Trump's immigration shift? 'They've turned out to be great,' says US President on farm workers; watch video
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Speaking at a White House event, Trump said an executive order is being considered to allow certain undocumented immigrants to stay in the country, especially those working for American farmers.
"Our farmers are being hurt badly. They have very good workers," Trump said.
"They've worked for them for 20 years. They're not citizens, but they've turned out to be great. We're going to have to do something about that," he added.
Trump indicated the possible executive action would also impact the hotel sector: "We can't take farmers and take all their people and send them back because they don't have maybe what they're supposed to have."
"We're going to have an order on that pretty soon. We can't do that to our farmers," US President said.
He did not specify what the order would contain or when it might be issued.
Farm industry leaders have long urged the administration to shield agriculture from mass deportations, warning that such policies could severely disrupt the nation's food supply chain, which relies heavily on immigrant labour.
According to the US Departments of Labour and Agriculture, nearly half of America's estimated 2 million farm workers—and many in the dairy and meatpacking industries—lack legal status.
"Our great Farmers and people in the Hotel and Leisure business have been stating that our very aggressive policy on immigration is taking very good, long time workers away from them, with those jobs being almost impossible to replace," Trump wrote on his social media platform. "Changes are coming!"
The US president's remarks come amid nationwide protests against immigration raids.
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Demonstrators have criticised the targeting of undocumented immigrants without criminal records, especially those detained at their workplaces. Protests intensified last week following enforcement actions in Los Angeles.
On Thursday, Trump acknowledged the broader economic consequences of strict immigration enforcement, including within the hotel industry—an area connected to his own business interests.
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Libyan Express
3 days ago
- Libyan Express
Trump says ‘no deal until there's a deal'
BY Libyan Express Aug 16, 2025 - 01:33 Trump says 'no deal until there's a deal' after Putin summit U.S. President Donald Trump said on Friday that his long-awaited meeting with Russian President Vladimir Putin in Alaska ended without any formal agreement, after nearly three hours of talks centered on the war in Ukraine. 'There's no deal until there's a deal,' Trump told reporters, acknowledging that no ceasefire or binding commitments were reached. The U.S. president described the discussions as 'very productive' and claimed 'some great progress' had been made, but offered no specifics. 'We didn't get there,' he added, before leaving without taking questions from the gathered press. The summit, held at Joint Base Elmendorf–Richardson in Anchorage, was part of Trump's effort to encourage direct negotiations between Moscow and Kyiv. While stressing that he was not negotiating on Ukraine's behalf, Trump said he planned to arrange direct talks between Putin and Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky. Putin expressed hope that all sides would respect what had been discussed and hinted at the possibility of meeting again, but no follow-up summit has been scheduled. For Washington's allies in Europe and the Middle East — many of whom have a direct stake in regional stability and energy markets — the meeting's failure to produce a breakthrough underscores the difficulty of reaching a negotiated end to the conflict. The views expressed in Op-Ed pieces are those of the author and do not purport to reflect the opinions or views of Libyan Express. How to submit an Op-Ed: Libyan Express accepts opinion articles on a wide range of topics. Submissions may be sent to oped@ Please include 'Op-Ed' in the subject line.
