Latest news with #HEU
Daily Mail
2 days ago
- Politics
- Daily Mail
Were Iran strikes for nothing? Fears Tehran is hiding thousands of centrifuges in secret nuke-making facilities - and may even have bomb components in North Korean mountain lairs
Donald Trump declared this weekend that his bunker-busting bombs 'obliterated' Iran 's nuclear facilities and erased the Islamic Republic's chances of building a bomb. But no amount of triumphant bluster can hide the fact that Iran still boasts significant stockpiles of highly enriched uranium (HEU) - and could well have other facilities lying in wait to reach purity levels required to fashion nuclear warheads. In May, the UN's nuclear watchdog, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), reported that Iran had accumulated more than 400 kilograms (900 lbs) of uranium enriched to 60% purity. This is already enough to create an atomic weapon like those that laid waste to Hiroshima and Nagasaki. Such bombs are too heavy and cumbersome for Iran to deploy effectively. But achieving the 90% enrichment required to produce modern nuclear devices small and light enough to mount to any one of Tehran's vast array of missiles could take mere weeks. As far as anyone knows, that HEU is still safely squirrelled away, safe from American and Israeli bombs - not to mention tonnes more uranium enriched to levels below 60%, but still far in advance of the 3-5% required for civilian energy use. At present, there is no telling whether Trump's 'Operation Midnight Hammer' was as effective as the President claims - particularly at the Fordow Fuel Enrichment Plant, where enrichment centrifuges are hidden beneath 90 metres of rock and concrete. There are fears that Tehran may well have several other secret facilities that remain unknown to Israel 's Mossad and the CIA. And a former national security adviser to Trump and one of America's staunchest anti-Iran hawks has even claimed that North Korea could help Iran to obtain a nuclear deterrent. Where is Iran's uranium? Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, the Supreme Leader of Iran, claims he moved the country's uranium stockpile to a secret location - a belief echoed by Israeli intelligence officials. IAEA chief Rafael Grossi told the New York Times his team of UN inspectors had seen the uranium about a week before Israel attacked Iran. HEU is stable and dense, meaning it can be easily dispersed and stored to avoid detection. Grossi said the stockpile seen by IAEA inspectors was stored in special casks small enough to fit in the trunks of about 10 cars. He also said he believed the material had been moved. Satellite images published by US defence contractor Maxar Technologies showed 16 trucks leaving Iran's Fordow nuclear facility on June 19, three days before Operation Midnight Hammer. Further images reveal a flurry of activity prior to the trucks' departure involving bulldozers and security convoys that were likely reinforcing and sealing Fordow's entrances and evacuating sensitive documents. Now, no one outside of Iran knows exactly where its HEU stockpile is located, and Tehran's options are endless. The canisters could be stored in Iran's network of tunnels and caves, brought to Iranian Revolutionary Guard bases, or concealed at civilian facilities such as universities and research centres or even telecoms. They could even be kept on the move in trucks. Analysts largely agree that no amount of bombing could totally eradicate Iran's nuclear programme, and have pointed out that the American and Israeli campaign could have the opposite effect. Dr Andreas Krieg, an expert in Middle East security and senior lecturer at King's College London's School of Security Studies, told MailOnline: 'Going after Iran's nuclear programme could reinforce Tehran's belief that a nuclear deterrent is not only justified but essential for regime survival'. 'Rather than halting Iran's nuclear trajectory, the strikes may serve as a vindication of the logic that drives Iran's long-term nuclear ambition - deterrence through capability,' he said. Dr Andreas Boehm, international law expert at the University of St. Gallen, was even more forthright. 'After the experiences of Ukraine, Libya and now Iran on the one hand, and North Korea on the other, there can be no other conclusion than that only the possession of nuclear weapons offers protection against attack,' he said. 