DGCA Violations: DGCA Uncovers Major Violations in Indian Aviation Safety Checks, ET TravelWorld
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Aviation watchdog DGCA has detected multiple violations related to airlines, airports, aircraft maintenance works, and repeated defects in multiple cases during its surveillance at major airports, an exercise carried out in less than two weeks after the Air India plane crash Without disclosing names of the airlines, airports and other entities in relation to the defects, the regulator on Tuesday said surveillance covered multiple critical areas such as flight operations, airworthiness, ramp safety, Air Traffic Control (ATC), Communication, Navigation and Surveillance (CNS) systems, and pre-flight medical evaluations.From a faded centre line marking of a runway at an airport to non-updation of obstruction limitation data for three years to a scheduled carrier's domestic flight being held up due to worn tyres, the watchdog came across multiple defects in the aviation ecosystem.Noting that the comprehensive surveillance will continue in future to detect hazards in the aviation ecosystem, the Directorate General of Civil Aviation (DGCA) said the findings have been communicated to the entities concerned for taking corrective actions within seven days.Two teams led by the Joint Director General carried out the surveillance during night and early morning hours at major airports, including Delhi and Mumbai airports.In a detailed statement about the surveillance findings, DGCA listed multiple cases wherein the reported defects reappeared many times on the aircraft indicating ineffective monitoring and inadequate rectification."Ground handling equipment such as baggage trollies... were found unserviceable; Line maintenance stores, tool control procedures were not followed," it said.During maintenance of aircraft, the work order was not followed, DGCA said and added that the unserviceable thrust reverser system and flap slat lever were not locked."During maintenance, safety precautions found not (to have been) taken by AME (Aircraft Maintenance Engineer) as per AMM (Aircraft Maintenance Manual); at places, AME was not attending to the snag rectification; defect reports generated by the aircraft system, were not found recorded in the technical logbook," the statement said.Also, DGCA found that several life vests were not properly secured beneath their designated seats in aircraft and the corrosion-resistant tape on the right-hand side winglet's lower blade was found to be damaged.At an airport, centre line marking of a runway was observed faded and the rapid exit taxiway, green centre light were not unidirectional. The obstruction limitation data was found to have not been updated for last three years and no survey has been performed despite many new construction around the vicinity of aerodrome, DGCA said.However, names of the airports were not disclosed."A number of vehicles in the ramp area were found without speed governors. These vehicles were withdrawn by cancelling there AVP and drivers ADP were suspended," the statement said.Further, the regulator said a simulator was found not matching with the aircraft configuration and that the software was not updated to the current version.Besides, a domestic flight of a scheduled carrier was held up due to worn tyres and it was released only after the required rectification was done, it added.DGCA emphasised that it has initiated a focused assessment of the aviation ecosystem to strengthen safety measures across the sector."Throughout the surveillance, ground activities and aircraft movements were closely monitored to check the compliance of regulatory requirements and to identify weak areas for improvement," the statement said.In the wake of the crash of the London-bound Air India Boeing 787-8 plane soon after take off from Ahmedabad on June 12, DGCA has also put in place a special audit framework for a "360-degree" evaluation of the country's aviation ecosystem and transcend the current practice of siloed assessment.