EVN Report
4 days ago
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What Does Armenia Stand to Gain? Musings on the Washington Signing
On August 8, 2025, during a meeting at the White House between Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan, U.S. President Donald Trump, and Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev, documents were signed that not only have serious significance in the context of resolving the Armenian-Azerbaijani conflict, but also aspire to fundamentally transform the security architecture formed in the South Caucasus as a result of the Armenian-Russian-Azerbaijani trilateral statement of November 9, 2020 that ended the Nagorno-Karabakh War. The trilateral and bilateral documents signed at the Washington summit became the subject of heated discussions in Armenia, ones that show no signs of abating. This article seeks to advance that conversation by drawing parallels between the political events of spring 2018, known as the 'Velvet Revolution,' and current perceptions of the Washington process. It will also examine the interdependence of the economy, military power, and negotiation dynamics to address a widely asked and legitimate question: What does Armenia stand to gain from this process? Finally, it will outline the political realities and variables of which the Washington process is either a component or a consequence. It is important to note that the primary aim of this article is not to enumerate all the advantages or disadvantages of the signed agreements for Armenia. Its focus lies elsewhere, as outlined below. The analysis draws heavily on the key ideas presented in Paul Kennedy's 'The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers', Thomas Schelling's 'Arms and Influence' and Fred Charles Iklé's 'Every War Must End.' Don't Confuse the Beginning With the End: The Imperative of Effective and Purposeful Work One of the enduring misjudgments following the 2018 Velvet Revolution, including by some members of the incoming administration, was treating those events as an endpoint rather than a beginning. The sense of victory was premature, a moment to celebrate rather than a mandate to act. In reality, 2018 marked a new beginning, an opportunity whose success could only be measured by the effectiveness of the steps and processes that followed. Yet, in hindsight, misreading the moment, misaligning priorities, neglecting the military imbalance and ineffective work in key areas led to serious failures not only in domestic and foreign policy, but also overshadowed the very political achievements of 2018. For many, the 'revolution' they once embraced became a source of caution, and some even came to question their participation. The documents signed in Washington did, indeed, formalize the status quo surrounding Artsakh, enshrining the results recorded on the battlefield. However, the Armenian-Azerbaijani dialogue is far from concluded. This is not an end, not a final reality, but the beginning of a new process, one that, whether we want it or not, is already unfolding. It is no coincidence that Nerses Kopalyan, who directly participated in the negotiations, notes that during meetings with the U.S. State Department and the National Security Council, American officials framed the Washington summit not as 'a one-off engagement, but rather a foundational framework for what the United States views as a three year process, from this normalization initiative to signing a final peace treaty.' In other words, while some objective developments do not hinge on Armenia, the final outcome of the agreements reached in Washington will depend on the government's subsequent efforts. The ruling party cannot assume that signing the accords guarantees peace or justifies a lighter pace of work. Instead, they must learn from previous mistakes, and try to protect and advance Armenian interests to the fullest within the evolving framework. Without drawing a direct parallel to the May 5, 1994 ceasefire in Bishkek that ended the First Nagorno-Karabakh War, it should be emphasized that Azerbaijan pursued a consistent strategy from that point onward. Baku strengthened its economy, enabling significant investments in its military, particularly acquiring modern weapons, and conducted effective foreign policy that complemented its internal capabilities ( internal balancing ) with strategic alliances ( external balancing ). Subsequently, in line with established political science principles, these efforts were directly reflected on the battlefield, and in subsequent negotiations. Azerbaijan continued to work with this same logic even after the trilateral statement of November 9, 2020. There may be different opinions about whether Armenia gained more than it lost in these accords, with strong arguments on both sides. What is undeniable, however, is that the agreements have given us breathing room, a chance to regain our footing. The existing playing field is complemented by a new, significantly important dimension—with its own challenges and opportunities. The side that acts with greater intelligence and effectiveness will ultimately benefit the most. In Bishkek, Azerbaijan emerged as the losing side, but through sustained effort it transformed that position into a winning one. How Armenia proceeds after Washington depends precisely on