Latest news with #politicalIslam
Jordan Times
20-05-2025
- Politics
- Jordan Times
Muslim Brotherhood 'threat to national cohesion' —French report
By AFP - May 20,2025 - Last updated at May 20,2025 PARIS — The Muslim Brotherhood movement is a "threat to national cohesion" in France and action must be taken to stop the spread of "political Islam", according to a report to be presented to President Emmanuel Macron on Wednesday. "The reality of this threat, even if it is long-term and does not involve violent action, poses a risk of damage to the fabric of society and republican institutions... and, more broadly, to national cohesion," said the report, a copy of which was obtained by AFP on Tuesday. The report, prepared by two senior civil servants, is to be examined by the Defence Council on Wednesday. France and Germany have the biggest Muslim populations among European Union countries. The report pointed to the spread of Islamism "from the bottom up" and at the municipal level, adding the phenomenon constituted "a threat in the short to medium term". In France, the movement is "based on a solid structure, but political Islamism is spreading primarily at the local level," the authors stressed. "Resolute and long-term action on the ground seems necessary to stem the rise of political Islamism," they said. The report highlighted the "subversive nature of the project", saying it aims "to gradually bring about changes to local or national rules," particularly those concerning secularism and gender equality. Such "municipal Islamism" risks affecting the public sphere and local politics, the report said, pointing to "the creation of increasingly numerous Islamist ecosystems." France's tough-talking Interior Minister Bruno Retailleau expressed concern on Tuesday about "a low-level Islamism" whose "ultimate goal is to turn the entire French society to Sharia law." But the report authors said that "no recent document demonstrates the desire of Muslims in France to establish an Islamic state in France or to enforce Sharia law there." Muslims in France (Musulmans de France), formerly the Union of Islamic Organisations of France, is identified as "the national branch of the Muslim Brotherhood in France." "We are not dealing with aggressive separatism" but a "subtle (...) yet no less subversive aim for the institutions," the authors said. The report estimates that there are 139 places of worship affiliated with Muslims of France, with an additional 68 considered close to the federation. This represents seven percent of the 2,800 Muslim places of worship listed in France, the report said. The Islamist movement is losing its influence in the Arab world and "focusing its efforts on Europe", it added. A public awareness campaign must be combined with renewed efforts to promote a "secular discourse" as well as "strong and positive signals to the Muslim community" including the teaching of Arabic, the report said.
Arab News
07-05-2025
- Politics
- Arab News
A new regional order brings major challenges
After more than 70 turbulent years in the history of the Middle East, a new generation may be looking for something better (AFP) Short Url If Francis Fukuyama can get it wrong about the end of history, I can take such a risk about the new regional order in the Middle East. Amid all its complexity, there might be a simple solution to the region's problems and it all boils down to coming to terms with the phenomenon of political Islam, with its various manifestations. Please note that I said 'simple,' I did not say 'easy.' What I am trying to explain is that the new order may have one major challenge instead of a multiplicity of smaller ones. In every conflict in the region, if one digs deep enough, we find at its root an as-yet-unresolved relationship between religion and state. This is not specific to the Middle East, Europe struggled with this one for centuries. It may not even be a problem with religion; it is probably much more of a problem with the state. Religions have been there for centuries, states are the newcomers. Relations between Islam and the state were much healthier in the liberal first half of the 20th century, before a new order of secular nationalists came about in the early 1950s and suppressed religion. Under the oppressive boot of military dictatorships, religion was radicalized and radicalism became contagious, spreading across the region through Egyptian, Syrian and Iraqi militants. There is little doubt that change is happening in the region. As if the advent of Donald Trump as president of the US was not enough, the Gaza war has shaken up the region, with Lebanon, Iraq and Yemen all joining in through their nonstate actors — Islamist militias with links to Iran. These were the culmination of the Shiite revival that started in Iran in the 1950s, spreading through the region and becoming radicalized under suppression by the shah and Saddam Hussein. In every conflict in the region, if one digs deep enough, we find at its root an as-yet-unresolved relationship between religion and