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Time of India
a day ago
- Politics
- Time of India
Kashmir 1989–90: Veterans call for reckoning over state failures & forgotten exodus
1 2 With Pic Times News Network Chandigarh: The Kashmir insurgency of 1989–90 remains one of the most turbulent and tragic episodes in India's contemporary history. It was not merely the rise of an armed rebellion—it signified a complete breakdown of state authority, intelligence apparatus, and moral leadership. These views were expressed on Saturday at a literary event held at the Chandigarh Press Club, where key voices from the military and strategic community came together to reflect on these defining events and the enduring lessons they offer. General V P Malik (retd), former Chief of the Army Staff, questioned the deeper systemic failures that led to the Valley's implosion. "Why did the law and order and security situation in Jammu and Kashmir collapse so completely in 1990?" he asked. "How did the culture of Kashmiriyat—rooted in peaceful coexistence—get overtaken by militant Islamist ideology?" Gen. Malik emphasized the need to study the past to safeguard the future, noting that the Kashmir crisis carries significant lessons for today's policymakers. Former army chief also spoke about deep necked corruption in the Jammu and Kashmir administration/government at that time. Col Daljeet Singh Cheema, author and motivational speaker, traced the insurgency to Pakistan's long-standing refusal to accept the terms of Partition. by Taboola by Taboola Sponsored Links Sponsored Links Promoted Links Promoted Links You May Like Memperdagangkan CFD Emas dengan salah satu spread terendah? IC Markets Mendaftar Undo He argued that after suffering a decisive defeat in the 1971 war, Pakistan shifted its strategy, adopting General Zia-ul-Haq's doctrine of "Bleed India with a thousand cuts"—a strategy that fuels insurgency through proxy warfare and religious radicalization. "An Islamic state that believes it can rely solely on Allah and its Army, and sees its faith as superior, will not change its policy easily," Col. Cheema warned. The event marked the formal launch of a book on Kashmir Insurgency authored by Colonel Yoginder Kandhari (retd). Drawing from firsthand experiences, RTI disclosures, and interviews with key stakeholders, Kandhari's work offers a hard-hitting account of how institutional silence, media inaction, and policy paralysis contributed to one of modern India's most successful campaigns of ethnic cleansing—the exodus of the Kashmiri Pandit community. Col Charan Jeev Singh (retd) further highlighted the administrative collapse and the conspicuous absence of timely state response. Veterans, including Col Jagdeep Singh (retd), also shared personal insights, emotional and strategic costs of those years.
New Indian Express
19-05-2025
- Politics
- New Indian Express
Operation Sindoor an emphatic message showing both our political will and military capability: Gen VP Malik
CHANDIGARH: General VP Malik, former Army Chief who led India to victory in the 1999 Kargil War, spoke to Harpreet Bajwa of The New Indian Express on Operation Sindoor. He said the use of terrorists has long been an integral part of Pakistan's DNA, ethos, and military doctrine. Regarding its nuclear threats, he added that Pakistan now understands any misadventure could lead to its complete destruction. Excerpts from the conversation: The Indian armed forces successfully executed Operation Sindoor. How do you view it? See, it had become necessary to take action against Pakistan because they have been continuing the proxy war for a long time and they crossed a red line in Pahalgam. I call it a red line — after that, we had to take action. So, we took very strong action, and this time the approach was a whole-of-nation effort. It wasn't just the armed forces; we began with political and diplomatic steps. We initiated action on the Indus Water Treaty, which is both an economic and political tool. Then we launched Operation Sindoor, a kinetic action. We had already taken earlier steps like the surgical strikes in 2016 and Operation Balakot, yet they continued. This time, a much stronger response was necessary to send a clear message. I see Operation Sindoor as very successful — a firm and emphatic message demonstrating both our political will and our military confidence and capability. When you were the Army chief, the Kargil War took place. What is the difference now and then? There was a significant difference at that time—not just politically, but militarily as well. They had come under the garb of jihadis. Initially, they claimed to be jihadis, and it took us some time to realise that they were actually Pakistani army personnel. So, we were reacting to a situation that had already landed in our lap. The conflict took place in high-altitude mountainous terrain, making the operation extremely difficult. We had to operate with shortages of weapons and absolutely no intelligence. The conditions were entirely different in terms of terrain and the equipment we had. What truly stood out in the Kargil War was the courage—shaurya, veerta—the sheer bravery of our Army. Another key point is that during Kargil, we were still cautious. Although we were capable of going across the Line of Control, we were restrained. The Cabinet at that time had imposed a clear condition: do not cross the Line of Control. It was a defensive restriction, not a proactive stance. But this time, politically, the armed forces were given full freedom—and that freedom has been effectively utilised. We must also not forget that today we are much better off as far as our technology is concerned. The capability we have built over the last 25 years is important. What is the difference at the western front then and now? That time we kept it as a limited war and this time also it is a limited war. That time the limited war meant we remained in J&K and we were fighting over a front of 160 kilometres. It was a defensive war, the objective and mandate given to us was throw them out but without crossing the Line of Control. But the mandate given this time was to go and hit all the terrorist camps and their headquarters. The way innocent tourists were selectively massacred in Pahalgam, it appears that it was a complete intelligence failure. What are your comments? This matter needs to be investigated. I am sure some inquires must be going on and it has not been made public. To some extent you can consider it a lack of intelligence. I do not want to point figures at anybody until the inquiry report is out.
