Hong Kong democracy activist Hui granted asylum in Australia
The former lawmaker said in a post on Facebook that he'd received written notice from the Department of Home Affairs granting protection visas to him, his wife, children and parents.
"This decision reflects values of freedom, justice, and compassion that my family will never take for granted,' he said.
The Australian Home Affairs department said by email it doesn't comment on individual cases due to privacy. The Hong Kong government issued a statement over the weekend, saying it disapproves of "the harboring of criminals in any form by any country.'
"The HKSAR Government will do everything possible and use all legal means to pursue and combat criminals who endanger national security,' the statement, which didn't name Hui or identify other fugitives, read.
U.K.-based Hong Kong activist Tony Chung was earlier this month granted asylum in Britain, according to a Threads post on Sunday.
In December, the Hong Kong government canceled the passports of seven overseas-based activists, including Hui, under the homegrown security law enacted last year.
A continuing crackdown on perceived threats and the introduction of the China-imposed security legislation have led to the imprisonment of dozens of former activists in the city after massive pro-democracy protests roiled the former British colony in 2019.
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The Diplomat
9 hours ago
- The Diplomat
The Indo-Pacific Is Like the Cold War, But Not in the Way Most Think
It has become increasingly common to refer to the changing geopolitics of the so-called Indo-Pacific as representing something of a return to Cold War-style superpower rivalry and confrontation. The logic underpinning this increasingly popular analogy is that the globe – with the Indo-Pacific as a kind of ground zero – is experiencing bipolarization between a U.S.-led vision of international order and a rival China-led vision. Key geopolitical flashpoints have emerged in Ukraine, Taiwan, and the South China Sea that evoke Cold War memories of Korea, Berlin, and Eastern Europe. Certainly, the clear breakdown of the China-U.S. relationship over the last decade has precipitated a marked shift in rhetoric and there is an undoubted feeling of anxiety in the Indo-Pacific and, increasingly, growing paranoia between China and the United States. But, there are significant differences between the current state of affairs and the original Cold War that make the analogy, at face value at least, clumsy and analytically bereft. Crucially, the clear bipolarity that defined the Cold War is not present in the current system. Even though the erosion of U.S. unipolarity is important and changing international politics, the current system remains heavily interdependent, rendering it more interpolar than anything else. Additionally, today there is not the same level of ideological messianism that enveloped the Cold War; if anything, there appears to be ideological ambivalence or even nihilism. Yet, the Cold War is useful to help unlock a different perspective on the Indo-Pacific, as we argued in our recent article in The Pacific Review. In this article, we push back on the dominant notion that the Indo-Pacific is a geopolitical region and rather identify it as an active attempt of macrosecuritization by a group of like-minded actors, chiefly the United States, Japan, Australia and, more recently, the European Union (and key member states like France) and the United Kingdom. Macrosecuritization, a concept that was developed by Barry Buzan and Ole Waever, is a process whereby a state or collection of states (as the chief securitizing actors) identifies an 'existential threat' to something deemed precious and worth protecting (a referent object), which demands an immediate and, if necessary, extraordinary collective response to protect it. The discourse underpinning the growth of the idea of the Indo-Pacific geopolitical region – especially since the United States formally adopted the Indo-Pacific concept at the center of its strategic thinking and, in the process, identified China as a clear 'strategic competitor' – can be interpreted as a macrosecuritization effort. The referent object is the rules-based international order (or, in the specific Indo-Pacific context, the 'Free and Open Indo-Pacific') and the existential threat is the rise of China. The Cold War is an interesting case because, for Buzan and Waever, it can also be conceptualized as an example of macrosecuritization by a group of like-minded actors. In this case, the existential threat was the Soviet Union, with its nuclear weapons and Marxist-Leninist internationalism, and the referent object was Western notions of liberty, democracy, and human rights. The