Secularism's Old Soldier
After reading A Maverick in Politics 1991-2024 (Juggernaut), my response was that this is a book written by a brilliant mind. These are not the memoirs of a maverick but a brilliant ideologue caught in a time capsule. It encapsulates the tragedy of the author's life and career as he so honestly acknowledges: 'What remains are the memories and fantasies of yesteryear. …..Coping with failure was more personal. …I just never thought the Gandhi family that had brought me into politics would bowl me out too. Do I regret having quit the Foreign Service midstream to take the plunge into politics? Not for one second. I took my decision consciously, never looking back, knowing that it might end in disaster, not triumph….No, I regret nothing'.
Unlike most who are 'born' into politics and do not switch from civil service to a completely different milieu, Mani, as we affectionately call him, refused after moving to politics, to change with the times, or accept that India had changed. He liked his time capsule and unlike Dr. Who, of BBC fame [a British science fiction programme produced by the BBC], refused to emerge from it. The consequences were clear and revealing and frequently tragic.
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Bilawal's delegation faced an uphill battle in Washington—especially as Indian officials, including Tharoor, delivered coordinated counter-narratives. STORY CONTINUES BELOW THIS AD Patterson's closing remark—'We need to put all that behind us… the international community and Pakistan need to continue to press on an international investigation'—was a quiet olive branch. But it came with a condition: Pakistan must confront its past with honesty, not deflection. In the theatre of global perception, silence is not neutrality. India understood this—launching a coordinated, image-conscious campaign that outmanoeuvred Pakistan's fragmented efforts. Pakistan cannot 'out talk' India abroad until it speaks the truth to itself at home. The author is a strategist in international relations and economic development. Views expressed in the above piece are personal and solely those of the author. They do not necessarily reflect Firstpost's views.
