologies involved, this could be far from straightforward. In particular, India is an enthusiastic customer of Russian defense products, including air defense systems. India operates the S-400 long-range surface-to-air missile system; the very same equipment that led to Turkey being ejected from the F-35 program in the past. More recently, the U.S. stance on transferring the F-35 to Turkey appears to have softened, but any such deal would still require Turkey to give up its S-400s. Turkey had refused to give up its S-400 systems and had to sacrifice its F-35s (and an industrial stake in the program) as a result. Were India to be offered the same choice, it's entirely unclear if it would agree. At the same time, while Turkey has acquired only a small number of different Russian-made weapons, India has long been one of Moscow's biggest arms importers, resulting in a close military relationship and a significant 'Russian lobby' in Indian defense circles. Ahead of Trump's announcement, Angad Singh, an Indian defense journalist and contributor to this website, also highlighted the S-400 as a major sticking point for any potential F-35 deal: 'Regardless of political winds in the United States, our case for the F-35 is complicated by the S-400 and the hordes of other Soviet/Russian equipment we operate.' In addition to traditional resistance to selling the highest-end U.S. defense technologies to countries operating particular Russian weapons systems, there is also the very real worry that these technologies could find their way into adversaries' hands by other means. Concerns of this kind have derailed similar potential deals in the past. The United States has safeguards in place to keep sensitive military technology and capabilities from falling into Russian or Chinese hands, and India's close ties with Moscow are likely to be a key factor in the approval of any F-35 deal. On the other hand, we are very much entering a new era in U.S. politics and foreign policy and it might well be the case that India's relationship with Russia, and its Russian-made defense systems, are no longer seen as such a barrier to F-35 sales. Perhaps a deal could also be cut, in which India receives equivalent U.S. air defense systems to replace the S-400. While it's highly significant that Trump would pitch the F-35 to India in this way, there are many more hurdles to negotiate before we even get to a point where a formal offer can be made. Essentially, what we are seeing now is a review of U.S. fifth-generation fighter policy for India. What happens next is very much unclear, with Indian fighter procurements already well known for their unpredictability. Putting aside the F-35 for a moment, it's also noteworthy that the U.S. government is increasing its efforts to establish defense ties with India. As well as the potential for more military sales, and not just of fighters, Washington may well be looking to take advantage of Russia's weakened position on the international stage and take its place by forging a strong defense relationship with India. This would be especially important in terms of the broader geopolitical situation in the Indo-Pacific region, where both the United States and India view China as their main long-term security threat and strategic rival. 'In our meeting today, the prime minister and I reaffirmed that strong cooperation among the United States, India, Australia, and Japan, and it's crucial really, to maintaining peace and prosperity tranquility, even, in the Indo-Pacific,' Trump said after his meeting with Modri. Ultimately, while the F-35 offer is about what could be a highly lucrative new fighter export deal for the U.S., it is just as much about driving a wedge between Moscow and New Delhi and helping build up the Indian military as a valuable counterbalance to China in the Indo-Pacific region. Contact the author: thomas@
