1989-batch IPS officer, Pakistan expert Parag Jain R&AW chief, succeeds Ravi Sinha
Jain will replace Ravi Sinha, a 1988-batch IPS officer of Chhattisgarh cadre, as he will complete his tenure as the chief of the R&AW on June 30 and Jain will take over from him on July 1.
In an order the Department of Personnel & Training (DoPT said, 'The Appointments Committee of Cabinet has approved the appointment of Shri Parag jain (PB:89) to the post of Secretary, Research & Analysis Wing (R$AW) under the Cabinet Secretariat for a tenure of two years from the date of assumption of the charge of the post or until further orders,whichever is earlier, in terms of provisions of FR 56 (d) and Rule 16 (1A) of All India India Service (Death-cum-Retirement Benefits) Rule, 1958.'
Jain is currently heading the Aviation Research Centre, which played a critical role during Operation Sindoor, by collecting intelligence about Pakistani armed forces and the exact locations of the terror camps situated in the neighbouring country.
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