state Nadim Shehadi The collapse of the Assad regime complicated matters but also made us revise our ideas. It all came too suddenly and challenged our perceptions and understanding of radical Sunni Islam. World leaders are sending their officials to snoop around and figure out the new Syrian leadership, while also meeting President Ahmad Al-Sharaa on the sidelines of international events. Even the Palestinian-Israeli conflict was at the point of being resolved 30 years ago, when Israel and the Palestine Liberation Organization signed the Oslo Accords. That was until it became a problem between the PLO and Hamas, and it still is: the state represented by the PLO needs to find a way to coexist with a radicalized version of political Islam. It is true that Hamas won the 2006 elections, but that was almost two decades ago and a whole new generation has been born since. The EU and the US, which pushed for the elections to be held, had to reject the outcome and there have not been any elections since. In Egypt, where the institution of the army has dominated politics since the 1950s, relations with the Muslim Brotherhood are also unresolved. Elections in 2011 after the so-called Arab Spring brought in Mohammed Morsi of the Muslim Brotherhood, but a massive popular revolt brought him down. There are similar complex relations between the state and political Islam in Jordan, Tunisia and Morocco. Unresolved relations between religion and state may become part of a global revolt against politicians. But again, it is not a simple division between religious and secular people. There is significant overlap, with individuals sometimes crossing from one side to the other. The French debate over radical Islam is interesting, particularly the analysis of Olivier Roy, who says that it is not Islam that is radicalized, it is radicalization that is Islamized. I tend to agree with this and there is plenty of evidence to support it, with Marxists and nationalists having joined Islamist movements, particularly in the 1980s. For them, religion was seen as a useful tool to recruit followers, in the same way Latin American liberation theology used Catholicism. Two cases are illustrative of this phenomenon. Firstly, the Hezbollah military commander Imad Mughniyeh initially trained with the PLO in Lebanon. Part of the reason for him shifting allegiance was the PLO's support for Saddam Hussein in the Iran-Iraq War. The second is the case of a Christian Palestinian member of the PLO's student brigade, Munir Shafiq. Shafiq was a Maoist who converted to Sunni Islam and had great influence through his writings. The main division in Israel is between the religious and the secular elements of society, both of which can go to extremes Nadim Shehadi Israel is also not immune to this problem of the relationship between religion and state. The main division in the country is between the religious and the secular elements of society, both of which can go to extremes. Radical religious parties can have far more influence because of the particularities of the electoral system. Hamas' Oct. 7, 2023, operation also helped radical Jewish politicians win more support. Radicals from both sides indirectly support each other. Turkiye is a perfect example of this division between religious and secular tendencies. Even Iran is changing. I am told by Iranian friends that in some areas of Tehran you might think you are in Paris, with art galleries and music concerts attended by a mixed audience and with women barely wearing their headscarves. I may have simplified a complex problem for the sake of understanding it better. A new order in the region will have to resolve the issue of the relationship between religion and state, but there is no one-size-fits-all solution. Every society will have to find its own way of dealing with this regionwide challenge. A new order is not announced on state television or through communiques; it evolves by millions of individuals going through a process of revising their ideas. We do not need aid, we need to get our act together. After more than 70 turbulent years in the history of the region, a new generation may be looking for something better. Nadim Shehadi is an economist and political adviser. X: @Confusezeus Disclaimer: Views expressed by writers in this section are their own and do not necessarily reflect Arab News' point of view
Arab News
07-05-2025
- Politics
- Arab News
Syrian leader heads to France in first European trip