extraordinary policies this justified were many, ranging from bloc formation and a macro-strategy of containment, the creation of NATO (and SEATO), and interventions in Korea, Vietnam, Congo, and Chile (the list goes on and on). Thus, the Cold War framing was an example of highly successful macrosecuritization – partly aided by the Soviet Union's willingness to engage in competition, rivalry, and confrontation – as it dominated global and regional geopolitics (and popular culture) for the best part of four decades. The Indo-Pacific, so far, is nowhere near as successful a macrosecuritization effort. Certainly, the growth of the Indo-Pacific in the security discourse of states is plain to see, as it has become the dominant frame used to discuss the geopolitics of broader Asia, the Indian Ocean, and the Pacific Ocean. This has precipitated a proliferation of Indo-Pacific strategies, ranging from within the Indo-Pacific (such as the United States, Australia, Canada, India and Japan, among others) to others that are farther away (such as the United Kingdom, the European Union, France, Germany, the Netherlands, Mongolia, and Lithuania, among others). Furthermore, China – to a greater extent than the Soviet Union during the Cold War – has sought to desecuritize the Indo-Pacific by pointing out the underlying 'Cold War mentality' of the concept. Instead, Beijing emphasizes the previously popular Asia-Pacific concept, which was not based on underlying macrosecuritization dynamics but rather rested on an optimistic vision of China's rise. China has also attempted to shift focus from the geopolitical ramifications of its rise to the opportunities it presents, such as greater economic interaction, development and infrastructure partnerships, and a larger role for the Global South. The Indo-Pacific macrosecuritization has also come unstuck by Trump 2.0. The Biden presidency – which espoused an 'America must lead again' foreign policy platform – saw an escalation in macrosecuritization efforts. This led to the revitalization of the Quad, the creation of AUKUS, the launch of the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework, and the creation of the Indo-Pacific 4 grouping at NATO Summits. However, under the leadership of Trump, the Indo-Pacific has taken a notable backseat due to more pressing geopolitical issues in Ukraine and the Middle East, but also the U.S. president's whimsical and idiosyncratic obsession with punitive tariffs and the search for 'deals.' The lack of Indo-Pacific thinking was most glaringly illustrated during Trump's Oval Office meeting with British Prime Minister Keir Starmer, in which he responded to a question about AUKUS by asking, 'What does that mean?' Ironically, for all the global unease and frustration Trump 2.0 has produced to date, when it comes to the Indo-Pacific, it has had something of a desecuritizing effect. States that adopted the Indo-Pacific concept did so on the confidence that they were aligning with a powerful and trustworthy ally in the United States to balance the perceived threat of China. However, the way Trump has treated the United States' closest allies and friends has left many states reconsidering their strategic positions. For example, India's Prime Minister Narendra Modi recently stated that he is seeking to return the Sino-India relationship to its previous standing before the 2020 border clashes in Galwan Valley. Japan and South Korea have also started engaging with China in order to reduce geopolitical tensions. It is also clear that Trump does not view China as an existential threat but, rather, as a state he might be able to make a deal with – despite China being one of the clear targets of his tariff strategy so far. In a visit to Beijing in March, Senator Steve Daines stated that his trip was 'the first step to an important next step, which will be a meeting between President Xi and President Trump.' Furthermore, whispers from the White House suggest that Trump is keen to strike an agreement – primarily to do with trade but also attaching issues of nuclear weapons and regional security – with China similar to the 2020 one he orchestrated. Seemingly, Trump's goal is not to contain China, but rather to bring it to the negotiating table. Even if a grand deal between the United States and China does not materialize, it appears that the underpinning of the macrosecuritization dynamics that drove the geopolitical instability of the Indo-Pacific in recent years has receded since Trump returned to power. Thus, unlike the Cold War, which was a clear-cut case of successful macrosecuritization, the idea that the Indo-Pacific 'region' is headed for decades of geopolitical strife should not be viewed as a fait accompli but rather as something more fluid and contestable.
