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Indian Express
02-05-2025
- Politics
- Indian Express
Opinion May 2, 1985, Forty Years Ago: Akali ‘Merger'
Sikh politics in Punjab took a piquant turn when Joginder Singh, the father of Jarnail Singh Bhindranwale, announced the merger of all the Akali Dal factions into a single unit that will be managed by a nine-member ad-hoc committee. Simranjit Singh Mann, IPS officer and alleged extremist currently interned in Bharatpur jail, has been appointed the convener of the committee. Gujarat Govt Grilled The Gujarat government was grilled in the Supreme Court and faced severe observations from the judges for first consenting to a probe into the Ahmedabad riots — after the police allegedly ran amok, cut off power and attacked women and children in their houses — in the high court and then challenging the court's power when the inquiry became inconvenient to the government. Communist Bonhomie The CPM, described by Moscow as pro-Chinese after the 1964 split in the Communist Party, is on the threshold of friendship with the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU). A delegation of the CPSU arrived in Delhi and soon began the first ever party-to-party level talks with general secretary E M S Namboodiripad and his senior politburo colleagues. The CPM has already received and accepted the first official invitation from Moscow. Indira Gandhi's Will A petition has been filed before the Delhi High Court on behalf of Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi, seeking probate of the will of his mother, Indira Gandhi. She has bequeathed her farm and farmhouse at Mehrauli in Delhi to the Prime Minister's children, Rahul and Priyanka. Some of her other assets, mainly royalty on books, have been given to Feroze Varun Gandhi, her third grandchild and son of the late Sanjay Gandhi. Her jewellery, and antique articles registered with the Department of Archaeology, will go to Priyanka.
Yahoo
12-03-2025
- Business
- Yahoo
Opinion - Taiwan's asymmetric defense opportunity
Many in the English-speaking world perceive Taiwan's defense spending as 'measly.' But Taiwan's president, Lai Ching-te, has taken a major step forward by committing to raise Taiwan's defense spending from 2.45 percent to 3 percent of GDP in 2025 through a special budget. Lai has clearly gotten the message that he must increase defense spending in a world where the U.S. appears increasingly likely to leave small powers to fend for themselves. However, the current Kuomintang-led majority coalition in Taiwan's legislature is often portrayed as intent on diminishing Taiwan's self-defense capabilities because it is pro-Chinese Communist Party, but there is more to this story. Critics parsing through Taiwan's 2025 general budget, passed by its legislature in late January, have highlighted perceived decreases in defense spending. The Kuomintang and Taiwan People's Party coalition indeed took a sledgehammer to the funding of various domestic government departments for partisan reasons. Prominent cuts to the military budget include 3 percent of the funds for military equipment and facilities expenses and 60 percent of the Ministry of National Defense's publicity budget. Small cuts to equipment procurement proposals in the draft budget are routine and this trim represents a small fraction of overall defense spending, which will still increase. Lastly, cutting the publicity budget hardly reduces real combat effectiveness. Although the opposition's characterizations of Lai's administration as unscrupulous and wasteful are almost certainly exaggerated for partisan effect, Taiwan's constitution gives the legislative branch limited powers to revise spending proposed by the executive branch, and thus it tends to rely on cuts and freezes to get its point across. The Kuomintang and Taiwan People's Party opposition parties have broadly justified the use of freezes as necessary to ensure rigorous scrutiny of the spending practices of the Democratic Progressive Party-led administration. Freezes are typically removed after relevant executive department heads submit reports to the legislature and face questioning. Budgetary freezes will affect Taiwan's armed forces more than cuts, but these are reversible and far from unreasonable. Some of the most controversial include a 50 percent freeze of the budget for Taiwan's indigenous submarine program until the prototype vessel passes sea trials, a freeze of one-third of the budget for a drone industrial park in Chiayi and a 30 percent freeze of the military's operational expenses budget. Closely inspecting the tactical and strategic merits of Taiwan's years-long $8.8 billion submarine procurement program, as several American experts have done, is