What recent arrests and ban mean for political influence of Jordan's Muslim Brotherhood DUBAI: Jordan's recent ban on the Muslim Brotherhood marks a historic rupture in the kingdom's political landscape, ending decades of uneasy coexistence and raising urgent questions about the future of political Islam in the country. The Brotherhood is now outlawed after authorities uncovered arms caches and arrested last month 16 people for allegedly plotting rocket and drone attacks that authorities said 'aimed at targeting national security, sowing chaos and sabotaging within Jordan.' Interior Minister Mazin Al-Farrayeh's subsequent decision to declare membership of the organization and promotion of its ideology as illegal reinforced a 2020 court ruling that had been largely unenforced in what analysts described as a 'strategy of containment.' Jordan's announcement comes at a time of heightened regional tension and surging Islamist activism amid Israel's war on Gaza. The question on many political observers' lips since the arrests has been: Why was Jordan targeted by Islamists, and how will the kingdom respond in the coming days? The Brotherhood's resurgence in the political spotlight coincided with the eruption of the war on Gaza, as it staged nationwide pro-Palestinian demonstrations. The Brotherhood's political trajectory shifted significantly following the government's liberalization process in the wake of the April 1989 protests in southern Jordan. (AFP/File) Hazem Salem Al-Damour, director-general of the Strategiecs think tank, said the group sought to exploit strong anti-Israel sentiment and deep-rooted grassroots support to rally backing for Hamas, the Palestinian militant group founded as a Brotherhood offshoot. Pro-Hamas slogans at protests highlighted the group's transnational and pan-Islamic loyalties, often at odds with Jordan's national interests, especially since Hamas' offices were shut down in Jordan in 1999. Authorities were further alarmed when investigations revealed that the busted Brotherhood cell had ties to Hamas' Lebanese wing, which trained and funded some of the arrested militants. This followed a similar incident in May 2024, when Jordan accused the Brotherhood of involvement in a foiled plot by Iranian-backed militias in Syria to smuggle weapons through Jordan. At the time, the Brotherhood said that while some members may have acted independently, the organization itself was not involved and remained part of the loyal opposition. It also claimed that the weapons were not intended for use in or against Jordan, but were being transported to support Palestinians in Gaza in their fight against Israeli security forces. However, Jordan has also witnessed a surge in attempts to smuggle weapons and explosives from Syria for delivery to the West Bank over the past year. 'In a sense, the government shut down the group's external support networks, through which it had sought to exploit Jordan's geographic position in the region,' Al-Damour told Arab News, referring to the April 23 ban. According to Al-Damour, the government's decision was driven by security concerns rather than political calculations, and that the Brotherhood's dual approach — public activity paired with covert operations — had become unacceptable to the state. On April 30, four of the 16 defendants were sentenced by Jordan's state security court to 20 years in prison after being convicted of 'possession of explosives, weapons and ammunition.' While the Brotherhood denied involvement, it admitted that some members may have engaged on individual capacity in arms smuggling. Mohammed Abu Rumman, a former Jordanian minister of culture and youth, regards the perceived radicalization of the Brotherhood's activities as unprecedented. 'The production of weapons, explosives and missiles, as well as planning of drone operations marked a significant shift in the mindset of young members of the movement, signaling a clear break from the organization's traditional framework and presenting a new challenge for the state,' he told Arab News. The Jordanian Muslim Brotherhood's cross-border, partisan character dates back to its founding. Inspired by the Egyptian organization established by Hassan Al-Banna in 1928, the Jordanian branch began as a charitable entity and gradually expanded its reach, becoming deeply embedded in the country's social and political landscape. Pro-Hamas slogans at protests highlighted the group's transnational and pan-Islamic loyalties. (AFP) For more than four decades, the Brotherhood maintained a close alliance with the early Hashemite regime, backing the late King Hussein during pivotal moments, including the attempted military coup of 1957. The absence of competing political forces — such as leftist and nationalist parties — due to martial law created a vacuum. This allowed the Islamist movement to broaden its religious-ideological outreach and deepen its political engagement across Jordanian society, including among labor unions and student groups. The Brotherhood's political trajectory shifted significantly following the government's liberalization process in the wake of the April 1989 protests in southern Jordan. With the lifting of martial law and the resumption of parliamentary elections, the Brotherhood expanded its charitable network by launching its political wing, the Islamic Action Front, in 1992. It quickly seized the moment, winning a strong bloc in the 11th parliament and earning broad popular support, establishing itself as a major political force. Although the Brotherhood and its political wing retained distinct leaderships and organizational structures, the