Unfinished Stories: No winner war
In this episode of Unfinished Stories, Hevidar Ahmed returns to Turkey for a second time to follow up on the ongoing peace talks between the Turkish state and the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK). His first visit took place in February.
This time, he travels to the location where the PKK launched its decades-long insurgency against Ankara. One of the group's earliest fighters takes him to a remote area to recount the first attacks on Turkish forces.
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Shafaq News
19 minutes ago
- Shafaq News
Iraq's water dilema: Basra looks to Istanbul for answers
Shafaq News – Basra Basra Governor Asaad al-Eidani's recent visit to Turkiye has drawn mixed political reactions across Iraq, particularly in the southern province he represents. Some officials view the trip as a necessary step to address Basra's worsening water shortage through potential Turkish investment and cooperation. Others, however, raise concerns about Ankara's long-term intentions, warning that such overtures could open the door to geopolitical leverage and influence over Iraq's internal affairs. Basra water crisis a serious violation of right to life A High-Profile Trip Amid Growing Thirst Al-Eidani led a high-level delegation to Ankara this week, meeting with Turkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan to discuss shared river flows and the deepening water crisis in southern Iraq. According to a statement from the governor's office, the talks focused on the Tigris and Euphrates rivers, whose reduced flows have devastated agriculture and drinking water supplies across Basra, a province already reeling from extreme temperatures and failing infrastructure. This compounded crisis has made Basra one of the most water-stressed regions in the country. Basra's Water Department Director, Nizar Nasser al-Laibi, told Shafaq News that the visit featured a roundtable meeting attended by senior Iraqi and Turkish officials, including the Turkish Consul General in Basra and representatives of DEİK (the Turkish Foreign Economic Relations Board), alongside major Turkish companies. According to al-Laibi, Turkish firms were formally invited to participate in Basra's reconstruction campaign, which spans a wide range of sectors. Governor al-Eidani, he added, pledged full administrative support to facilitate their entry into the local market and help ease visa procedures for Turkish businesspeople. 'The offer was framed as part of a broader push to attract foreign capital into Iraq's underdeveloped provinces.' A key proposal raised during the visit was a 'twinning' initiative with Istanbul. Turkish officials presented successful water distribution and transport projects in the city that Basra hopes to replicate to rehabilitate its aging network. During talks with Istanbul's governor, Iraqi delegates also emphasized the need for increased upstream water releases and improved water quality to counteract salinity and climate stress in southern Iraq. Mass die-offs hit Basra marshes amid rising salinity A Sign of Local Desperation? The trip has drawn mixed reactions from Iraqi lawmakers. MP Thaer Mukheef, a member of Parliament's Committee on Agriculture, Water, and Marshes, framed the visit as an act of frustration more than strategy, suggesting the move was reactive rather than part of a coordinated national plan. 'It seems the governor has lost hope in the [Iraqi] central government, particularly the Prime Minister's Office and other relevant agencies. With Basra suffering from an acute water shortage, he likely feared an imminent popular backlash,' Mukheef told Shafaq News. Mukheef expressed doubts about Turkish commitments but said he hopes the visit results in at least partial improvement in water flows to Basra. Constitutional Boundaries and Diplomatic Protocols Governor al-Eidani's outreach to a foreign state has raised legal questions as Iraq's constitution centralizes foreign policy and international treaties under federal authority. However, MP Amer al-Fayez, a member of the Parliamentary Foreign Relations Committee, clarified that local administrations (governors) can initiate discussions with foreign actors as long as they coordinate with Baghdad and secure federal approval. 