Latest news with #post-Saddam
Time Out
14-05-2025
- Entertainment
- Time Out
The Young Vic has announced its first season under new artistic director Nadia Fall
It's been a long time since we had a proper season announcement from the Young Vic: its previous artistic director Kwame Kwei-Armah announced his departure – ands a year's worth of programming – in February 2024. But his successor Nadia Fall has been beavering away behind the scenes, and finally has her first season ready to go. And a very decent season it is, focussing on the Young Vic's historical bread and butter of big name classic plays with interesting directors. Fall will kick things off herself in September by directing the first Joe Orton production London has seen in an age, tackling the 1964 classic Entertaining Mr Sloane (Sep 15-Nov 8), a dark comedy about a lodger who infiltrates a brother and sister's family home, to the deep misgivings of their father. Not seen in London since 2009, this production will star Tamzin Outhwaite and Daniel Cerqueira as middle-aged siblings Kath and Ed. The big show over Christmas will be the UK premiere of US playwright Rajiv Joseph's Bengal Tiger at the Baghdad Zoo (Dec 2-Jan 31 2026), which previously ran on Broadway in a production starring Robin Williams. Set in a chaotic post-Saddam Iraq, surrealist director Omar Elerian's production will star David Threlfall as a fast-talking tiger wondering what the hell he is doing in the chaos of Baghdad – the production will also star Arinzé Kene, Ammar Haj Ahmad and Hala Omran. Into next year and Jordan Fein – director of the recent smash hit revival of Fiddler on the Roof – will turn his hand to non musical theatre with a revival of Arthur Miller's late classic Broken Glass (Feb 21-Apr 18 2026), casting tba. Following that, auteur Brit Alexander Zeldin directs the UK premiere of CARE (May 11-Jul 11 2026), his drama about an elderly grandmother unceremoniously moved to a care home by her busy family. Kwei-Armah made little use of the Young Vic's second space the Maria, but Fall seems to be a fan, and there will be three studio productions in her first season. Ohio (Sep 30-Oct 24), by Abigail and Shaun Bengson, is an intimate autobiographical folk musical about their experience of losing faith in religion but finding it in music. The Museum of Austerity (Dec 5-Jan 16 2026) is a mixed-reality headset-based exhibition from Sasha Wares that confronts the reality of life in the UK for disabled people who whom the social security net has failed. Finally, running next summer is Sophie Swithinbank's Sting (Jun 18-Jul 18 2026), a satire on systematic institutional failure that follows an off-the-rails young woman who has just started work on an assignment to catalogue historic cases of women being accused of witchcraft in the UK.
Yahoo
13-03-2025
- Politics
- Yahoo
Opinion - Syria shows dangerous signs of Iraq's post-Saddam chaos
Democracy and peace are not guaranteed when a dictator falls — sometimes, a country's fate turns uglier and messier. Look no further than Iraq. The aftermath of Saddam's fall demonstrates that even most well-intentioned policies under the guise of a 'new democracy' can backfire abysmally. Today, Iraq still reels from the consequences of de-Baathification, transitional justice failures and a vague constitution that have contributed to decades of needless sectarian violence and terror. This does not have to be true of Syria. In a recent address to the nation, Syria's new self-appointed president, Ahmed al-Sharaa, pledged a reformed government that protects the rights of all minorities and expressed aspirations of a modern Syria, comparable to Saudi Arabia and its latest reforms. The outlook is far from promising. Recent reports of intense clashes, allegedly between al-Sharaa's security forces and members of the Alawite religious minority, have resulted in more than 1,000 deaths just two days, casting serious doubt on the country's stability. Yes, Syria faces its own distinct set of challenges. But at a minimum, it must move quickly avoid the sectarian fractures that devastated post-Saddam Iraq. Iraq's policy of de-Baathification stands as one of its most disastrous decisions. The government dismissed approximately 100,000 Baathist professionals — party members under Saddam's regime — from their jobs, disbanded the military, and restructured the government under predominantly Shia leadership, disproportionately affecting Sunnis. To make matters worse, despite ambitious plans to address Saddam's legacy of human rights abuses, transitional justice measures focused on purging and persecuting former Baathists. Plans for truth commissions by the best Iraqi lawyers and judges failed to materialise, and working-class educators, doctors and civil servants were treated the same as Saddam's murderous accomplices. Consequently, thousands of young Sunni men joined violent insurgent groups seeking retribution, including The Islamic State. Among them were Saddam's most