line between the two remained blurred. Tensions between the movement and the government first emerged over the 1994 peace treaty with Israel and deepened in 1997, when the IAF chose to boycott the parliamentary elections. The 2011 'Arab Spring' revolts marked another period of tense relations as the ascent of Islamist regimes to power in Egypt and Tunisia sparked alarm in Jordan. In 2015, Jordan passed a law dissolving the Brotherhood and transferring its assets to a newly established entity, the 'Muslim Brotherhood Association,' in a move widely seen as an attempt to split the more hardline 'hawks' from the moderate 'doves.' This new group was formed by leaders who had either been expelled from the original organization or resigned amid an increasingly bitter internal power struggle. The 2011 'Arab Spring' revolts marked another period of tense relations in Jordan between the organization and the state. (AFP/File) Abu Rumman, the former minister, says that Jordan's decision to reinforce the 2020 court ruling aims to regulate political activity and ensure transparent participation, potentially benefiting the Brotherhood by pushing it away from the dualities that previously defined Islamist politics and caused internal divisions. 'The strict application of the rule of law requires the Brotherhood to clearly define its identity and role within the national framework, while cutting all foreign ties that raise ambiguity and suspicion,' he said. The future now hinges on the findings of ongoing security investigations and the extent of the IAF's links to the Brotherhood's suspected activities. Soon after the activities of the Brotherhood were outlawed on April 23, Jordanian security forces raided the premises associated with it, acting in line with the new directive. The IAF has not been officially banned, though the authorities also carried out raids on its offices. Al-Damour, from the think tank Strategiecs, outlined three possible scenarios: the ban remains limited to the Brotherhood, it extends to the IAF if its involvement is proven, or both are fully dismantled. Under the Political Parties Law, the IAF could face a ban if its involvement in the plot is confirmed, a possibility that has grown after it suspended the membership of three accused members. This would mark a fundamental shift in Jordan's political landscape and alter the course of reform announced in 2022. If the IAF survives, Al-Damour said, it would need to formally sever ties with the banned Brotherhood, shrinking its size and influence by cutting off its traditional electoral base, mobilization network, and campaign funding. Alternatively, the party may attempt to circumvent the ban by quietly absorbing sympathizers and non-involved members of the banned group. 'Individuals from the banned group or its affiliated party may establish new licensed political parties, associations, or civil society organizations; and second, they may seek membership in already licensed Islamic parties. Their motivations could vary from genuine political participation and reform to quietly infiltrating these parties,' he said. In 2015, Jordan passed a law dissolving the Brotherhood and transferring its assets to a newly established entity, the 'Muslim Brotherhood Association.' (AFP) However, according to him, a purely legal approach may not be enough to eradicate threats to national security. 'This casts doubt on the likelihood that all members of the banned group will comply with the law,' Al-Damour said. 'Instead, the radical elements of the group may intensify covert activity similar to what the group practiced in Egypt during the 1950s and 1960s, and again after the July 30, 2013, revolution, as well as in Syria during the 1980s and Algeria in the 1990s.' Security and intelligence efforts will likely remain active and focused on tracking the organization's radical remnants, their networks, and alignment with regional counterparts invested in their continued activity. Amer Al-Sabaileh, a geopolitical and security expert, stresses the need for a clear state strategy that extends beyond security measures to address social and media aspects. 'The organization has enjoyed freedom of operation for years, building extensive support networks,' he told Arab News. 'To contain these implications, the state should construct a strong, solid narrative that clearly communicates the risks associated with the Muslim Brotherhood's activities within Jordan.' Jordan's break from the Muslim Brotherhood, then, is both a response to immediate security threats and a reckoning with the movement's complex legacy. The question posed at the outset — why was Jordan targeted by Islamists? — finds its answer in the confluence of history, ideology and the shifting sands of Middle Eastern geopolitics. The kingdom's next steps may determine not only the fate of political Islam within its borders, but also the broader trajectory of reform, stability and national identity in a region where the lines between domestic dissent and regional conflict are increasingly blurred.