wise given the near-term threat from China's People's Liberation Army and the clear need for less-costly asymmetric platforms. Cultivating a drone industry from scratch is also a daunting task. After debating last year whether Taiwan's state arms manufacturer or the Ministry of Economic Affairs would be better suited to developing a drone business park and how private investments will fit into the picture, Taiwan's legislators settled on a 30 percent freeze until the state arsenal, the National Chung-Shan Institute of Science and Technology, submits a comprehensive business plan. In response to Lai's recent pledge to increase spending, opposition coalition legislators have urged that additional spending be allocated wisely, the executive branch should not avoid close oversight by the legislative branch, and spending should not overlook soldier salaries and training expenses. Without proper compensation and revitalized training, Taiwan's increasing reliance on conscription might not succeed in increasing national morale and combat effectiveness. Nonetheless, Taiwan's national security could still be impacted if legislators are too slow to complete their reviews and procedural votes. One Taiwanese researcher estimated that Taiwan's military could face a nine- to 30-day window without operational funding where it will have to rely on reserves of food, fuel and ammunition, possibly leading to unexpected shortages. The difficulty of unfreezing funding may also affect the Coast Guard's ship procurement. In addition to addressing these questions, Taiwan's government should take the opportunity to reconsider its broader procurement strategy. Delays in the delivery of prior large purchases of exquisite arms from the U.S. have led to a well-known backlog worth upwards of $20 billion. The credibility of U.S. arms manufacturers has also recently suffered in Taiwan due to price gouging by Raytheon, further raising questions about Taiwan's strategic reliance on the U.S. for procurement, which has been a fact of life during previous decades of Kuomintang governance as well. Taiwan's failure to swiftly adapt its defense strategy away from purchasing expensive conventional weapons systems has long been attributed to the conservative defense establishment which has deep historical ties to the Kuomintang. Now that the Democratic Progressive Party's support for expensive conventional platforms like submarines has driven Kuomintang legislators to favor more cost-effective systems, the time is ripe for a sea change in both the quantity and quality of Taiwan's defense spending. Reports suggest that the Taiwanese government already intends to focus the forthcoming special budget on precision ammunition, air defense, command and control, reserve force equipment and anti-drone technology. Such a budget could support relevant purchases from the U.S. such as additional guided missiles, specialized domain awareness, and equipment for command and control, intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance, but the real opportunity likely lies within Taiwan itself. Taiwan's strong manufacturing base and mature commercial electronics industry have enormous potential to contribute to the national defense, as evidenced by the rapid expansion of domestic precision missile production after a special budget passed in 2021. Domestic spending could also help bolster local economies, creating jobs and business opportunities. Future spending could continue investments into the missile supply chain, rapidly scale up aerial and maritime drone production, harden critical infrastructure and military facilities and address deficiencies in emergency food and energy stockpiles. The Lai administration should vigorously facilitate close coordination between its policy staff, military planners and political opposition in the legislature to ensure that increased defense spending represents the will of Taiwan's elected representatives and thus maximizes the odds that the legislative branch passes a special budget for defense. Such cross-partisan cooperation can provide a foundation of trust upon which more durable increases in defense spending can be achieved in future annual general budgets. Although there is a strong desire in some quarters to accuse Lai of trying to distract from President Trump's trade demands and the ongoing recall crisis, all sides should realize that they fundamentally agree on the necessity of increased defense spending, and spending three percent of GDP on defense would be good for the whole country. Francis de Beixedon is an Asia researcher at a Washington think tank. Copyright 2025 Nexstar Media, Inc. All rights reserved. This material may not be published, broadcast, rewritten, or redistributed.
