Gaza on the brink: How is Egypt preparing?

Arab News

6 days ago

https://arab.news/c2tnt
Gaza has long been a central flashpoint in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. This small coastal strip is home to approximately 2.3 million Palestinians within an area that does not exceed 365 sq. km. It has suffered from isolation and armed conflicts since Hamas took control in 2007.
The latest war in Gaza, since Oct. 7, 2023, has surpassed all previous rounds in terms of both scale and devastation. It marks a turning point that has reshaped the entire landscape and elevated the political and humanitarian risks, particularly with regard to Egypt's role.
The developments that have unfolded demonstrate just how close Gaza is to complete collapse. Should conflict spike once again, it would do so amid near-total destruction, decaying infrastructure and a population at the peak of suffering and tension, making any new escalation a compounded catastrophe.
If a new round of fighting erupts, the main players — Israel, Hamas, the international powers and Egypt — will determine whether the conflict is contained or if it will spiral. Egypt, as Gaza's southern neighbor, is a decisive actor in shaping any outcome.
Egypt manages the Gaza file with extreme caution, balancing national principles with strategic interests. On the one hand, Cairo is committed to the peace treaty it signed with Israel in 1979 and maintains security coordination with Tel Aviv, especially in Sinai. On the other hand, it insists that Gaza remains occupied Palestinian territory and that Egypt should not bear its burden under any circumstances.
At the beginning of the war, Egypt stepped in to play the role of mediator, hosting an international summit in October 2023 and working to open humanitarian corridors and coordinate a truce. But as talk of displacing Gaza's population escalated, Egypt hardened its stance in an unprecedented way: a firm rejection of any mass displacement toward Sinai and an outright refusal to assume any administrative or security role in the Strip after the war, except within a clear political framework toward a two-state solution.
One of Egypt's chief fears is that Israel will attempt to 'export' its Gaza problem to Egyptian territory, either by pressuring Egypt to open the border or by permanently occupying the Philadelphi Corridor, the narrow strip of land between Gaza and Sinai. Cairo has repeatedly emphasized that any Israeli move to take control of this corridor would be a clear violation of the peace treaty.
In this context, Egypt has become Gaza's only remaining lifeline. The Rafah crossing is the only non-Israeli outlet to the outside world, yet it has remained closed for long periods during the war or only partially open for limited aid or the evacuation of the wounded and foreign nationals. Aid convoys have faced major obstacles, including trucks stalling on the Egyptian side and supplies spoiling under the sun.
Despite this, Egypt has kept its borders closed to any mass influx, holding firm to the principle that the solution must come from within Gaza, not through displacement. It has established a field hospital near Rafah, received some of the wounded for treatment and facilitated aid deliveries, but it has refused to set up refugee camps on its soil.
Any new escalation in Gaza will not remain within its borders. The repercussions will be felt regionally. Egypt and Israel, which have engaged in close security cooperation over the past decade, have seen their ties significantly strained since the war began. Mutual accusations over the Rafah crossing and repeated Israeli suggestions about relocating Palestinians have deepened the rift.
Amid this complexity, Egypt has emerged as a central player in any path toward escalation or de-escalation. Cairo has maintained open channels with all parties — Israel, Hamas, the Palestinian Authority and the US, as well as Qatar, Turkiye and European countries — through its General Intelligence Service and Foreign Ministry.
Diplomatically, Egypt has followed a dual messaging strategy: a rational and moderate tone toward the West, emphasizing international law and the urgency of humanitarian aid; and a nationalist, sharper tone toward the Arab public, holding Israel responsible for the catastrophe and rejecting any attempt to relocate or resettle Palestinians in Sinai. This approach has allowed Egypt to maintain a delicate balance between its global relationships and domestic public opinion.
The Egyptian public generally has deep sympathy with the Palestinians, especially amid scenes of destruction and civilian casualties. At the same time, there is a broad understanding among Egyptians that Sinai is not a viable solution and that opening the border would pose a direct threat to national security and risk dragging Egypt into a prolonged conflict.
Cairo has come under pressure, and continues to face it, from international parties, particularly the US, to accept temporary solutions involving limited refugee reception. However, Egypt has remained firm: no resettlement, no refugee camps and no concessions on its borders. Egypt has reinforced this position diplomatically by rallying Arab and international support and has even secured acknowledgment from Washington and Brussels that Sinai is not an option.
Between escalation and de-escalation, three main scenarios can be envisioned if the situation in Gaza explodes again.
The first is a limited, short-term escalation. In this scenario, a new round of fighting could break out between Israel and Gaza-based factions lasting several days or weeks, ending through regional and international mediation, most likely led by Egypt, Qatar and Washington. This would be seen as the 'best possible' outcome because it would prevent a broader disaster and preserve Egypt's role as an effective mediator. However, the humanitarian cost would remain high in Gaza and Egypt would once again face public and economic pressure, particularly in terms of tourism and energy.
The second is a full-scale, prolonged war, which is the most dangerous scenario. This would involve an extended war exceeding the last one in scope and destruction, possibly including a new ground invasion of Gaza or temporary occupation of parts of it. In this case, civilians would face an even greater humanitarian disaster and tens of thousands would be forced to flee south toward Egypt's border.
The international pressure on Cairo to open the border, even temporarily, would be immense, putting Egypt in a difficult position between moral obligations and security imperatives. This escalation could lead to the effective collapse of Egyptian-Israeli de-escalation and threaten the peace treaty, especially if the Israeli military presence extended along the length of the Philadelphi Corridor. The chaos would escalate.
Egypt manages the Gaza file with extreme caution, balancing national principles with strategic interests.
Dr. Abdellatif El-Menawy
The third and most optimistic scenario is that an explosion in Gaza could prompt a wide international effort, leading to a permanent ceasefire that is followed by reconstruction tied to new political arrangements. In this context, Egypt could work with other Arab states to support a transitional framework that includes reducing Hamas' military power, enabling the PA to govern Gaza and introducing international monitors. Egypt might agree to participate in an international Arab force to secure border crossings or train Palestinian security forces — but only if this is part of a clear political path toward a two-state solution.
Egypt today stands at the heart of the Gaza equation: not a direct party to the war but the first to feel its consequences. Cairo understands that any renewed explosion in Gaza could destabilize it internally, drain it economically and confront its people and the international community with difficult tests.
Egypt's strategy is built on three parallel tracks: preventing resettlement at any cost, maintaining its role as mediator, and reinforcing its security and economic preparedness. Egypt also seeks to turn the crisis into an opportunity to relaunch a genuine political process, one that moves beyond mere crisis management to address the root causes of the conflict.
In every scenario, all eyes remain on Cairo: will it once again succeed in extinguishing the fire or find itself suddenly caught in the flames?