'Japanese First' party rocked by suspicions of Russian interference
JUNNOSUKE KOBARA
TOKYO -- Populist upstart party Sanseito, which has gained traction with a "Japanese First" message, is in hot water after reports that one of its candidates for Sunday's upper house election did an interview with Russian state-owned media.
Russian news agency Sputnik posted on its Japanese X social media account a video interview with Saya, a political newcomer running for the Tokyo upper house district. The video has spread through reposts and other digital channels.
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The Mainichi
39 minutes ago
- The Mainichi
Japan may face political turmoil if PM quits soon after election loss
TOKYO (Kyodo) -- If Prime Minister Shigeru Ishiba resigns soon, the move could herald political turmoil in Japan, as no decisive winner emerged from Sunday's House of Councillors election, in which the ruling bloc suffered a major setback. Having lost its majority in both chambers of parliament it remains unclear whether the ruling Liberal Democratic Party could even produce the next prime minister from within its own ranks, should Ishiba step down. Amid deep ideological divisions, prospects for an opposition-led government are dim, compelling the LDP's next leader to pursue new alliances. Should coalition talks falter, Japan could be thrust into a period of prolonged political turbulence, analysts warn. The ruling bloc was already a minority in the more powerful House of Representatives following last year's general election, held about a month after Ishiba won the LDP leadership race in late September. Frustration over his government's failure to take effective measures to ease the negative impact of inflation on the economy also led to the LDP losing this year's Tokyo metropolitan assembly election one month before the upper house race. A government official said, "Ishiba struck out on three pitches. He's out and it's time to switch sides." Some pundits say Ishiba's reluctance to cut the consumption tax rate to maintain the social security system -- a move believed to favor the elderly -- is viewed by the younger generation as tone-deaf to household struggles, eroding support across ideological lines. The LDP has not clarified whether it will begin discussing a consumption tax cut with opposition parties. Ikuo Gonoi, a politics professor at Takachiho University, said the public "will not be satisfied" unless the ruling party "makes concessions" on the issue. Ishiba, meanwhile, said Japan has reached a crucial trade agreement with the United States, avoiding the worst-case scenario of a 25 percent "reciprocal tariff," but the deal's conclusion may pave the way for Ishiba's exit, the pundits added. While the ruling camp's loss of its majority in both the lower and upper houses has provided a window of opportunity for opposition parties to take power, they have been ideologically fragmented, particularly on national security issues. Even if the LDP-led coalition remains the core of the government, it must seek cooperation from opposition parties to pass individual bills and budgets, at least until the next scheduled upper house election in three years. Ishiba's resignation would force the LDP to hold a leadership race -- either involving rank-and-file members or decided swiftly by lawmakers alone. A shift toward a more conservative, pro-spending figure might be the party's best bet. Sanae Takaichi, a former minister for economic security, is considered a top candidate to succeed Ishiba. She won the most rank-and-file votes in the previous LDP leadership race and would become the party's first female president if elected. Takaichi, known as an advocate of expansionary fiscal spending and hawkish national security policies, could trigger a broader political realignment as Ishiba has alienated conservative supporters from the LDP. If the LDP pivots rightward, the possibility of a grand coalition with the Constitutional Democratic Party of Japan would diminish, as the largest opposition force holds more left-leaning perspectives on security and diplomacy. But some conservative opposition groups that gained momentum in the latest election -- such as the Democratic Party for the People and the right-leaning populist Sanseito party -- could align with Takaichi's LDP, making a coalition feasible. Even so, it remains to be seen whether Takaichi can become Japan's first female prime minister. As a last resort to expand the coalition, the LDP could tap a partner party leader as premier in exchange for securing a bicameral majority. In Japan, the biggest party in parliament has occasionally handed the prime ministership to the leader of a smaller coalition partner to form a government, most notably after the LDP was briefly ousted from power in 1993. Other potential successors to Ishiba could face difficulties bringing other parties into the coalition, as many are regarded as moderates like him. He has prompted conservative opposition groups to further distance themselves from the LDP. Farm minister Shinjiro Koizumi, who has regained media attention for promoting efforts to curb surging rice prices, is perceived as a close ally of Ishiba, while Chief Cabinet Secretary Yoshimasa Hayashi shares the blame for Sunday's setback as the government's top spokesman. Former Prime Minister Fumio Kishida, Ishiba's predecessor, appears eager to make a comeback, but he has not escaped criticism for losing the conservative support base that Shinzo Abe, Japan's longest-serving premier who was assassinated in 2022, had built. Only Koizumi seems well-positioned to forge a coalition government with the conservative Japan Innovation Party, as he has a "strong affinity" with its leader, Osaka Gov. Hirofumi Yoshimura, the group's founder Toru Hashimoto said on a TV program. If the next LDP president fails to join hands with groups other than its long-standing partner Komeito party, the opposition bloc could submit a no-confidence motion against the Cabinet. Given the seat distribution in the lower house, the motion is set to pass. The new leader would then most likely dissolve the lower house and call a snap election, said Masamichi Adachi, chief economist for Japan at UBS Securities, adding, "In any case, political uncertainty is expected to continue for some time."