skilled commanders, who became key lieutenants to Caliph al-Baghdadi, head of ISIS. Syria must avoid a similar policy of de-Alawitization. For decades, more than 80 percent of Alawites — Bashar Assad's own ethnic group — worked under his government, despite comprising around 10 percent of the country's population. In reality, however, most soldiers earned as little as $35 a month after the Syrian pound had lost 99 percent of its value since the 2011 civil war. Al-Sharaa has assured Alawites there will be no mass purges and has granted amnesty to most of Assad's former soldiers. However, thousands of Alawites remain uncertain about their fate following the dissolution of Syria's army, security forces and Baathist government. Reports indicate that the new administration has illegitimately replaced thousands of senior administrators across key institutions with unqualified individuals. Meanwhile, the state is planning a major economic overhaul including cutting one-third of public-sector jobs to reduce waste and corruption and transitioning to a 'competitive free-market economy.' Alawites also look to al-Sharaa's government for protection against active radicals in the country seeking to settle scores with their former tormentors. A major challenge will be balancing sufficient security in Alawite communities despite the severe strain on existing resources and the overwhelming demands of the country. Although officials have held meetings with the local Alawite leaders emphasizing security and accountability to sectarian agitators, Alawites remain justifiably nervous about their future. Fresh reports from the Syrian Observatory for Human Rights state over 162 Alawite civilians have been executed in 'field executions' in Syria's coastal Latakia province. Additionally, heavy fighting erupted in Alawite-concentrated cities early this weekend, resulting in an estimated 830 Alawite civilian deaths, allegedly by Al-Sharaa's security forces. Analysts are calling this by far the worst violence in Syria since rebels toppled Assad in December. The situation echoes a warning from a Syrian source quoted in The New York Times: 'If the new government cannot guarantee their safety, they will take matters into their own hands to protect themselves.' These sectarian tensions could be a strategic asset for a country like Iran, which lost a major national ally and access to its critical land routes through Syria used for smuggling weapons to its Lebanese proxies. The International Institute for Strategic Studies estimated the presence of 70,000 Syrian fighters loyal to Iran and Hezbollah since 2014, organized by Tehran. Ominously, senior Iranian military figure Brig. Gen. Behrouz Esbati hinted at their potential utility early this year: 'We can activate the social layers that our guys lived among for years; we can be active on social media, and we can form resistance cells.' Alarmingly, Syria expert Aaron Y. Zelin of the Washington Institute confirmed that Iran-linked Assad remnants were indeed responsible for triggering the crisis, and have been involved in 46 attacks across multiple provinces since January. How Syria's new constitution addresses these fundamental issues will prove extremely consequential. Under immense pressure to stabilize the country and meet tight U.S. deadlines, Iraq hastily drafted a constitution that left key issues of power sharing and the governance of oil-rich regions ambiguous, contributing to a shift toward greater authoritarianism. In an Al Arabiya News interview, al-Sharaa seemed to acknowledge these complexities, outlining a generous three- to four-year timeline for drafting and elections. However, his administration must reconcile the differing perspectives of Syria's diverse ethno-sectarian population — including Kurds, Druze and Christians — each with distinct moral and cultural attitudes. More difficult will be striking a balance between state and religion and upholding democratic values, which has historically been a challenge in the Middle East. A former leader of the al Qaeda-affiliated group Jabhat al-Nusra, al-Sharaa today is positioning himself more as a pragmatist. But his interim government still includes many members of conservative Salafi-jihadist factions that have already removed Darwin and the Big Bang from the public school's curriculum. Syria's future depends on precisely these nuanced policies and tactics evolving behind closed doors. Al-Sharaa's government should de-escalate sectarian tensions now and develop policies that, unlike those of Bashar Assad, uphold the individual rights and freedoms of all Syrians — rights that were denied for more than five decades. Syrians must hold their new leaders accountable. Their future and lives depend on it. Sally Michael is pursuing a master's degree in conflict and terrorism at The University of Auckland in New Zealand. Copyright 2025 Nexstar Media, Inc. All rights reserved. This material may not be published, broadcast, rewritten, or redistributed.