The Hill
12-03-2025
- Business
- The Hill
Taiwan's asymmetric defense opportunity
Many in the English-speaking world perceive Taiwan's defense spending as ' measly.' But Taiwan's president, Lai Ching-te, has taken a major step forward by committing to raise Taiwan's defense spending from 2.45 percent to 3 percent of GDP in 2025 through a special budget. Lai has clearly gotten the message that he must increase defense spending in a world where the U.S. appears increasingly likely to leave small powers to fend for themselves. However, the current Kuomintang-led majority coalition in Taiwan's legislature is often portrayed as intent on diminishing Taiwan's self-defense capabilities because it is pro-Chinese Communist Party, but there is more to this story. Critics parsing through Taiwan's 2025 general budget, passed by its legislature in late January, have highlighted perceived decreases in defense spending. The Kuomintang and Taiwan People's Party coalition indeed took a sledgehammer to the funding of various domestic government departments for partisan reasons. Prominent cuts to the military budget include 3 percent of the funds for military equipment and facilities expenses and 60 percent of the Ministry of National Defense's publicity budget. Small cuts to equipment procurement proposals in the draft budget are routine and this trim represents a small fraction of overall defense spending, which will still increase. Lastly, cutting the publicity budget hardly reduces real combat effectiveness. Although the opposition's characterizations of Lai's administration as unscrupulous and wasteful are almost certainly exaggerated for partisan effect, Taiwan's constitution gives the legislative branch limited powers to revise spending proposed by the executive branch, and thus it tends to rely on cuts and freezes to get its point across. The Kuomintang and Taiwan People's Party opposition parties have broadly justified the use of freezes as necessary to ensure rigorous scrutiny of the spending practices of the Democratic Progressive Party-led administration. Freezes are typically removed after relevant executive department heads submit reports to the legislature and face questioning. Budgetary freezes will affect Taiwan's armed forces more than cuts, but these are reversible and far from unreasonable. Some of the most controversial include a 50 percent freeze of the budget for Taiwan's indigenous submarine program until the prototype vessel passes sea trials, a freeze of one-third of the budget for a drone industrial park in Chiayi and a 30 percent freeze of the military's operational expenses budget. Closely inspecting the tactical and strategic merits of Taiwan's years-long $8.8 billion submarine procurement program, as several American experts have done, is wise given the near-term threat from China's People's Liberation Army and the clear need for less-costly asymmetric platforms. Cultivating a drone industry from scratch is also a daunting task. After debating last year whether Taiwan's state arms manufacturer or the Ministry of Economic Affairs would be better suited to developing a drone business park and how private investments will fit into the picture, Taiwan's legislators settled on a 30 percent freeze until the state arsenal, the National Chung-Shan Institute of Science and Technology, submits a comprehensive business plan. In response to Lai's recent pledge to increase spending, opposition coalition legislators have urged that additional spending be allocated wisely, the executive branch should not avoid close oversight by the legislative branch, and spending should not overlook soldier salaries and training expenses. Without proper compensation and revitalized training, Taiwan's increasing reliance on conscription might not succeed in increasing national morale and combat effectiveness. Nonetheless, Taiwan's national security could still be impacted if legislators are too slow to complete their reviews and procedural votes. One Taiwanese researcher estimated that Taiwan's military could face a nine- to 30-day window without operational funding where it will have to rely on reserves of food, fuel and ammunition, possibly leading to unexpected shortages. The difficulty of unfreezing funding may also affect the Coast Guard's ship procurement. In addition to addressing these questions, Taiwan's government should take the opportunity to reconsider its broader procurement strategy. Delays in the delivery of prior large purchases of exquisite arms from the U.S. have led to a well-known backlog worth upwards of $20 billion. The credibility of U.S. arms manufacturers has also recently suffered in Taiwan due to price gouging by Raytheon, further raising questions about Taiwan's strategic reliance on the U.S. for procurement, which has been a fact of life during previous decades of Kuomintang governance as well. Taiwan's failure to swiftly adapt its defense strategy away from purchasing expensive conventional weapons systems has long been attributed to the conservative defense establishment which has deep historical ties to the Kuomintang. Now that the Democratic Progressive Party's support for expensive conventional platforms like submarines has driven Kuomintang legislators to favor more cost-effective systems, the time is ripe for a sea change in both the quantity and quality of Taiwan's defense spending. Reports suggest that the Taiwanese government already intends to focus the forthcoming special budget on precision ammunition, air defense, command and control, reserve force equipment and anti-drone technology. Such a budget could support relevant purchases from the U.S. such as additional guided missiles, specialized domain awareness, and equipment for command and control, intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance, but the real opportunity likely lies within Taiwan itself. Taiwan's strong manufacturing base and mature commercial electronics industry have enormous potential to contribute to the national defense, as evidenced by the rapid expansion of domestic precision missile production after a special budget passed in 2021. Domestic spending could also help bolster local economies, creating jobs and business opportunities. Future spending could continue investments into the missile supply chain, rapidly scale up aerial and maritime drone production, harden critical infrastructure and military facilities and address deficiencies in emergency food and energy stockpiles. The Lai administration should vigorously facilitate close coordination between its policy staff, military planners and political opposition in the legislature to ensure that increased defense spending represents the will of Taiwan's elected representatives and thus maximizes the odds that the legislative branch passes a special budget for defense. Such cross-partisan cooperation can provide a foundation of trust upon which more durable increases in defense spending can be achieved in future annual general budgets. Although there is a strong desire in some quarters to accuse Lai of trying to distract from President Trump's trade demands and the ongoing recall crisis, all sides should realize that they fundamentally agree on the necessity of increased defense spending, and spending three percent of GDP on defense would be good for the whole country.
