Latest news with #geostrategic
Malay Mail
2 days ago
- Business
- Malay Mail
Singapore will choose principles over power in global conflicts, defence minister tells Shangri-La Dialogue
SINGAPORE, June 1 — Singapore's Defence Minister Chan Chun Sing today made clear that Singapore's foreign policy will remain grounded in principles — not alliances — as the city-state navigates an increasingly polarised global landscape. According to Channel New Asia (CNA), Chan said: 'If we have to choose sides, may we choose the side of principles — principles that uphold a global order where we do not descend into the law of the jungle, where the mighty do what they wish and the weak suffer what they must.' This approach, he said, helps ensure 'states, big and small, have a fair chance to compete and improve the lives of their people through trade and not war'. The remarks were delivered during a session titled Enhancing Security Cooperation for a Stable Asia-Pacific, alongside defence ministers Billy Joseph of Papua New Guinea and Pål Jonson of Sweden, at the final plenary session of the Shangri-La Dialogue. Chan, attending his first Shangri-La Dialogue as defence minister, described South-east Asia's engagement with the United States, China and other powers as a 'geostrategic necessity'. 'For Singapore, we believe that taking sides, regardless of issues and context, breeds irrelevance; and if one is irrelevant, it will almost certainly require (one) to take sides,' he reportedly said. 'We look at every situation carefully' Pressed during the session on whether choosing principles meant not choosing sides, Chan clarified that Singapore assesses every issue independently. 'Singapore does not base its positions on who the key players are in a given issue,' he reportedly said. 'Instead, we look at every situation very carefully to decide what are the principles that are at stake.' He cited the war in Ukraine as an example where various interests are involved — from supply chain disruptions to the fundamental issue of sovereignty. 'But if I may suggest, the highest order of concern for all of us should be the principles of how we conduct international relationships,' he was quoted as saying. 'If one country, whether big or small, can march into another country on the basis that they will want to right the wrongs of history, then I think we live in a very dangerous world.' He warned that such behaviour, if normalised, would leave 'very little room' for smaller countries like Singapore — which has been independent for just 60 years — to chart their own path. Standing firm even under pressure Chan said Singapore has consistently taken principled positions, even when they diverge from those of major powers. 'There have been instances in history where superpowers went in to another country, a smaller country, and we objected,' he reportedly said. 'There have been instances whereby the rules on the freedom of navigation have been violated, and we have objected.' Asked if Singapore ever fears being penalised by superpowers for not toeing the line, Chan replied: 'Of course, there are risks. But there is a greater risk that when principles are not upheld by countries, big and small, we live in a more dangerous world.' He reaffirmed Singapore's commitment to working with like-minded partners through bilateral, plurilateral, and multilateral networks — not as a bloc, but for the 'common good'.
Telegraph
3 days ago
- Business
- Telegraph
Warfare is changing by the day, but Britain is still decades behind
When Lord George Robertson led the Strategic Defence Review (SDR) in 1997, the GDP of the UK was greater than those of China and India combined. America reigned supreme, the only other superpower, the Soviet Union, having slowly dissolved after losing the Cold War eight years previously. Lord George is back as one of three leads of the latest SDR, widely expected to be published on Monday. But the geostrategic landscape is very different now. No longer can we afford to luxuriate in that uni-polar moment of Western and Nato supremacy. China, Iran and North Korea are functioning surprisingly well as a de facto alliance in supporting Russia in its war on Ukraine. And that is a real war of national survival, not the politically caveated, limited military interventions of the global war on terrorism. This is war at speed and scale, a war mixing the timeless requirements of industrial production with the cutting-edge technologies of the digital age: smart sensors, big-data, cloud connectivity, artificial intelligence, robotics. The new ways of warfare are evolving at dizzying speed. Technical evolution, the obsolescence cycle, is now measured in weeks. Dual-use technology – that with civil and military utility – is blended with more conventional munitions; decades-old assumptions are upended overnight; the ways and means of warfare are being comprehensively disrupted. Historically, this is a change that happens every century or so: Napoleon's Levée en Masse, sail to steam, the aeroplane. That a superpower's navy has, in the Black Sea, been defeated by a country without a navy is a wake up call to all. And here lies the big risk – the victor's paradox. 