The Hill
13-03-2025
- Politics
- The Hill
Syria shows dangerous signs of Iraq's post-Saddam chaos
Democracy and peace are not guaranteed when a dictator falls — sometimes, a country's fate turns uglier and messier. Look no further than Iraq. The aftermath of Saddam's fall demonstrates that even most well-intentioned policies under the guise of a 'new democracy' can backfire abysmally. Today, Iraq still reels from the consequences of de-Baathification, transitional justice failures and a vague constitution that have contributed to decades of needless sectarian violence and terror. This does not have to be true of Syria. In a recent address to the nation, Syria's new self-appointed president, Ahmed al-Sharaa, pledged a reformed government that protects the rights of all minorities and expressed aspirations of a modern Syria, comparable to Saudi Arabia and its latest reforms. The outlook is far from promising. Recent reports of intense clashes, allegedly between al-Sharaa's security forces and members of the Alawite religious minority, have resulted in more than 1,000 deaths just two days, casting serious doubt on the country's stability. Yes, Syria faces its own distinct set of challenges. But at a minimum, it must move quickly avoid the sectarian fractures that devastated post-Saddam Iraq. Iraq's policy of de-Baathification stands as one of its most disastrous decisions. The government dismissed approximately 100,000 Baathist professionals — party members under Saddam's regime — from their jobs, disbanded the military, and restructured the government under predominantly Shia leadership, disproportionately affecting Sunnis. To make matters worse, despite ambitious plans to address Saddam's legacy of human rights abuses, transitional justice measures focused on purging and persecuting former Baathists. Plans for truth commissions by the best Iraqi lawyers and judges failed to materialise, and working-class educators, doctors and civil servants were treated the same as Saddam's murderous accomplices. Consequently, thousands of young Sunni men joined violent insurgent groups seeking retribution, including The Islamic State. Among them were Saddam's most skilled commanders, who became key lieutenants to Caliph al-Baghdadi, head of ISIS. Syria must avoid a similar policy of de-Alawitization. For decades, more than 80 percent of Alawites — Bashar Assad's own ethnic group — worked under his government, despite comprising around 10 percent of the country's population. In reality, however, most soldiers earned as little as $35 a month after the S yrian pound had lost 99 percent of its value since the 2011 civil war. Al-Sharaa has assured Alawites there will be no mass purges and has granted amnesty to most of Assad's former soldiers. However, thousands of Alawites remain uncertain about their fate following the dissolution of Syria's army, security forces and Baathist government. Reports indicate that the new administration has illegitimately replaced thousands of senior administrators across key institutions with unqualified individuals. Meanwhile, the state is planning a major economic overhaul including cutting one-third of public-sector jobs to reduce waste and corruption and transitioning to a 'competitive free-market economy.' Alawites also look to al-Sharaa's government for protection against active radicals in the country seeking to settle scores with their former tormentors. A major challenge will be balancing sufficient security in Alawite communities despite the severe strain on existing resources and the overwhelming demands of the country. Although officials have held meetings with the local Alawite leaders emphasizing security and accountability to sectarian agitators, Alawites remain justifiably nervous about their future. Fresh reports from the Syrian Observatory for Human Rights state over 1 62 Alawite civilians have been executed in 'field executions' in Syria's coastal Latakia province. Additionally, heavy fighting erupted in Alawite-concentrated cities early this weekend, resulting in an estimated 830 Alawite civilian deaths, allegedly by Al-Sharaa's security forces. Analysts are calling this by far the worst violence in Syria since rebels toppled Assad in December. The situation echoes a warning from a Syrian source quoted in The New York Times: 'If the new government cannot guarantee their safety, they will take matters into their own hands to protect themselves.' These sectarian tensions could be a strategic asset for a country like Iran, which lost a major national ally and access to its critical land routes through Syria used for smuggling weapons to its Lebanese proxies. The International Institute for Strategic Studies estimated the presence of 70,000 Syrian fighters loyal to Iran and Hezbollah since 2014, organized by Tehran. Ominously, senior Iranian military figure Brig. Gen. Behrouz Esbati hinted at their potential utility early this year: 'We can activate the social layers that our guys lived among for years; we can be active on social media, and we can form resistance cells.' Alarmingly, Syria expert Aaron Y. Zelin of the Washington Institute confirmed that Iran-linked Assad remnants were indeed responsible for triggering the crisis, and have been involved in 46 attacks across multiple provinces since January. How Syria's new constitution addresses these fundamental issues will prove extremely consequential. Under immense pressure to stabilize the country and meet tight U.S. deadlines, Iraq hastily drafted a constitution that left key issues of power sharing and the governance of oil-rich regions ambiguous, contributing to a shift toward greater authoritarianism. In an Al Arabiya News interview, al-Sharaa seemed to acknowledge these complexities, outlining a generous three- to four-year timeline for drafting and elections. However, his administration must reconcile the differing perspectives of Syria's diverse ethno-sectarian population — including Kurds, Druze and Christians — each with distinct moral and cultural attitudes. More difficult will be striking a balance between state and religion and upholding democratic values, which has historically been a challenge in the Middle East. A former leader of the al Qaeda-affiliated group Jabhat al-Nusra, al-Sharaa today is positioning himself more as a pragmatist. But his interim government still includes many members of conservative Salafi-jihadist factions that have already removed Darwin and the Big Bang from the public school's curriculum. Syria's future depends on precisely these nuanced policies and tactics evolving behind closed doors. Al-Sharaa's government should de-escalate sectarian tensions now and develop policies that, unlike those of Bashar Assad, uphold the individual rights and freedoms of all Syrians — rights that were denied for more than five decades. Syrians must hold their new leaders accountable. Their future and lives depend on it.
