Afghanologists — the poverty of analysis

Express Tribune

26-03-2025

The writer is a retired major general and has an interest in International Relations and Political Sociology. He can be reached at [e-mail] and tweets @20_Inam
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When someone is introduced as an 'Afghanistan Expert', I tend to take exception, because I reckon nobody can be an 'expert' on Afghanistan. I prefer using 'Afghanologist' instead. We have a galaxy of Afghanologists on a social media group, vibrant, wise and opinionated, with ideas. However, discussion is generally under perpetual 'lament', as I characterise their incessant blame game and criticism of Pakistan's Afghan policy.
So, frustrated, last week I threw a challenge. Given the TTP demands of reversal of FATA merger, enforcement of Sharia (their version) across Pakistan, release of TTP prisoners, return of TTP rank and file armed and in groups to their areas and payment of reparation by the State of Pakistan, what should be the way forward by Pakistan.
As usual after an uncomfortable silence and some meek prose, that was in fact an extension of the lament, one did not have a roadmap that one could suggest and recommend. And that lays bare the difficulty of constructivism in the face of perpetual lament and complaining. One particular Afghanologist who runs a think tank suggested to the State to 'forget and forgive' and move forward, after much debate on what he said and meant. When the perils of such approach and its implications in encouraging terrorism for future were highlighted, there was no cogent and coherent response.
That is the danger of criticism that comes in droves and is almost fashionable these days when Afghanologists discuss Pakistan's Afghan policy. They never tire of pointing out its shortcomings and failures. One finds it hard to swim against the tide as criticism by far is the easiest thing to do. In one such think tank interaction, when I asked an ex-Afghan ambassador to Pakistan how Afghanistan would have dealt with the situation if the roles were reversed between both countries in early 2000s. Taken aback by the suddenness of the question, his answer was mere good English prose with no substance. When you nail this cohort to forward actionable and doable recommendations, there is generally a clueless silence with 'some' restating and regurgitating the known knowns.
Not schooled enough in the art of 'operational analysis' most Afghanologists give in to the 'lament of the moment', mood of the day or influenced by everyday mundane events. In one case, when pressed, the individual came up with 'breaking news' about some meeting (like many) to substantiate his point, without benefitting from the constants and variables of Pak-Afghan bilateralism. Even a venerable Afghanologist from the Afghan side could offer no cogent and actionable recommendations for Pakistan to deal with the TTP, other than emotive rationale and highlighting the importance of good relations between the brotherly Muslim neighbours.
A good analysis is based on known and reported 'facts' that lead to good 'inferences, conclusions and deductions'. This process results in 'recommendations', offering multiple courses of action (CsOA). The analyst recommends a particular COA, citing the merits of the recommended COA using hard and cold logic without being swayed by emotions. His choice springs from the weightage of factors discussed and not their numbers and listing.
And Governments and Militaries thereafter make 'plans' based upon the recommended COA, thus completing the 'operational cycle'. One very much doubts adherence to this structured process in our analyses, most of which, most of the time, are based upon ordinary variables like mood swings etc. Academia teaches the rigours of analysis, and except for some, most Afghanologists learn while on the job.
Extending the argument, the Afghan side most of the time gives in to emotional outburst when in discussions. I was invited to an Afghan radio talk show. I as a matter of routine avoid such interaction as most participants start from 'times immemorial' rather than constructive engagement, are mostly negative and impolite, use your credentials to bolster their ratings, and love a heated argument.
One participant from an American university started rattling out facts of Pakistani State's excesses against Afghanistan. When the diatribe went too long, unchecked by the moderator, he was reminded that the purpose of one's participation was to find common ground in bilateralism, and discuss constructive engagement now, or in the mid to long-term, and not to perpetually repeat the negativity and live in hostility. And that Pakistan also has its long list of grievances that would take the whole show time.
My cross-references and questioning of Afghanologists, who are always critical of Pakistan's Afghan policy, result in meek responses or emotional rants instead of rationale discussions. From an Afghan apologist to a critical bystander, one has experienced personal transformation driven by hard data and actions of the IEA. Afghan analysts are generally on the backfoot when reminded of the good deeds and ehsanat of Pakistan and its 'Punjabi Miltablishment' as they deridely call us.
In dealing with the TTP issue, by far the largest and most damning variable of Pak-Afghan relations, when confronted with hard facts about Kabul's obligations and imperatives under the injunctions of Islam and Islamic fraternity, Pukhtu lar (way of doing things under Pukhtunwali), and the demands of good neighborliness, the cohort is silent or steers the discussion towards non-issues.
Did not Pakistan offer unconditional refuge to millions of uprooted Afghan brethren under Islamic fraternity, neighbourly demands and Pukhtunwali despite not being signatory to the 1951 Geneva Convention on Refugees, and its 1967 Protocol? Did Pakistan not offer them subsidised food, education, healthcare and employment in the most dignified manner, often at the cost of its own citizenry and under resource constraints?
Did Pakistan not postpone their repatriation under sympathy for their unfortunate circumstances despite dwindling international commitments? Did the Punjabi Miltablishment not help IEA win over their country twice - first against the USSR and then against the US/NATO Combine, often plying a perilous double game? Did Pakistan not act as Kabul's only interlocutor, insisting on engagement and accepting the IEA reality? If yes, then does Pakistan deserve the continued hostility of IEA and TTP, the sworn enemy of Pakistan, its State, Security Forces and people?
Any justification by the IEA under religion, Pukhtunwali and gawandgeree (neighborliness) would be welcome — but alas there is none!