Asia Times
24-02-2025
- Business
- Asia Times
Musk is a Trump administration outlier: a China dove among hawks
Elon Musk holds an outsized influence in the new Trump administration. As head of his Department of Government Efficiency, or DOGE, the world's wealthiest man has enjoyed nearly unfettered political power in slashing and refashioning the federal government as he sees fit. And it has quickly become clear that he has the president's ear on issues beyond that brief. On one topic, though, Musk stands somewhat apart from others in the coterie of aides and advisers around Trump: China. In contrast to the many hawks in the new Trump cabinet who call for a hard-line approach on China, Musk is a striking outlier. As an expert on China-US relations who has monitored Musk's views on China, I don't find his long history of espousing pro-Chinese sentiment surprising, given that he has sought throughout to get a business hold in the country. But those entanglements are worth scrutiny, given Musk's role in the Trump administration at a time when one of America's biggest foreign policy challenges is how to manage its relationship with Beijing. For years, Musk has had significant business interests in China, with Tesla's Shanghai factory, Tesla Giga Shanghai, playing a crucial role in the company's global operations. Notably, Tesla was the first foreign automaker permitted to establish operations in China without a local partner, following a change in ownership regulations. The Shanghai factory was constructed with the support of US$1.4 billion in loans from Chinese state-owned banks, granted at favorable interest rates. Between 2019 and 2023, the Shanghai government also provided Tesla with a reduced corporate tax rate of 15% – 10 percentage points lower than the standard rate. The cost advantages of manufacturing in Shanghai, which include lower production and labor expenses, have further cemented Tesla's reliance on the Chinese market. Given that Musk's wealth is largely tied to Tesla stock, his financial standing is increasingly dependent on the company's fortunes in China, which would make any potential disengagement from the country both economically and strategically challenging. Tesla's continued investment in China underscores this dependency. On February 11, 2025, the company opened its second factory in Shanghai — a $200 million plant that is set to produce 10,000 megapack batteries annually. It's the company's first megapack battery factory outside the US.. This investment deepens Tesla's presence in China amid a new wave of US-China trade tensions. On February 1, the Trump administration imposed a 10% tariff on Chinese imports, prompting Beijing's retaliation with tariffs on American coal, liquefied natural gas, agricultural equipment and crude oil. It remains unclear to what extent Musk's financial interests in China will translate to real influence over the Trump administration's policy toward Beijing. But Musk's long history of pro-China remarks suggests the direction in which he wants the administration to move. During his visit to Beijing in April 2024, Musk praised the country, noting also: 'I also have a lot of fans in China – well, the feeling is mutual.' His admiration appears to hinge in part on how he views business and labor practices in China. In that vein, Musk has criticized American workers as lazy and has faced US labor law disputes, while simultaneously praising Chinese workers for 'burning the 3 am oil' under an intensely repressive labor system. In numerous posts on the social media platform X, formerly Twitter, which he owns, Musk has also praised China's infrastructure and high-speed rail system, lauded its space program, applauded its leadership in global green energy initiatives and urged his followers to visit the country. Musk has also opposed US efforts to decouple from China, describing the countries' economies as 'conjoined twins,' despite the view of a sizable part of the foreign policy establishment in the West that decreasing dependency on China is necessary because of security interests amid rising geopolitical tensions. On the issue of Taiwan, the most dangerous flashpoint in US-China relations, Musk has compared Taiwan to Hawaii, arguing that it is an integral part of China and noting that the US Pacific Fleet has prevented mainland China from achieving reunification by force. Musk has suggested further that the Taiwan dispute could be resolved by allowing China to establish Taiwan as a special administrative zone, similar to Hong Kong. His remarks were shared and welcomed by China's then-ambassador to the US, who, in a post on X, emphasized China's so-called peaceful unification strategy and advocated for the 'one country, two systems' model. The big question going forward is how Musk's financial stakes in, and stated admiration for, China will translate into attempts to influence the US administration's China policy, particularly given Musk's unconventional advisory role and the strong faction of anti-China hawks in Trumpworld. Given Musk's approach to China, it's hard to see him not trying to use his influence with the president to push for somewhat warmer relations with Beijing. If such counsel were heeded, it's easy to envision Musk leveraging his deep ties to China, particularly his close personal relationship with China's current second-ranking official, Premier Li Qiang, who was the