'For this or any subsequent Iranian regime, the path of negotiation is no longer an option. It will now work even more resolutely towards acquiring a nuclear bomb.' Could Iran still enrich its uranium? If the US and Israeli military action in Iran has provided Khamenei and his inner circle the political will to double down on their pursuit of nuclear weapons, they will eventually need to restart the enrichment process. And, although HEU is easy to store and transport, the centrifuges required to enrich it are highly sensitive and extremely difficult to reposition. Satellite images taken after Operation Midnight Hammer appear to reveal significant damage at the Natanz fuel enrichment site and Isfahan nuclear technology centre, with craters also seen at the Fordow facility. Though we don't know the true extent of the damage done by the US and Israeli bombing campaigns, IAEA chief Grossi believes the centrifuges at the Natanz facility - a larger plant far less protected than Fordow - were likely destroyed. If centrifuges at Fordow remain intact, it is reasonable to assume that parts of the facility have at least been damaged and that accessing the site has been rendered more difficult. But even if Fordow's operations are offline, Iran may have other facilities that are concealed and remain a secret. The prospect is not far-fetched - both Pakistan and North Korea covertly developed a nuclear bomb while apparently under tight US surveillance. Since 2022, Tehran has also been building another site close to Natanz under the so-called 'Pickaxe Mountain' that is said to be buried even deeper than Fordow. The Islamic Republic claims the facility is for building centrifuges, but Iranian authorities have refused to admit IAEA inspectors to the site, claiming it is not yet in operation. Nuclear proliferation experts have warned that this site could be used as another enrichment facility. Sima Shine, an expert on Iran's nuclear programme and former Mossad researcher, told The Telegraph there was 'no doubt' Israeli and US aircraft had inflicted 'huge damage' to Iran's known nuclear sites at Fordow, Natanz and Isfahan. But she added that other 'secret' facilities almost certainly existed. Meanwhile, analysts say the strikes could push Iran to withdraw entirely from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), which currently obliges it to cooperate with IAEA inspectors. 'The Non-Proliferation Treaty allows member states to withdraw 'if it decides that extraordinary events, related to the subject matter of this treaty, have jeopardised the supreme interests of its country',' said Darya Dolzikova, Senior Research Fellow for Proliferation and Nuclear Policy at the RUSI think tank. 'The events of the last week could arguably give Tehran the justification it needs to that end. A withdrawal from the NPT would likely see the international community lose all visibility of the Iranian nuclear programme and could - long-term - become a catalyst for broader proliferation in the region.' Pyongyang to Tehran's rescue? Despite issuing stern condemnations of US and Israeli military action, Iran's key allies - Russia, China and North Korea - have so far urged restraint and diplomacy. Crucially, none have offered Tehran military support, not even defensive systems such as surface-to-air missile batteries. But former US ambassador to the UN and Trump-era national security adviser John Bolton has claimed that North Korea is already playing a covert role in Iran's nuclear ambitions. 'My biggest concern is that parts of Iran's nuclear programme are located under a mountain in North Korea,' he told German outlet Der Spiegel in a shocking interview this week. Bolton offered little in the way of evidence, but Iran and North Korea, both long isolated by Western sanctions, have maintained cordial ties for decades and are widely suspected of sharing military technology, particularly in the realm of missile development. A now-defunct UN panel of experts reported in 2021 that the two countries had resumed collaboration on long-range missile projects, including the transfer of sensitive components. Tehran would have to enrich its own uranium, but 'Pyongyang could provide important assistance in helping Iran reconstitute destroyed missile production facilities, potentially at new sites, shielded from scrutiny,' said Ankit Panda of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. 'There are certain matters pertaining to weapons design that the North Koreans would not want to proliferate,' he added. 'Once in Iran, those designs could potentially be discovered by the United States and used to undermine North Korea's own deterrent.' But Panda also noted that Pyongyang's deep expertise in nuclear weaponisation - particularly in the non-fissile components of a bomb, such as the precision-engineered conventional explosives used to trigger a detonation - could prove valuable to Iran.