The Diplomat
9 hours ago
- The Diplomat
‘Stable Instability': China-Japan Dilemmas in the Shadow of Sino-American Rivalry
Three enduring dilemmas define the complex relationship between Asia's two largest economies as they mark the 80th anniversary of World War II's end. Japanese Prime Minister Ishiba Shigeru (left) meets with Chinese President Xi Jinping on the sidelines of the APEC Summit in Lima, Peru, Nov. 15, 2024. As Asia-Pacific nations grapple with an increasingly complex security environment, Japan and China find themselves locked in what can be described as 'stable instability' – a relationship characterized by sustained economic engagement alongside persistent political mistrust and security tensions. This paradoxical state has become the defining feature of bilateral relations between Asia's two largest economies, particularly as they commemorate the 80th anniversary of the conclusion of World War II in 2025. Despite strong economic ties, with bilateral trade reaching $292.6 billion in 2024, China-Japan relations remain strained by geopolitical disputes, wartime history, and territorial issues. This economic interdependence coexists uneasily with deep-seated public mistrust and strategic competition, creating a relationship that defies simple categorization as either cooperative or adversarial. Understanding this complex dynamic requires examining three structural dilemmas that have come to define contemporary China-Japan relations. These enduring challenges reveal why the relationship has settled into its current state of stable instability and what this means for regional security and prosperity. Interdependence vs Security: The First Dilemma The first dilemma centers on the tension between economic interdependence and security vulnerabilities. Japan and China have developed one of the world's most extensive economic relationships, with deeply integrated supply chains spanning automotive parts, semiconductor materials, and consumer electronics. China remains Japan's largest trading partner, a position that has persisted despite periodic political tensions and calls for economic decoupling. However, this economic intimacy has increasingly become a source of strategic anxiety rather than just mutual benefit. The concept of 'weaponized interdependence,' as described by Henry Farrell and Abraham Newman in their seminal work on how global economic networks shape state coercion, perfectly captures this dilemma. Dependencies on critical materials, advanced technologies, and production networks that once represented pure economic efficiency now carry potential security risks and political leverage. Japan's concerns have been amplified by China's use of economic tools for political purposes, such as restrictions on Japanese seafood imports following the Fukushima wastewater release. China announced in June this year that it would resume imports of some Japanese seafood products that had been suspended due to the discharge of treated water from Tokyo Electric Power Company's Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant, but seafood from 10 prefectures, including Fukushima, remains subject to import bans. Such incidents underscore how economic relationships can quickly become instruments of political pressure. This dynamic has led Japan to pursue what it terms 'economic security' – a policy framework formally integrated into its 2022 National Security Strategy. The strategy defines Japan's economic security as ensuring 'Japan's national interests, such as peace, security, and economic prosperity, by carrying out economic measures,' reflecting a recognition that economic and security considerations can no longer be separated. The challenge lies in maintaining the benefits of economic cooperation while mitigating the vulnerabilities that come with interdependence. Neither complete decoupling nor naive trust represents a viable path forward, forcing both nations to navigate an uncomfortable middle ground where economic collaboration must coexist with strategic hedging. Alliance Strengthening vs Regional Leadership: The Second Dilemma Japan's second structural dilemma involves balancing its deepening alliance with the United States against its aspirations to play a constructive role in regional stability. This tension has been thrown into sharp relief by Japan's dramatic defense transformation, outlined in this same 2022 National Security Strategy and accompanying documents. The National Security Strategy pledges to increase defense spending from roughly 1 percent of GDP to 2 percent by fiscal year 2027 and calls for Japan's armed forces to acquire counterstrike missile capabilities. These changes represent the most significant shift in Japan's defense posture since World War II, effectively moving beyond the constraints of purely defensive capabilities. From China's perspective, these developments appear to confirm fears of Japan's participation in the U.S.-led containment strategy. The East China Sea remains a flashpoint due to territorial disputes over the Senkaku Islands, known as the Diaoyu in China, with China's growing military presence raising concerns in Tokyo. Recent incidents, including a Chinese JH-7 fighter-bomber flying within 30 meters of a Japanese intelligence aircraft in July 2025, illustrate how quickly tensions can escalate. Yet Japan simultaneously seeks to position itself as a responsible stakeholder in the regional order. Through initiatives like the China-Japan-South Korea Trilateral Cooperation Secretariat (TCS) and its engagement with ASEAN, Japan attempts to demonstrate that its enhanced defense capabilities serve regional stability rather than destabilization. Recent diplomatic initiatives, including the meeting between Foreign Minister Iwaya Takeshi and Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi during ASEAN-related foreign