The iconic mobiles that didn't survive to 2025 amid fears another major brand will shut down after 33 years
But before them many big brands came and went in a flash.
6
6
Now there are fears another could become a thing of the past.
Sony bosses insisted last week that they're not giving up on their Xperia brand despite all phones being out of stock for weeks.
Instead, Lin Tao, Sony's chief financial officer, suggested that the division could go in another direction, saying "communication technology is used in areas other than smartphones".
Little did many consumers know, Sony has still been releasing smartphones - and they've even won awards too.
Samsung is currently the most popular phone around, with a 20.1 per cent market share according to IDC.
They're followed very closely by Apple at 19.5 per cent.
Others include Xiaomi, OPPO and Vivo which no one had even heard of in Sony Mobile's heyday.
So which forgotten phones didn't survive to 2025? Take a look back below.
LG
LG was once the world's third biggest mobile maker, peaking in 2013.
But those numbers dwindled as Samsung and Apple grew, not to mention a load of cheaper new players.
In April 2021, the firm announced that it would stop making phones altogether, before closing practically everything mobile in July the same year.
Only recently was the final software update issued to its more recent phones.
Android users warned as major brand shuts down phone business
Windows Phone
6
In a world suddenly led by iOS or Android, Microsoft tried to offer something a bit different in the form of Windows Phone.
Despite a simple square design similar to the Windows PC operating system at the time, Windows Phone struggled to make inroads.
In 2017, the firm gave up on new Windows Phone hardware, though they continued to support software for a little longer.
BlackBerry
6
At its height BlackBerry sold 50 million smartphones in a year.
A physical keyboard and BBM before WhatsApp was the in thing which helped propel its success.
But in came touch screens and everything changed leaving BlackBerry behind.
The company gave up on mobiles in 2016, though the name briefly returned via a licencing deal with Chinese firm TCL until 2020.
Sony Ericsson
6
Sony Ericsson is another iconic name you no longer see - though it didn't go because of ailing success.
In 2012, Sony bought Ericsson's half of the company to go it alone.
And so, Sony Mobile was the new name with its Xperia line.
However, Sony's market share has gradually decreased, falling as low as one per cent in some countries.
The firm recently told The Sun: "Withdrawal from the mobile business is not being considered at this time."
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