Time of India
13-06-2025
- Politics
- Time of India
Has Israel's attack on Iran failed? Fordow nuclear fuel enrichment plant untouched
Israel strikes Iranian nuclear facilities but misses Fordow site Live Events Fordow's fortified structure makes it Iran's most secure nuclear site Fordow's role in Iran's nuclear deterrence strategy Israel's strategy falls short without neutralizing Fordow (You can now subscribe to our (You can now subscribe to our Economic Times WhatsApp channel Israel launched a large-scale military operation on June 13, 2025, against Iran, targeting nuclear facilities, military leaders, and scientists in an attempt to degrade Tehran's nuclear program. Dubbed Operation Rising Lion , the strikes hit the Natanz enrichment plant and killed high-profile figures, including former Atomic Energy Organization head Fereydoun Abbasi and physicist Mohammad Mehdi Salami, Commander in Chief of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, who was a target in the Stuxnet virus attack in 2007 by Israel and US was killed in the June 13 attack, with confirmation from Iranian TV read: Stocks sell off, oil surges as Israel strikes Iran However, Israel's most critical objective, the destruction of the Fordow Fuel Enrichment Plant (FFEP), was missed, leaving Iran's nuclear capabilities largely Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu claimed the operation aimed to 'roll back the Iranian threat' by targeting enrichment facilities, scientists, and missile programs. Yet, Fordow's survival means Iran retains a hardened, underground site capable of producing highly enriched uranium (HEU), a key hurdle in dismantling its nuclear deep inside a mountain near Qom, the Fordow Fuel Enrichment Plant has long been a focal point of Western concerns over Iran's nuclear program. Designed to hold 3,000 centrifuges, Fordow's small scale, just 6 per cent of Natanz's capacity, makes it ill-suited for civilian fuel production but ideal for covert HEU the 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), Iran repurposed Fordow as a research center. However, in 2023, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) discovered undeclared modifications for HEU production. By March 2023, inspectors found uranium enriched to 83.7 per cent purity, close to weapons-grade read: Trump had warned of 'something big' in the Middle East hours before Israel's strikes on Iran Despite Israel's recent strikes, Fordow's untouched status means Iran can quickly resume high-level enrichment if Israel successfully struck Natanz, the damage may be temporary. Natanz, Iran's largest enrichment site, has faced multiple attacks in the past, including sabotage and cyber operations, yet Tehran has consistently rebuilt its capabilities. The IAEA confirmed the June 13 strike but reported no radiation leaks, suggesting swift argue that without disabling Fordow, Iran's nuclear program faces no existential threat. 'Fordow's mountain-shielded infrastructure makes it nearly invulnerable to airstrikes,' said a former US nonproliferation official. 'As long as it operates, Iran maintains a breakout option.'Tehran has long framed Fordow as a "deterrent" against attacks on its nuclear program. The facility's location on an Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) base and its fortified design underscore its strategic role. Analysts suggest Fordow's existence complicates military calculations, as destroying Natanz alone would not cripple enrichment read: Israel strikes Iran's nuclear sites as hinted by Trump, declares state of 'emergency' Iran's foreign ministry condemned Israel's strikes as "adventurism" and warned of retaliation. However, with Fordow still operational, Tehran retains leverage in any future negotiations or operation highlights a recurring flaw in efforts to halt Iran's nuclear progress: Fordow's immunity. Past attacks on Natanz and assassinations of scientists have delayed but not stopped enrichment. Until Fordow is neutralized, Iran's path to a bomb remains read: Trump to attend security meeting on Friday after Israeli strikes on Iran Netanyahu's claim that Iran was 'months away' from a weapon underscores the urgency, but without targeting Fordow, Israel's strike may only buy time rather than deliver a decisive blow. As the IAEA monitors Fordow's ongoing activity, the world watches whether Israel or its allies will risk a more direct confrontation with Iran's most secure facility.1. Why is Iran's Fordow nuclear facility considered so important?The Fordow Fuel Enrichment Plant is Iran's most fortified nuclear site, located deep within a mountain near Qom. It is capable of enriching uranium to near-weapons-grade levels and is heavily shielded against airstrikes, making it central to Iran's nuclear breakout potential.2. Did Israel's June 13, 2025, airstrike on Iran damage the Fordow nuclear plant?No, Israel's June 13, 2025, attack did not hit the Fordow nuclear facility. While the strike targeted other sites such as Natanz and resulted in the deaths of top Iranian nuclear scientists, Fordow remained operational, limiting the strike's long-term effectiveness.3. What nuclear sites in Iran were targeted by Israel in 2025?In the 2025 attack, Israel reportedly targeted the Natanz uranium enrichment facility and struck military and scientific personnel involved in Iran's nuclear program. However, the Fordow Fuel Enrichment Plant, Iran's most secure site, was not hit.4. Can Iran still build a nuclear weapon with Fordow intact?Yes, experts believe that as long as the Fordow plant remains active, Iran retains a critical path to developing highly enriched uranium. Its underground design and resistance to military strikes make it a persistent challenge for nuclear nonproliferation efforts.