Arab News
07-05-2025
- Politics
- Arab News
Sisi: Greece, Egypt set to sign deal to boost ties
What recent arrests and ban mean for political influence of Jordan's Muslim Brotherhood DUBAI: Jordan's recent ban on the Muslim Brotherhood marks a historic rupture in the kingdom's political landscape, ending decades of uneasy coexistence and raising urgent questions about the future of political Islam in the country. The Brotherhood is now outlawed after authorities uncovered arms caches and arrested last month 16 people for allegedly plotting rocket and drone attacks that authorities said 'aimed at targeting national security, sowing chaos and sabotaging within Jordan.' Interior Minister Mazin Al-Farrayeh's subsequent decision to declare membership of the organization and promotion of its ideology as illegal reinforced a 2020 court ruling that had been largely unenforced in what analysts described as a 'strategy of containment.' Jordan's announcement comes at a time of heightened regional tension and surging Islamist activism amid Israel's war on Gaza. The question on many political observers' lips since the arrests has been: Why was Jordan targeted by Islamists, and how will the kingdom respond in the coming days? The Brotherhood's resurgence in the political spotlight coincided with the eruption of the war on Gaza, as it staged nationwide pro-Palestinian demonstrations. The Brotherhood's political trajectory shifted significantly following the government's liberalization process in the wake of the April 1989 protests in southern Jordan. (AFP/File) Hazem Salem Al-Damour, director-general of the Strategiecs think tank, said the group sought to exploit strong anti-Israel sentiment and deep-rooted grassroots support to rally backing for Hamas, the Palestinian militant group founded as a Brotherhood offshoot. Pro-Hamas slogans at protests highlighted the group's transnational and pan-Islamic loyalties, often at odds with Jordan's national interests, especially since Hamas' offices were shut down in Jordan in 1999. Authorities were further alarmed when investigations revealed that the busted Brotherhood cell had ties to Hamas' Lebanese wing, which trained and funded some of the arrested militants. This followed a similar incident in May 2024, when Jordan accused the Brotherhood of involvement in a foiled plot by Iranian-backed militias in Syria to smuggle weapons through Jordan. At the time, the Brotherhood said that while some members may have acted independently, the organization itself was not involved and remained part of the loyal opposition. It also claimed that the weapons were not intended for use in or against Jordan, but were being transported to support Palestinians in Gaza in their fight against Israeli security forces. However, Jordan has also witnessed a surge in attempts to smuggle weapons and explosives from Syria for delivery to the West Bank over the past year. 'In a sense, the government shut down the group's external support networks, through which it had sought to exploit Jordan's geographic position in the region,' Al-Damour told Arab News, referring to the April 23 ban. According to Al-Damour, the government's decision was driven by security concerns rather than political calculations, and that the Brotherhood's dual approach — public activity paired with covert operations — had become unacceptable to the state. On April 30, four of the 16 defendants were sentenced by Jordan's state security court to 20 years in prison after being convicted of 'possession of explosives, weapons and ammunition.' While the Brotherhood denied involvement, it admitted that some members may have acted on individual capacity. Mohammed Abu Rumman, a former Jordanian minister of culture and youth, regards the perceived radicalization of the Brotherhood's activities as unprecedented. 'The production of weapons, explosives and missiles, as well as planning of drone operations marked a significant shift in the mindset of young members of the movement, signaling a clear break from the organization's traditional framework and presenting a new challenge for the state,' he told Arab News. The Jordanian Muslim Brotherhood's cross-border, partisan character dates back to its founding. Inspired by the Egyptian organization established by Hassan Al-Banna in 1928, the Jordanian branch began as a charitable entity and gradually expanded its reach, becoming deeply embedded in the country's social and political landscape. Pro-Hamas slogans at protests highlighted the group's transnational and pan-Islamic loyalties. (AFP) For more than four decades, the Brotherhood maintained a close alliance with the early Hashemite regime, backing the late King Hussein during pivotal moments, including the attempted military coup of 1957. The absence of competing political forces — such as leftist and nationalist parties — due to martial law created a vacuum. This allowed the Islamist movement to broaden its religious-ideological outreach and deepen its political engagement across Jordanian society, including among labor unions and student groups. The Brotherhood's political trajectory shifted significantly following the government's liberalization process in the wake of the April 1989 protests in southern Jordan. With the lifting of martial law and the resumption of parliamentary elections, the Brotherhood expanded its charitable network by