'If coordinated with Baghdad and approved by the Foreign Ministry, such visits are legitimate. Any subsequent agreements or contracts would then be considered federally mandated,' al-Fayez told Shafaq News. While acknowledging Turkiye's own water scarcity, al-Fayez emphasized that this does not justify limiting downstream flows. He welcomed investment in Basra but warned against bypassing the constitutional framework that governs foreign relations. Iraq's water crisis: Basra's struggle for survival Hidden Costs: Strategic Leverage and Border Politics Behind the investment narrative, Iraqi parliamentary sources suggest Turkiye's broader strategy includes securing long-term political and security footholds in Iraq. Speaking anonymously, one source warned that Turkish cooperation often comes with 'political strings,' such as sustaining its military presence in disputed northern territories. Sources also revealed that Turkiye has received preliminary clearance to allow Turkish firms to construct between four and six dams across Iraq. While such infrastructure could help regulate water distribution, critics argue it would deepen Turkiye's role in shaping Iraq's internal water governance. This, they caution, could give Ankara new tools to influence water access and policy decisions in Iraq's most vulnerable regions. Erdogan's Gesture: Symbolic or Substantial? In July, Iraqi Parliament Speaker Mahmoud al-Mashhadani announced that Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan had authorized a temporary increase in water flow to Iraq—reportedly 420 cubic meters per second. However, technical data from Mosul Dam authorities showed actual releases peaked at 350 cubic meters per second—falling short of the agreed-upon threshold. Water policy expert Ramadan Hamza described the gesture as more symbolic than transformative. 'Iraq has not meaningfully benefited from the increased discharges. The gains are marginal and will not suffice to meet long-term demand,' he told Shafaq News. Hamza stressed that while such boosts may temporarily stabilize water levels, they do little to address the structural causes of Iraq's crisis—decades of mismanagement, lack of cross-border water-sharing agreements, and growing climate stress. He called for binding water-sharing treaties as a more sustainable alternative. A Local Initiative with National Implications Whether al-Eidani's trip marks a pragmatic search for solutions or an overreach into foreign policy remains contested, but what is clear is that the water crisis—worsened by climate change, upstream damming, and domestic mismanagement—continues to push Iraqi officials at all levels toward unorthodox and sometimes constitutionally ambiguous strategies. The question now is whether Baghdad will endorse, restrain, or replicate these provincial overtures in its wider foreign policy framework.
Memri
16 hours ago
- Memri
Druze Documentation Nexus Releases Initial Estimates Following Massacre Of Druze In Swaida: 228,100 People Displaced From Over 40 Cities And Villages
The following is a report compiled by the Druze Documentation Nexus. It is an initial estimate of the numbers people displaced after the massacre of Druze in the Swaida Governorate, in Southern Syria.[1] On July 14, 2025, the City of Swaida witnessed a brutal campaign of sectarian violence targeting the Druze community. Initially framed as retaliatory operations by Bedouin groups and extremist elements, the events quickly escalated into a coordinated campaign of systematic atrocities. What began as sporadic assaults evolved into a deliberate and sustained onslaught involving state-aligned forces, local militias, and jihadist factions. Contrary to their official mandate, units from the General Security Force of the Interior Ministry and Multiple Syrian Army Divisions operating under the Syrian Defense Ministry not only failed to protect civilians in Swaida but actively collaborated with Bedouin militias and extremist fighters. The result was a multi-day campaign characterized by targeted killings, acts of sexual violence, use of Turkish drones to bomb civilians, mass executions, looting, burning down houses, and widespread desecration of cultural and religious sites. It is worth noting that the Druze Documentation Nexus reported that the preliminary number of deaths caused by the massacre is 1,500, according to official records from the National Hospital of Swaida. The figure is expected to rise due to the presence of corpses not yet recovered in homes and on roads across 31 villages that remain under the control of security forces and Bedouin militias. Massacre in Swaida (Source: Druze Documentation Nexus) Below are estimated statistics of internally displaced persons (IDPs) after the massacre of Swaida, which amount to 228,100 IDPs: 1. City of Swaida Pre-Massacre Population: 125,000 Post-Massacre Population: 50,000 Situation: Infrastructure destroyed, markets stormed, shops looted, homes burned, civilians killed, public executions, women and children kidnapped, elderly abused/shaved, hospitals attacked, services unavailable, security/food threatened, most residents fled east/south. 2. Village of Walga Pre-Massacre Population: 4,000 Post-Massacre Population: 0 Situation: Homes burned, public executions, kidnappings, places of worship/shrines burned, declared devastated. 3. Village of Reema Hazem Pre-Massacre Population: 3,500 Post-Massacre Population: 0 Situation: Homes burned, public executions, kidnappings, places of worship/shrines burned, declared devastated. 