ministers' meetings in Malaysia on July 10, suggest both sides recognize the need for dialogue even amid strategic competition. This balancing act reflects Japan's broader strategic challenge: how to fulfill alliance commitments while maintaining the flexibility to engage constructively with all regional stakeholders. The Trump administration's unpredictable approach to China adds another layer of complexity, as Japan seeks to influence how China-U.S. competition develops while emphasizing to Washington that Japan cannot completely sever ties with its largest neighbor and trading partner. Mutual Understanding vs Emotional Reactions: The Third Dilemma The third dilemma involves the growing disconnect between the imperative for mutual understanding and the emotional polarization amplified by digital media. Social media algorithms and online echo chambers have created information environments that often prioritize sensationalism over nuance, making thoughtful dialogue more difficult even as its importance grows. Public opinion data reveals the depth of this challenge. Japanese surveys consistently show that those who feel 'no affinity' toward China significantly outnumber those who think positively about the relationship. Today, 84.7 percent of Japanese respondents express that they 'do not feel close' to China – a dramatic reversal from the early post-normalization period, when favorable sentiment reached nearly 80 percent. This shift reflects not just policy disagreements but the accumulation of negative impressions reinforced by digital media consumption patterns. The problem extends beyond public opinion to the operational level of crisis management. While a China-Japan defense hotline was established in 2023, its effectiveness remains untested in severe crises. The rapid pace of military encounters in the East China Sea, where split-second decisions can escalate tensions, demands robust communication mechanisms backed by mutual trust, precisely what remains in short supply. Paradoxically, people-to-people exchanges have shown resilience. Tourism and educational exchanges have rebounded from pandemic lows, with China easing its stance on various issues, including the resumption of imports of Nishikigoi tropical fish and the reinstatement of visa-free entry. However, these positive developments at the societal level have not translated into improved political relations or reduced strategic mistrust. The challenge is compounded by the reality that both governments face domestic political pressures that reward tough rhetoric toward the other country. With Japan's House of Councillors election having taken place in July 2025, Prime Minister Ishiba Shigeru continues to face constraints, given that the majority of the Japanese population is critical of China. Similar dynamics operate in China, where nationalist sentiment limits leaders' flexibility in making concessions. Embracing 'Stable Instability': The Art of Perpetual Management These three dilemmas illustrate why China-Japan relations have settled into their current pattern of stable instability. Rather than representing a temporary phase that will eventually resolve into clear cooperation or confrontation, this may be the enduring character of the relationship – one that requires constant management rather than definitive resolution. As reflected in their November 2024 meeting, Ishiba and Chinese President Xi Jinping confirmed that Japan and China continue to share a broad direction of comprehensively promoting a 'Mutually Beneficial Relationship Based on Common Strategic Interests' and building 'constructive and stable Japan-China relations.' The 80th anniversary of World War II's end provides a symbolic opportunity for both nations to demonstrate mature leadership, but the structural factors driving stable instability remain powerful. Success will likely depend on both countries' ability to compartmentalize different aspects of their relationship. Economic cooperation, climate change mitigation, pandemic preparedness, and cultural exchange can proceed even when security competition continues. Recent examples include the renewal of the bilateral currency swap deal worth 200 billion yuan (about $28.13 billion) and a Japanese business delegation visiting China for the first time since 2019. The path forward requires acknowledging that China-Japan relations exist in a multipolar context where neither country can afford to view the other purely through the lens of bilateral dynamics. Regional institutions, global challenges, and third-party relationships all shape the bilateral relationship in ways that create both constraints and opportunities. Rather than seeking to resolve the fundamental tensions that define the relationship, both countries might be better served by establishing mechanisms to manage these tensions constructively. This means strengthening crisis communication channels, maintaining economic dialogue even during periods of political dispute, and creating space for civil society exchanges that can withstand periodic government tensions. The concept of stable instability, uncomfortable as it may be, offers a more realistic framework for understanding China-Japan relations than expectations of either strategic partnership or inevitable conflict. In an era of growing global complexity, managing such relationships may be among the most essential diplomatic skills both nations can develop. As Japan and China navigate the remainder of 2025, their ability to demonstrate that major powers can maintain stable relationships despite fundamental differences will have implications far beyond Northeast Asia. In a world increasingly characterized by multiple centers of power and persistent areas of competition, the China-Japan model of stable instability may prove more relevant than traditional notions of either alliance or rivalry.