launching its political wing, the Islamic Action Front, in 1992. It quickly seized the moment, winning a strong bloc in the 11th parliament and earning broad popular support, establishing itself as a major political force. Although the Brotherhood and its political wing retained distinct leaderships and organizational structures, the line between the two remained blurred. Tensions between the movement and the government first emerged over the 1994 peace treaty with Israel and deepened in 1997, when the IAF chose to boycott the parliamentary elections. The 2011 'Arab Spring' revolts marked another period of tense relations as the ascent of Islamist regimes to power in Egypt and Tunisia sparked alarm in Jordan. In 2015, Jordan passed a law dissolving the Brotherhood and transferring its assets to a newly established entity, the 'Muslim Brotherhood Association,' in a move widely seen as an attempt to split the more hardline 'hawks' from the moderate 'doves.' This new group was formed by leaders who had either been expelled from the original organization or resigned amid an increasingly bitter internal power struggle. The 2011 'Arab Spring' revolts marked another period of tense relations in Jordan between the organization and the state. (AFP/File) Abu Rumman, the former minister, says that Jordan's decision to reinforce the 2020 court ruling aims to regulate political activity and ensure transparent participation, potentially benefiting the Brotherhood by pushing it away from the dualities that previously defined Islamist politics and caused internal divisions. 'The strict application of the rule of law requires the Brotherhood to clearly define its identity and role within the national framework, while cutting all foreign ties that raise ambiguity and suspicion,' he said. The future now hinges on the findings of ongoing security investigations and the extent of the IAF's links to the Brotherhood's suspected activities. Soon after the activities of the Brotherhood were outlawed on April 23, Jordanian security forces raided the premises associated with it, acting in line with the new directive. The IAF has not been officially banned, though the authorities also carried out raids on its offices. Al-Damour, from the think tank Strategiecs, outlined three possible scenarios: the ban remains limited to the Brotherhood, it extends to the IAF if its involvement is proven, or both are fully dismantled. Under the Political Parties Law, the IAF could face a ban if its involvement in the plot is confirmed, a possibility that has grown after it suspended the membership of three accused members. This would mark a fundamental shift in Jordan's political landscape and alter the course of reform announced in 2022. If the IAF survives, Al-Damour said, it would need to formally sever ties with the banned Brotherhood, shrinking its size and influence by cutting off its traditional electoral base, mobilization network, and campaign funding. Alternatively, the party may attempt to circumvent the ban by quietly absorbing sympathizers and non-involved members of the banned group. 'Individuals from the banned group or its affiliated party may establish new licensed political parties, associations, or civil society organizations; and second, they may seek membership in already licensed Islamic parties. Their motivations could vary from genuine political participation and reform to quietly infiltrating these parties,' he said. In 2015, Jordan passed a law dissolving the Brotherhood and transferring its assets to a newly established entity, the 'Muslim Brotherhood Association.' (AFP) However, according to him, a purely legal approach may not be enough to eradicate threats to national security. 'This casts doubt on the likelihood that all members of the banned group will comply with the law,' Al-Damour said. 'Instead, the radical elements of the group may intensify covert activity similar to what the group practiced in Egypt during the 1950s and 1960s, and again after the July 30, 2013, revolution, as well as in Syria during the 1980s and Algeria in the 1990s.' Security and intelligence efforts will likely remain active and focused on tracking the organization's radical remnants, their networks, and alignment with regional counterparts invested in their continued activity. Amer Al-Sabaileh, a geopolitical and security expert, stresses the need for a clear state strategy that extends beyond security measures to address social and media aspects. 'The organization has enjoyed freedom of operation for years, building extensive support networks,' he told Arab News. 'To contain these implications, the state should construct a strong, solid narrative that clearly communicates the risks associated with the Muslim Brotherhood's activities within Jordan.' Jordan's break from the Muslim Brotherhood, then, is both a response to immediate security threats and a reckoning with the movement's complex legacy. The question posed at the outset — why was Jordan targeted by Islamists? — finds its answer in the confluence of history, ideology and the shifting sands of Middle Eastern geopolitics. The kingdom's next steps may determine not only the fate of political Islam within its borders, but also the broader trajectory of reform, stability and national identity in a region where the lines between domestic dissent and regional conflict are increasingly blurred.