4. Village of Al-Mazraa Pre-Massacre Population: 10,000 Post-Massacre Population: 0 Situation: Homes burned, public executions, kidnappings, places of worship/shrines burned, declared devastated. 5. Village of Al-Tayr Pre-Massacre Population: 1,500 Post-Massacre Population: 0 Situation: Homes burned, public executions, kidnappings, places of worship/shrines burned, declared devastated. 6. Village of Sama Al-Hunaidat Pre-Massacre Population: 1,800 Post-Massacre Population: 0 Situation: Homes burned, public executions, kidnappings, places of worship/shrines burned, declared devastated. 7. Village of Samma Pre-Massacre Population: 2,500 Post-Massacre Population: 0 Situation: Homes burned, public executions, kidnappings, places of worship/shrines burned, declared devastated. 8. Village of Al-Dour Pre-Massacre Population: 4,000 Post-Massacre Population: 0 Situation: Homes burned, public executions, kidnappings, places of worship/shrines burned, declared devastated. 9. Village of Taara Pre-Massacre Population: 2,000 Post-Massacre Population: 0 Situation: Homes burned, public executions, kidnappings, places of worship/shrines burned, declared devastated. 10. Village of Qarrasa Pre-Massacre Population: 1,500 Post-Massacre Population: 0 Situation: Homes burned, public executions, kidnappings, places of worship/shrines burned, declared devastated. 11. Village of Al-Duwairi Pre-Massacre Population: 2,100 Post-Massacre Population: 0 Situation: Homes burned, public executions, kidnappings, places of worship/shrines burned, declared devastated. 12. Village of Najran Pre-Massacre Population: 8,000 Post-Massacre Population: 0 Situation: Homes burned, public executions, kidnappings, places of worship/shrines burned, declared devastated. 13. Samma Al-Hunaidat Pre-Massacre Population: 1,800 Post-Massacre Population: 0 Situation: Homes burned, public executions, kidnappings, places of worship/shrines burned, declared devastated. 14. Town of Thaala Pre-Massacre Population: 10,000 Post-Massacre Population: 0 Situation: Homes burned, public executions, kidnappings, places of worship/shrines burned, declared devastated. 15. Village of Al-Dara Pre-Massacre Population: 1,950 Post-Massacre Population: 0 Situation: Churches burned and vandalized. 16. Village of Al-Aslehah Pre-Massacre Population: 1,000 Post-Massacre Population: 0 Situation: Churches burned and vandalized. 17. Village of Kanaker Pre-Massacre Population: 1,100 Post-Massacre Population: 0 Situation: Homes burned, public executions, kidnappings, places of worship/shrines burned, declared devastated. 18. Village of Ara Pre-Massacre Population: 11,000 Post-Massacre Population: 6,000 Situation: Mortar/missile shelling, under assessment. 19. Village of Al-Mujaymir Pre-Massacre Population: 5,000 Post-Massacre Population: 2,000 Situation: Mortar/missile shelling, under assessment. 20. Village of Al-Majdal Pre-Massacre Population: 6,500 Post-Massacre Population: Unknown Situation: Homes burned, public executions, kidnappings, places of worship/shrines burned, declared devastated. 21. Village of Kafr Al-Lahf Pre-Massacre Population: 4,000 Post-Massacre Population: Unknown Situation: Homes burned, public executions, kidnappings, places of worship/shrines burned, declared devastated. 22. Village of Reema Al-Fakhour Pre-Massacre Population: Unknown Post-Massacre Population: Unknown Situation: Homes burned, public executions, kidnappings, places of worship/shrines burned, declared devastated. 23. Village of Salakhed Pre-Massacre Population: 2,500 Post-Massacre Population: Unknown Situation: Homes burned, public executions, kidnappings, places of worship/shrines burned, declared devastated. 24. Majadel, Smayd, Al-Kharsa Pre-Massacre Population: 20,000 Post-Massacre Population: Unknown Situation: Homes burned, public executions, kidnappings, places of worship/shrines burned, declared devastated. 25. City of Shahba Pre-Massacre Population: 20,000 Post-Massacre Population: Unknown Situation: Mortar/missile shelling, homes/property destroyed, militant presence, declared devastated. 26. Village of Umm Al-Zeitoun Pre-Massacre Population: 4,000 Post-Massacre Population: 1,000 Situation: Homes burned, public executions, kidnappings, places of worship/shrines burned, declared devastated. 27. Village of Al-Sweimrah Pre-Massacre Population: 1,000 Post-Massacre Population: 0 Situation: Homes burned, public executions, kidnappings, places of worship/shrines burned, declared devastated. 28. Village of Al-Metouneh Pre-Massacre Population: 3,000 Post-Massacre Population: 0 Situation: Homes burned, public executions, kidnappings, places of worship/shrines burned, declared devastated. 29. Village of Al-Hayyat Pre-Massacre Population: 2,800 Post-Massacre Population: 1,800 Situation: Partial displacement. The gas station, village entrances and public facilities were vandalized. Currently it's not with HTS. 30. Village of Al-Heett Pre-Massacre Population: 2,450 Post-Massacre Population: 1,200 Situation: Partial displacement, most of the population is Christian. Currently it is not under HTS control. 