The Mainichi
39 minutes ago
- The Mainichi
US-Japan: Reimagining an alliance for a fractured world
The following is a contribution to the Mainichi Shimbun from Michael Schiffer, who served as assistant administrator of the Bureau for Asia at the United States Agency for International Development (USAID), which was dismantled by the Donald Trump administration. In his contribution, Schiffer discusses the future of the Japan-U.S. alliance. -- In the first six months of the second Trump administration, the U.S.-Japan alliance has been rocked by renewed uncertainty. Although the July 22 tariff agreement has relieved some of the immediate pressure, the negotiations were contentious and drawn-out, with the White House's threats to impose fresh tariffs on Japanese automobiles and agriculture, coupled with demands that Tokyo increase its host-nation support for U.S. forces and step up its security commitments in the region -- demands that may have contributed to the "postponement" of a planned 2+2 meeting earlier this month -- reviving painful memories of the trade wars and alliance strains of the 1980s. Trump's public questioning of whether the United States will live up to its alliance commitments, alongside his erratic posture on Ukraine and unilateral cuts to foreign assistance programs -- including those supporting Indo-Pacific infrastructure and governance -- have further shaken confidence in the reliability of American leadership. At a time when the foundational pillars of the post-war world are cracking under the combined weight of technological upheaval, environmental crisis, demographic transformation, and a new era of great-power rivalry, these moves have undermined the sense of strategic stability that has long defined an alliance that has served as the cornerstone for peace, security and prosperity for Tokyo and Washington alike. In the face of these structural changes, alliance managers must move beyond the conceptual mainstream, and seek to imagine a new world rather than continue to act as custodians of a fading order, attempting to solve 21st-century problems with 20th-century blueprints and defending the sanctity of an alliance built for a world that no longer exists. And yet, Japan remains one of America's most capable, trusted, and forward-looking allies. With its advanced economy, technological prowess, and increasingly assertive defense policy, Japan is uniquely positioned to work with the United States on the basis of shared interests and shared values to navigate the strategic challenges of a more contested Indo-Pacific -- and the generational challenge of a more assertive and aggressive China, with its own vision for what the regional and global order should look like. Neither the U.S. or Japan are likely to be successful in this undertaking alone, and even less so if Washington and Tokyo are working at cross-purposes. Doing so will also require more than a reaffirmation of old commitments. The rapidly changing global geostrategic and geoeconomic landscapes demand a fundamental reimagining of the alliance -- across economic, technological, diplomatic, and military domains. The rise of a more assertive China -- militarizing the South and East China Seas, threatening Taiwan, weaponizing economic coercion, and seeking to shape global norms to its advantage -- has made clear that alliances anchored in Cold War-era assumptions about roles, missions and capabilities are no longer sufficient. Tokyo recognizes this: Japan has undertaken a historic defense build-up, doubled its defense budget, and committed to acquiring counterstrike capabilities, signaling a Japan that is ready to be not just a junior partner, but a co-equal shaper of regional stability. The United States must meet this moment with strategic imagination, not just a narrowly construed "America First" transnationalism. That means moving beyond instrumental debates over cost-sharing to deepen integration across defense planning, technological innovation, and economic resilience. The U.S.