Iranian Regime Continues To Lie About The Alleged Fatwa Banning Nuclear Weapons
With the possibility of Iranian nuclear negotiations with President Trump's second administration, Trump, on February 4, 2025, reiterated his position that Iran must not have nuclear weapons. [1] In response, Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi and Iranian Vice President for Strategic Affairs Mohammad Javad Zarif, the former foreign minister and leader of the nuclear talks with the Obama administration, banded together to again bring up the lie about Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei's nonexistent fatwa that allegedly guarantees that Iran cannot produce or obtain nuclear weapons.
The Iranian Regime Continues To Lie About The Existence Of The Fatwa
Foreign Minister Araghchi stressed, in his February 5 response to President Trump, that "if the central issue is that Iran will not acquire nuclear weapons, this is achievable. This isn't a problem... Iran's positions regarding nuclear weapons is very clear. There is also a fatwa by the Supreme Leader that clarifies the mission to all of us." [2]
Several days later, on February 9, Vice President for Strategic Affairs Mohammad Javad Zarif said in a media interview: "The use of missiles was made possible for us according to the rules of war and our religious approach, and this has shown that we can do this. The issue of nuclear weapons is completely different from the [issue of] missiles, and the Leader [Khamenei's] fatwa has closed this discussion permanently." [3]
Vice President for Strategic Affairs Mohammad Javad Zarif (Source: Asr-e Iran, Iran, February 9, 2025)
The Nonexistent Nuclear Fatwa – A Purported Religious Guarantee That Iran Will Not Develop Nuclear Weapons
The Iranian regime is doubling down on its lies about the existence of a fatwa banning nuclear weapons, supposedly issued by Iranian Supreme Leader Khamenei. Over the years, no such fatwa has ever appeared on either of Khamenei's two fatwa websites, and while the fatwa has been said to have been issued on several different dates and in a range of different versions, no one has ever actually seen it (see below MEMRI reports over the years on this nonexistent fatwa).
During the 2002-2006 Iran-EU3 (UK, France, and Germany) nuclear negotiations, Iran presented its position that a fatwa by Khamenei bans nuclear weapons, and that this fatwa ban is more legally binding than any constitutional ban or parliamentary legislation, as in other countries, could possibly be. Iran also said that it is far more binding than the regimen of inspections of Iran's nuclear facilities carried out by the UN's International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) that the EU3 was demanding.
In a May 2012 interview, Hassan Rohani, who would soon be Iran's president and who had headed the Iranian nuclear negotiating team, said that he was the one who proposed claiming that Khamenei had published this fatwa in a Friday sermon in November 2004 (see for example Inquiry and Analysis No. 1022, The Official Iranian Version Regarding Khamenei's Alleged Anti-Nuclear Weapons Fatwa Is A Lie, October 3, 2013). Again, that this alleged fatwa has never been found on Khamenei's fatwa webpages, not in November 2004 nor at any other time. Rohani's proposal, as he attested, was to present this alleged fatwa to the Europeans as a guarantee that Iran would not strive to produce nuclear weapons.
This Iranian position was not accepted by the EU3 in the negotiations, however, after its demand to be given the alleged fatwa in the original was rejected. All Iran would provide was a report by an Iranian news agency purportedly about the fatwa (see MEMRI Inquiry and Analysis No. 825, Renewed Iran-West Nuclear Talks – Part II: Tehran Attempts to Deceive U.S. President Obama, Sec'y of State Clinton With Nonexistent Anti-Nuclear Weapons Fatwa By Supreme Leader Khamenei, April 19, 2012).
The Obama administration, which took over from the EU3 in conducting the nuclear negotiations with Iran, accepted Iran's position that this fatwa actually existed and that it did indeed serve as an alternative to invasive IAEA oversight. The administration promoted the fatwa as binding, even though it never saw it. [4] (See Inquiry and Analysis 1080, U.S. Secretary Of State Kerry In New And Unprecedented Statement: 'President Obama And I Are Both Extremely Welcoming And Grateful For The Fact That [Iranian] Supreme Leader [Khamenei] Has Issued A [Nonexistent] Fatwa' Banning Nuclear Weapons', March 31, 2014, and Special Dispatch No. 5461, President Obama Endorses The Lie About Khamenei's 'Fatwa' Against Nuclear Arms, September 29, 2013, as well as the other MEMRI reports on the nonexistent fatwa listed below.)