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The Print
8 hours ago
- The Print
67% aircraft accident reports cite pilot action, but show human error often last straw in flawed system
These references are mentioned either in the findings under conclusions or under probable causes in both fatal and non-fatal accidents involving fixed winged aircraft. New Delhi: Pilot actions find mention in at least 67 percent of the 68 final reports the Aircraft Accident Investigation Bureau (AAIB) has put out on aircraft accidents since 2012, an analysis by ThePrint has shown. Notably, the reports highlighting inflight erroneous actions, judgements of pilots or lapses don't necessarily attribute all of these accidents to just errors by persons inside the cockpit. The topic of pilot error recently took centrestage soon after the AAIB came out with its interim probe report on the tragic 12 June Air India plane crash in Ahmedabad that claimed the lives of all those on board barring one. According to the report, soon after the aircraft took off, the fuel switches to both engines turned off one after the other, just one second apart. As the engines stopped getting fuel, their speeds began dropping from take-off levels. According to the cockpit audio, one pilot asked the other why he turned the fuel off, and the other pilot replied that he didn't do it. While global headlines pinned the crash on one of the pilots, the AAIB slammed these reports. In its interim report, it did not point to any error or deliberate action by the pilots as the reason for the 12 June crash. In Part 2 of a three-part series on AAIB's final reports on aircraft accidents, ThePrint looks at some of the cases where fingers have been raised at pilots for lapses. The AAIB, India's primary agency for investigating aviation accidents and incidents, was established on 30 July 2012 in compliance with ICAO (International Civil Aviation Organisation) Annex 13 guidelines. It functions under the Ministry of Civil Aviation, but works independently from the aviation watchdog Directorate General of Civil Aviation (DGCA). According to the 'Aircraft (Investigation of Accidents and Incidents) Rules', the DG AAIB has to institute an investigation into the circumstances of accidents, and shall be responsible for conducting the probe. Also Read: Considered quitting Air India job to look after father—family, friends remember Capt Sumeet Sabharwal 'Last line of defence' Lack of coordination in the cockpit and disagreements between pilots, poor decision-making, lapses in judgement, failure to adhere to SOPs among others are mentioned as factors contributing to human error and complacency in as many as 46 final reports. Moreover, the Bureau highlights issues such as lack of assertiveness among co-pilots, refusal of one pilot to hand over controls to the other, inadequate experience of the pilot-in-command (PIC), inappropriate handling, procedural violations, flying into severe weather despite awareness of its deterioration, and failure to monitor fuel levels and conduct proper pre-flight inspection leading to engine starvation. 'We aren't denying or refuting that there are pilot errors. However it is important to understand that pilots are the last line of defense,' Captain Anil Rao, general secretary, Air Line Pilots Association, told ThePrint. 'The bigger question should be how did we reach that last line? It is a multitude of factors—mechanical, environmental, and even manufacturers' defects. A pilot isn't a robot. If they missed 1 out of the 100 things in the book, they are grounded and blamed. Sometimes pilots have less than a minute or just a couple of seconds to take a call.' 'One has to also understand that aircraft accidents involve multiple stakeholders and only when multiple errors align that it leads to a disaster,' Rao added. 'Faulty HR policy' The AAIB maintains that the sole objective of investigation is only the prevention of such accidents or incidents. In the 2020 Air India Express crash in which 21 people, including both pilots, were killed in Kozhikode, the report attributes the probable cause to the pilot not adhering to SOPs, with contributing systemic failures including faulty HR policy that added pressure on the person sitting in the cockpit, among others. Apart from 'overconfidence', the AAIB repeatedly cited poor decision-making by the PIC and noted his use of unprescribed drugs, which could have caused cognitive deficits. The final report also points towards lack of coordination between the pilots. 'The first officer (FO) had correctly identified that the approach for runway 10 was an 'unstabilised approach'. After making two unassertive attempts to attract the PIC's attention towards the unstabilised approach, using non-standard vocabulary, he asked the PIC to 'Go Around' just before touchdown,' it mentions. 