Yahoo
03-06-2025
- Business
- Yahoo
Lightbridge Expects to Benefit from Advanced Expedited Testing Method in its Planned Irradiation Testing in the Advanced Test Reactor
RESTON, Va., June 03, 2025 (GLOBE NEWSWIRE) -- Lightbridge Corporation (Nasdaq: LTBR), a leader in advanced nuclear fuel technology, today announced it expects to benefit from a groundbreaking testing method developed by Idaho National Laboratory (INL), known as the Fission Accelerated Steady-state Test (FAST). This pioneering method utilizes increased enrichment levels to expedite the irradiation testing of fuel samples in the Advanced Test Reactor (ATR). Use of Highly Enriched Uranium (HEU) in private sector fuel testing is exceedingly rare. HEU, defined as uranium enriched to 20% or more uranium-235, is tightly controlled and legally accessible only through government-operated facilities. The enrichments in the 26-30% range for each set of Lightbridge coupon samples were selected to yield the required linear heat generation rates based on the specific core position within the Advanced Test Reactor where the experiment is planned to be inserted for irradiation testing. 'Lightbridge is thrilled to benefit from the FAST method at INL,' said Dr. Scott Holcombe, Vice President of Engineering at Lightbridge. 'This advanced technique enables achieving burnup targets faster than using conventional testing methods, which means we can acquire necessary performance data in an accelerated time frame.' The planned irradiation testing program, along with post-irradiation examination activities (the scope of which will be detailed in a future Project Task Statement), is aimed at generating critical irradiation performance data for Lightbridge's advanced fuel. This data will play a key role in supporting the company's regulatory licensing through the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) and the company expects this data to contribute to streamlined, expedited licensing under the ADVANCE Act. The company also expects to share this data with utilities to assist in their analyses of Lightbridge Fuel for use in commercial nuclear power plants. Seth Grae, CEO of Lightbridge, added: 'We are grateful to the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) for providing the HEU and to INL and DOE for enabling Lightbridge fuel material samples to be tested using this innovative FAST method. It reflects the importance of strong public-private partnerships in advancing clean energy technologies. This is an excellent example of the U.S. government using its advanced technologies and resources, particularly HEU and the Advanced Test Reactor, to support commercialization of advanced nuclear fuel technologies potentially on accelerated timelines.' This work is conducted under an existing Cooperative Research and Development Agreement (CRADA) between Lightbridge and Idaho National Laboratory. More details on FAST can be found at: • • About Idaho National LaboratoryBattelle Energy Alliance manages INL for the U.S. Department of Energy's Office of Nuclear Energy. INL is the nation's center for nuclear energy research and development, and also performs research in each of DOE's strategic goal areas: energy, national security, science and the environment. For more information, visit Follow us on social media: Facebook, Instagram, LinkedIn and X. About Lightbridge Corporation Lightbridge Corporation (NASDAQ: LTBR) is focused on developing advanced nuclear fuel technology essential for delivering abundant, zero-emission, clean energy and providing energy security to the world. The Company is developing Lightbridge Fuel™, a proprietary next-generation nuclear fuel technology for existing light water reactors and pressurized heavy water reactors, significantly enhancing reactor safety, economics, and proliferation resistance. The Company is also developing Lightbridge Fuel for new small modular reactors (SMRs) to bring the same benefits plus load-following with renewables on a zero-carbon electric grid. Lightbridge has entered into two long-term framework agreements with Battelle Energy Alliance LLC, the United States Department of Energy's operating contractor for Idaho National Laboratory, the United States' lead nuclear energy research and development laboratory. DOE's Gateway for Accelerated Innovation in Nuclear program has twice awarded Lightbridge to support the development of Lightbridge Fuel over the past several years. Lightbridge is participating in two university-led studies through the DOE Nuclear Energy