us. In his book 'Every War Must End,' prominent American military expert Fred Charles Iklé specifically emphasizes this—no document establishes a final status quo; the outcomes depend on how the parties act afterward. The Three Year Window of Opportunity Negotiation outcomes are not detached from economic, military, and diplomatic realities; they are deeply interconnected. That is, a side that is economically and militarily weaker, and with more limited diplomatic capacity, cannot enter negotiations from a position of strength and secure greater gains than its stronger counterpart. There may be exceptions when, under certain conjunctural conditions, the weaker side benefits beyond what its own resources would allow. Yet, the general pattern of history is clear: economic potential translates into military capability, military capability into influence, and that influence is then leveraged diplomatically to elicit desired behavior from the other party. Parallel to all this, however, one cannot underestimate the impact of geographical position, the development of state institutions, the effectiveness of state governance, and the presence of political will. Economic Strength, Military Power and Peace The launch of the Washington process opens new horizons for Armenia's economic development. Proposed American investments can serve as a powerful catalyst, sparking interest from other countries and attracting additional capital. It is possible that Armenia will become a participant in the creation of major corridors connecting East and West, which in turn can generate additional financial resources . The prospect of deterring the threat of war for at least three years, combined with an official U.S. presence in southern Armenia—with clear economic and business interests, offers not only an additional layer of security, but also the potential to significantly improve Armenia's strategic position. Paul Kennedy, in his seminal work ' The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers, ' emphasizes that the triumph and collapse of great powers has often been conditioned not only by the results of wars, but by the economic strength cultivated before and during conflicts. Expanding production capabilities has enabled greater investments in armed forces, while military growth, in turn, has allowed powers not only to defend their own borders, but also expand them. This pattern can be seen in the France of Napoleon Bonaparte, the subsequent century-long hegemony of the British Empire, the German Empire and Nazi Germany before the two World Wars, and later, in the global reach of the United States and the Soviet Union after 1945. In all these cases, the development of economic capabilities led to an increase in military potential, which—alongside other important factors such as effective state governance, political will, and work ethic—contributed to achieving political success. We currently see how China is rapidly transforming accumulated economic power into military power , which in turn dramatically increases its political weight. The same logic operates in the cases of Germany and Japan . Looking at the post–Bishkek ceasefire period, the contrast between Armenia and Azerbaijan is stark. Azerbaijan, by steadily building its economic potential, was able to channel greater resources into its military, an investment that proved decisive in shaping later military-political outcomes. Armenia, by contrast, faced a confluence of debilitating factors: the imposed blockade, entrenched corruption (also present in Azerbaijan), and an inefficient state apparatus. These constraints stifled economic growth and, in turn, left the country without the economic or military capacity needed to meet emerging military-political challenges. Moreover, in the case of Armenia, what is called ' retrenchement ' in international relations occurred. Starting from 1994, Armenia appeared as the main guarantor of Artsakh's security, which meant that Armenia's economic and military potential, as well as alliance capabilities, should have been sufficient to protect not only Armenia's, but also Artsakh's security. However, time showed that Armenia's capabilities, measured relative to Azerbaijan's , were insufficient not only for Artsakh's, but even for Armenia's own security. As a result, we lost not only Artsakh, but also about 200 square kilometers of internationally recognized Armenian territory. We now see the same process in Russia's case: with the ongoing conflict with Ukraine, Russia's influence is weakening or receding in other regions, particularly in Syria and the South Caucasus . Azerbaijan's 'Bargaining Power' and Washington's Soft Deterrence for Armenia Many in Armenia feel that Azerbaijan has benefited more from these agreements than Armenia. While arguments and counterarguments can be made, a key distinction remains: unlike Armenia, Azerbaijan is able to defend its borders with its own forces and, until recently, effectively used the threat of renewed war as leverage in negotiations. Moreover, Azerbaijan's security was not at risk without the Washington agreements, whereas Armenia's was. One of Armenia's main achievements from the Washington agreement has been preventing a possible Azerbaijani offensive in the near term. We often overlook that since November 9, 2020, Armenia has not been