'Top Dogs' are loath to shed that which put them on top, that in which they have made big investments and of which they are masters. Paradigm shifts are the opportunity for smart challengers to abandon the previous, flagging chase and master the emerging world quicker than the current champions can adapt. China, especially, has had a plan to do exactly this for the last few decades, with massive investments in, inter alia, cyber, AI and hypersonic missiles to add a technological edge to the military mass it has built in parallel: its navy now has more ships than America's. It is using Ukraine, and Kashmir, as a proving ground. Russia has learned (slowly, as it is a corrupt kleptocracy) with grim determination the lessons of modern warfare – exemplified by its recent invention of fibre-optically steered drones. It also knows how to mobilise a war economy. In contrast, and despite much pumped-up rhetoric, most of Nato, including the UK, has demonstrated a reluctance to abandon the old paradigm. Yes, we have bought some drones, but we have bought them as if we were buying sophisticated manned warplanes. We may be buying them slightly quicker now, but these are percentage changes on a system that still takes years, and millions of pounds, to buy tens. Ukraine is on schedule to make four million drones this year. Allied to that is that Western militaries have mirrored a society that has become ever more regulated and risk averse. The British Army is down to 14 artillery pieces, which were bought as stop-gaps. There is still no certification and so no clearance to fire them on a UK range. Similar restrictions apply to innovative drone training – but what if one crashes? The paradox here is that by trying to eradicate every small risk we make the big one – war – more likely. Ultimately we aim to deter, and deterrence depends on credibility. Credibility hinges on the proven military capability to win and the political will to engage with force and see it through. Small forces, a limited production capacity and supply chain to rapidly expand and evolve them, and a risk averse culture that trains and employs them will not impress allies or deter enemies. The SDR's other authors alongside Lord George are Fiona Hill, a proven free-thinker, and General Richard Barrons who was one of the first to write about this changing paradigm ten years ago. Their SDR should not be read as recent reviews have been – a relative tally of platform numbers and the size of the residual, 'bonsai' military. That paradigm was already broken several defence reviews ago – tweaking it is but to fiddle with the increasingly irrelevant. The reader should ask instead: to what extent is this a root and branch reform of our now sclerotic system, and to what extent is it going to re-orientate our whole Defence Enterprise – MOD Head Office processes and accountabilities, agile adaptation and procurement, secure supply chains, rapid adoption of technological advances, expansion of reserve forces? If it charts a clear path to a revised 'theory of winning' that can credibly generate a wartime force with the mass and lethality to defeat our foes then it will be a good review. If it continues the usual horse-trading between the individual services over their peacetime structure then it will have been a missed opportunity. With the US making it clear that Europe must look after its own defence we have no safety net if we get it wrong. But America's position gives us an opportunity as well: the chance, the obligation, to show genuine leadership in Europe.
Japan Times
15-05-2025
- Politics
- Japan Times
Trump's Greenland threats spark Iceland jitters
U.S. President Donald Trump's threats to take over Greenland have neighbouring Iceland rethinking its long-term defense, currently provided by the United States and NATO as the volcanic island has no military of its own. Around 74% of Icelanders think Trump's interest in Greenland, and in the Arctic in general, pose a threat to their country, according to a recent poll by public broadcaster RUV. "We can easily put ourselves in Greenlanders' shoes," said Dagur Eggertsson, an Icelandic member of Parliament for the governing Social Democrats. The White House under Trump has so far not voiced any plans for Iceland, a subarctic island in the North Atlantic between the U.K. and Greenland and home to 390,000 people. Trump "is threatening Greenland every day but doesn't say a thing about Iceland," said Valur Ingimundarson, a professor of contemporary history at the University of Iceland. He noted that while Iceland shares Greenland's geostrategic location, it does not possess the mineral riches believed to be hidden under Greenland's soil. And like Greenland, Iceland has close military ties with the United States. Washington has guaranteed Iceland's defense since 1951 following an agreement between the two NATO members. During World War II, the Keflavik military base was a key U.S. hub, and it remained important to the alliance during the Cold War. The 1951 agreement enables the United States to maintain troops on the island but allows Iceland to set limits on the number of soldiers and to unilaterally cancel the agreement with 18 months' notice. Subsea infrastructure Although the United