6 days ago
Caste census could further strengthen the dominant OBCs
Written by Viplov Wingkar
The central government's decision to enumerate caste in the upcoming Census has invoked much excitement, with both the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) and Congress heralding it as a transformative moment. The prevailing assumption across the political spectrum is that it will usher in a new era of politics.
This optimism is not just misplaced but naïve. Of course, there is a possibility for emancipatory politics — but there are other factors as well. One possible impact of the caste enumeration exercise will be the further empowerment of the locally dominant OBC castes, without forging a pan-Indian OBC alliance. The caste census could end up fuelling a politics of convenience, and it may worsen the atmosphere for more vulnerable castes, especially the Dalits.
B R Ambedkar, in Annihilation of Caste, laid bare a truth about Indian society and politics: Every caste is a self-conscious entity, its identity forged in opposition to others, devoid of fraternal bonds. This is what makes caste a labyrinth of hierarchies within hierarchies, and ensures that alliances across castes are brittle at best.
Consider the Dalits and Adivasis, whose shared experience of marginalisation and numerical strength — roughly 25 per cent of India's population — should, in theory, make them a formidable anti-caste force. Yet there is hardly any pan-Indian Dalit-Adivasi unity today, thanks to sub-caste rivalries, cultural gaps, and regional loyalties. Despite their shared oppression and strong independent mobilisation, the Chamars of Uttar Pradesh and the Mahars of Maharashtra rarely come together to represent a united political voice. They seldom even agree on what the broad strategy for the Dalit movement should be.
How, then, could we expect the OBCs — a sprawling category encompassing hundreds of castes — to transcend these divides?
On the other hand, by quantifying the numerical strength of OBCs, the Census might embolden dominant castes, who are usually the numerically dominant ones. These groups have already leveraged Mandal politics since the 1990s to secure power at the state level, with their ascendancy often coming at the expense of smaller OBC castes and their lower-caste counterparts. Moreover, they have failed to build a broader political narrative, focusing instead on region-specific political interests. It is hard to find a Kurmi-led organisation in Patna allying with a Yadav-dominated bloc in Lucknow.
The father of sociology, Ibn Khaldun, discusses the concept of asabiyyah, or social solidarity. According to him, this type of cohesive bonding progresses from the barbaric stage (fragmented) to the highest civilised stage, with each smaller unit of cohesion being replaced by a broader one. Each caste's inherent exclusivity undermines the kind of social cohesion required for an OBC or Bahujan alliance — asabiyyah exists today at the level of individual castes, not yet diluted enough to be superseded by higher forms of cohesion.
The optimism surrounding the caste census hinges on another flawed assumption: that we are unable to eradicate caste inequalities because we lack data. This assumption is naïve. History shows that data does not inherently translate into mobilisation. The global working class, for instance, is exhaustively documented — from Marx's Capital to modern ILO reports — yet a unified proletarian movement remains a mirage. In India, the Periodic Labour Force Survey reveals stark inequalities, but the working class languishes, fragmented by caste, trade, nationality, and region.
Similarly, the caste census may mirror OBC realities but will not automatically forge a broader coalition. As Antonio Gramsci might argue, political consciousness requires organic intellectuals and sustained organisation — not mere numbers on a page.
However, Indian intellectuals today still follow the framework of the Lohiaite style of caste politics. This model has no doubt been reasonably successful, but we must also ask whether it is suited for post-enumeration caste politics. Socialist parties, from the RJD to the BSP, mostly rely on stitching together a bare-minimum coalition of castes that will get them a stake in governance. In such coalitions, the fewer the number of partners, the more convenient it is to claim more. Is there any feasible alternative to this politics of convenience? Another question we must contemplate is: What will be left for the Dalits if the dominant OBC communities are further politically strengthened?
The conflict between the Dwijas and Shudras has not brought much relief to Dalits. When it comes to Dalit atrocities, states like Tamil Nadu — long ruled by non-Brahmin parties — are no better than Brahmin-ruled states. Bihar, one of the crucial centres of OBC politics, is not great for Dalits either. It was the Mahagathbandhan government, not the NDA, which released Anand Mohan, the former MP convicted for the mob lynching of Dalit IAS officer Krishnaiah.
Socialist politics led by OBCs have achieved great victories. It would be better if OBC leaders also fought for the rights of other lower castes. Stronger cohesion should be the response to prevalent caste inequality. Caste enumeration might jeopardise these possibilities by binding leaders to their specific castes and interests.
The writer is an assistant professor of philosophy at B K Birla College (Autonomous), Kalyan