able to defend its borders solely with its own forces. After the Jermuk battles of 2022, it finally became clear that Russia would not honor its alliance obligations toward Armenia. In response, at Yerevan's request, the EU monitoring mission was deployed along the Armenian-Azerbaijani border. To be fair, since their arrival, ceasefire violations have significantly decreased , and Armenia has not lost even a single square kilometer of territory due to military actions. Prominent American economist and professor of foreign policy and national security Thomas Schelling, in his book ' Arms and Influence ,' notes that 'bargaining power' in negotiations is conditioned by the ability to cause physical pain to the adversary (power to hurt). Schelling argues that it is precisely this desire to avoid pain that weakens one's negotiation positions and compels them toward concessions. He calls this process 'the diplomacy of violence,' the purpose of which is to extract the desired result under the credible threat of using weapons and causing pain, without getting involved in real war. The Washington process allows Armenia to crack the above-described coercive framework imposed by Azerbaijan since November 9, 2020. The active involvement of the United States in the process of regulating Armenian-Azerbaijani relations, the construction of 'Trump Route for International Peace and Prosperity' in southern Armenia, as well as President Trump's personal interest give Armenia a weighty soft deterrence mechanism to deter new Azerbaijani aggression. It is no coincidence that during a press conference, Trump emphasized that the parties can call him in case of problems. These factors, in addition to the presence of the EU monitoring mission, significantly strengthen Armenia's external balancing potential. The success of the process largely depends on whether the Armenian government will be able to use this window of relative stability to strengthen Armenia's military power to such an extent that it becomes as self-sufficient as possible. The question is clear: how many days can Armenia defend its borders with its own forces, and what price must the aggressor pay? It is important to realize that every ceasefire or agreement, including a peace treaty, is more stable when the cost of war outweighs the political gains expected as a result. This is the formula that can make the expected peace more stable. And finally, following the advice of Paul Kennedy and Fred Charles Iklé, the Armenian government should make the most of the three-year window provided by the Washington process. This requires remaining vigilant and resisting the temptation to prioritize highly visible, short-term projects that appeal to daily public needs at the expense of critical defense spending. Restoring military balance must go hand in hand with investments that foster long-term economic growth and strengthen domestic manufacturing capacity. Conclusion Despite heavy losses, Armenia now has an opportunity to significantly strengthen its security system. How we do this depends on us. The government should present a roadmap outlining specific programs, action plans and timelines for implementing the commitments set out in the documents, including for example, Armenia's complete unblocking. Public uncertainty around the Washington process remains high, and it is the duty of state officials to address these doubts with transparency and facts. Opposition forces should closely follow, monitor, and constructively criticize the government's actions, demanding more effective work. It should be realized that criticism devoid of substance does not produce results, and too often creates an environment in which authorities feel less pressure to perform. Armenian civil society also has an important role to play. Not constrained by the struggle for power, civil society organizations, expert groups, and independent analysts can bring impartiality and professionalism to the debate, providing a necessary counterweight between the government's overly optimistic narratives and the opposition's overly pessimistic perspectives.
EVN Report
6 days ago
- EVN Report
Beyond the Ceremony: The Real Test for Armenia–Azerbaijan Peace
Last Friday night many in Armenia and Azerbaijan stayed up late, drawn to the flicker of a live broadcast from Washington. It was a ritual heavy with hope and hesitation: the signing of agreements meant to turn the page on three decades of conflict. For those in Yerevan or Baku, it was clear enough that these papers, signed in one of the world's most powerful offices, were not an ending. Thirty years of enmity, two wars, tens of thousands dead and entire communities driven from their homes cannot be erased with a flourish of ink. The stains run deeper than parchment. And yet, what unfolded was undeniably a moment, perhaps even a turning point. These two nations, born alongside the collapse of the Soviet Union and the conflict itself, now face a harder task than war: learning to live in peace. Their armies have mastered the arts of fortification and offense. But peace—real, lasting peace—is a discipline that may take as long to learn as this conflict once took to wage. Short-term Calm The signing marks a first step toward stability, however fragile. Along much of the Armenia–Azerbaijan border, the frontlines remain