Japan Times
15 hours ago
- Japan Times
Trade partners grow restless waiting for Trump's tariff breaks
U.K. Prime Minister Keir Starmer declared at a Jaguar Land Rover factory in May that his world-leading trade deal with U.S. President Donald Trump included a cut in U.S. tariffs on British steel to zero. More than three months later, steel lobbyist Peter Brennan is still waiting for that relief to become reality. Brennan, director of trade and economic policy at industry body U.K. Steel, said most members had seen U.S. orders fall because of the uncertainty over America's 25% import tax. One producer that makes particularly price-competitive products said they'd be out of business by year-end if tariffs aren't reduced to zero, he added. "Concern is growing that finalizing the deal on steel has fallen down the priority list both for the U.K. and U.S. governments,' Brennan said last week. "The will to close the deal may well be faltering on both sides.' Frustration and economic losses like those in the U.K. are growing in Japan, the European Union and South Korea. Those three made similar announcements over the past month: that Washington granted them leniency on auto exports in the haggling over the level of Trump's across-the-board tariffs that took effect Aug. 7. But for the trio of car export powerhouses, which unlike the U.K. face a 50% duty on their steel and aluminum, the wait for Trump's concession continues while an American levy justified on national security grounds on imported Toyotas, BMWs, Hyundais and others remains at a crippling 25%. "We're continuing to see damage — the bleeding hasn't stopped,' Japan's chief trade negotiator, Ryosei Akazawa, said Friday in a reference to the country's car industry. "We want the U.S. to sign the executive order as soon as possible.' Spokesmen for the White House, the U.S. Trade Representative's office and the Commerce Department didn't reply to requests for comment. 'Forever negotiations' It was three weeks ago that EU Commission President Ursula von der Leyen shook hands with Trump in Scotland over what she called an "all-inclusive' tariff of 15% that officials in Brussels later understood to be a ceiling that would also apply to cars. VDA, which represents Germany's car industry, is pressing for fast implementation to alleviate a "considerable burden' on manufacturers and their suppliers. "The deal between the EU and the U.S. has not yet brought any clarity or improvement for the German automotive industry,' VDA President Hildegard Müller said in a statement on Thursday. "The costs incurred run into the billions and continue to rise.' Volkswagen body shells on the production line at a factory in Dresden, Germany | BLOOMBERG Cecilia Malmstrom, the former European commissioner for trade who's now a nonresident fellow at the Peterson Institute for International Economics, cautioned that any delays may be purely administrative. But "if nothing happens, there will be huge pressure on the European Commission to retaliate or to act in some way, especially from carmakers in Germany, Italy, France, Sweden and others,' she said. "There are so many other things that are vague in the EU-U.S. deal — and in the others as well — so it is likely we will see forever negotiations and a lot of filibustering.' At a press briefing on Aug. 14, European Commission spokesperson Olof Gill said Washington and Brussels are finalizing a joint statement. "The U.S. has made political commitments to us in this respect and we look forward to them being implemented,' he said. Japan's uncertainty Less than a week before the EU's announcement, the U.S. and Japan clinched a surprise deal on July 22 that lowered across-the-board tariffs and car levies to 15%. So far the broader duties have been implemented but the added tax on autos remains at 25%. Officials in Asia's No. 2 economy are waiting for an executive order from Trump to bring down the car levies, as well as an official directive — like the EU already received — to clarify that the universal tariffs don't