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Middle East Eye
25-05-2025
- Business
- Middle East Eye
Why France may no longer hold the whip hand over Algeria
Algiers and Paris are locked in a familiar, almost ritualistic dance of diplomatic escalation. Barely a week passes without a fresh contretemps, a new dispute injecting poison into their already volatile relationship. The recent expulsion of French embassy staff by Algiers - a direct response to the arrest in Paris of an Algerian consulate official allegedly embroiled in a kidnapping case - is merely the latest step in this predictable tango. France is expected to retaliate, prompting another counter-move from Algiers. This tempestuous je t'aime, moi non plus dynamic - a familiar love-hate relationship characterised by years of turbulence and mistrust - has reached a particularly precarious juncture. New MEE newsletter: Jerusalem Dispatch Sign up to get the latest insights and analysis on Israel-Palestine, alongside Turkey Unpacked and other MEE newsletters For many observers, it marks an unprecedented low point in Franco-Algerian relations since Algeria's hard-won independence in 1962. A central question remains largely unasked: who needs whom more? Yet a central question remains largely unasked: who needs whom more? Is Paris truly in a position to dictate terms, or does Algiers now possess the leverage it needs? Who, in the end, holds the whip hand? To answer this question, one must look beyond the familiar narrative of historical grievances, colonial legacies and France's shifting stance on the Western Sahara. Rather than these well-rehearsed points of contention, it is the strategic and economic realities now shaping this fraught relationship that will determine the path each country takes - and ultimately, define its future. A close look at present economic realities reveals a subtle but significant shift in the balance of power - one that suggests Paris may face a more precarious future should this chill harden into a full-blown economic winter. Economic leverage The escalating diplomatic friction between Algiers and Paris casts a long shadow over their intertwined economic interests. Though overt economic retaliation has, for now, remained muted, recent developments signal growing risks. The Algerian Council for Economic Renewal (Crea) - a national confederation of business owners - abruptly cancelled a meeting with French business leaders at the Movement of the Enterprises of France (Medef). The move was reportedly triggered by French authorities deterring Rodolphe Saade, head of shipping giant CMA CGM, from pursuing Algerian port investments. Can France and Algeria patch things up? Read More » The decision serves as a potent early warning of the fragility of commercial ties should the current tensions escalate. Adding to the strain, Algeria has recently excluded France from crucial wheat import tenders - a direct consequence of the diplomatic chill. Veteran Algeria-based businessman Michel Bisac issued a stark warning to AFP: a severe Algerian reaction, he said, could instantly wipe out €5bn ($5.6bn) in French exports. His remarks reflect mounting anxiety within French business circles. For now, the bilateral economic ledger appears relatively stable, with overall trade contracting by a modest 4.3 percent. French enterprises continue to hold a notable - albeit gradually shrinking - presence in Algeria, with substantial investments in key sectors such as hydrocarbons (Total), pharmaceuticals (Sanofi, Aventis), and banking and agriculture (Societe Generale, BNP Paribas, Natixis). However, this surface-level resilience belies deeper vulnerabilities, particularly for France. In 2023, Algeria's exports to France, mostly in energy (oil and gas), reached a substantial $7.2bn, with an average annual growth of 8.1 percent over the previous five years. That same year, Algeria supplied 8 percent of France's gas. While existing long-term contracts make a complete rupture in supply unlikely in the short term, such a scenario would still force Paris to seek more expensive alternatives from providers such as Qatar or the US. This shift would carry significant logistical and financial costs. Meanwhile, French exports to Algeria - valued at $4.6bn in 2023 - have been shrinking, declining by an average of 5.4 percent annually over the past five years. Shifting ties It is worth noting that while the legacy of the Franco-Algerian relationship is reflected in the continued operation of some 450 French companies leveraging established market expertise, the evolving economic landscape is seeing other actors gain significant ground. Despite a less prominent historical presence, Turkey now boasts a far larger contingent of around 1,400 registered companies in Algeria, underscoring that historical ties do not guarantee present-day economic dominance. A crucial asymmetry lies in the diversity of economic options available to each country. Algeria has strategically broadened its horizons, actively cultivating partnerships with major economic powers such as the US, China, Turkey, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Germany and Italy. The latter has become a particularly close partner. The Eni-Sonatrach agreement of April 2022 positioned Algeria as Italy's primary gas supplier, meeting 39 percent of its import needs. The two countries are also deepening cooperation on renewable energy, such as the Southern Hydrogen Corridor project (SoutH2Corridor), as well as in industry and agriculture. This diversification mitigates Algeria's dependence on France as a primary trading hub. Bolstering this position, Algeria's record-breaking natural gas production in 2023, coupled with its expanding liquefied natural gas export capacity, which saw the highest growth rate in the Arab world that year, provides it with significant leverage in energy negotiations. It also offers alternative markets in a gas-hungry Europe, should the relationship with key client France deteriorate. In 2024, Algeria was the EU's fourth-largest gas supplier, accounting