-Japan alliance faces a precarious security landscape, one demanding immediate and decisive action. From China's assertive military expansion and "gray zone" tactics in the East and South China Seas, particularly around the Senkaku Islands and Taiwan, to North Korea's relentless pursuit of nuclear and ballistic missile capabilities, the Indo-Pacific is increasingly volatile, all part and parcel of an international system that is rapidly evolving from X to Y. Given the scope and scale of these challenges, we cannot afford complacency. It is imperative that Washington and Tokyo accelerate our joint development of next-generation defense technologies -- AI-enabled command systems, autonomous platforms, cyber defense -- and fast-tracking the co-development and deployment of advanced technologies, strengthening integrated air and missile defense systems, and ensuring seamless interoperability of our forces across all domains. This will help the alliance to deter aggression and operate effectively in an era defined by multi-domain conflict. The time to act is now, not only to safeguard our shared security interests but to uphold regional stability and to set the rules for the evolving international order against growing authoritarian challenges. Economically, the alliance must focus on shaping the rules of the road for the 21st century. With the Trans-Pacific Partnership long abandoned, the U.S. and Japan should spearhead digital trade agreements, investment screening regimes, and supply chain partnerships that insulate both economies from coercive pressures. Initiatives like the U.S.-Japan Economic Policy Consultative Committee (EPCC) should be scaled up into a formal economic dialogue akin to the 2+2 defense framework, driving coordination on geoeconomic strategy. While headlines may be dominated by tariffs and calls for economic rebalancing, it's crucial to recognize these discussions as echoes of a bygone era. While there are valid arguments for rebalancing, obsessing over trade deficits and protectionist measures risks diverting our focus from the true challenges and opportunities of the 21st century. The global economic landscape has fundamentally shifted, and our attention must pivot from the battles of the past to the imperative of co-leading the future. This means looking beyond traditional trade in goods to foster deeper collaboration and shared investments in areas like the governance of emerging technologies, resilient supply chains, and the green economy, ensuring our alliance is not just economically balanced but future-proofed. Finally, Japan and the United States should jointly invest in regional capacity-building -- from infrastructure finance to maritime domain awareness to climate resilience. This means reconsidering cuts to foreign assistance and treating development as a strategic instrument. Japan's extensive development networks and America's innovation ecosystem can be combined to offer a robust alternative to China's Belt and Road. To meet the test of this moment, the U.S.-Japan alliance must become more than a security arrangement. It must be a platform for shared strategy, innovation, and governance in the Indo-Pacific. The future of the U.S.-Japan alliance hinges on our willingness to confront the present with clear eyes and bold action. This isn't a moment for nostalgia; it's a demand for strategic reimagining. We must move beyond outdated notions of stability and influence to rebuild an alliance fit for a fragmented and fast-moving world. This means prioritizing investment beyond military modernization to include the governance of emerging technologies. It requires us to fully integrate climate adaptation and economic competitiveness as core pillars of national security. And critically, it compels us to evolve the institutions and coalitions -- both formal and informal -- that are essential for managing geopolitical volatility and for competing effectively with the PRC. The past six months have been challenging for Tokyo and Washington. But we have an opportunity to seize the moment to forge an alliance that is not just resilient, but truly transformative for the 21st century. Profile: Michael Schiffer has served as U.S. Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for East Asia, senior advisor and counselor on the Democratic Staff of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, and assistant administrator of the USAID Bureau for Asia. His areas of expertise include U.S. foreign and defense policy, and security in the Indo-Pacific region.
Nikkei Asia
39 minutes ago
- Nikkei Asia
Critics question Russia's ability to build Kazakh nuclear power plant
Energy Worries swirl over Rosatom selection, as China's CNNC recruited for 2nd project Kazakhstan estimates it will face a shortage of 6 gigawatts of energy by 2030. © Reuters PAUL BARTLETT and NAUBET BISENOV ALMATY, Kazakhstan -- Kazakhstan's recent selection of Rosatom as consortium leader to build the country's first nuclear plant is raising worries about the ability of the Russian state-owned nuclear power agency to finance and complete the project. Kazakhstan's atomic energy agency said last month that Rosatom had a "slight advantage" over state-owned China National Nuclear Corp. (CNNC) and so was chosen to lead an unspecified group to build a two-reactor plant in Ulken, a village about 400 kilometers northwest of the commercial hub of Almaty.