University Program at Massachusetts Institute of Technology and Texas A&M University. An extensive worldwide patent portfolio backs Lightbridge's innovative fuel technology. Lightbridge is included in the Russell Microcap® Index. For more information, please visit To receive Lightbridge Corporation updates via e-mail, subscribe at Lightbridge is on YouTube. Subscribe to access past demonstrations, interviews, and other video content at Lightbridge is on X (formerly Twitter). Sign up to follow @LightbridgeCorp at Forward Looking Statements With the exception of historical matters, the matters discussed herein are forward-looking statements. These statements are based on current expectations on the date of this news release and involve a number of risks and uncertainties that may cause actual results to differ significantly from such estimates. The risks include, but are not limited to: Lightbridge's ability to commercialize its nuclear fuel technology; the degree of market adoption of Lightbridge's product and service offerings; Lightbridge's ability to fund general corporate overhead and outside research and development costs; market competition; our ability to attract and retain qualified employees; dependence on strategic partners; demand for fuel for nuclear reactors; Lightbridge's ability to manage its business effectively in a rapidly evolving market; the availability of nuclear test reactors and the risks associated with unexpected changes in Lightbridge's fuel development timeline; the increased costs associated with metallization of Lightbridge's nuclear fuel; public perception of nuclear energy generally; changes in the political environment; risks associated with war in Europe; changes in the laws, rules and regulations governing Lightbridge's business; development and utilization of, and challenges to, Lightbridge's intellectual property; risks associated with potential shareholder activism; potential and contingent liabilities; as well as other factors described in Lightbridge's filings with the Securities and Exchange Commission (the 'SEC'). Lightbridge does not assume any obligation to update or revise any such forward-looking statements, whether as the result of new developments or otherwise, except as required by law. Readers are cautioned not to put undue reliance on forward-looking statements. A further description of risks and uncertainties can be found in Lightbridge's Annual Report on Form 10-K for the fiscal year ended December 31, 2024, and in its other filings with the SEC, including in the sections thereof captioned 'Risk Factors' and 'Forward-Looking Statements', all of which are available at and Investor Relations Contact: Matthew Abenante, IRC Director of Investor Relations Tel: +1 (347) 947-2093 ir@ Error in retrieving data Sign in to access your portfolio Error in retrieving data Error in retrieving data Error in retrieving data Error in retrieving data
South China Morning Post
16-04-2025
- Science
- South China Morning Post
Arctic advantage: China's new tech boosts sub detection capabilities near Alaskan waters
Chinese researchers have unveiled a key development in underwater acoustic technology that could chart a new course for the country's underwater defence capabilities. Advertisement The innovation allowed scientists to pinpoint the depth of a low-frequency sound source with near-perfect accuracy in the Arctic's Beaufort Sea – a critical gateway to Alaska and a focal point of US naval operations. A peer-reviewed paper published last month in Acta Acustica, China's leading acoustics journal, detailed how scientists with Harbin Engineering University (HEU) could use challenging Arctic oceanographic conditions to develop a passive depth-discrimination method with 93 per cent accuracy for underwater targets and a 100 per cent success rate for identifying surface vessels. The achievement, verified through a computer simulation built with real-life data collected by China's 11th Arctic expedition in 2020, marks a significant step in China's undersea warfare capabilities, in the northern backyard of the United States. The Beaufort Sea's 'double duct' acoustic environment – a layering of water masses with contrasting temperatures and salinities – has long been a challenge for sonar systems. Advertisement 'The upper surface duct (0-80 metres, or 0-263 feet) exhibits increasing sound velocity with depth while the Beaufort duct (80–300 metres) forms a distinct sound channel' due to warm water coming from the Pacific, according to the researchers.