MEMRI Reports On Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei's Nonexistent Fatwa
Below are MEMRI reports on the nonexistent fatwa published over the years:
Renewed Iran-West Nuclear Talks – Part II: Tehran Attempts to Deceive U.S. President Obama, Sec'y of State Clinton With Nonexistent Anti-Nuclear Weapons Fatwa By Supreme Leader Khamenei, April 19, 2012
Release Of Compilation Of Newest Fatwas By Iranian Supreme Leader Khamenei – Without Alleged Fatwa About Nuclear Bomb, August 13, 2013
President Obama Endorses The Lie About Khamenei's 'Fatwa' Against Nuclear Weapons, September 29, 2013
The Official Iranian Version Regarding Khamenei's Alleged Anti-Nuclear Weapons Fatwa Is A Lie, October 3, 2013.
Iranian President Hassan Rohani In Article In Saudi Daily: While Avoiding Confrontation And Hostility, We Shall Be Diligent In Pursuing Our Supreme Interests, December 23, 2013
U.S. Secretary Of State Kerry In New And Unprecedented Statement: 'President Obama And I Are Both Extremely Welcoming And Grateful For The Fact That [Iranian] Supreme Leader [Khamenei] Has Issued A [Nonexistent] Fatwa' Banning Nuclear Weapons,' March 31, 2014
Tehran Again Offers Khamenei's Nonexistent Fatwa In Negotiations As A Guarantee That It Is Not Developing Nuclear Weapons –
Iranian Regime Continues Its Lies And Fabrications About Supreme Leader Khamenei's Nonexistent Fatwa Banning Nuclear Weapons, April 6, 2015
Insights Following Exposure Of Iran's Military Nuclear Program – Part I: The Leadership Of Iran's Religious Regime Lies About Essential Islamic Matters, Manipulates Religion To Justify Its Grip On Power, Regional Expansion, May 6, 2018
Iranian Foreign Minister Zarif Reiterates Iran's Lie, Promoted By Obama Administration, That Supreme Leader Khamenei Issued Fatwa Banning Nuclear Weapons; No Such Fatwa Ever Existed, May 31, 2019
Iran Uses 'Maximum Pressure' On Biden Administration – Part II: Supreme Leader Khamenei: 'If The Islamic Republic [Of Iran] Decided To Obtain Nuclear Weapons, Neither You [The Zionist Clown] Nor Those Greater Than You [The U.S.] Would Be Able To Stop It' , February 23, 2021
Shift In Iranian Regime Statements On Nuclear Weapons: Regime Spokesmen Talk Openly About Them, Aiming For Western Acquiescence To Iran As A Nuclear Threshold State, August 2, 2022
Khamenei's 'Nuclear Fatwa,' Once Again MEMRI Daily Brief
Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei: 'If It Were Not An Islamic Principle, And If We Had The Will To Build Nuclear Weapons, We Would Do So – Even The Enemies Know That They Cannot Stop Us'; MEMRI: The Fatwa Banning Nuclear Weapons That Is Attributed To Khamenei Does Not Exist, June 26, 2023.
Inquiry & Analysis Series No. 1784 - In Advance Of Revival Of U.S.-Iran Nuclear Talks, Iranian Calls For Iran To Possess Nuclear Weapons Are Again Heard, September 5, 2024.
[1] Whitehouse.gov/fact-sheets/2025/02/fact-sheet-president-donald-j-trump-restores-maximum-pressure-on-iran, February 4, 2025.
[2] ISNA (Iran), February 5, 2025.
[3] Asr-e Iran (Iran), February 9, 2025.
[4] It should be noted that in 2012 U.S. media reported that the Obama administration was using this nonexistent fatwa as justification for reviving the nuclear negotiations with Iran. For example, on May 11, 2012 in The Washington Post, David Ignatius wrote that President Obama had sent a message to Khamenei, delivered in March 2012 by then-Turkish prime minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, stating that his, Khamenei's, "fatwa banning nuclear weapons would be a good starting point for negotiations." See MEMRI Inquiry & Analysis No. 1458, Iranian Foreign Minister Zarif Reiterates Iran's Lie, Promoted By Obama Administration, That Supreme Leader Khamenei Issued Fatwa Banning Nuclear Weapons; No Such Fatwa Ever Existed, May 31, 2019.
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