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Europe's LNG Gamble Exposed by Middle East War
Oil and the security of its supply have stolen the media spotlight in the context of the new Middle East war, and with good reason. Ever since Israel first bombed Iran, diesel prices have soared, jet fuel prices have soared, and importers have been troubled. For Europe, the situation is even worse due to natural gas.
Europe has been hurt more than others by the diesel price surge because it has boosted its imports considerably over the past years. About 20% of the diesel Europe consumes comes from imports, and a lot of these imports come from the Middle East. The situation is not much different in jet fuel. Europe depends on imports and a solid chunk of these imports comes from the Middle East.
What's true of these essential fuels is doubly true of natural gas—even though direct imports of gas from the Middle East constitute a modest 10% of total imports. Yet they constitute a substantial portion of global gas exports, so any suggestion of disrupted supply affects gas prices in exactly the same way it has affected oil prices—and makes a vital commodity less affordable for Europeans.
The latest import figures from the European Commission, for 2024, show that Norway was the EU's biggest supplier of natural gas via pipeline, and the United States was its biggest supplier of liquefied natural gas. Other large suppliers of LNG included—awkwardly—Russia, with 17.5% of the total inflows of LNG, and Algeria, with 10.7%. Qatar's share in EU LNG imports stood at 10.4%, largely because Qatar prefers to deal in long-term contracts, and European Union planners don' it is not these 10.4% that matter. It is the fact that around 20% of global LNG trade passes through the Strait of Hormuz and Iran threatened to close the waterway in response to Israeli and U.S. attacks. This prompted a jump in European natural gas prices by a fitting 20% per the Financial Times, which highlighted the dangers of import dependence in energy commodities.
To be fair, the European leadership is aware of these dangers. They are one reason for many European leaders' near-obsession with the energy transition, on the assumption that wind and solar would be able to provide local energy—which is true—and that this energy can replace that provided by gas—which is not true. The latter was proven rather conclusively by the April 28 events in Spain, although it will be a while before the facts become accepted.
In the meantime, Europe is in for more suffering, even if Iran doesn't close the Strait of Hormuz, which for the time being seems to have been taken off the table amid ceasefire efforts. The reason is that Europe needs to refill its gas storage caverns for next winter. Even if it cancels the 90% refill rate requirement, it still needs to buy a lot of gas, most of it on the spot market because of that aversion to long-term gas commitments it believes is part and parcel of the transition effort. And geopolitics has made LNG costlier—which will add billions to the refill bill.
Earlier this year, it became clear that Europe's bill for natural gas would be higher this year than last because the winter of 2024-25 was colder and storage levels fell lower than in the previous two years. So, this year, Europe needs to buy more gas, adding some $11.2 billion to its total tab. But that was before the latest Middle Eastern war broke out. Now, the tab has gone further up—and Europe is already struggling with high energy costs, not least because of its dependence on LNG imports.
Once again, then, Europe would need to rely on luck. If it is lucky, demand for liquefied natural gas from Asia will remain tepid, as it has been over the first half of the year. If it is lucky, the war between Israel and Iran will be over within the month, removing the supply disruption premium from LNG prices. If it is lucky, finally, winter 2025-26 will be as mild as winter 2023-24 and gas demand will be lower.
Even if Europe gets lucky on all three, however, the cost of its energy will remain elevated compared to places such as China and the United States—its main business rivals. The reason is as simple as it is unpalatable for European political decision-makers: local supply. Both the U.S. and China are putting their local natural gas resources to good use. Europe isn't, although in all fairness, it doesn't have as much of an easily accessible gas resource abundance as either the U.S. or even China.
The staunch refusal to develop any hydrocarbon resources locally, however, is as counterproductive as the refusal to make long-term LNG supply commitments. It is a refusal to acknowledge the reality of energy demand and supply. The sooner Europe gets over this, the better for energy supply security.
By Irina Slav for
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