31. Village of Al-Khalidiyah Pre-Massacre Population: 3,500 Post-Massacre Population: 0 Situation: Homes burned, public executions, kidnappings, places of worship/shrines burned, declared devastated. 32. Village of Lahtha Pre-Massacre Population: 8,900 Post-Massacre Population: 0 Situation: Homes burned, public executions, kidnappings, places of worship/shrines burned, declared devastated. 33. Village of Radhimah Al-Liwaa Pre-Massacre Population: 3,000 Post-Massacre Population: 0 Situation: Homes burned, public executions, kidnappings, places of worship/shrines burned, declared devastated. 34. Village of Al-Soura Al-Kabir Pre-Massacre Population: 2,800 Post-Massacre Population: 0 Situation: Homes burned, public executions, kidnappings, places of worship/shrines burned, declared devastated. 35. Village of Hazm Pre-Massacre Population: 1,700 Post-Massacre Population: 0 Situation: Homes burned, public executions, kidnappings, places of worship/shrines burned, declared devastated. 36. Village of Khalkhala Pre-Massacre Population: 2,700 Post-Massacre Population: 0 Situation: Homes burned, public executions, kidnappings, places of worship/shrines burned, declared devastated. 37. Village of Dhakir Pre-Massacre Population: 1,200 Post-Massacre Population: 0 Situation: Homes burned, public executions, kidnappings, places of worship/shrines burned, declared devastated. 38. Village of Al-Soura Al-Sagheer Pre-Massacre Population: 1,000 Post-Massacre Population: 0 Situation: Homes burned, public executions, kidnappings, places of worship/shrines burned, declared devastated. 39. Town of Areeqa Pre-Massacre Population: 9,000 Post-Massacre Population: 5,000 Situation: Mortar/missile shelling, under assessment. 40. Village of Dama Pre-Massacre Population: 4,000 Post-Massacre Population: 0 Situation: Homes burned, public executions, kidnappings, places of worship/shrines burned, declared devastated. 41. Village of Lebbain Pre-Massacre Population: 3,500 Post-Massacre Population: 0 Situation: Homes burned, public executions, kidnappings, places of worship/shrines burned, declared devastated. 42. Village of Haraan Pre-Massacre Population: 2,800 Post-Massacre Population: 0 Situation: Homes burned, public executions, kidnappings, places of worship/shrines burned, declared devastated. Total Pre-Massacre Population: 295,100 Total Post-Massacre Population: 67,000 Total Number Of Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs): 228,100
Iraqi News
19 hours ago
- Iraqi News
Iraq resumes oil exports via Turkey's Ceyhan
Baghdad ( – The Iraqi Minister of Oil, Hayan Abdul-Ghani, confirmed on Wednesday that Iraq's oil exports through the Turkish port of Ceyhan will be resumed within a day or two. During the inauguration of development projects in the northern Iraqi province of Kirkuk, Abdul-Ghani stated to the state-run news agency (INA) that Iraq plans to resume oil exports through the Turkish port of Ceyhan, starting with an initial capacity of 80,000 barrels per day. The step follows a recent agreement between the federal government in Baghdad and the Kurdistan region of Iraq, according to Abdul-Ghani. Last month, the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) and the federal government in Baghdad reached a settlement that will enable the resumption of oil flows from Iraqi Kurdistan to global markets via the Turkish port of Ceyhan, following a suspension lasting nearly 28 months. The Iraqi cabinet approved several decisions, facilitating the return of oil from Iraqi Kurdistan to the global market through the State Organization for Marketing of Oil (SOMO). The Iraqi cabinet decided that the KRG should immediately start handing over all oil produced in Iraqi Kurdistan's oil fields to SOMO for export. According to the decisions, the Iraqi Ministry of Finance is required to pay $16 for each barrel of oil received from Iraqi Kurdistan in compliance with the budget legislation, given that the volume received does not fall below the existing 230,000 barrels per day. Iraqi Kurdistan is currently producing 280,000 barrels of oil per day. 50,000 barrels per day are set aside for domestic consumption in northern Iraq, with the remaining 230,000 barrels per day handed over to SOMO. Crude oil shipments through the Iraq-Turkey oil pipeline have been suspended since March 2023. This pipeline previously accounted for approximately 0.5 percent of the world's oil supply. After the International Chamber of Commerce (ICC) in Paris ruled that Ankara had violated a 1973 treaty by permitting oil exports without the approval of the federal government in Baghdad, oil flows via the Iraq-Turkey oil pipeline were stopped. Additionally, the ruling obligated Turkey to pay Baghdad $1.5 billion in compensation for losses caused by the KRG's illegal oil exports between 2014 and 2018.