Arab News
06-05-2025
- Politics
- Arab News
What recent arrests and ban mean for political influence of Jordan's Muslim Brotherhood
DUBAI: Jordan's recent ban on the Muslim Brotherhood marks a historic rupture in the kingdom's political landscape, ending decades of uneasy coexistence and raising urgent questions about the future of political Islam in the country. The Brotherhood is now outlawed after authorities uncovered arms caches and arrested last month 16 people for allegedly plotting rocket and drone attacks that authorities said 'aimed at targeting national security, sowing chaos and sabotaging within Jordan.' Interior Minister Mazin Al-Farrayeh's subsequent decision to declare membership of the organization and promotion of its ideology as illegal reinforced a 2020 court ruling that had been largely unenforced in what analysts described as a 'strategy of containment.' Jordan's announcement comes at a time of heightened regional tension and surging Islamist activism amid Israel's war on Gaza. The question on many political observers' lips since the arrests has been: Why was Jordan targeted by Islamists, and how will the kingdom respond in the coming days? The Brotherhood's resurgence in the political spotlight coincided with the eruption of the war on Gaza, as it staged nationwide pro-Palestinian demonstrations. Hazem Salem Al-Damour, director-general of the Strategiecs think tank, said the group sought to exploit strong anti-Israel sentiment and deep-rooted grassroots support to rally backing for Hamas, the Palestinian militant group founded as a Brotherhood offshoot. Pro-Hamas slogans at protests highlighted the group's transnational and pan-Islamic loyalties, often at odds with Jordan's national interests, especially since Hamas' offices were shut down in Jordan in 1999. Authorities were further alarmed when investigations revealed that the busted Brotherhood cell had ties to Hamas' Lebanese wing, which trained and funded some of the arrested militants. This followed a similar incident in May 2024, when Jordan accused the Brotherhood of involvement in a foiled plot by Iranian-backed militias in Syria to smuggle weapons through Jordan. At the time, the Brotherhood said that while some members may have acted independently, the organization itself was not involved and remained part of the loyal opposition. It also claimed that the weapons were not intended for use in or against Jordan, but were being transported to support Palestinians in Gaza in their fight against Israeli security forces. However, Jordan has also witnessed a surge in attempts to smuggle weapons and explosives from Syria for delivery to the West Bank over the past year. 'In a sense, the government, with its ban on the Brotherhood, shut down the group's external support networks, through which it had sought to exploit Jordan's geographic position in the region,' Al-Damour told Arab News, referring to the April 23 ban. According to Al-Damour, the government's decision was driven by security concerns rather than political calculations, and that the Brotherhood's dual approach — public activity paired with covert operations — had become unacceptable to the state. On April 30, four of the 16 defendants were sentenced by Jordan's state security court to 20 years in prison after being convicted of 'possession of explosives, weapons and ammunition.' Mohammed Abu Rumman, a former Jordanian minister of culture and youth, regards the perceived radicalization of the Brotherhood's activities as unprecedented. 'The production of weapons, explosives and missiles, as well as planning of drone operations marked a significant shift in the mindset of young members of the movement, signaling a clear break from the organization's traditional framework and presenting a new challenge for the state,' he told Arab News. The Jordanian Muslim Brotherhood's cross-border, partisan character dates back to its founding. Inspired by the Egyptian organization established by Hassan Al-Banna in 1928, the Jordanian branch began as a charitable entity and gradually expanded its reach, becoming deeply embedded in the country's social and political landscape. For more than four decades, the Brotherhood maintained a close alliance with the early Hashemite regime, backing the late King Hussein during pivotal moments, including the attempted military coup of 1957. The absence of competing political forces — such as leftist and nationalist parties — due to martial law created a vacuum. This allowed the Islamist movement to broaden its religious-ideological outreach and deepen its political engagement across Jordanian society, including among labor unions and student groups. The Brotherhood's political trajectory shifted significantly following the government's liberalization process in the wake of the April 1989 protests in southern Jordan. With the lifting of martial law and the resumption of parliamentary elections, the Brotherhood expanded its charitable network by launching its political wing, the Islamic Action Front, in 1992. It quickly seized the moment, winning a strong bloc in the 11th parliament and earning broad popular support, establishing itself as a major political force. Although the