Shanghai party chief when Tesla's factory was built. In the scenario, Donald Trump could tap Musk as a back channel for diplomacy to ease US-China tensions and facilitate bilateral cooperation when needed. To this point, it was, perhaps, telling that it was Musk who met with China President Xi Jinping's envoy to Trump's inauguration, Vice President Han Zheng, on the eve of the event. But it's far from certain that Trump wants Musk in that diplomatic role, or that other voices won't win out with regard to Beijing. In his first term, Trump launched an unprecedented trade war and tech blockade against China, fundamentally reshaping US-China relations and pushing the US toward something of a bipartisan consensus to counter Beijing that has existed for several years. Trump's tariff moves and second-term picks for top trade and commerce roles, such as Peter Navarro and Jamieson Greer — who played key roles in the trade war against China during the president's first term — suggest that Trump's commitment to further decoupling from China remains strong. Furthermore, Musk's business interests and personal wealth tied to China could leave him vulnerable to Chinese influence. By leaning on Musk's close ties with Trump, China could use his dependence on the Chinese market as a bargaining chip to pressure Trump into making concessions on issues of major strategic importance to Beijing. China has a history of coercing foreign companies reliant on its market into making compromises on matters concerning its national interests. For instance, Apple removed virtual private network apps from its app store in China at the government's request. Similarly, Tesla could face comparable pressure in the future if Beijing wants to use Musk as a cudgel to influence policy in the Trump administration. Notably, as the head of DOGE, with access to sensitive data from multiple agencies, Musk could find himself caught between US security scrutiny and China's strategic targeting. So long as Musk retains the influence with Trump that he holds now, it's conceivable that his pro-China sentiments will translate into attempts to influence government policy. Yet even if this turns out to be the case, whether those efforts succeed will depend on the president and his other advisers, many of whom are seeking an aggressive front against Beijing and are likely to view Musk as an impediment rather than ally in that fight to come. Linggong Kong is a PhD Student at Auburn University. This article is republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons license. Read the original article.
Yahoo
24-02-2025
- Business
- Yahoo
How Elon Musk's deep ties to – and admiration for – China could complicate Trump's Beijing policy
Elon Musk holds an outsized influence in the new Trump administration. As head of his Department of Government Efficiency, or DOGE, the world's wealthiest man has enjoyed nearly unfettered political power in slashing and refashioning the federal government as he sees fit. And it has quickly become clear that he has the president's ear on issues beyond that brief. But on one topic, Musk stands somewhat apart from others in the coterie of aides and advisers around Trump: China. In contrast to the many hawks in the new Trump cabinet who call for a hard-line approach on China, Musk is a striking outlier. As an expert on China-U.S. relations who has monitored Musk's views on China, I don't find his long history of espousing pro-Chinese sentiment surprising, given that he has sought throughout to get a business hold in the country. But those entanglements are worth scrutiny, given Musk's role in the Trump administration at a time when one of America's biggest foreign policy challenges is how to manage its relationship with Beijing. For years, Musk has had significant business interests in China, with Tesla's Shanghai factory, Tesla Giga Shanghai, playing a crucial role in the company's global operations. Since its opening in 2019, the Shanghai plant has surpassed Tesla's Fremont, California, facility in both size and productivity, now accounting for more than half of the company's global deliveries and a majority of its profits. Moreover, nearly 40% of Tesla's battery supply chain relies on Chinese companies, and these partnerships continue to expand. Notably, Tesla was the first foreign automaker permitted to establish operations in China without a local partner, following a change in ownership regulations. The Shanghai factory was constructed with the support of US$1.4 billion in loans from Chinese state-owned banks, granted at favorable interest rates. Between 2019 and 2023, the Shanghai government also provided Tesla with a reduced corporate tax rate of 15% – 10 percentage points lower than the standard rate. The cost advantages of manufacturing in Shanghai, which include lower production and labor expenses, have further cemented Tesla's reliance on the Chinese market. Given that Musk's wealth is largely tied to Tesla stock, his financial standing is increasingly dependent on the company's fortunes in China, making any potential disengagement from the country both economically and strategically challenging. Tesla's continued investment in China underscores this dependency. On Feb. 11, 2025, the company opened its second factory in Shanghai — a $200 million plant that is set to produce 10,000 megapack batteries annually. It's the company's first megapack battery factory outside the U.S.. This investment deepens Tesla's presence in China amid a new wave of U.S.