'In spite of knowing full well that the approach was unstabilised and the PIC was not responding, the FO did not take over the controls as per the company SOP and initiate a 'Go Around'.' In another 2014 accident of a Deccan charter operating from Delhi to Guwahati, the more qualified pilot was found to be the co-pilot. Incidentally, the PIC had denied giving the controls to the co-pilot after the second bounce of the aircraft, which landed on its nose landing gear. 'The co-pilot asked PIC for the controls after the second bounce which was denied by the PIC,' the report mentions. Systemic failures such as lapses by the aircraft operators, aerodrome operators, regulatory oversight among others were mentioned in at least 32 of the 46 cases. Additionally, in at least six of these cases, the AAIB reports identify mechanical failures such as the failure of the pilot's seat back recliner mechanism and suboptimal performance of the PIC's windshield wiper in rain in addition to some sort of erroneous pilot judgement or decision. Moreover, at least four of these cases were a combination of mechanical and system failures in addition to erroneous pilot judgements. The systemic failures should be seen from the perspective of the AAIB repeatedly flagging violations and lapses of both airline operators, and Flight Training Organisations in at least 47 percent of the 68 reports for one reason or the other. These violations, as reported in Part 1 of the series, were cited as either contributory factors or probable causes or in the conclusion findings, highlighting deeper issues with the overall safety culture. Of the 68 aircraft accidents of which the AAIB has published its final reports, 23 are of training flights operated by trainee pilots either in solo sorties or with a flying instructor. Seventeen of these accidents were fatal, claiming one or more lives. There are 101 AAIB accidents reports in public domain, including 27 helicopter reports (both preliminary and final) and six preliminary reports of aircraft accidents. 'There can be errors, lapses in judgement. No one is denying that. But it's time, we look at what is leading up to these errors and fix that. It's easy to blame the cockpit crew because that way the accountability doesn't fall upon other stakeholders and even if some accountability is put on them, it can be brushed off, simply blaming it on the pilots,' a pilot told ThePrint. Fatigue, another pilot asserted, has always been overlooked. 'Pilots are under tremendous pressure all the time. Most of this pressure is unwarranted, and both operators and authorities must look into making things a tad bit easy for the pilots.' Given the overall scenario, it comes as no surprise that the DGCA warned Air India in July over crew fatigue management and training including lack of adequate rest for the pilots, insufficient crew for long haul flights, among others. The airline has been under immense scrutiny after the 12 June crash in Ahmedabad. Also Read: Air India crash preliminary report: A look at what fuel switches are designed to do & built-in safeguards Recurring pattern Many of the AAIB final reports reveal a recurring pattern of poor decision-making, inappropriate aircraft handling, and inadequate crew coordination across airlines. In the 2021 accident involving an InterGlobe Aviation (IndiGo) aircraft with seven passengers and four crew, the AAIB attributed the probable cause to 'inappropriate aircraft landing technique and not following the bounced landing recovery procedure.' A similar pattern is evident in the 2022 episode involving a SpiceJet 737-800 that met with severe turbulence leading to three serious injuries and one fatality. The AAIB attributed the probable cause to 'poor CRM (Crew Resource Management) and decision making on part of the crew to penetrate bad weather and not maintaining specified separation from turbulence prone weather'. 'Procedures for recurring defect monitoring and control were not being followed meticulously in the organisation,' it said, flagging lapses in the airline's internal processes. The passengers, the report said, had also failed to comply with the seatbelt sign. At times, both human and mechanical lapses are at fault—as seen in the 2021 force landing of a Pinnacle Air Pvt Ltd's non-scheduled flight in which the PIC sustained serious injuries while the co-pilot and the passenger escaped with minor injuries in Madhya Pradesh. While the probable cause of the accident is listed a mechanical failure—oil leak from an engine during flight, the report does mention that 'the crew did not follow the emergency procedures for single engine operation and took a decision to come for landing with single engine'. Likewise, both fuel valves were found closed and left unnoticed leading to fuel starvation in a joyride sortie that ended in a crash in March 2023 and injured both pilot and 14-year passenger