for nearly 15 percent of its imports - a clear indication of its growing importance to European energy security. The EU also remains Algeria's foremost trading partner, with a trade agreement in place since 2005 mandating the phased and mutual removal of import tariffs on goods. The Algerian president has declared his intention to renegotiate this agreement beginning in 2025 - a process in which Algeria will likely seek the support of France, a key player at the EU level. Diversification drive Beyond cultivating diverse partnerships, Algeria is actively transforming its economic foundations. World Bank data indicates that non-hydrocarbon exports have tripled since 2017, reaching $5.1bn in 2023. This marks a deliberate shift towards reducing the country's reliance on oil and gas, while also aiming to attract greater foreign investment. Conversely, while Algeria remains a significant export destination for France - €4.8bn ($5.4bn) in 2024, a 6.6 percent increase from 2023 - its relative importance within France's broader and more sophisticated global trade network is limited. Should the political brinkmanship persist, the scales appear to be tipping: Paris may face a greater downside than Algiers France, with a higher Economic Complexity Index and substantially greater overall exports, has a stronger capacity to absorb the loss of the Algerian market than Algeria does the reverse. Even so, the anxieties expressed by French small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs), which make up the majority of the nearly 6,000 French firms engaged with Algeria, are telling. These more fragile entities are already feeling the strain from issues such as customs delays. While France's diversified economy might ultimately weather a complete loss of the Algerian market, finding replacements would require considerable effort and the immediate impact on SMEs could be significant. In essence, while the economic ramifications of escalating diplomatic tensions remain contained for now, the underlying dynamics suggest a shifting balance - with Algeria growing more assertive in its economic dealings. Should the political brinkmanship persist, the scales appear to be tipping: Paris may face a greater downside than Algiers. Security stakes The intricate and often acrimonious relationship between Algiers and Paris extends far beyond immediate diplomatic sparring or economic calculations. Beneath the surface lie critical concerns around security, migration, and the deeply intertwined human dimension represented by the Algerian diaspora in France. The strategic landscape of the Sahel underscores Algeria's enduring - if somewhat tested - regional importance. While Algiers has seen a slight dip in influence, France's approach to the region, increasingly viewed as militarised and neo-colonial, has backfired. Paris is now largely unwelcome across the Sahel. France and Algeria rocked by 'most serious' diplomatic crisis since end of colonial rule Read More » In this volatile context, Algeria's geographical proximity, its longstanding intelligence networks and its strategic depth remain essential assets - particularly in the fight against terrorism. France, having withdrawn Operation Barkhane, cannot afford to cut itself off from Algeria's intelligence apparatus. This reality was quietly acknowledged during the discreet high-level visit to Algiers by French foreign intelligence agency chief Nicolas Lerner. The imperative of regional stability demands continued - albeit recalibrated - security cooperation, with Algeria's central role firmly recognised. Migration patterns form another critical - and often contentious - layer in the Franco-Algerian relationship. France's ability to manage irregular migration, ensure border security and implement deportation policies is closely tied to Algeria's cooperation. A complete breakdown in that cooperation would pose serious challenges for Paris. While France has its own immigration frameworks, Algeria's role as both a source and transit country makes it an indispensable partner in managing these complex flows. This reality calls for a pragmatic approach and the maintenance of functional bilateral agreements. Human cost The turbulent relationship between Algiers and Paris continues to weigh heavily on the substantial Algerian diaspora in France. Numbering nearly 650,000 in 2024, with an additional 1.2 million descendants, this community often faces heightened anxiety during periods of diplomatic crisis. These tensions can manifest in increased scrutiny and political scapegoating, particularly by far-right actors seeking to exploit anti-immigrant sentiment. France's 'crisis' with Islam: A legacy of 200 years of colonial brutality Read More » Even longstanding agreements that underpin their legal status, such as the 1968 migration pact, risk being turned into bargaining chips, casting a pall of uncertainty over their future and underscoring the human stakes of this fraught bilateral relationship. Ultimately, if the Franco-Algerian relationship is to navigate the present turbulence, a fundamental recalibration will be essential. Sustained diplomatic engagement is crucial. Yet France's diminished diplomatic corps - halved over the past three decades - struggles to meet the demands of the moment. This challenge is compounded by overlapping commentary from the interior ministry, which often undermines France's foreign policy coherence and weakens its diplomatic leverage. Looking ahead, Paris must present a unified diplomatic front. Algiers, for its part, will need to continue diversifying its alliances without jeopardising a longstanding - and still vital - economic partnership with France. In a globalised Mediterranean marked by growing competition, de-escalation remains the only viable path forward. However, it will require both capitals to move beyond reactive tit-for-tat escalation and commit to a more strategic long-term vision. The views expressed in this article belong to the author and do not necessarily reflect the editorial policy of Middle East Eye.