-China trade tensions. On Feb. 1, the Trump administration imposed a 10% tariff on Chinese imports, prompting Beijing's retaliation with tariffs on American coal, liquefied natural gas, agricultural equipment and crude oil. It remains unclear to what extent Musk's financial interests in China will translate to real influence over the Trump administration's policy toward Beijing. But Musk's long history of pro-China remarks suggests the direction he wants the administration to move. During his visit to Beijing in April 2024, Musk praised the country, noting also: 'I also have a lot of fans in China – well, the feeling is mutual.' His admiration appears to hinge in part on how he views business and labor practices in China. In that vein, Musk has criticized American workers as lazy and has faced U.S. labor law disputes, while simultaneously praising Chinese workers for 'burning the 3 a.m. oil' under an intensely repressive labor system. In numerous posts on the social media platform X, formerly Twitter, which he owns, Musk has also praised China's infrastructure and high-speed rail system, lauded its space program, applauded its leadership in global green energy initiatives and urged his followers to visit the country. Musk has also opposed U.S. efforts to decouple from China, describing the countries' economies as 'conjoined twins,' despite a sizable part of the foreign policy establishment in the West viewing decreased dependency on China as necessary for security interests amid rising geopolitical tensions. On the issue of Taiwan, the most dangerous flashpoint in U.S.-China relations, Musk has compared Taiwan to Hawaii, arguing that it is an integral part of China and noting that the U.S. Pacific Fleet has prevented mainland China from achieving reunification by force. Musk further suggested that the Taiwan dispute could be resolved by allowing China to establish Taiwan as a special administrative zone, similar to Hong Kong. His remarks were shared and welcomed by China's then-ambassador to the U.S., who, in a post on X, emphasized China's so-called peaceful unification strategy and advocated for the 'one country, two systems' model. The big question going forward is how Musk's financial stakes in, and stated admiration for, China will translate into attempts to influence the U.S. administration's China policy, particularly given Musk's unconventional advisory role and the strong faction of anti-China hawks in Trumpworld. Given Musk's approach to China, it's hard to see him not trying to use his influence with the president to push for somewhat warmer relations with Beijing. If such counsel were heeded, it's easy to envision Musk leveraging his deep ties to China, particularly his close personal relationship with China's current second-ranking official, Premier Li Qiang, who was the Shanghai party chief when Tesla's factory was built. In the scenario, Donald Trump could tap Musk as a back channel for diplomacy to ease U.S.-China tensions and facilitate bilateral cooperation when needed. To this point, it was, perhaps, telling that it was Musk who met with China President Xi Jinping's envoy to Trump's inauguration, Vice President Han Zheng, on the eve of the event. But it's far from certain that Trump wants that diplomatic role for Musk, or that other voices won't win out with regard to Beijing. In his first term, Trump launched an unprecedented trade war and tech blockade against China, fundamentally reshaping U.S.-China relations and pushing the U.S. toward something of a bipartisan consensus to counter Beijing that has existed for several years. Trump's tariff moves and second-term picks for top trade and commerce roles, like Peter Navarro and Jamieson Greer — who played key roles in the trade war against China during the president's first term — suggest that Trump's commitment to further decoupling from China remains strong. Furthermore, Musk's business interests and personal wealth tied to China could leave him vulnerable to Chinese influence. By leaning on Musk's close ties with Trump, China could use his dependence on the Chinese market as a bargaining chip to pressure Trump into making concessions on issues of major strategic importance to Beijing. China has a history of coercing foreign companies reliant on its market into making compromises on matters concerning its national interests. For instance, Apple removed virtual private network apps from its app store in China at the government's request. Similarly, Tesla could face comparable pressure in the future if Beijing wants to use Musk as a cudgel to influence policy in the Trump administration. Notably, as the head of DOGE, with access to sensitive data from multiple agencies, Musk could find himself caught between U.S. security scrutiny and China's strategic targeting. So long as Musk retains the influence with Trump that he holds now, it's conceivable that his pro-China sentiments will translate into attempts to influence government policy. Yet even if this is to be the case, whether those efforts succeed will depend on the president and his other advisers, many of whom are seeking an aggressive front against Beijing and are likely to view Musk as an impediment rather than ally in that fight to come. Linggong Kong does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.