in Jharkhand. The AAIB found that the pre-flight inspection wasn't carried out as the sortie was initiated in a hurry. Apart from the other systemic failures, it notes that the pilot lacked 'situational awareness' and didn't respond as per protocol in an engine failure situation. Other similar instances include a September 2021 episode involving an InterGlobeAviation (IndiGo) aircraft and an October 2018 accident in which the Air India Express hit the boundary wall of the airport in Tiruchirappalli. The PIC, according to the AAIB report in the first case, 'busy with his paperwork failed to inform the cabin crew of an anticipated turbulent weather ahead'. It also mentions probable causes about 'serious communication failure' between the cockpit and the cabin crew and that they didn't follow SOPs. A cabin crew, as a result, fractured her leg when the plane carrying 52 passengers from Tiruchirapalli to Bengaluru flew into turbulent weather. It also mentions probable causes about 'serious communication failure' between the cockpit and the cabin crew and that they didn't follow SOPs. As for the Air India Express plane, the AAIB noted that both pilots 'failed to capture drop in engine thrust during the critical phase of operation and therefore no timely corrective action was initiated by either of the crew members to increase the thrust for continuation of the flight.' The PIC's seat recline mechanism had also malfunctioned during takeoff, it added. Though no injuries were reported, the aircraft belly was severely damaged among others. (Edited by Tony Rai) Also Read: Air India crash spotlights 2018 advisory on Boeing switches installed with locking feature disengaged
The Print
a day ago
- The Print
Indian aviation has a ‘safety culture' problem. Airline carriers, training institutes share blame
SpiceJet, the inquiry found, had not 'meticulously' followed procedures for monitoring and controlling recurring defects. Sixty such defects were reported in its Boeing 737 fleet equipped with the Honeywell RDR-4B weather radar system, 15 of which occurred prior to the 1 May incident. Three years later, the Aircraft Accident Investigation Bureau (AAIB) in its final report put out in May pointed at poor crew coordination, erroneous decision-making by pilots and passengers ignoring seat belt signs among other factors for the episode. But, it also flagged deeper issues—recurring maintenance lapses and non-compliance with basic reporting protocol. New Delhi: On 1 May 2022, a regular flight from Mumbai to Durgapur turned into a mid-air nightmare for the passengers and crew of the SpiceJet plane as it flew into a storm while landing. The severe turbulence jolted several passengers who were not wearing seat belts. One passenger succumbed to a spinal injury later, while three others too were grievously hurt. Notably, three defects involving the weather radar system were reported just days before, between 14 and 30 April, although none of them officially pertained to that particular aircraft. Several media reports suggested that pilots had raised doubts on the dependability of the weather radar system of this fleet. Moreover, post the May incident, SpiceJet had returned the aircraft to its lessor without obtaining the necessary clearance from the Directorate General of Civil Aviation (DGCA) or AAIB, and before complete information from the airline could be obtained regarding repeated weather radar related snags, the final report said. Such lapses and violations are not one-offs. Oversight failures by aircraft operators, glider clubs, etc are as endemic as they are persistent. And the picture is no better in the training ecosystem. The 12 June crash of Air India flight 171—one of the worst civil aviation disasters in the country in decades—has put an uneasy spotlight on the airline industry. After the AAIB released its preliminary report—which put both Air India and Boeing in the clear for now—questions about safety, protocol, pilot and crew training, maintenance of aircraft and previously reported snags, etc took centrestage. Last month, the AAIB drew flak over its preliminary findings. A particular point of contention was a brief mention about a conversation between the two Air India pilots on the fuel switches, wherein one of them asks the other on why he cut off fuel supply to the engines, and the latter denies doing so. After the report was released, there have been many takes on what exactly happened, including several questions on Boeing and Air India. The AAIB had slammed several Western media reports suggesting pilot error or deliberate action by one pilot. ThePrint has analysed 68 AAIB final reports on aircraft accidents since 2012. Part 1 of this three-part series looks at how the investigating body has repeatedly flagged violations by both airline operators and Flight Training Organisations (FTOs). 