Straits Times
15-05-2025
- Business
- Straits Times
China first quarter emissions fell despite rising power demand
China plans to peak carbon emissions by 2030 and achieve carbon neutrality by 2060. PHOTO: AFP BEIJING - Surging renewable energy meant China's carbon emissions fell in the first quarter of 2025 despite rapidly rising power demands, a key milestone in the country's energy transition, analysis from a think tank showed on May 15. China's trade war with the United States remains a wildcard, however, especially if Beijing acts to stimulate polluting industrial sectors in response, the report notes. China, the world's largest emitter of greenhouse gases such as carbon dioxide (CO2) that drive climate change, plans to peak carbon emissions by 2030 and achieve carbon neutrality by 2060. It has invested heavily in its renewable energy sector, building almost twice as much wind and solar capacity as every other country combined, according to research published last year. New wind, solar and nuclear capacity meant China's CO2 emissions fell by 1.6 per cent year-on-year in the first quarter and one per cent in the 12 months to March, said analyst Lauri Myllyvirta at the Centre for Research on Energy and Clean Air (Crea). China's emissions have dipped before, but those reductions were driven by falling demand, such as during strict Covid-19 lockdowns in 2022. This time the drop came despite China's total power demand growing 2.5 per cent in the first quarter, said the report published in Carbon Brief. 'Growth in clean power generation has now overtaken the current and long-term average growth in electricity demand, pushing down fossil fuel use,' Mr Myllyvirta said. 'The current drop is the first time that the main driver is growth in clean power generation.' he added. Power sector emissions fell 5.8 per cent in the first quarter, offsetting rises in emissions from coal use in the metals and chemicals industries. But the report cautioned that emissions could rise again if Beijing seeks to stimulate carbon-intensive sectors to try to counteract the trade war with Washington. China also remains 'significantly off track' for a key 2030 target to reduce its carbon intensity – carbon emissions relative to GDP – under the Paris climate agreement. China pledged to achieve a 65 per cent reduction in carbon intensity by 2030 from 2005 levels. 'The future path of China's CO2 emissions hangs in the balance, depending on trends within each sector of its economy, as well as China's response to (US President Donald) Trump's tariffs,' Mr Myllyvirta said. Beijing has agreed to a 90-day pause on sky-high tariffs with Washington, but the shape of a final truce remains unclear. China has sought to position itself as a leader in combating climate change at a time when Mr Trump is promoting fossil fuel extraction and has withdrawn from multilateral climate agreements. Despite China's renewable energy boom, coal remains a vital part of its energy mix. China began construction on 94.5 gigawatts of coal power projects in 2024, 93 per cent of the global total, according to a February report by Crea and US-based Global Energy Monitor. Much of that is expected to be for backup power, however. In April 2025, China said that wind and solar energy capacity had surpassed mostly coal-based thermal capacity for the first time, according to data for the first quarter. AFP Find out more about climate change and how it could affect you on the ST microsite here.