States officially closed the Keflavik base in 2006, it returned following Russia's 2014 invasion of Crimea. "The U.S. military base has not formally been reopened in Iceland, but American troops are here the whole year round, if on a rotational basis," Ingimundarson said. At stake are underwater telecommunications and energy infrastructure, at risk of potential Chinese or Russian sabotage. Beijing and Moscow have been increasingly active in the Arctic as climate change opens up sea routes. As a result, no one in Iceland has officially questioned the U.S. presence or Reykjavik's military dependence on Washington. "Iceland and the U.S. have a longstanding and close relationship on security and defense matters, based on shared interest in the North Atlantic and the Arctic," the foreign ministry said. "There is no reason to assume that this will change." Establishing an Icelandic army has always been a taboo subject. "If the government would put it on the agenda, it would result in a divisive public debate, with those opposing the idea most likely having the upper hand," Ingimundarson said. Yet the tide appears to be gradually turning, said Eggertsson, the member of Parliament. "We are in a time of transformation, where the clear vision from the post-World War years that Europe should not rearm, but be provided defense under the NATO-U.S. umbrella, is giving way," he said. Plan B Advocating a multilateral approach to security, Iceland is now shifting its gaze toward Europe as Trump casts U.S. defense ties with NATO allies into doubt. Given the unpredictability of the Trump administration, "we should have as a plan B (to) try to establish a close relationship with the EU," Ingimundarson said. The foreign ministry has already made it clear that partnerships with the European Union "are expected to deepen further in the coming years." "Iceland would definitely support a European NATO if the United States would withdraw from the alliance," Ingimundarson said. That would be an "easier option" than transferring European defense to the EU — of which Iceland is not a member. "It wouldn't necessitate Iceland becoming an EU member, if it would seek to disentangle itself from the U.S.," he said. Iceland launched EU membership negotiations in 2009 following its 2008 economic collapse. The talks were suspended in 2013, but a referendum on their resumption is due in 2027. EU membership would not just be about safeguarding the island's security. "It is also about economic prosperity, low tariffs with our biggest trading partners, fisheries and more," Eggertsson said. Fisheries policy would be the biggest stumbling block, with Iceland keen to retain total control over its lucrative fishing zones, a crucial pillar of its economy.
South China Morning Post
11-05-2025
- Politics
- South China Morning Post
Vietnamese leader's ‘pragmatism' is old wine in new bottles
Feel strongly about these letters, or any other aspects of the news? Share your views by emailing us your Letter to the Editor at [email protected] or filling in this Google form . Submissions should not exceed 400 words, and must include your full name and address, plus a phone number for verification Advertisement I refer to the op-ed, 'To Lam – the pragmatic leader putting Vietnam on the geostrategic map ( May 6 )'. Depicting the Communist Party of Vietnam's general secretary as a pragmatic statesman risks mistaking optics for strategy. In reality, Lam's early leadership reflects not bold recalibration, but a reactive approach to diplomacy shaped by external pressures and internal constraints. First, while To Lam may be a 'pragmatist', exaggerating this trait obscures the reality that his diplomacy remains largely ceremonial and defensive, not transformational. He has neither redefined Vietnam's long-standing ' bamboo diplomacy ' nor introduced new strategic thinking. Instead, he has inherited a tradition of careful hedging, now increasingly out of sync with a polarised international order. His foreign policy remains consistent with Vietnam's institutional norms and shows no evidence of personal vision. Second, the article overlooks the strategic shift unleashed by Donald Trump's re-election as US president. Lam's three-day visit to Beijing last August, taken shortly during his brief presidential term, and his meeting with then US president Joe Biden last September in New York followed an outdated script. However, with Trump back in power and threatening tariffs of up to 46 per cent, Vietnam has found itself in a vulnerable position . President Xi Jinping 's visit to Hanoi, less than two weeks after Trump's tariff escalation , was less about Vietnam's geopolitical ascent than China's attempt to prevent it from sliding towards Washington. Meanwhile, Lam's visit to Russia for its Victory Day parade and French President Emmanuel Macron's planned visit to Vietnam offer little strategic substance. Advertisement Third, Lam's internal base remains brittle. Vietnam's young people are disengaged and increasingly outward-looking. Lingering political apathy and outward emigration reflect a system more concerned with control than consensus. A nation cannot sustain foreign ambitions disconnected from domestic renewal.