'AAIB does not classify occurrences immediately unless there are casualties. The first responders which may comprise DGCA and/or AAIB officials, tasked by the DG AAIB, then reach the spot and an initial report is prepared in case there is no clarity on the nature of the occurrence. The DG, AAIB has the final say in which classification the occurrence will fall under and that is binding. If there are casualties, then the AAIB team reaches the spot directly,' Group Captain Aurobindo Handa (retired), a former director general of the AAIB, told The Print. 'The responsibility of cobbling up the investigating team rests with the DG, AAIB. Aviation crash investigators are a scarce resource not just in India but also across the world. The DG, AAIB decides the composition of the team and is empowered to pick people—domain experts from different domains as deemed necessary. The investigator in charge may also be called from outside the investigating body,' he added. Overall, 101 AAIB investigation reports, including 27 of helicopters (both preliminary and final reports) and six preliminary reports of fixed aircraft accidents, are in the public domain. An analysis of the final reports show that in at least 47 percent of the cases, the AAIB has found out violations or lapses by operators and made remarks about them. These, however, may or may not have been found to be directly linked to aircraft accidents. In at least a dozen accidents, mechanical failures were reported even if they weren't cited as direct causes and in at least five of them, the AAIB couldn't even conclude what led to the failure or the chain of events. Some form of pilot action or decision leading up to the accident are mentioned in nearly 67 percent of these final reports by the AAIB. Even though these reports put some spotlight on inflight erroneous actions or judgements by pilots, they don't necessarily attribute or directly link all of these accidents to pilot errors. A detailed report on this aspect will be taken up in Part 2 of this series. ThePrint's analysis of the AAIB findings point to a broader pattern of not just irregular oversight by aircraft operators, but also of them often neglecting SOPs and guidelines. Other issues that find mention are ambiguous tech logs, maintenance issues, serious lapses in procedures such as maintaining fuel and oil consumption records, outdated regulations, non-adherence to safety recommendations cited in earlier accidents, lack of discipline, poor safety culture, and even inefficient training of pilots. A similar pattern is seen with FTOs—DGCA-approved institutes that impart training to those looking to secure pilot licences. This pertains to oversight including improper briefing procedures, vague tech logs, substandard training, lack of weather monitoring mechanisms, faulty maintenance, flying instructors not sticking to SOPs, not incorporating night flying SOP, non-existent SOPs for radio telephony communications between ground and flight staff, lack of CCTV inside FTO premises, etc. Take for example the 2016 accident of a glider aircraft during a routine flight: the AAIB had flagged various concerns about the Hadapsar Gliding Centre, that was run by the DGCA till December last year. The centre didn't have SOPs in place for emergency situations, the Bureau said in its report, adding that the DGCA hadn't uploaded its own glider circulars on the website to be readily accessed by glider training institutes. ThePrint reached AAIB, DGCA, and airlines—Air India Express, Air India, SpiceJet, and IndiGo—via email and messages for comments. This report will be updated as and when responses are received. Also Read: 'No mechanical, maintenance issues with aircraft'—Air India CEO tells employees post prelim crash probe Pressure, poor training & safety warnings ignored 'Safety culture' finds mention multiple times in the AAIB inquiry report of the Air India Express plane crash at Kozhikode in August 2020. Nineteen passengers as well as both pilots were killed after the Boeing 737 skidded off the wet runway, fell down an embankment, and broke into three sections. Though pilot errors were listed as the probable cause, the AAIB also observed that Air India Express had a 'faulty' HR policy, which it said placed undue pressure on the pilots. Originally on standby, the pilot in command (PIC) was reassigned last-minute due to shortage of captains. His flight next morning was delayed to fit duty hours, putting pressure on him to land in Kozhikode on time. The captain has the final say over aircraft operation, while the first officer assists throughout all phases of the journey. Air India Express's HR policy failed to align crew base assignments with operational needs, leaving just one captain against 26 first officers at Kozhikode. The PIC's decision to return to Kozhikode was driven by a misplaced urgency to operate the next morning's flight, the AAIB report said. 