Yahoo
14-05-2025
- Business
- Yahoo
America mulls sanctions on Russia – here's how they could do it
What would it mean for Russia, if the United States really did launch 'harder' sanctions 'than we've ever seen before' against its economy? That was the threat issued by Lt Gen Keith Kellogg, the US special envoy to Ukraine, in an interview with Fox News on Tuesday. Lt Gen Kellogg said Vladimir Putin had been warned that drastic new US sanctions were ready to go, should he come to be seen as the main obstacle to peace. European leaders would act in tandem with the president, he said, having had a 'good phone call' on the subject last week. It remains the overwhelming likelihood that, come the talks in Istanbul on Thursday, Putin fails to engage in anything but prevarication. He is not expected to attend in person. Volodymyr Zelensky therefore has the chance to further convince Washington that Russia – not Ukraine – is to blame for the continuation of the war. The point will be easy to convey if he meets an empty chair instead of Putin, the only person he has agreed to talk to on the Russian side. It begs the question: what is left in the US sanctions arsenal, and will Donald Trump pull the trigger? Russia's war effort is funded by fossil fuel exports. Since the war began, Moscow has earned £760 billion from oil, gas and coal sales, according to the Centre for Energy and Clean Air (Crea), a Helsinki-based think tank. That is more than double the £300 billion given and promised to Ukraine so far across Europe and the United States. It is seven times what Russia spent on its military last year. Western efforts to cut off this source of funding have had an impact at the fringes, though Russia has adapted with comparative ease. Moscow has foregone £106 billion in oil revenue thanks to existing sanctions, according to data up to January 2025 from the KSE Institute, a branch of the Kyiv School of Economics. European nations including Hungary and Slovakia will not voluntarily slash the £18.5 billion they spent on Russian energy in 2024, with few leaders willing to take the economic hit and political instability that would follow. But with US leadership, Russia's fuel export business could effectively be crippled. 'The idea that we're maxed out… is silly,' says Daniel Fried, the former US State Department sanctions co-ordinator and Atlantic Council fellow. Joe Biden was long unwilling to crack down against Russian energy exports, fearful of the impact on pump prices and his chance of re-election. In 2022, the US oversaw the creation of a price cap on purchases of Russian oil, set at $60 a barrel. That was meant to impose a haircut on Moscow's export earnings, rising and falling in line with the benchmark crude price (which slumped from a height of $124 to $66 over the course of Mr Biden's term). Mostly, however, it prompted Russia to create a so-called 'shadow-fleet' of tankers to carry its oil to India, China and other nations, obscuring the origin of the fuel via foreign-flagged vessels. After the Democrats lost in November, Mr Biden ratcheted up the pressure. The US imposed sanctions on two major Russian oil producers, LNG production and 155 'shadow-fleet' tankers, around half the total force. A blow of sorts was dealt. In March, there was a 36 per cent month-on-month rise in Russian oil transported on vessels subject to the price cap. LNG revenues decreased by 22 per cent. But Russia's monthly fossil fuel export revenues remained steady, in fact increasing by 1 per cent, according to Crea. The US is now exploring what would effectively be the 'nuclear' option. Lindsay Graham, the US senator, has widespread support in Congress for the Sanctioning Russia Act of 2025. This would impose a 500 per cent US tariff on goods from nations that buy Russian energy. China, India, Turkey and Brazil would be forced to find alternative sources to retain access to the US market. The extension of sanctions on the central bank could further complicate trade. In effect, the move would mimic the 'maximum pressure' sanctions imposed on Iran's oil industry – and torpedo Moscow's prime revenue source. 'This bill is a tool in President Trump's toolbox,' Mr Graham, a close Trump ally, said earlier this month. When he believes that 'we've reached an impasse, then watch for action'. There is a team working on 'hammer' sanctions in the US State Department that gained prominence recently over that figuring out 'carrots' to offer to Moscow, says Tom Keatinge of the Royal United Services Institute, a London-based think tank. In his Fox interview, Lt Gen Kellogg explicitly referenced Mr Graham's bill as the source of the 'very serious' sanctions pointing at Moscow. The question is, will Mr Trump ever pull the trigger? The president has retreated when faced with the economic blow-back from his tariff policy. Having just reduced tariffs on China, it seems unlikely he would choose to reimpose them – at the highest rate yet – over a war his top negotiators suggested the US was willing to walk away from helping to end just weeks ago. Emmanuel Macron, Sir Keir Starmer and other members of the 'coalition of the willing' will no doubt do their best to convince Mr Trump. Tymofiy Myolvanov, president of the KSE, said on Wednesday the 'rumour' going around was that the president would back Mr Graham's bill. One senior European diplomat told The Telegraph not to discount Mr Trump's appetite for tougher measures, should he be persuaded of the idea. It is to Mr Trump's advantage that Russian officials appear to find him 'hard to read,' Mr Fried says. 'There are those who argue [Mr Trump] will never pull the trigger because he is ultimately on Putin's side. I'm not sure I buy that.' Whether the uncertainty alone is enough to force Russia to take peace negotiations seriously is about to become clear. The gun is on the table. Putin and his inner circle will be assessing if they are right to keep betting the West does not really want to fire it. Broaden your horizons with award-winning British journalism. Try The Telegraph free for 1 month with unlimited access to our award-winning website, exclusive app, money-saving offers and more.