alarmingly close. Near the village of Khnatsakh, above Goris in Syunik region, opposing trenches lie so close to each other that soldiers can hear TikTok videos drifting from the other side. Skirmishes could erupt again. But for now, the aim is containment, keeping sparks from catching. Militarily, Azerbaijan continues to hold the advantage. Its forward positions inside Armenian territory could inflict serious damage if fighting resumed. In this light, Washington's agreements serve a practical function: removing a ready-made pretext for renewed escalation, at least for the moment. This conditional calm matters in Armenia, where parliamentary elections loom in less than a year. If tensions ease, the country can finally turn inward, focusing on political debate without the constant threat of a new war. That space could nurture the trust needed for long-term domestic stability. The U.S. Factor Recent media polls with people in Yerevan and Meghri speaking in support of the announced deals suggest cautious optimism. But hope will not sustain itself. Implementation requires action, starting with selecting an international company to facilitate transit between Azerbaijan and Nakhchivan through Armenian territory. During the ceremony, President Trump declared that his personal involvement and the White House venue were guarantees the agreements would hold. This should certainly be the case at least until his anticipated Nobel Peace Prize nomination later this year. Political self-interest might help in the short term. What's less certain is whether Washington will fully and properly commit to managing even this single transit arrangement. One concern is the uncertainty over who will now drive the Armenian-Azerbaijani file forward within the Trump team. While special envoy Stephen Witkoff was instrumental in bringing Azerbaijan to Washington, much of Armenia's position was safeguarded by the leadership of the State Department, which pushed for measures like initiating the peace treaty—lifting a political 'sword of Damocles' that had hung over Yerevan in talks on transportation routes. Who takes over the portfolio now will help determine whether the effort advances or stalls. Even so, Washington's involvement does not signal a return to long-term 'curation' of the South Caucasus. U.S. interest in the region peaked during George W. Bush's presidency, symbolized by his 2005 visit to Tbilisi, and has since waned. Since then, reluctance to take on new commitments or openly confront Russia has shaped policy for years. This same caution has driven U.S. mediation since Russia's invasion of Ukraine, when Moscow's distraction from the South Caucasus, the collapse of its already fragile peacekeeping role , and the halt of weapon supplies to Armenia undermined the diplomatic efforts it had once maintained, raising fears of a full-scale Azerbaijani advance into Armenia. Trump may alter the tone, but without significant investment the fundamentals will remain unchanged. Turkey's Next Move Perhaps the most significant follow-on could come from Turkey. Its normalization process with Armenia, restarted three years ago, produced agreements to open the border and begin direct trade. Until now these steps were held hostage to the Armenian-Azerbaijani track, which has just taken a fresh turn in Washington. At present all Armenia-Turkey trade travels through third countries. This summer in my native Javakheti region of Georgia, bordering both nations, the constant rumble of trucks moving goods between them was impossible to miss—day and night, seven days a week. Direct routes could shift that flow onto Armenian-Turkish roads. Technically everything is almost ready. In the past, Turkish diplomats admitted that the missing element was Azerbaijan's assent. Initiation of the peace agreement has already triggered it. Several phone calls between Ankara, Baku and Yerevan have followed the Washington event. For Armenia, opening the border would mean access to Turkish ports, expanded trade and reintegration into the region's transit transport network after more than three decades of isolation. For Turkey, the benefits are tangible: reopening its only closed border, extending influence across the South Caucasus and injecting resources into its underdeveloped eastern provinces. In the past officials in Ankara, in their attempts to make Baku move, also noted that an open border would give Turkey more leverage over Armenia, which would be keenly aware that closure could be reinstated. Europe's Role The European Union should not stand aside. Though sidelined when Armenia and Azerbaijan turned to direct talks after the 2023 collapse of Nagorno-Karabakh, Brussels remains the only Western actor with a multi-sector, structural presence in the region. EU enlargement may be stalled, but investment in infrastructure and stability continues. In the near term, European funding could prove decisive in closing the forty-kilometer gap in southern Armenia's railway—a stretch that may require tunneling and complex engineering. Such a project would give Brussels a seat at the table in implementing the agreements while anchoring stability for years to come. The EU should make a move, even if the main event took place not in Brussels but in Washington DC, which does not seem to favor relations with Europe very much nowadays.