'In case of diversion of flight AXB 1344, the PIC would have exceeded his Flight Duty Time Limitations (FDTL) and would not have been available for the following day morning flight. This would have resulted in shortage of PIC at Kozhikode for operating the three scheduled flights ex-Kozhikode the next day.' 'AIXL (Air India Express Limited) policies of upper level management have led to a lack of supervision in training, operations and safety practices, resulting in deficiencies at various levels causing repeated human error accidents,' it further noted, adding that although poor crew resource management had emerged as a major contributor in a previous major accident and serious incidents involving Air India Express, CRM training failed to generate its desired results and continued to be the causal factor in this crash as well. Data from cockpit voice recorder (CVR) revealed that the plane's windshield wiper wasn't working properly and that the crew was aware of it but the malfunction wasn't mentioned in the technical log. The report notes probably a verbal briefing about it could have taken place which highlights the non-standard practice of reporting on snags. Training standards were also flagged: simulator maintenance was substandard, and mandatory exercises weren't always checked. Pilots lacked access to Onboard Performance Tool (OPT) for quick landing calculations. Despite Civil Aviation Requirements (CARs) and repeated DGCA audits, Air India Express also failed to fully monitor Digital Flight Data Recorder (DFDR) data—a crucial factor to avoid accidents. Issued by the DGCA, CARs are a set of mandatory standards and procedures laid down for aviation operations which include flight data monitoring, maintenance, safety management, training among other things. While probing an accident reported at Mumbai airport in July 2019, the AAIB noted that SpiceJet hadn't adhered to the safety recommendations in spite of incidents and accidents under similar conditions including similar errors by the flight crew. The plane had overshot the main runway while landing amid heavy rains. 'In the past, there have been occurrences (incidents and accidents) to the aircraft operated by the organisation under similar circumstances and more or less due to the same inactions/errors by the flight crew,' the AAIB said. 'The investigation of these occurrences and those to the aircraft operated by other organisations had given recommendations to obviate these occurrences in future. It was observed that the majority of the safety recommendations were either not implemented in true letter and spirit or the action taken has withered away with passage of time.' SpiceJet, the Bureau found, also didn't have an active flight watch or monitoring programme. 'It is vital that AAIB closes the loop with critical recommendations and directives post incident and accident investigation to all operators and such directives enforced with stringent regulations by the DGCA so as to ensure minimal compromise in safety in aviation. Safety culture, which is reporting culture, is virtually non-existent in India. Aircraft operators along with helicopter operators are the worst offenders of safety and airworthiness norms,' said Mark D. Martin, CEO of Martin Consulting, an aviation advisory and risk firm. Also Read: Too much traffic & too little control, why Char Dham route is a hotbed for chopper crashes Faulty fuel checks & on-paper maintenance In another instance reported in May 2021, an uninsured aircraft operated by the Directorate of Aviation (DoA), Madhya Pradesh, had incorrect CAR references in the operator's Operations Manual. The DoA had also not sought exemption from the DCGA to carry a passenger in cargo and not in the cabin of the Beechcraft King Air 250 aircraft that crash-landed at Gwalior airport and injured all three occupants, including the two pilots. Another violation of basic protocols was reported in a case from June 2020 in which an IndiGo aircraft flying from Dammam, Saudi Arabia encountered turbulence during descent to Cochin. A cabin crew member had sustained serious injuries. IndiGo, the AAIB noted, hadn't preserved the cockpit voice recorder (CVR) data, which is crucial to analyse the causes behind accidents. In March 2023, a 'joy ride sortie' conducted by the Jharkhand Flying Institute ended in a crash after engine failure due to fuel starvation. Joy ride sorties can be conducted either on smaller aircraft or helicopters for sightseeing or recreational purposes. Both fuel valves located inside the cockpit were found unnoticed, left in closed positions. Both the pilot and the 14-year-old passenger suffered injuries after the Sinus 912 motor glider crashed-landed at a residential area in Dhanbad. While the AAIB noted that the flight was initiated in haste, with no pre-flight inspection, it