Telegraph
14-05-2025
- Business
- Telegraph
America mulls sanctions on Russia – here's how they could do it
What would it mean for Russia, if the United States really did launch 'harder' sanctions 'than we've ever seen before' against its economy? That was the threat issued by Lt Gen Keith Kellogg, the US special envoy to Ukraine, in an interview with Fox News on Tuesday. Lt Gen Kellogg said Vladimir Putin had been warned that drastic new US sanctions were ready to go, should he come to be seen as the main obstacle to peace. European leaders would act in tandem with the president, he said, having had a 'good phone call' on the subject last week. It remains the overwhelming likelihood that, come the talks in Istanbul on Thursday, Putin fails to engage in anything but prevarication. He is not expected to attend in person. Volodymyr Zelensky therefore has the chance to further convince Washington that Russia – not Ukraine – is to blame for the continuation of the war. The point will be easy to convey if he meets an empty chair instead of Putin, the only person he has agreed to talk to on the Russian side. It begs the question: what is left in the US sanctions arsenal, and will Donald Trump pull the trigger? Russia's war effort is funded by fossil fuel exports. Since the war began, Moscow has earned £760 billion from oil, gas and coal sales, according to the Centre for Energy and Clean Air (Crea), a Helsinki-based think tank. That is more than double the £300 billion given and promised to Ukraine so far across Europe and the United States. It is seven times what Russia spent on its military last year. Western efforts to cut off this source of funding have had an impact at the fringes, though Russia has adapted with comparative ease. Moscow has foregone £106 billion in oil revenue thanks to existing sanctions, according to data up to January 2025 from the KSE Institute, a branch of the Kyiv School of Economics. European nations including Hungary and Slovakia will not voluntarily slash the £18.5 billion they spent on Russian energy in 2024, with few leaders willing to take the economic hit and political instability that would follow. But with US leadership, Russia's fuel export business could effectively be crippled. 'The idea that we're maxed out… is silly,' says Daniel Fried, the former US State Department sanctions co-ordinator and Atlantic Council fellow. Biden unwilling to crack down on energy exports Joe Biden was long unwilling to crack down against Russian energy exports, fearful of the impact on pump prices and his chance of re-election. In 2022, the US oversaw the creation of a price cap on purchases of Russian oil, set at $60 a barrel. That was meant to impose a haircut on Moscow's export earnings, rising and falling in line with the benchmark crude price (which slumped from a height of $124 to $66 over the course of Mr Biden's term). Mostly, however, it prompted Russia to create a so-called 'shadow-fleet' of tankers to carry its oil to India, China and other nations, obscuring the origin of the fuel via foreign-flagged vessels. After the Democrats lost in November, Mr Biden ratcheted up the pressure. The US imposed sanctions on two major Russian oil producers, LNG production and 155 'shadow-fleet' tankers, around half the total force. A blow of sorts was dealt. In March, there was a 36 per cent month-on-month rise in Russian oil transported on vessels subject to the price cap. LNG revenues decreased by 22 per cent. But Russia's monthly fossil fuel export revenues remained steady, in fact increasing by 1 per cent, according to Crea. Sanctioning Russia Act The US is now exploring what would effectively be the 'nuclear' option. Lindsay Graham, the US senator, has widespread support in Congress for the Sanctioning Russia Act of 2025. This would impose a 500 per cent US tariff on goods from nations that buy Russian energy. China, India, Turkey and Brazil would be forced to find alternative sources to retain access to the US market. The extension of sanctions on the central bank could further complicate trade. In effect, the move would mimic the 'maximum pressure' sanctions imposed on Iran's oil industry – and torpedo Moscow's prime revenue source. 