stack on top of existing duties. Akazawa has mentioned how a Japanese carmaker is losing ¥100 million ($680,000) every hour due to the tariffs. Last month, Nissan Motor said it foresaw a ¥300 billion hit from the lower tariff rate, down from a previous estimate of ¥450 billion. But Chief Executive Officer Ivan Espinosa has warned of the difficulties in giving an accurate forecast as long as it's unclear when the tariffs will take effect and in what way. Akazawa flew to the U.S. earlier this month to confirm that the U.S. will be adjusting its executive order soon to remove the stacking, and pay back overcharges on tariffs. Neither has yet to materialize. Hyundai, Kia Facing similar questions is South Korea, which announced a trade agreement with Washington on July 31. That pact would impose a 15% tariff on imports to the U.S., including autos, alongside a $350 billion Korean investment pledge focused on shipbuilding, and $100 billion in energy purchases. Vehicles bound for export at a port in Incheon, South Korea | BLOOMBERG The 15% universal tariff took effect earlier this month under Trump's order, but like Japan, the sectoral auto tariffs remain at 25%. While South Korea's exports overall have stayed resilient in the first half of the year, thanks to front-loading by companies anticipating higher U.S. tariffs, the value of car shipments to the U.S. fell nearly 17%, and steel exports dropped more than 11%, trade data showed. South Korea's top automaker — Hyundai Motor and affiliate Kia — could face as much as $5 billion in additional costs this year even under the new 15% auto tariff. While avoiding a 25% levy will save more than $3 billion, the duty squeezes margins amid softer demand and tighter subsidies, intensifying competition with Japanese automakers, Chen said. South Korean President Lee Jae Myung's planned summit with Trump on Aug. 25 — their first meeting since Lee took office in June — will test the durability of the $350 billion investment pledge, as well as their alliance over sensitive issues such as defense spending, U.S. troop levels and North Korea policy. 'Just overwhelmed' For Starmer and the U.K., most aspects of the pact have now come into force, including a 10% so-called reciprocal rate that's the lowest among all U.S. trading partners. Yet Trump's 25% tax on British steel still chafes amid the delays in cutting it. Among the issues to resolve is the U.S.'s insistence that steel should be melted and poured in the U.K. in order to qualify. That's a requirement that Tata Steel U.K., one of the country's biggest producers, is no longer able to fulfill after closing down its blast furnace last year. Its new electric arc furnace is not due to be ready until late 2027. People familiar with the government's thinking are cautiously optimistic they might be able to secure exemptions to the melt-and-pour rule, whereby steel imported from certain European countries before being further processed in the U.K. is allowed to qualify as British. "It's not for lack of trying by the U.K. government,' said Tim Rutter, director of public affairs at Tata Steel. "We hear that U.S. departments are just overwhelmed.' A spokesperson for the U.K. Department for Business and Trade said officials will continue to work with Washington to implement the deal as soon as possible. Late on Friday in Washington, the U.S. Customs and Border Protection agency issued new inclusions to steel and aluminum product lists for tariffs that take effect Monday, with some of the guidance affecting imports from the U.K. Japan's Akazawa acknowledged that even with the U.K., actual implementation of key parts of their deal took 54 days. As a result, he's said that it's "not bad' if an executive order from the U.S. comes by around mid-September. "It's just further confirmation that negotiations never really end,' especially with more U.S. tariffs coming for sectors including pharmaceuticals and semiconductors, said Sam Lowe, a partner at Flint Global in London and head of its trade and market access practice.