also mentions that there was a lack of safety culture in the organisation, among other things. Fuel starvation leading to engine starvation isn't really uncommon, the AAIB investigation reports show. Such a situation refers to the engines not being fed with fuel, leading them to either shut down or go into some sort of mechanical failure. This can have catastrophic consequences. In its final report on a February 2019 accident in Baramati during a solo training sortie of a Cessna 172S aircraft, the AAIB mentioned that fuel and oil records were not maintained according to the CAR guideline, and that the pilot was not imparted adequate training in fuel assessment. Fuel assessment is the process of calculating the amount of fuel required to complete the trip, the quantity on board and then accessing it with the route vis-à-vis how much will be needed to complete the flight. The process includes checking the fuel quantity as well as quality (for contamination), functioning of the fuel system for checks on any leaks, fuel pumps, routing of the fuel without any blockades to the engines and proper valve positions. For modern commercial aircraft, there are fuel quantity indication systems and pilots also check cross-check dispatch fuel slips. This is a critical task done not just before but also during the flight, as part of routine checks/monitoring during intervals. The FTO in this case was Academy of Carver Aviation. A similar case was reported in May 2016 when an air ambulance with five people on board, crash-landed at Delhi's Najafgarh area. The operator, Alchemist Air Pvt. Ltd, had not followed established procedures in assessing fuel consumption of aircraft, the AAIB found. Last year, the DGCA cancelled the FTO approval of Alchemist after audits revealed serious lapses in compliance of regulatory provisions. The action came after an instructor and a trainee pilot were killed in an air crash near Jamshedpur in August, 2024. Another accident involving an air ambulance was reported at Mumbai airport in May 2021. The inquiry revealed that the positions of quality manager and the chief of flight safety have been at a 'higher attrition rate than the others within the company — Jet Serve Aviation'. 'The chief of flight safety post has been inconsistent since 2019 and was lying vacant as on the date of the accident,' the AAIB noted. Jet Serve Aviation also had approval to operate as an FTO. While the AAIB noted that the aircraft suffered a mechanical failure, it couldn't ascertain the root cause of this failure. Both cases involved Beechcraft King Air C90 A aircraft. In January 2023, Falcon Aviation Academy lost a chief flight instructor in a crash at Rewa while the trainee pilot was grievously injured. Investigators found the Cessna 152 aircraft had taken off in night conditions in spite of the stipulated visuality. Falcon had no local visibility arrangements in Rewa and didn't follow set protocols for coordination with ATC in Varanasi. Notably, in an accident in February 2022 wherein a trainee pilot lost his life in Nalgonda, the AAIB found out that the FTO—Flytech Aviation Academy—during maintenance and inspections failed to detect the deteriorated conditions of control cables and other instruments of the Cessna 152 aircraft. But the operator's records showed all scheduled inspections had been completed, the inspection of the wreckage showed that the aircraft was not maintained as those records claimed. The AAIB couldn't fully ascertain the exact cause of the accident, but suggested that it was due to technical faults with the aircraft. 'While no snag was documented pending on the aircraft prior to the accident flight, the investigation team found a number of deficiencies in maintenance,' the report said. 'As per the documents maintained by the operator, all Inspection Schedules (Operations) were compiled on the aircraft. However, wreckage examination revealed that aircraft condition prior to the accident was not in line with work completed under those schedules. Conditions of a few control cables and associated components were found beyond the limits. Lack of lubrication, corrosion and groove marks were noticed on a few pulleys,' the AAIB said. (Edited by Tony Rai) Also Read: Recurring aircraft defects to faded runway lines, DGCA check reveals safety lapses at key airports
News18
2 days ago
- News18
Families Demand Transparency And Accountability In Air India Crash Investigation : Attorney Mike
Families Demand Transparency And Accountability In Air India Crash Investigation : Attorney Mike Last Updated: India Videos | US attorney Mike, representing 85 families, tells CNN News18 victims' kin face bureaucratic hurdles in compensation & demand transparency. He calls AAIB's report 'speculative' and warns against unfairly blaming pilots, urging release of full FDR & CVR data. n18oc_india News18 Mobile App -