Brotherhood and its political wing retained distinct leaderships and organizational structures, the line between the two remained blurred. Tensions between the movement and the government first emerged over the 1994 peace treaty with Israel and deepened in 1997, when the IAF chose to boycott the parliamentary elections. By 2007, the Brotherhood viewed the regime's policies as increasingly restrictive, particularly changes to the electoral law. The group participated in that year's elections only symbolically, winning just six seats — a disappointing result that triggered a leadership crisis within the organization. The 2011 'Arab Spring' revolts marked another period of tense relations in Jordan between the organization and the state, as the ascent of Islamist regimes to power in Egypt and Tunisia sparked alarm in the kingdom. In 2015, Jordan passed a law dissolving the Brotherhood and transferring its assets to a newly established entity, the 'Muslim Brotherhood Association,' in a move widely seen as an attempt to split the more hardline 'hawks' from the moderate 'doves.' This new group was formed by leaders who had either been expelled from the original organization or resigned amid an increasingly bitter internal power struggle. Abu Rumman, the former minister, says that Jordan's decision to reinforce the 2020 court ruling aims to regulate political activity and ensure transparent participation, potentially benefiting the Brotherhood by pushing it away from the dualities that previously defined Islamist politics and caused internal divisions. 'The strict application of the rule of law requires the Brotherhood to clearly define its identity and role within the national framework, while cutting all foreign ties that raise ambiguity and suspicion,' he said. The future now hinges on the findings of ongoing security investigations and the extent of the IAF's links to the Brotherhood's suspected activities. Soon after the activities of the Brotherhood were outlawed on April 23, Jordanian security forces raided the premises associated with it, acting in line with the new directive. The IAF has not been officially banned, though the authorities also carried out raids on its offices. Al-Damour, from the think tank Strategiecs, outlined three possible scenarios: the ban remains limited to the Brotherhood, it extends to the IAF if its involvement is proven, or both are fully dismantled. Under the Political Parties Law, the IAF could face a ban if its involvement in the plot is confirmed, a possibility that has grown after it suspended the membership of three accused members. This would mark a fundamental shift in Jordan's political landscape and alter the course of reform announced in 2022. If the IAF survives, Al-Damour said, it would need to formally sever ties with the banned Brotherhood, shrinking its size and influence by cutting off its traditional electoral base, mobilization network, and campaign funding. Alternatively, the party may attempt to circumvent the ban by quietly absorbing sympathizers and non-involved members of the banned group. 'Individuals from the banned group or its affiliated party may establish new licensed political parties, associations, or civil society organizations; and second, they may seek membership in already licensed Islamic parties. Their motivations could vary from genuine political participation and reform to quietly infiltrating these parties,' he said. However, according to him, a purely legal approach may not be enough to eradicate threats to national security. 'This casts doubt on the likelihood that all members of the banned group will comply with the law,' Al-Damour said. 'Instead, the radical elements of the group may intensify covert activity similar to what the group practiced in Egypt during the 1950s and 1960s, and again after the July 30, 2013, revolution, as well as in Syria during the 1980s and Algeria in the 1990s.' Security and intelligence efforts will likely remain active and focused on tracking the organization's radical remnants, their networks, and alignment with regional counterparts invested in their continued activity. Amer Al-Sabaileh, a geopolitical and security expert, stresses the need for a clear state strategy that extends beyond security measures to address social and media aspects. 'The organization has enjoyed freedom of operation for years, building extensive support networks,' he told Arab News. 'To contain these implications, the state should construct a strong, solid narrative that clearly communicates the risks associated with the Muslim Brotherhood's activities within Jordan.' Jordan's break from the Muslim Brotherhood, then, is both a response to immediate security threats and a reckoning with the movement's complex legacy. The question posed at the outset — why was Jordan targeted by Islamists? — finds its answer in the confluence of history, ideology and the shifting sands of Middle Eastern geopolitics. The kingdom's next steps may determine not only the fate of political Islam within its borders, but also the broader trajectory of reform, stability and national identity in a region where the lines between domestic dissent and regional conflict are increasingly blurred.