'This bill is a tool in President Trump's toolbox,' Mr Graham, a close Trump ally, said earlier this month. When he believes that 'we've reached an impasse, then watch for action'. There is a team working on 'hammer' sanctions in the US State Department that gained prominence recently over that figuring out 'carrots' to offer to Moscow, says Tom Keatinge of the Royal United Services Institute, a London-based think tank. In his Fox interview, Lt Gen Kellogg explicitly referenced Mr Graham's bill as the source of the 'very serious' sanctions pointing at Moscow. The question is, will Mr Trump ever pull the trigger? The president has retreated when faced with the economic blow-back from his tariff policy. Having just reduced tariffs on China, it seems unlikely he would choose to reimpose them – at the highest rate yet – over a war his top negotiators suggested the US was willing to walk away from helping to end just weeks ago. Emmanuel Macron, Sir Keir Starmer and other members of the 'coalition of the willing' will no doubt do their best to convince Mr Trump. Tymofiy Myolvanov, president of the KSE, said on Wednesday the 'rumour' going around was that the president would back Mr Graham's bill. One senior European diplomat told The Telegraph not to discount Mr Trump's appetite for tougher measures, should he be persuaded of the idea. It is to Mr Trump's advantage that Russian officials appear to find him 'hard to read,' Mr Fried says. 'There are those who argue [Mr Trump] will never pull the trigger because he is ultimately on Putin's side. I'm not sure I buy that.' Whether the uncertainty alone is enough to force Russia to take peace negotiations seriously is about to become clear. The gun is on the table. Putin and his inner circle will be assessing if they are right to keep betting the West does not really want to fire it.
Russia Today
04-03-2025
- Business
- Russia Today
EU spending more on Russian energy than on Ukraine aid
The EU is allocating more funds to Russian fossil fuel purchases than to providing aid to Ukraine amid the ongoing conflict between Moscow and Kiev, US President Donald Trump has claimed. Following the escalation of the hostilities in 2022 and the sabotage of the Nord Stream pipelines, the EU prioritized reducing its reliance on Russian energy. Some members voluntarily stopped importing Russian pipeline gas, while others continued buying LNG, which has only been partially targeted by sanctions. In a Truth Social post late on Monday, Trump stated without providing any concrete figures that 'Europe has spent more money buying Russian Oil and Gas than they have spent on defending Ukraine —BY FAR!' In an earlier post, Trump criticized European leaders for admitting that they needed US backing to continue supporting Ukraine. According to estimates from the Centre for Research on Energy and Clean Air (Crea), released last month on the third anniversary of the Ukraine conflict, EU member states bought €21.9 billion (over $23 billion) of Russian oil and gas in 2024 despite their efforts to reduce reliance on Russian amount is greater than the $20 billion the bloc allocated to Kiev in financial aid last year, according to the Kiel Institute for the World Economy (IfW Kiel). European Commission spokesperson Anna-Kaisa Itkonen has previously acknowledged that Russian energy continues to flow to the EU despite the bloc's commitment to eliminating its dependence on it. According to data by analytics firm Kpler, imports of Russian LNG by EU member states are now at an all-time high. In the first half of 2024, Russia was the second biggest supplier of the super-chilled fuel to the bloc after the US, statistics showed. Brussels stopped short of imposing a full ban on Russian LNG in its 16th package of sanctions, imposed on Moscow last month. In light of ongoing Ukraine peace-related negotiations between Moscow and Washington, Brussels is reportedly preparing a military aid package worth at least $6.2 billion for Kiev, which is expected to include 1.5 million artillery shells in addition to air defense systems. On Monday, news agencies reported, citing American officials, that Trump has instructed the US Defense Department to pause all military aid to Ukraine following his public spat with Vladimir Zelensky. Trump has repeatedly accused Zelensky of undermining his efforts to broker a peace deal between Kiev and Moscow. Their meeting in the Oval Office last Friday culminated in an unprecedented shouting match after which Trump said that the Ukrainian leader was disrespectful to the US.
